
THE INDIAN EMPIRE
HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA,
AFGHANISTAN
BALUCHISTAN
RAJPUTANA
ARABIAN SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
Mouths of the Ganges
BOMBAY
MADRAS
Masulipatam
Laccadive Islands
Maldive Islands
Andaman Is.
Mergui Archipelago
Gulf of Martaban
Long E of 84 Greenwich

A HISTORY of BRITISH INDIA. By Sir William Wilson Hunter, K.C.S.I., M.A., LL.D., a Vice-President of the Royal Asiatic Society

VOLUME I.

TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE ENGLISH IN THE SPICE ARCHIPELAGO

NEW IMPRESSION

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INTRODUCTION

In this book I endeavour to complete a task which has occupied a large part of my life. Thirty-four years ago my attention was drawn to the historical materials in the record rooms of Bengal, and the inquiries then commenced have been continued from the archives of England, Portugal and Holland. I found that what had passed for Indian history dealt but little with the staple work done by the founders of British rule in the East, or with its effects on the native races. The vision of our Indian Empire as a marvel of destiny, scarcely wrought by human hands, faded away. Nor did the vacuum theory, of the inrush of the British power into an Asiatic void, correspond more closely with the facts.

Yet if we bring down England's work in India from the regions of wonder and hypothesis to the realm of reality, and if the Jonah's gourd growth of a night must give place for a time to the story of the Industrious Apprentice, enough of greatness remains. The popular presentment of the East India Company as a sovereign ruler, with vast

provinces and tributary kingdoms under its command, obscures the most characteristic achievement of our nation in Asia. That achievement was no sudden triumph, but an indomitable endurance during a century and a half of frustration and defeat. As the English were to wield a power in the East greater than that of any other European people, so was their training for the task to be harder and more prolonged.

We have been too much accustomed to regard our Indian Empire as an isolated fact in the world's history. This view does injustice to the Continental nations, and in some degree explains the slight esteem in which they hold our narratives of Anglo-Asiatic rule. In one sense, indeed, England is the residuary legatee of an inheritance painfully amassed by Europe in Asia during the past four centuries. In that long labour, now one Christian nation, then another, came to the front. But their progress as a whole was continuous. It formed the sequel to the immemorial conflict between the East and the West, which dyed red the waves of Salamis and brought Zenobia a captive to Rome. During each successive period, the struggle reflected the spirit of the times: military and territorial in the ancient world; military and religious in the middle ages; military and mercantile in the new Europe which then awoke; developing into the military, commercial, and political combinations of the complex modern world.

This preliminary volume attempts a survey, rapid, yet so far as may be from primary sources, of the early phases of that conflict. After a glance at its commercial meaning to the peoples of antiquity, the scene opens with the Ottoman Power in possession of the Indo-European trade routes. The first Act discloses the capture of the ocean highways of Asia by Portugal; an exploit which then seemed a maritime extension of the Crusades, and which turned the flank of Islam in its sixteenth-century grapple with Christendom. The swift audacity of the little hero-nation forms an epic, compared with which our own early labours in India are plain prose.

The second Act sets forth the contest of the Protestant sea-powers of Northern Europe with the Catholic sea-powers of the South, for the position which Christendom had thus won in the East. Portugal, forced under the bigot rule of Philip II., was dragged into his wars with England and the Netherlands, and her fleets, which had grown up on the Asiatic trade, went to swell the wreck of the Armada. The task appointed to Elizabethan England stands out as a struggle not of Protestantism against Catholicism alone, but against Catholicism equipped by the wealth of both the West and the East Indies. Before Portugal could break loose from her sixty years' captivity to Spain her supremacy in the East had passed to the English and the Dutch.

Again the victors fought over the spoils. Those spoils lay chiefly not on the Indian coast, but in the Eastern Archipelago. India was then a half-way house for the richer traffic of the Spice Islands. The third Act unfolds the strife between the two Protestant sea-powers for this prize. The Netherlands had long contained the marts by which the produce of the East, transhipped at Lisbon to Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam, was distributed to Northern and Central Europe. The capture of the Indian trade seemed to Holland a continuation of her just revolt against Portugal and Spain, a heritage from her hard subjection, and the seal of the independence which she had so dearly won. To England it was but the mercantile development, on an extended scale, of the sea enterprise of the Elizabethan adventurers.

Holland brought to the struggle a slowly acquired knowledge of the Eastern trade, a vast patriotic subscription from the United Provinces, and a resolve alike of her people and her Government that the Spice Islands should pass to no hands but their own. England cared to risk only a small capital, split up into separate voyages and joint-stocks : for State support she had but the quicksand diplomacy of the first James and Charles. The United Dutch Company was practically a national enterprise ; the London Company was a private undertaking ; and the fortitude of individual Englishmen in Asia availed little against the com-

bined strength of Holland. The forces were too unequally matched; and the present volume ends with the catastrophe which compelled the English to realise that, if they were to establish themselves in the East, it must be somewhere else than in the Spice Archipelago.

It may seem, perhaps, that I have allotted too much space to this threefold struggle—of Christendom against Islam, of the Protestant North against the Catholic South, and of the two Protestant sea-powers of the Atlantic—for the Asiatic trade. But a different law of proportion applies to Indian history, as I have conceived it, from that which sufficed for a melodrama of British triumphs. We must give up the idea of the rapid greatness of England in the East. In these chapters will be found, in part, the explanation of our unique position in India at the present day. Europe, just emerged from mediævalism, was then making her first experiments in Asiatic rule. Mediæval conceptions of conquest imposed themselves on her exploitation of the Eastern world; mediæval types of commerce were perpetuated in the Indian trade. Portugal, Spain and Holland established their power in Asia when these conceptions and types held sway. The English ascendency in India came later, and embodied the European ideals of the eighteenth century in place of the European ideals of the sixteenth. It was the product of modern as against semi-mediæval Christendom.

Yet even England found it difficult to shake off the traditions of the period with which this volume deals: the traditions of monopoly in the Indian trade, and of Indian government for the personal profit of the rulers.

Characteristic features of our present Indian polity date from that early time. We shall see, for example, that the scheme of a European dominion in the East, built on native alliances and upheld by drilled native soldiers, was no invention of Dupleix improved upon by Clive. It developed with a slow continuous growth from the first Portuguese garrison in Malabar; through the Dutch system of subjugation by treaty; to the Feudatory States, the Sepoy army, and the Imperial Service Troops of British India. Much that we have accomplished our predecessors attempted, not in vain.

Nor were their forms of home-control less fruitful of analogy than their experiments in Indian administration. The conquest and commerce of India were in Portugal royal prerogatives, almost a private estate of the Portuguese kings. The Dutch first tried separate voyages, then a United Company which became more and more national in character till it ended in a State Department. The English commerce with the East also started on the basis of royal prerogative—the prerogative of granting monopolies in trade. Under the later Stuarts the East India Company formed a battle-

ground between the ancient privileges of the Crown and the growing strength of the nation; with the Revolution, the right of granting its charters passed finally to Parliament. Nor have the varied forms of organisation which the Dutch devised for their Indian trade lacked counterparts in England; from the London Company's initial system of separate voyages, and its regulated or joint-stock associations of the seventeenth century, to the United East India Company and Board of Control in the eighteenth, and a Secretary of State for India under the Queen-Empress in the present day.

But if resemblances between our work in India and that of our predecessors are apparent, these chapters disclose differences more profound. The achievement of Portugal was the command of the ocean-routes, secured by settlements at strategic points along the shore. The Dutch dominion lay chiefly in the Eastern Archipelago. England's conquest was India itself. The native powers whom the early Portuguese encountered were petty coast rajas; the native powers whom the Dutch subdued were island chiefs. The English in India, schooled for a hundred years under the rod of the mighty Moguls, brought a deeper experience and wider conceptions to a harder task. Their empire was to be not a few shore settlements like those of Portugal, nor an island dominion like that of the Dutch, but the Indian Continent. The question of territorial extension as against trade profits and

sea-control arose with the first Portuguese viceroy in the East. It divided parties alike in the Dutch and in the English Companies; as, in its modern form of the Forward Policy, it still divides British opinion.

One fact stands clearly out. No European nation has won the supremacy of the East which did not make it a national concern; and no nation has maintained its power in the East which was not ready to defend it with its utmost resources. The prize fell successively to States, small in area, but of a great heart—a heart beating with the throbs of independence newly won. We shall see that Vasco da Gama's voyage was but the last advance in an eighty years' march of discovery, commenced by the King who had secured the national existence of Portugal, and resolutely carried out by the successors of his house. The Dutch supremacy in the East formed the widest expression of their hard-earned freedom at home. It was the spirit which had hurled back Castile on the field of Aljubarrota, that opened the Cape route to Portugal; and it was the spirit which had cut the dykes that gained the Spice Archipelago for Holland.

Here and throughout the following volumes the question of questions is not the size of a European nation, but what sacrifices it is willing to make for its position in the East. The united Spain and Portugal which lost the supremacy of the Asiatic routes formed a State on a much larger scale than

the little Portugal that had won it. But to united Spain and Portugal, with vast armies to pay, the silver-yielding West Indies seemed a more profitable possession than the silver-absorbing East, and the resources which might have held the Asiatic seas were spent on the Catholic camps of Europe. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the strength of England was not less than that of Holland. But the English nation was as yet prepared to risk little for the Indian trade ; the English sovereigns would risk nothing ; the Dutch people and the Dutch Government were ready to risk much. In the middle of the eighteenth century the power of England was not greater than that of France, and France had servants in the East neither less brave, nor less skilful and fortunate, than our own. But the English in India had then their nation at their back ; the French had not ; and again the supremacy in the East passed to the people who were willing to endure most for it.

The *crux* in Asia has always been not the validity of rival titles, but which nation could enforce its claim. Nor has any Western nation preserved its ascendency in the East after it has lost its position in Europe.

The English connection with India has grown with the growth of England, till it now forms flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone. The Papal partition of the new Southern world between Spain and Portugal in 1493 forced England to try for a

passage by the north; and her persistent quest for India and Cathay through the Arctic Circle in the sixteenth century became the starting point of British exploration. At each stage our Eastern enterprise has taken the popular temper of the times. Garbed in religious phrases when England was Puritan, exuberantly loyal under the Restoration, a great constitutional question at the Revolution, cynical with the cynicism of the eighteenth century, yet quick to feel the philanthropic impulses of its close—those impulses which brought East Indian pro-consuls before the bar of an awakened public opinion, which were to give freedom to West Indian slaves, and to create a fresh field of national activity in Christian missions. A close monopoly as long as England believed in exclusive commerce, India now exhibits the extreme application of the English doctrine of Free-trade, and it forms the corner-stone of the new imperialism of Greater Britain.

These volumes will recount magnificent deeds done by Englishmen in Asia. Yet history cannot rank the generalship of Clive above that of Albuquerque, or the constructive genius of Warren Hastings above that of Jan Pieterszoon Coen. It is enough for a great man to be the express image of the greatness of his country in his time. The national spirit has been the dominant factor alike in our fortunes and in those of our rivals in the East. As the Cape route was discovered for Por-

tugal before Da Gama hoisted sail in the Tagus, and as the Spice Archipelago would have passed to the Dutch without any tragedy of Amboyna, so Bengal must have become a British province although on some other field than Plassey, and the Mutiny would assuredly have been put down, even had no Lawrence stood in the gap in that great and terrible day of the Lord.

I thankfully recognise the opportunities which I have enjoyed for the preparation of this book. While still young in the Bengal service, I was appointed to plan and direct a Statistical Survey of all India, its peoples, history, and products. The work involved annual tours which enabled me to see every province with my own eyes, and to study at first hand the local conditions and races from beyond the Khaibar Pass to Comorin. The results are condensed for popular use in the fourteen volumes of the Imperial Gazetteer of India. But as the survey went on, it was not found possible, within the prescribed limits, to combine the economic and political data required for an exact account of the British Indian Empire at the present, with an adequate treatment of its past. The historical sections were therefore reduced to summaries, while effort was concentrated on completeness from the administrative and industrial points of view. The promotions incident to an Indian career brought other duties, and it was only on retiring from the public service that I

became free to resume historical work. Hardly was it recommenced, when the main part of my materials and manuscripts, collected during twenty-three years, went down in the ill-fated 'Nepal' on their way home.

The ten years required to repair the loss have not been without compensations. The Oxford University Press utilised the interval by issuing the Rulers of India Series—a sort of biographical conspectus of the periods whose history I am now to write. The editing of that series, and the renewed intercourse which it brought with old friends who had themselves governed the territories of which they then consented to treat, formed a fruitful experience. But I did not find it possible to gather again, in their entirety, the collections of a lifetime. That I am so soon enabled to write afresh from the original sources is due in part to the co-operation of His Highness the Thakur Saheb of Gondal and of the lamented Maharaja of Darbhanga. I was also compelled to realise that much which I had hoped to do for myself in the Indian archives of England and the continent must now be done with the aid of others. I gratefully acknowledge my obligations to Mr. P. E. Roberts, Miss Constance Blandy, Sir George Birdwood, the Visconde de Castilho of Lisbon, Mr. Frederick Danvers, Mr. William Foster, Miss Ethel Sainsbury, and Dr. W. R. Bisschop (University of Leyden), but above all to the brave counsels and ever-helpful hand of my dear wife.

I have deemed it prudent, however, to reduce the plan of the work. Its original design was a complete history of India from the early Aryan period onwards. I shall now be thankful if I am permitted to present a narrative of events since the country came into contact with the nations of modern Europe. In such a narrative the internal history of India, and its wondrous diversity of races, religions and types of intellectual effort, will form not the least instructive chapters. But the chief purpose of the book is to trace the steps by which the ascendency of England was won in the East; the changes which it has wrought; and the measures by which it is maintained.

If I have relied much on the official records, I do not ignore the dangers of their too exclusive use. Contemporary documents tend to foreshorten the perspective of history.[1] They give a false simplicity

[1] *Official Records* in India include, moreover, not only contemporary documents, but also works compiled under the orders of the Government. Such works sometimes lead one into error. Thus my statement at p. 97, made on the authority of the official account of Malabar, which cites the Peutingerian Tables for two Roman cohorts stationed at Mouziris, does not find support from the edition of the *Tabula Itineraria Peutingeriana* by Konrad Müller (1888), or in the earlier Leipsic facsimile of 1824, or in Ernest Desjardins' fine work *La Table de Peutinger*, Paris 1869. Nor can I discover evidence in any previous edition. As respects dates, also, the contemporary materials often stand in need of verification. Thus the Dutch and English narratives of the tragedy of Amboyna, from the official depositions, contain discrepancies not to be explained by the difference between the old and the new style calendars then respectively used by the two nations. The footnote at p. 303 gives a striking, but by no means isolated,

of direct cause and effect to transactions which were in reality the results of converging sequences of causes. In untwisting one strand from the cable that binds age to age, we are apt to overestimate the part which the isolated fibre played in the making of the rope. There is the peril, too, of accepting as witnesses men who were parties to a cause After all, the traditional view embodies the average opinion of the time. I have been careful, therefore, to compare the official documents with the contemporary literature; and when possible, the archives of the Dutch and Portuguese with our own Calendars of State Papers, and with the records in India and the India Office. The reader will at any rate be enabled to judge of the evidence for himself by abundant footnotes. These notes

example of how a wrong date was copied from a nearly contemporaneous account of a naval victory of the first importance to our fortunes in India, and has been passed on from one standard history to another down to our own day. In regard to names of persons and places, uniformity of spelling is not to be expected in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. But even the titles of well-known Englishmen, as given in collections from the manuscript records, are sometimes misleading. Thus we find Sir John Mildenhall, or Midnall, and Sir Nicholas Withington for plain Mr. John Mildenhall and Mr. Nicholas Withington. The explanation, as Mr. William Foster of the India Office Record Department has pointed out to me, is that the factors in India often addressed each other as Signor: a practice derived from the Levant merchants who, as we shall see, were the chief founders of the East India Company. Signor, contracted into Si^r in the official correspondence, becomes Sir in printed extracts and histories. This little slip is worth noticing, as the frequent prefix of Sir to names of the early servants of the East India Company conveys an erroneous impression as to their social status and official rank.

will also, I hope, serve him as a convenient form of bibliography and indicate the materials which still await a controlling brain and hand.


I write these lines in the capital of the Caucasus, an old-world meeting place of the East and the West. Now, as in the time of Strabo, the commerce of the Caspian ascends by the valleys of the Kura river, and descends by the gorges of the Phasis to the Black Sea. But the poled boat and the camel have given place to the iron-line ; and the modern ship has deserted the dwindled streams and their silted estuaries for deeper harbours on either coast. Tiflis, the mediæval mart of this ancient route, now stands as a type of the new railway-power by which Russia in the twentieth century will weld together North Europe and Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific, as England won the richest realms of Southern Asia in the eighteenth century by sea-control.

Not only a new force but also a new nation has entered on the scene. The Colonial Empire of Spain has crumbled to pieces at a touch from the youngest of the great Christian peoples. America starts on her career of Asiatic rule with an amplitude of resources, and with a sense of moral responsibility which no previous State of Christendom brought to the work. Each Western nation, as we shall find, has stamped on its Eastern history the European ethics of the age when its supremacy

was won. In the splendid and difficult task which lies before our American kinsmen, they will be trammelled by no Portuguese Inquisition of the sixteenth century, nor by the slave colonisation of Holland in the seventeenth, nor by that cynical rule for the gain of the rulers which for a time darkened the British acquisition of India in the eighteenth. The United States, in the government of their dependencies, will represent the political conscience of the nineteenth century. I hail their advent in the East as a new power for good, not alone for the island races who come under their care, but also in that great settlement of European spheres of influence in Asia which, if we could see aright, forms a world-problem of our day.

W. W. H.

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CHAPTER I

THE CLOSING OF THE OLD TRADE PATHS
TO 1516 A.D.

On the establishment of the Ottoman Empire the mediæval commerce between Europe and India was for a time blocked. That commerce started from the marts of Eastern Asia and reached the Mediterranean by three main routes. The northern tracks, by way of the Oxus and Caspian, converged on the Black Sea. The middle route lay through Syria to the Levant. The southern brought the products of India by sea to Egypt, whence they passed to Europe from the mouths of the Nile.

The struggle for these trade-routes forms a key to the policy and wars of many nations. When the Turks threw themselves across the ancient paths in the fifteenth century A.D., a great necessity arose in Christendom for searching out new lines of approach to India. From that quest the history of modern commerce dates. The prize for which the European Powers contended during the next three hundred years was a magnificent one. It had been grasped at by the monarchies of antiquity, and by the republics of the Middle Ages. As they in turn

secured it they had risen to their highest point of prosperity; as they in turn lost it their prosperity declined. The command of the Asiatic trade-routes was sometimes, indeed, the expression rather than the cause of the aggrandisement of a nation. But to the Princes who fitted forth Columbus to seek for India in the West, and sent out Vasco da Gama to find it in the East, one thing seemed clear. The possession of the Asiatic trade had in memorable examples marked high-water in the history of empire; its loss had marked the ebb of the tide.

The most ancient of the three routes was the middle one through Syria. Ships from India crept along the Asiatic shore to the Persian Gulf, and sold their costly freights in the marts of Chaldæa[1] or the lower Euphrates. The main caravan passed thence northwards through Mesopotamia, edged round the wastes of Arabia Petræa, and struck west through the lesser desert to the oasis where, amid the Solitudo Palmyrena, the city of Tadmor eventually arose. Plunging again into the sands the train of camels emerged at Damascus. There the Syrian trade-route parted into two main lines. The northern branched west to the ancient Tyre and Sidon and the mediæval Acre and Ascalon. The other diverged southwards by Rabbah,[2] and

[1] 'Whose cry is in the ships.' Isaiah xliii. 14. Mr. J. Kennedy, in a monograph which forms a model of destructive criticism, finds no positive evidence of an Indian *sea-trade* with Western Asia before 700 B.C. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*: April, 1898, pp. 241-288. Previous authority is on the side of an earlier period.

[2] The Rabbah or Rabbath—Ammon of the Old Testament, Rabbatamana of Polybius (v. 71)·

skirting the eastern frontier of Palestine passed through the land of Edom towards Egypt and the shores of the Red Sea. Its halting places can still be traced. Thousands of Musalmans travel yearly down the Darb-el-Hajj, or pilgrim way, by almost, although not exactly, the same route as that followed by the Indo-Syrian trade thirty centuries ago—no made road, but a track beaten hollow at places by the camels' tread.[1]

The dawn of history discloses the Syrian trade-routes in the hands of Semitic races. The Chaldæan or Babylonian merchants who bought up the Indian cargoes on the Persian Gulf, the half-nomad tribes who led the caravan from oasis to oasis around the margin of the central desert to Tyre or to the Nile, the Phœnician mariners who distributed the precious freights to the Mediterranean cities, were all of the Semitic type of mankind. The civilization of ancient Egypt created the first great demand for the embalming spices, dyes, and fine products of the East. But as early as the fall of Troy (1184? B.C.), if we may still connect a date with the Æolic saga, Phœnician seamen had conveyed them northwards to Asia Minor and the Ægean Sea. Homer does not mention the name of India, but he was acquainted with the art-wares of Sidon, a Mediterranean outport of the eastern

still locally known as Amman. The Darb-el-Hajj, or modern pilgrim path, leaves it on the west, but draws supplies from it.

[1] *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, by Charles M. Doughty, Cambridge University Press, 1888, vol. i. p. 8. See the $\frac{3}{8}$-inch map of the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund 1890.

trade. It was, however, in Egypt that the products of the Syrian caravan-routes, and the possibly still earlier merchandise of Somali-land and the African littoral, found their chief market.

An emporium, perhaps originally a convict settlement from the Nile, sprang up at Rhinoculora,[1] where the coast line of Palestine adjoins Egypt. It probably received the traffic seawards from Tyre and by more than one land route[2] through Palestine, and passed on the re-united volume of the eastern trade to the neighbouring Nile valley. The Phœnician mariners of the Levant carried their alphabet, apparently derived from Egypt, to Greece and the countries around the Mediterranean Sea; the Sabæans of the Persian Gulf gave a cognate form of the same alphabet to India and the nations bordering on the Indian Ocean.[3]

As the Phœnicians held the northern out-ports of the Syrian trade route towards Europe, so the Edomites commanded its southern outlet towards Egypt. The Hebrews, also a Semitic race, occupied the country between the two, and the earliest traditions, not less than the verified history of Israel, are intimately connected with Eastern

[1] The modern El-Arîsh, on the 'Brook of Egypt.'

[2] The south-western ones by Tiberias, Acre, Ramla and Ascalon were of permanent importance.

[3] Professor Hofrath G. Bühler has summed up the evidence on the origin of the Brahma alphabet in the *Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*, vol. 132, 1895. The Journal of the Roy. As. Soc. for 1897 (pp. 60-61) indicates traces of the Phœnician alphabet as far east as Sumatra and Japan, and (April 1898, p. 274) ascribes the Indian alphabet to trade with Babylon in the 7th cent. B.C.

commerce. The geography of Genesis is the geography of the Syrian trade route; one of its most picturesque episodes, the sale of Joseph by his brethren, is an incident of the caravan journey.[1] Abraham starts from the Chaldæan or Euphrates end of the route near the Persian Gulf, and in four generations his descendants are settled at its south-western terminus on the Nile. The intermediate regions thus traversed formed the heritage promised to his seed, 'from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates.'[2] This covenant is renewed in more precise terms in Deuteronomy, and grants to the Israelites the whole countries of the caravan route from the Euphrates on the east to the Mediterranean on the west, with Lebanon in Phœnicia as their northern, and the desert as their southern, boundary. The emporiums on the main branches of the Syrian route find mention in the Pentateuch, from Tyre, Sidon and Damascus, down through Rabbah, Bozrah[3] and Edom towards the Egyptian and Red Sea end.

The political achievement of the Hebrew monarchy was to convert this promise, for a time, into a fact. The seventy-three[4] years assigned to the 11th cent. B.C.

[1] 'And they lifted up their eyes and looked, and behold, a company of Ishmeelites came from Gilead with their camels bearing spicery, and balm, and myrrh, going to carry it down to Egypt' (Genesis xxxvii. 25).

[2] Genesis xv. 18. Deuteronomy xi. 24.

[3] Bozrah of the Edomites (El Buseireh); to be distinguished from Bostra of the Moabites at the meeting of the four Roman roads in the Bashan country.

[4] David, although anointed king in 1064 B.C., did not consolidate his ascendency over the Twelve Tribes until 1049 B.C. His reign

11th cent. B.C. reigns of David and Solomon saw both the process of conquest and its full commercial development. When David made Jerusalem his capital (*circ.* 1049 B.C.), he found himself able from that stronghold to seize the positions which commanded the caravan route. On the north he occupied Damascus,[1] the outlet of the desert track, and the key to the two branches of the Syrian trade westwards to Tyre and southwards to Egypt and the Red Sea. The King of Tyre sought friendly relations with him.[2] David garrisoned Damascus together with the surrounding country, through which the spice caravans passed west to the Levant, and captured the great halting-place of Rabbah, about half-way down the eastern frontier route. His general, according to correct oasis strategy, had first secured the water-supply [3] on which the town depended. David also completed the conquests begun by Saul among the Moabites and Edomites, who held the southern sections of the caravan-track towards Egypt and the Red Sea. Before the close of his reign he made himself master of the entire trade-route from Damascus to Edom, controlled the country at both ends, seized the chief halting-place in the middle, and 'cut off every male in Edom' towards the Red Sea and Egyptian outlets.[4]

It was reserved for Solomon during his long rule

lasted thirty-three years to 1016 B.C. I reproduce the generally accepted Biblical dates.

[1] 2nd Samuel viii. 6.

[2] 2nd Samuel v. 11.

[3] Having 'taken the city of waters,' *i.e.* the lower town containing the pools of the Wadi Ammon (2nd Samuel xii. 27).

[4] 1st Kings xi. 16.

of forty years, 1016–976 B.C., to put his father's conquests to their mercantile uses. He strengthened his hold on the northern outlets of the trade by advancing into the desert and occupying the oasis of Palmyra. There he built or enlarged Tadmor in the wilderness, and thus gained command of the caravan track at a central point between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean. Tyre depended for her prosperity on obtaining a regular share of the eastern trade by way of Palmyra and Damascus. The friendly intercourse of her king with David was therefore consolidated into a regular commercial treaty with Solomon; the Phœnician monarch supplying gold and the timber of the Lebanon hills in return for certain towns near the Tyrian frontier, and for stated quantities of the agricultural produce of the Jordan valley.[1] According to the Hebrew record, Solomon's sovereignty or overlordship extended to the Euphrates itself.[2] Generally accepted maps show only the narrow strip between the Lebanon ranges and the Mediterranean as belonging to Tyre, while the Jewish hinterland stretches in a solid block north-east to Mesopotamia. The promise to Abraham thus found its geographical fulfilment.

10th cent. B.C.

Having secured the northern outlet of the caravan trade towards Phœnicia, Solomon sought fresh developments for the Eastern trade at the

[1] 1st Kings ix. 10–14; v. 10, 11.

[2] 1st Kings iv. 24. The Tiphsah here mentioned is the Thapsakos of classical geography in lat. 35° 15′ on the right bank of the Euphrates, memorable as the crossing place for an army (Xenophon, *Anabasis* i. 4), and probably for trade-transit.

10th cent. B.C. southern extremity of the route. The Red Sea ends in two prongs, the Gulf of Suez on the Egyptian side, and the Gulf of Akaba[1] on the Arabian, with the desert peninsula of Sinai jutting out between. David's conquest of Edom not only secured the land-track into Egypt, but brought him to the Gulf of Akaba. Solomon occupied two harbours[2] on its shores and launched vessels on its waters. Hiram, King of Tyre, supplied the materials and artisans for the construction of the ships, together with Phœnician sailors to navigate them, and built a fleet of his own on the same gulf. The two merchant navies sailed and traded in company, and poured the wealth of Ophir and the East into the new southern sea-board of Palestine.[3]

This complete capture of the Syrian route forms the mercantile epic of Israel. The record of the rare and costly products with which it adorned Jerusalem, and of the transit duties which it yielded to the king, reads like a psalm rather than a trade catalogue. To some of those products, although bought up in the intermediate marts of the Euphrates valley, an Indian origin is plausibly

[1] The Ælaniticus Sinus, with Aelana at its head.

[2] Ezion-Geber and Eloth (the mediæval Ailah).

[3] 1st Kings ix. 27, 28; x. 11, 22; 2nd Chronicles viii. 18. The Ophir of the Old Testament, or Sopheira of Josephus (Flavii Josephi *Opera*, ed. B. Niese, vol. ii. p. 212, lib. viii. vi. 4; Berolini, 1885), has been variously identified—with Sopara, the ancient seaport of the Bombay coast; with the Sanskrit Abhira or delta of the Indus; with sites in Arabia; with the prehistoric gold-workings in Mashonaland; with Afar, or the Dankali country between Abyssinia and Somaliland. Cf. *Die Afar Sprache* by Prof. Reinisch.

ascribed—the ivory of which Solomon 'made a great throne,' his 'precious stones,' and 'three hundred shields of beaten gold,' the 'traffic of the spice-merchants,' the 'apes and peacocks' of his pleasure gardens, and, probably, the sandal-wood pillars 'for the House of the Lord.'[1] From the Egyptian side[2] the Hebrew King received linen yarn, horses, and a royal bride. The Song of Solomon, supposed by some commentators to celebrate his nuptials with Pharaoh's daughter, breathes the poetry of the caravan route, with its advancing clouds of dust, and its guards posted at night, every man 'with his sword upon his thigh.' 10th cent. B.C.

Who is this that cometh out of the wilderness,
Like pillars of smoke?
Perfumed with myrrh and frankincense
With all powders of the merchant.[3]

The recollections of the Ægypto-Syrian trade, its spices, pigments, and precious stones, survived in

[1] 1st Kings x. 11–29. Sir George Birdwood has examined with ingenious erudition the whole list, and has identified to the limits of conjecture the minerals, vegetables, animals, and manufactured products with their original Indian names. For example, the Hebrew *kophim*, apes, are the Sanskrit *kapi*; and the Hebrew *tukkiyim*, peacocks, is the Semitic plural of the Tamil *togei* (cf. *toka*, Tamil for *tail*, *i.e.* the tailed bird). *The First Letter Book of the East India Company*, 1600–1619, edited by Birdwood and Foster (1893), pp. xxx.–xxxiv. Lieutenant-Colonel Conder, in a correspondence with which he has favoured me, prefers an Egyptian derivation for the *kophim* and *tukkiyim* of the Old Testament. The evidence is critically re-examined by Mr. J. Kennedy in the Journal of the Royal As. Soc. (April 1898). See also G. Bühler's *Indian Studies*, No. III. pp. 81–82, &c.

[2] 1st Kings x. 28, 29, xi. 1.

[3] *Song of Solomon* iii. 6.

the Hebrew memory long after the possession of the route had passed from the nation. 'Who is this that cometh from Edom with dyed garments from Bozrah?' wrote Isaiah in a dark period of his race. If the theocratic thesis of Jewish history sometimes obscures its political aspects, the national hatred against the cities which regained the eastern trade after Jerusalem lost it, stands clearly out. Tyre is to be engulfed, 'a place for the spreading of nets in the midst of the sea.'[1] 'The riches of Damascus' 'shall be taken away;' 'it shall be a ruinous heap.'[2] Rabbah, the ancient halting-place half way down the southern caravan route, shall be 'a stable for camels,' 'a desolate heap, and her daughters shall be burned with fire.'[3] 'Bozrah shall become a desolation,' a fire shall devour her palaces, and the heart of her mighty men shall be 'as the heart of a woman in her pangs.'[4] The old rival Edom, towards the Egyptian terminus, forms the subject of a whole literature of denunciation.

Solomon's command of the Indo-Syrian route proved as evanescent as it had been brilliant.
10th cent. B.C. After his death (976 B.C.) his monarchy broke up. But the Twelve Tribes, even if they had held

[1] Ezekiel xxvi. 5. See Birdwood's *Report of H.M.'s Commissioners for the Paris Exhibition of* 1878. The riches of Tyre in the sixth century B.C. (400 years after Jerusalem lost her command of the Eastern trade) are described in Ezekiel xxvii. Dean Vincent's *Commerce of the Ancients*, vol. ii. pp. 619–655 (1807).

[2] Isaiah viii. 4; xvii. 1.

[3] Ezekiel xxv. 5; Jeremiah xlix. 2.

[4] Jeremiah xlix. 13, 22; Amos i. 12.

together, were a nation on too small a scale to maintain their independence against the mighty Powers which, during the next nine centuries, made Syria and Asia Minor their battlefield. Egypt from the South; Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia from the East; Macedonia from the North; Rome from the West, each sought to secure the countries that formed the outlets of the caravan routes. Whichever in turn was successful, the intermediate nationalities were crushed: the Jews among them. The reign of Solomon formed the climax alike of the territorial and of the mercantile ascendency of his race. I have dwelt on it for a moment as it enables us to realise what the command of the Syrian caravan-route meant to an ancient people.

It was a prosperity dangerous to the possessor. The coveted Syrian seaboard formed an Asiatic Palatinate for ever shaking under the tramp of armies. In the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., Babylon was the entrepôt of the eastern routes: 'The greatest commercial mart in the world.'[1] The Persian chastisements for her rebellions led to the transfer of her trade to Gerrha on the Arabian coast, and afterwards to Seleucia. In the time of Strabo, Babylon had dwindled to a village and an ancient name.[2] By the conquest of Phœnicia and the Ionian colonies, Persia became a Mediterranean power, threatened the sea-commerce of Athens, and brought on the struggle between Greece and Asia fought out at Marathon, Salamis, 5th cent. B.C.

[1] J. Kennedy, Journal of the R. A. S., p. 270; April 1898.

[2] Mr. Kennedy cites the authorities in detail. *Idem*, p. 271.

and Platæa. It was a Phœnician settlement, Carthage, that led to the great conflict between the rising maritime power of Italy and North Africa, represented by the Punic wars. The seizure of the countries along the Asiatic trade routes by Pompey supplied the luxuries and splendours of Imperial Rome.

1st cent. B.C.

to 6th cent. A.D.

How complete was the Roman command of the regions through which that route passed is attested by ruins surviving to this day.[1] Palmyra in the desert, respected by the earlier Roman emperors as an independent city, reached the height of prosperity under her prince Odenathus, who received from Gallienus the title of Augustus, and was acknowledged as a colleague in the Empire. Bostra in the Bashan country, four days' journey south of Damascus, became under Trajan the beautified capital of the Roman province of Arabia, and the headquarters of the Third Legion. As a trade emporium before its capture by the Arabs it had won the title of 'the market place of Syria, Irak, and Hejaz.' The spacious Roman amphitheatre at Rabbah, midway down the south-eastern trade route, may still be traced. Photographs shown to me by a recent traveller along the track disclose at many places the enduring work of Rome, from the straight road whose solid pavement slabs emerge above the sand, to fluted

[1] For the Jewish trade with the East during the Imperial period, see an interesting article on 'The Jews under Rome,' by Lieutenant-Colonel Conder, R.E. *Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund*, pp. 47–79; January 1894.

columns, sculptured temples, and public buildings half-buried beneath it.[1]

The Saracen Arabs who, under the conquering impulse of Islam, next seized the countries of the Indo-Syrian route (632–651 A.D.), soon realised its value. They were a trading not less than a fighting race, and Bussorah and Baghdad under the caliphs became the opulent headquarters of the Indian trade.[2] An Arabic manuscript in the British Museum narrates an embassy of a Byzantine emperor in the tenth century A.D. to Baghdad, which recalls the visit of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon in the tenth century before Christ.[3] The same splendid profusion was displayed by the Caliph as by Solomon to his guest; the products and art-work of India were alike conspicuous at the Arab and the Hebrew capital. The Caliph's curtains were of brocade with elephants and lions embroidered in gold. Four elephants caparisoned in peacock-silk stood at the palace gate, 'and on the back of each were eight men of Sind.'[4] If Baghdad was, from the commercial point of view,

7th cent. A.D.

917 A.D.

[1] Cf. Professor W. M. Ramsay's *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, particularly vol. i. chap. vi., Clarendon Press, 1895; and his *Historical Geography of Asia Minor* (Royal Geographical Society's Supplementary Papers, vol. iv. 1890). Also Dr. G. A. Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (1897), and Lieutenant-Colonel Conder's *Palestine* (1889).

[2] The Saracens conquered Egypt, Syria and Persia, 632–651 A.D. The Caliph Omar founded Bussorah 636–638 A.D.; Al Mansur founded Baghdad 762 A.D.

[3] *A Greek embassy to Baghdad in* 917 A.D. from the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus to the Caliph Muktadir. Translated from the Arabic MS. of Al-Khatîb by Guy Le Strange in the *Royal Asiatic Society's Journal* for January 1897.

[4] *Idem*, p. 41.

the more spacious Jerusalem of the Caliphate, Bussorah was its Alexandria on the Persian Gulf, which received from the East, and passed on to the West, 'the wealth of Ormuz and of Ind.'

11th cent A.D.

The Crusades blocked for a time the Syrian route. But the Crusades, although impelled forward by the religious fervour of northern Europe, were speedily organised for trade purposes by the Mediterranean Republics. The fleets of Venice, Genoa and Pisa victualled the armies of the Cross, accompanied their progress along the Syrian coast, and divided their spoils. Under the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem (1099–1291)[1] the Syrian caravan route revived. It exchanged the products of the tropical East and of the North for the hard cash of the Crusaders, and a regular fur market existed in Jerusalem for the sale of ermine, marten, beaver and other Siberian or Russian skins.[2] In 1204 the capture of Constantinople by the Crusaders, with the Earl of Flanders raised to the Imperial dignity, promised to mediæval Italy a restoration of the affluence which had flowed from the East to ancient Rome.

to 13th cent.

But new forces were upheaving in further Asia, destined to overthrow Saracen culture and Christian trade with a common ruin. About 1038 A.D.

[1] The initial and terminal dates taken by Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Conder in his *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, published by the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 1897.

[2] *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, p. 332. Free intercourse existed between the Christians and the Moslems early in the twelfth century, as is shown by the autobiography of the Arab Chief Osama (cf. *Vie d'Ousama*, ed. H. Derenbourg, 3 vols. Paris, 1886–1893.)

the Seljuk Turks had burst upon Persia. Two centuries later the gathered strength of the Mongols poured over Asia under Chengis Khan (1206), ravaged through Poland under his son, and under his grandson wrested back Russia to barbarism. In 1258 Baghdad went down before the Mongol hordes, and the Saracenic caliphate was shattered. The tidal wave of devastation spread over the countries of the Syrian caravan track, at times leaping forward in irresistible masses, then pausing to gather volume for the next onrush. In 1403 Timur drove the Knights Hospitallers forth from Smyrna to their island stronghold at Rhodes.[1] By that time the Mongols and Turks had partially blocked the middle trade route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, and were preparing to seize the northern trade route by way of the Black Sea.

13th cent. A.D.

15th cent. A.D.

The main northern route started from the Indus valley and crossed the western offshoots of the Himalayas and the Afghan ranges to the Oxus. On that great river of Central Asia the products of India were joined by the silks of China, conveyed from the western province of the Celestial Empire by a caravan journey of eighty to a hundred days. The united volume of traffic struggled onwards to the Black Sea, due west by the Caspian, southwards by Trebizond, northwards by the Volga and the Don, as shown on my map. A route referred to somewhat obscurely by Strabo, but with a new

B.C.

[1] Towards the end of Jumāda II, 805 A.H. (or middle of January 1403) according to the Rausat-es-Safa. Date sometimes given, 1401.

interest in our days, seems to have crossed the southern basin of the Caspian. The galleys proceeded up the twelve-mouthed Cyrus river[1] as far as its channel allowed. Their cargoes were then transported by a four or five days' land journey over the water-parting which separates the Caspian from the Black Sea, until they reached the point where the river Phasis became navigable. Its stream carried the precious freights down to the emporium of the same name at its mouth on the Black Sea: a Milesian settlement whence the pheasant[2] is said to have been brought to Europe by the Argonauts—the legendary pioneers of that branch of eastern trade. The Russian railway from Baku on the Caspian to Batum on the Black Sea, with Tiflis as the meeting mart midway, corresponds to this ancient route up the river valleys and across the watershed.

Besides the Oxus routes ending on the Black Sea, other roads led from the Indus valley to the West. After crossing the Hindu Kush the southern tracks touched the capitals of Bactria, Parthia, and Media, eventually reaching Baghdad, Palmyra, Tyre and Antioch. The spoil found by the soldiers of Heraclius in the palace of King Khosru Perviz shows how the products of India had entered into the courtly life of Persia in the 7th century A.D.[3]

[1] Κῦρος, the modern Kur. The passages in Strabo (lib. 1.A, c. 498, Meineke's text, 1877) and Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* lib. vi., cap 17) scarcely bear out Dr. W. Robertson's precision of statement (Works, pp. 1044, 1059: ed. 1831).

[2] *Avis Phasiana.*

[3] The *Ancient Commerce of India*, by Professor Gustav Oppert, Ph.D., Madras 1879, pp. 17, 29.

The difficulties of the Central Asia routes to the Black Sea, with their deadly camel journey of alternate snows and torrid wastes, rendered them available only for articles of small bulk. They never attained the importance to India which the two southern trade-routes, by the Syrian caravan track and by the sea-passage to Egypt, acquired. They formed, however, ancient paths between Europe and China, and received prominence from the blocking of the Syrian route in mediæval times.

From the Black Sea the products of the East went chiefly to Constantinople, but they also penetrated into Europe by the Danube and other channels. The trade appears to have helped towards the early civilisation of the Crimea and the Danubian provinces.[1] The emporium of Theodosia on the Crimean coast was, like Phasis, originally a trading colony of the Milesians. It survived, although in decay, to the time of Arrian, and reappears in a variant of its modern name, Kaffa, under the Greek emperor who sent the embassy to Baghdad in 917 A.D.[2]

The eastern trade by the Black Sea long formed a source of wealth to the Byzantine empire. Conflicts between Christian and Saracen in Syria enhanced its importance, and the Venetian merchants who settled at Constantinople when captured by the Crusaders in 1204, further developed the route. During the fifty-eight years of the Latin empire at Constantinople (1204–1261) the

13th cent. A.D.

[1] *Histoire Raisonnée du Commerce de la Russie*, par Jean Benoit Scherer, 2 vols. Paris 1788. [2] *Ante*, p. 29.

Venetians engrossed the eastern commerce by way of the Black Sea. Venice stretched her armed trading stations from the Adriatic to the Bosphorus, and stood forth the acknowledged Queen of the Mediterranean.[1]

13th cent. A.D. On the re-establishment of the Byzantine empire (1261), the Genoese, whose mercantile jealousy of Venice overcame their orthodox faith and led them to assist the Greek Emperor in the expulsion of their Catholic trade-rivals, took the place of the Venetians at Constantinople.[2] They received the Pera quarter, commanded the harbour, planted fortified factories along the European and Asiatic coasts of the Euxine, occupied part of the Crimea, and made its old emporium at Kaffa[3] the headquarters of the Eastern trade by the Black Sea route. About 1263 they rebuilt the ruined city of Kaffa. Its spacious harbour, with deep water and firm anchorage for a hundred ships, played a leading part in the Genoese monopoly of the Euxine.

Of scarcely less importance was Soldaia, also on

[1] Among other words which have passed from the Eastern trade of Venice into the languages of Modern Europe is *baldaquin* or *baldachino*, from Baldacco, the Italian form of Baghdad, whence the rich embroidered stuff for canopies was obtained. For the Venetians in Palestine, see Conder's *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, p. 208, &c.

[2] For the position of the Genoese, Pisan, Amalfi and other Italian merchants in Palestine see Conder's *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 208, 324–5, 330, &c.; W. Heyd's *Commerce du Levant au moyen-âge* (2 vols. Leipzig, 1885–1886); E. Rey's *Les Colonies Franques en Syrie* (Paris 1883); and Müller's *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città Toscane coll' oriente Cristiano c coi Turchi* (Florence, 4to. 1879).

[3] Ibn Batuta (*circ.* 1330) calls it El-Kafa (*Voyages*, ed. Defrémery and Sanguinetti, ii. 357).

the south-east coast of the Crimea. Its Greek settlers had long acted as middlemen between the Asiatic and Russian traders, and, strengthened by a Venetian factory, they grew rich on the Indian commerce by the Black Sea route during the thirteenth century. Marco Polo the elder owned a house at Soldaia which he bequeathed in 1280 to the Franciscan friars of that port. In 1323 Pope John XXII. complained that the Christians had been driven forth by the Mongols from Soldaia, and 'their churches turned into mosques.' Yet Ibn Batuta (1304–1377) still reckoned it as one of the five great ports of the world. In 1365 Soldaia became a fortified factory of the Genoese, who traded there till the downfall of the Byzantine empire, and whose defensive works survive to this day.[1]

14th cent. A.D.

These ports on the Crimea formed the inlets of the eastern trade to the Russian emporium of Novgorod. The position of Novgorod gave it access by the Dnieper to the Black Sea on the south, and by the Neva to the Hanse towns of the Baltic. In its marts the spices and fabrics of the East were exchanged for the furs of the North, and distributed to Western Europe. 'As far back as the eleventh century Gothland's commerce with the East by way of Novgorod was already of much importance.'[2] The marshes and lake region

[1] *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, edited by Sir Henry Yule, K.C.S.I., vol. i. pp. 3, 4 (ed. 1875). Soldaia is the Sudak of the Arab geographers, who sometimes call the Sea of Azov the Sea of Sudak.

[2] Consul Perry's *Report on the*

around Novgorod defended it for a time against the Mongol hordes. Its merchants carried with them not only the art-work but also the currency of Asia to Scandinavia; and 20,000 Cufic coins minted in about seventy towns of the Abbaside caliphs are said to have been at one time preserved in Stockholm.[1]

14th cent. A.D. The tide of wealth which thus set towards Venice and Genoa from the Black Sea procured for them a period of splendour scarcely less striking than that of the Saracen, or of the briefer Jewish, ascendency over the Indo-Syrian route. Trebizond, at the south-eastern extremity of the Black Sea, had grown into the terminus and emporium of a great Asiatic trade-route by way of Erzeroum. But the Turks pressed ever closer on the outskirts of the Byzantine empire. The bitter trade-hatreds of the Genoese and the Venetians rendered a continuous coalition impossible for the Mediterranean Christian powers. Each aimed at engrossing the Eastern commerce, and each would gladly have seen its rival ruined.

For a time indeed it appeared as if the lands and riches of the Byzantine emperors were to be divided by an unholy connivance among Serbians, Albanians, Genoese, and Turks.[2] In 1444, Genoese

Trade and Commerce of the Island of Gothland, dated December 10, 1873. Quoted by Birdwood.

[1] Sir George Birdwood, K.C.I.E., on the authority of Sir Clements Markham, K.C.B. *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, p. 117 (ed. 1891).

[2] *A History of Greece* from B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864, by George Finlay, LL.D; edited by H. F. Tozer, M.A., 7 vols. Oxford 1877. Vol. iii. pp. 446–8.

vessels ferried an army of 40,000 Ottomans across the Bosphorus, at a ducat a head, to do battle against the champions of Christendom. Nine years later, in 1453, the Turks finally took Constantinople. In 1475 Kaffa fell to their all-devouring armies. The Genoese colony with its warehouse palaces at Pera, its trading strongholds along the narrow seas, and its two factories in the Crimea, went down in the wreck of the Byzantine empire. 14th cent. A.D.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, therefore, the Mongol and the Ottoman hordes had blocked both the Black Sea and the Syrian routes of the Indo-European trade. The third or southern maritime route to Egypt claimed perhaps a less ancient origin; it was destined to survive the other two in mediæval times, and to again become the highway of Eastern commerce in our own day. Herodotus narrates the naval expedition of Sesostris, the Egyptian monarch of the fourteenth (?) century B.C.,[1] from the Red Sea along the Asiatic coast, and his conquest of the intervening countries between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This would suffice, apart from any legendary invasion of India proper, to give to Egypt for a time the command of the Syrian caravan route. The Father of History mentions that he had himself seen the sculptured memorials of the conqueror in Syria and Asia Minor—a statement 14th cent. B.C.

[1] Identified with Ramses II. of the XIXth dynasty (15th to 13th century B.C.) according to M. Mariette and Professor Lepsius. The British Museum date on the statue of Ramses II. is 1333 B.C.

B.C. seemingly verified by their modern discovery on the roads to Smyrna and to Beirut.[1] Nor is it needful to examine too closely the evidence for the Sesostris Canal from the Nile to the Gulf of Suez, or its identity with the similar works on which later Egyptian kings, Necho, Darius son of Hystaspes, and Ptolemy Philadelphus laboured.

The northerly winds that blow down the Egyptian side of the Red Sea during most of the year[2] rendered the navigation up its western shores difficult for vessels of the Old World. Indeed, the perils of the coasting trade from the emporiums of Indian commerce on the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea seem to be commemorated by names along its route—by the Cape of the Indian's Grave on the south-east of Arabia, and by the Straits of Bab-el-Mendeb, or Gate of Tears, at its south-western extremity.[3] The author of the 'Periplus' (about 80 A.D. ?) gives a chapter to the 'dreadful coast' of Arabia, without harbours, and peopled by tribes who had no mercy for shipwrecked crews.[4]

[1] Herodotus, ii. 102–104; ii. 106. The Hittite character of one of these monuments does not raise too serious difficulties, as Ramses II. is said to have married the daughter of the Kheta or Khati (identified by Professor Sayce as the Hittite) king.

[2] *Sailing Directory* (*India*) *for Steamers and Sailing Vessels*, by Commander A. D. Taylor, p. 157 (ed. 1874).

[3] The headland known to mariners as the Ras Jabrin or Kabr Hindi (Indian's Grave) more correctly Ras-el-Kabr-el-Hindi, rises sheer 1,200 feet from the sea. Taylor's *Sailing Directory*, p. 239 (ed. 1874). Horsburgh's *Sailing Directory* refers to it as the Ras Goberhindee (Cape of the Indian's Grave), i. 404. (ed. 1855). Lane (*Arabic Lexicon*, p. 2780) renders Báb-el-Mendeb as *the Strait of the Place of Summons*, or *of the Place of Wailing for the Dead.*

[4] *Periplus Maris Erythræi*, cap. xx. Cf. McCrindle's *Cosmas Indicopleustes*, *post*, p. 43.

Under the enterprising Egyptian King Psammetichus, however (671–617 B.C.), Carian and Ionian settlements at the mouth of the Nile had opened out the Mediterranean to the Indo-Egyptian trade—a trade which that monarch further secured by Syrian and Phœnician wars.[1] Alexander the Great perceived the capabilities of the Nile delta as the natural entrepôt for the East and West. Alexandria, which he ordered to be built on the neck of land between Lake Mareotis and the Mediterranean, grew into the emporium of the Eastern traffic for the Greek and Roman world, eclipsed the ancient glories of Tyre, and, on its modern site, again became one of the strategic positions of the globe as the half-way house of Indo-European commerce.

7th cent. B.C.

4th cent. B.C.

From the founding of Alexandria (332 B.C.) its Asiatic trade grew with the improvements in the sea-passage. At a very early period the Arab navigators tried to avoid the northerly winds which sweep down the Egyptian coast, by unlading their cargoes near the modern Kosair, and transporting them overland to Thebes, the capital of the Nile Valley,—the fame of whose 20,000 war-chariots and hundred gates had reached the ears of Homer.[2] Ptolemy Philadelphus did much during his long reign (285–247 B.C.)[3] to concentrate the Eastern trade at Alexandria, the new capital of Lower Egypt. He reopened the ancient cutting from Bubastis to the Bitter Lakes,

3rd cent. B.C.

[1] Herodotus, ii. 157; i. 105.

[2] Iliad ix. 381–384.

[3] Or 283–247 B.C. if we count from the actual death of his father.

3rd cent. B.C. and was only stayed from completing his canal to the Gulf of Suez by fears lest the Red Sea would flow in and submerge the delta.

To escape the difficult navigation of the Suez Gulf, Ptolemy Philadelphus founded, on the headland near its mouth, Myos Hormos (274 B.C.), whence the Indian wares were carried across the desert to the Nile Valley. To still further avoid the northerly head winds on the passage up the African coast, Ptolemy created the emporium of Berenice at the southern extremity of Egypt on the Red Sea, and honoured it by his mother's name—a name which it is said to have transmitted to modern commerce in the word *varnish.*[1] A caravan journey of 285 Roman miles conveyed the eastern freights through wastes and mountains to Coptos on the Nile, with regular halting stations along the track. Some of these still dot the desert, and the proposed Assuan-Berenice railway, for which a survey is being made as I write, would revive the old trade path from Ptolemy's harbour to the Nile Valley by a shorter cut. Railway communication seems destined, indeed, to reopen the ancient paths of Indo-European commerce. The Russian line to Bokhara represents, not too exactly, an old route from China by way of the Oxus; the long projected Euphrates Valley Railway would be the modern counterpart of the Syrian caravan track.

The final development of the Indo-Egyptian route did not take place until three centuries after

[1] Italian *vernice.* Berenice lay in about 23° 56′ N. lat., and 35° 34′ E. long.

Ptolemy Philadelphus, when the pilot Hippalus[1] discovered the monsoons, or more strictly speaking, worked out the regular passage by means of them (*circ.* 47 A.D.). These periodical winds blow from Africa to India for about six months, and from India to Africa during the other six.[2] While, moreover, the Egyptian coast-passage is impeded by northerly winds during most of the year in the upper part of the Red Sea, the navigation at its southern end is aided by regular variations in the air currents, southerly winds predominating from October to June, and northerly winds from June to October. The establishment of the emporium at Berenice in the third century B.C. thus paved the way for a vast expansion of the Eastern trade as soon as the monsoons were put to their mercantile uses in the first century A.D.

1st cent. A.D.

Egyptian merchant fleets sailed from Berenice or Myos Hormos in July, rounded the modern Aden with a halt at Kanê in August, and were blown rudely across the Arabian Sea to Malabar by the middle of September—a voyage of sixty or seventy days from the Egyptian to the Indian coast. Having sold their western freights and bartered their bullion[3] for eastern cargoes, they

[1] *The Commerce and Navigation of the Erythræan Sea*, being a translation of the *Periplus Maris Erythræi* by J. W. McCrindle, pp. 5, 7, 10, 135, 138 (ed. 1879). The existence of the monsoons may have been known as early as Nearchus.

[2] Taylor's *Sailing Directory*, xvi. xvii. (ed. 1874).

[3] Of 522 silver denarii found near Coimbatore in Madras in 1842, 135 were coins of Augustus and 378 of Tiberius. Another find near Calicut about 1850 contained an aureus of Augustus with several hundred other coins of the early emperors.

1st cent. A.D.

started from India at the end of December, and were wafted more gently back by the winter monsoon to their Red Sea harbours about the beginning of March.

This monsoon route became the chief channel for the bulkier produce, as well as for the precious gems and wares, of India; enriched the ports along its line, and made Alexandria the commercial metropolis of the Roman Empire. Pliny lamented the vast shipments of gold and silver sent from Europe to pay for the products of Asia. 'In no year,' he says, 'does India drain our Empire of less than fifty-five millions of sesterces (£458,000), giving back her own wares in exchange, which are sold at one hundred times their prime cost.' [1]

Of this great commerce, while Egypt still remained a Roman prefecture, two accounts by actual traders exist. 'The Circumnavigation of the Indian Ocean' [2] describes it within a hundred years after the discovery of the monsoon winds by the pilot Hippalus. Written probably by a

[1] Pliny, *Historia Naturalis*, lib. vi. c. 26 (Teubner): 'Digna res, nullo anno minus H.S. |DL| imperii nostri exhauriente India et merces remittente quæ apud nos centiplicato veneant.' Taking the sestertius at 2*d*. at the end of the Republic, 55 million sesterces = £458,333 6*s*. 8*d*. By an easily explicable error the sum is occasionally multiplied by ten, giving 4 to 5 million sterling. But the 'miliens centena milia sestertium annis omnibus India et Seres et pæninsula illa [*Arabia*] imperio nostro adimunt' of Pliny, xii. 18, give £833,333 6*s*. 8*d*. for the whole volume of the Eastern trade, from Arabia to China. I thank Mr. Strachan-Davidson of Balliol College for verifying these conversions.

[2] *Periplus Maris Erythræi* (*ante*, note, p. 41). McCrindle assigns its composition to between 80 and 89 A.D., p. 5.

Greek merchant who had settled at the southern Red Sea emporium of Berenice and voyaged to the East, its composition is assigned to between 80 A.D. and after 161 A.D. It gives the seaports on the route, specifies ninety-five of the chief articles of traffic, and forms a wonderfully complete presentment of the Indo-Egyptian trade in the first century of our era.

'The Christian Topography of the Universe,'[1] by Cosmas Indicopleustes (*circ.* 535–547 A.D.), takes up the story about four hundred years later. Its author, a merchant and apparently also a navigator, had become a monk of Alexandria in later life, and wrote out in his cell the recollections of his voyages. To these he adds much cosmical speculation, 'not built on his own opinions or conjectures,' he assures us, 'but drawn from Holy Scripture and from the mouth of that divine man and great master, Patricius.' Apart from such mystical physics, he gives an account of the trade of Malabar and the Eastern Archipelago, with topographical details and notices of Indian products, in some respects fuller and more exact than can be found in the Arab geographers of the next seven centuries. In his time Ceylon had become famous as the meeting place of the merchants of the East and West; of the galleys from Egypt and

6th cent. A.D.

[1] *Χριστιανικὴ τοπογραφία περιεκτικὴ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου*, *A Christian Topography embracing the Whole World*, edited by Montfaucon in 1707, vol. ii. of his *Collectio nova Patrum*, &c.; now admirably translated by J. W. McCrindle for the Hakluyt Society (1897). Largely used in *The Commerce and Navigation of the Ancients in the Indian Ocean*, by Dean Vincent, 2 vols. 1807; vol. ii.

6th cent. A.D. the Persian Gulf, with the heavier junks of China. Cosmas not only mentions China for the first time by a name[1] which admits of no dispute, but he had also a fair idea of its position, lying to the north-east of Ceylon as the Euphrates delta lies to the north-west, and with the same circumambient ocean as the highway to both.

From this time, China plays a distinctive part in the Indo-European trade. Three ancient land-routes have been traced from India to China; Indian colonies settled on the Malacca coast and in the Eastern Archipelago;[2] Indian missionaries spread their Buddhist faith from Central Asia to Burma, Ceylon and Cathay. At the Red Sea or western extremity of the route, Indian sailors seem to have given a Sanskrit name to the island of Socotra,[3] as they did to Sumatra[4] half-way along the ocean-course. At the eastern extremity the very ancient Tao coinage, or 'Knife-Cash' of China, has been ascribed to sea-traders from the Indian Ocean, who before 670 B.C. marked their bronze

[1] As Tzinista, cf. Chinistán.

[2] *E.g.* At Kokkonagra on the Malay peninsula, Java, Bali, &c.

[3] Socotra has been traced conjecturally to the Sanskrit Dwipa-Sukhádhára, or Island Abode of Bliss; 'from which (contracted Diuskadra) the Greeks,' says Sir Henry Yule, made "the island of Dioscorides."' Marco Polo, ii. 400, Footnote 2 (ed. 1875). But see also Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, April 1898, pp. 256–257.

[4] Sumatra is (Malay derivations notwithstanding) almost certainly a variant of the Sanskrit Samudra. It appears as Súmútra in the Jámi'u-t-Tawáríkh of Rashídu-d Din from Al Bírúní (970–1039 A.D.); as Samuthrah or Samathra in Ibn Batuta (*circ.* 1346); and as Samudra in one of its north-coast capitals—meaning the Sea Town.

knives with distinctive symbols so as to convert them into a returnable currency.[1]

It must be remembered that during ten centuries (250 B.C. to about 700 A.D.) Buddhism was the dominant political religion in India, and that it was a religion of enterprise both mercantile and missionary by land and by sea. We are told that Indian merchants were found in Alexandria, although the supposed statue of the river deity Indus in that city was probably the gift of a Greek.[2] A Chinese book of botany, ascribed to a prefect of Canton in the fourth century A.D., mentions plants then growing in Canton, which seem to have been brought by traders from Arabia or the Roman provinces.[3] The trading colony of Arabs at Canton, dating from the times when they still followed Sabæan rites, included at the beginning of the seventh century A.D. an uncle of Muhammad. Hearing of his nephew's fame as one sent by God, the worthy merchant returned to Arabia only to find the

7th cent. A.D.

[1] One should still carefully preserve the hypothetical mood with regard to the origin of the Chinese knife money. See the lamented Terrien de Lacouperie's *Catalogue of Chinese Coins in the British Museum*, p. 213, &c. Also Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1895, p. 368 ff. and April 1898, pp. 265–266. Compare Stanley Lane-Poole's *Coins and Medals*, pp. 204, 214 (1885).

[2] Professor Gustav Oppert, *Ancient Commerce of India* (Madras 1879), p. 29. But Indus might possibly be misread for Nilus in a half-obliterated Greek inscription.

[3] Professor Joseph Edkins on *Ancient Navigation in the Indian Ocean*, Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, vol. xviii. N.S. p. 2, 1886. The connection of Rome with the Far East is more fully examined by Dr. F. Hirth from the old Chinese records in his *China and the Roman Orient* (Kelley and Walsh, Shanghai 1885). He shows that the Roman Empire meant to the Chinese its provinces of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt; pp. vi.; 304–306, &c. De Lacouperie dates Indian trade with China from 631 B.C.

prophet dead. 'Has he left any message for me?' he asked. 'None,' was the reply. 'Then I shall go back to China. If the prophet had other views for me, he would have left me word.' He accordingly sailed again for Canton, where his mausoleum is shown.[1] But the early connection of China with India and the West has not yet emerged from the twilight of tradition.

A learned Chinese scholar has examined the influence of Arabian or Babylonian trade-intercourse on the science and geographical conceptions of ancient China.[2] Of that influence he finds evidence under the Chow dynasty in the history of Chinese astrology, metrology, and astronomical instruments. The pre-Alexandrian astronomy of India also had probably a Chaldean origin.[3] It was a commercial dispute[4] that brought about the first
711 A.D. Musalman conquest of an Indian province. In 711 Kasim led a naval expedition against Sind to claim damages for the ill-treatment of Arab merchantmen

[1] The Chinese tradition is an old one, attested by several monuments, none, however, contemporary, although one is said to go back to the fourteenth century. The uncle seems to have been Wahb Abu-Kabsha, the brother of Muhammad's mother. There is nothing improbable in the story, as in the other tradition that the Emperor of China sent an embassy to Muhammad in 629 A.D. A century later there was certainly a flourishing Moslem trade with China. The matter has been summed up in P. Dabry de Thiersant's *Le Mahométisme en Chine* (2 vols. Paris 1878). Vassilieff went over the same ground in his memoir on Chinese Musalmans, 1867.

[2] Edkins, Journal R.A. Society, xviii. 1886. Cf. *First Letter Book of the E. I. Company*, xlviii., and J. R. A. Soc. April 1898.

[3] Weber, *Hist. Ind. Lit.* 246 ff.

[4] The Moslem writers make it an act of piracy. Chach-nama and Tuhfatu-l Kirám, in Sir Henry Elliot's *History of India from its own Historians* (8 vols.), vol. i. pp. 428–434 (ed. 1867).

and pilgrims near the mouth of the Indus on their voyage from Ceylon. During the following centuries the Indian Ocean became an outlying domain of Islam. The Arab geographers mapped the course from the Persian Gulf to China into 'seven seas,' each having a name of its own, and with the Arab-Chinese harbour of Gampu on their eastern limit.[1] As the Chinese trade grew in volume, Ceylon had to share her gains as the meeting mart of Europe and Asia with entrepôts still further east. Abulfeda, the princely geographer of the fourteenth century (1273-1331), mentions Malacca as the most important trading place between Arabia and China, the common resort of Moslems, Persians, Hindus and Chinese.

8th cent. A.D.

14th cent. A.D.

While Greek and Roman merchants had enriched themselves by the Indo-Egyptian trade, the actual sea-passage from India to Egypt, like the actual caravan route from the Persian Gulf to the Levant, remained in the hands of Semitic races. Colonies of Arabs and Jews settled in an early century of our era, or perhaps before it, on the southern Bombay coast, where their descendants form distinct communities at the present day. The voyages of Sinbad the Sailor are a popular romance of the Indian trade under the caliphs of Baghdad, probably in the ninth century A.D. Although inserted in the 'Thousand and One Nights,' they form a distinct work in Arabic.[2]

[1] Gustav Oppert *ut supra*, 32.

[2] Translated by L. M. Langlès, Paris 1814. See Baron Walckenaer's interesting paper before

Sinbad traverses the ocean regions from the Persian Gulf to Malabar, the Maldive Islands, Ceylon, and apparently as far as the Malay Peninsula.

A series of Arabian geographers and travellers [1] bring down the narrative to the fourteenth century. Egypt had passed to the Saracens in 640 A. D. But under its Fatimite caliphs and later Mameluk sultans, the Indo-Egyptian trade continued to flourish, and probably gained rather than lost by the temporary interruption of the Syrian land-route during the Crusades. Ibn Batuta (1304-1377), who travelled for twenty-four years in Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean, declared Cairo to be the greatest city in the world 'out of China,' and mentions Alexandria as one of the five chief ports which he had seen. Two other of them were on the Bombay coast, and all the five were fed by the Indian or Chinese trade.[2]

14th cent. A.D.

But the same Turkish avalanche that had thrown itself across the Syrian and Black Sea routes was also to descend on Egypt. The Venetians on their expulsion from Constantinople in 1261 transferred their eastern commerce to Alexandria, and after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, Egypt for a time enjoyed

the Académie des Belles-Lettres. *Mélanges publiés par la Société des Bibliophiles Français*, Paris 1827, vol. v.

[1] Among them Sulaiman of Bussorah, *circ.* 851 A.D. Ibn Khurdádbih, *circ.* 869-885 A.D. Masudi of Baghdad, 890-956 A.D. Edrisi of Sicily, 1099-1186 A.D. The Jewish Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, 1159-1173 A.D. Abulfeda, 1273-1331 A.D. Ibn Batuta of Tangiers, 1304-1377 A.D.

[2] The five were Alexandria in Egypt, Soldaia or Sudak in the Crimea (*ante*, p. 35), Koulam or Quilon and Calicut in India, Zaitun or Chincheu in China.

almost a monopoly of the Indian trade. The monsoon passage was in fact the one channel that remained always open from India amid the Mongol and Turkish convulsions along the caravan routes. The growth of the Ottoman navy from 1470 onwards began, however, to imperil the Mediterranean outlets of the Indo-Egyptian trade. It was in vain that Venice in 1454 made an un-Christian peace with the Moslem conquerors of Constantinople, and sought to secure the passage from the Adriatic to Alexandria by fortified stations and island-strongholds along the route. Venice had ruined the naval power of Genoa, and the gallant defence of the Knights Hospitallers at Rhodes in 1480 could only delay, not avert, the Ottoman seizure of the Mediterranean highway. 15th cent. A.D.

In 1470 the Turks wrested the Negropont from Venice with a fleet of one hundred galleys and two hundred transports. Before ten years passed their squadrons swept the Adriatic and ravaged along the Italian coast. In their work of destruction the Turks were aided by an even more savage sea-force from the West. The rise of the Barbary corsairs is usually treated as an episode of mediæval piracy. As a political factor, it formed the maritime complement of the Turkish conquests by land. While the Musalmans held Southern Spain, treaties between the Muhammadan and Christian princes tried to restrain the buccaneering ports for which the inlets on the African coast seemed made by nature. But on the overthrow of the Moorish power in Spain by Ferdinand and

15th cent. A.D. Isabella[1] in 1492, the scourge of African piracy was let loose on the Mediterranean. The reign of terror reached its height under the great corsair admirals after 1504. Yet during a quarter of a century before this final development, the galleys of the African Moors outflanked the Venetian and Genoese fleets in the western Mediterranean, and thus strengthened the Turks in their struggle for the naval supremacy in the Levant.

The same year, 1480, that saw the temporary failure of the Ottomans at Rhodes saw also their capture of Otranto in Italy. In 1499 they crushed the naval force of Venice at Zonchio and Lepanto.[2] By this time the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea had become Turkish lakes. Turkish fleets and fortresses dominated the Hellespont, the Syrian coast, the Greek harbours, and most of the island trading-stations of the Ægean and the Levant. The rise of the Ottomans as a sea-power thus blockaded the Mediterranean outlets of the Indo-Egyptian trade as their rise as a land-power had obstructed the Indo-Syrian and Black Sea routes. Their seizure of Egypt in 1516–1517 was merely the finishing stroke of the conquests by which, in the preceding century, the command of the old Indo-European highways had passed to the Turkish hordes.

16th cent. A.D.

[1] Fall of Granada to the Christians, November 1491 to January 1492; Jews expelled March 1492; edict for baptism or expulsion of Moors, 1502 (although their expulsion was not finally consummated till afterwards).

[2] *The Barbary Corsairs*, by Stanley Lane-Poole, pp. 67–71 (ed. 1890).

While a great necessity thus arose among the Christian nations to search out new trade routes to India, we must not exaggerate the extent to which the old ones were closed. Alike in the Euphrates valley, in Syria and in Egypt the Ottomans ousted Semitic dynasties of a comparatively civilised type. For a time, also, they trampled down the refinements in which those dynasties delighted. But the rude despoilers grew themselves into luxurious potentates, and although their Mongol nature was incapable of the higher Semitic culture, it took on a veneer. The period of avalanche passed; the need of the Indian trade routes for exits towards Europe remained as insistent as before. 15th cent. A.D.

Nor were the Turks indifferent to the taxes and transit-duties that could be squeezed from the traffickers whom they despised. The Asiatic commerce, whether by Syria or by Egypt, often interrupted and at times blocked, was never altogether destroyed. Genoa and Venice still distributed their eastern wares, in an impeded flow, to the European nations. After the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, and the partial blockade of the Nile by the growing Ottoman navy, Famagusta in Cyprus became the Venetian headquarters of the trade in succession to Alexandria (*post* 1475). It did business with Egypt under the Mameluk sultans until 1516, and resumed its intercourse when the Nile valley settled down, after that year, beneath Ottoman rule. For nearly a century Famagusta remained a leading emporium of the

Levant, until itself taken by the Turks in 1570–1571.[1]

The Ottoman seizure or obstruction of the Indian trade routes brought disaster not alone to the Mediterranean republics. The blow fell first on Genoa and Venice, but it sent a shock through the whole system of European commerce. The chief channel by which the products of Asia reached the central and northern nations of Christendom was the Hanseatic League. This Hansa, or 'Association' of towns and merchant colonies for mutual defence, had developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries into the great trade organisation of Northern and Central Europe. At the beginning of the fifteenth, its settlements stretched from Russia to the Thames; appeals from distant Novgorod were heard by its chief tribunal at Lübeck; Augsburg became the central depôt of Europe, and her banker-weavers, the Fuggers and Velsers, rivalled the merchant-princes of Venice and Genoa. Bruges, the north-western depôt of the Hanseatic trade, had at one time representatives of twenty foreign Courts in the warehouse mansions which lined her canals. 'There are hundreds of women here,' the wife of Philip the Fair of France is said to have exclaimed when she visited Bruges at the beginning of the fourteenth century, 'who have more the air of queens than myself.'

[1] Sir George Birdwood's *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, pp. 114–115 (ed. 1891). I thank Sir George for courteously reading the proof-sheets of this chapter.

The Indian trade formed an important contributory to this Hanseatic commerce.[1] When the Eastern traffic began to dry up, its European emporiums declined; when, as we shall see, the Cape route was substituted, they withered away. 'Grass grew,' says Motley, 'in the fair and pleasant streets of Bruges, and sea-weed clustered about the marble halls of Venice.'[2] Augsburg which had financed the commerce of Central Europe dwindled into a provincial town. Novgorod suffered in addition to mercantile decay the abolition of its charters by Ivan III. in 1475, and the carrying into captivity of a thousand of its richest families. Its later sack by Ivan the Terrible has left little besides a fortress and cathedral, rich in relics, to bear witness to its ancient greatness. The Mediterranean marts of Eastern commerce, from Lisbon looking out on the Atlantic, to Venice once mistress of the Adriatic and the Levant, shared in varying degrees the common fate. In the first years of the sixteenth century the Indo-European trade of the Middle Ages lay strangled in the grip of the Turks.

[1] *Memoires sur le Commerce des Hollandois* (Amsterdam 1717) describe the mediæval trade of Italy and Germany as a continuation of the Eastern commerce under the Roman Empire. An MS. note in my copy ascribes this work to Huet, Bishop of Avranches.

[2] *The Rise of the Dutch Republic*, by John Lothrop Motley, vol. i. pp. 37, 83 (ed. 1864).

CHAPTER II

THE QUEST FOR INDIA BY SEA

1418-1499

THE European nations had not stood idle spectators of this collapse of their mediæval Eastern commerce. At first indeed the dim masses in Central Asia appeared to Christian princes as possible allies in their struggle for the Holy Places against the nearer Saracens. In 1245 Pope Clement IV. sent
13th cent. A.D. a Franciscan agent to the Tartars in Persia, and two years afterwards another friar to the Tartar camp on the Volga. St. Louis during his ill-fated crusade (1248–1254) found the Tartar hordes advancing on the common enemy from the east. The casual concurrence seemed to promise an identity of interest, and envoys passed between the Tartar chief in Persia and the French king. About the same time St. Louis despatched William de Rubruquis, a Minorite friar, to the Tartar Khan on the Black Sea (1253).[1]

Rubruquis' narrative formed the delight of

[1] Rubruquis' travels appear in Purchas and in at least seven other of the early Collections. The standard edition is now the French one: *William de Rubriques, Ambassadeur de Saint Louis en Orient.* Récit de son voyage; traduit de l'original Latin et annoté par Louis de Backer (Paris 1877).

mediæval students, Roger Bacon among them; and its veracity is attested by modern geographical research.[1] At first passed to the learned world in manuscript, it has been repeatedly printed in whole or part. But it failed to enlighten Christian diplomacy as to the true character of the forces at work in Western Asia. Rubruquis visited various Tartar chiefs from the Black Sea to the edge of the great Mongolian desert, and returned by the Volga and the Caucasus, much impressed by the Tartar power. The Turkish kingdom in Asia Minor struck him as of no treasure, few warriors and many enemies. Two ambassadors from Castile had seen the Turks shattered by Timur in the carnage at Angora in 1402, and were honourably entertained by the Mongol conqueror.[2] The Black Sea route obtained a delusive prominence, and the menacing strength of the Turks continued for a time obscure to Catholic Europe.

13th cent. A.D.

It was by this Black Sea route that the Venetian family of merchant travellers, the Polos, originally started towards India and China in 1260. The imperishable record of the greatest of that name, Marco, is the masterpiece of travel in the Middle Ages, and has been illustrated by the patience and learning of a foremost geographer of our day.[3]

[1] Professor Peschel, *Gesch. der Erdkunde*, p. 151 (1865). Sir Henry Yule placed Rubruquis' narrative higher than any one series of Polo's chapters. *Marco Polo*, vol. i. Introd. para. 66 (ed. 1875).

[2] *Narrative of the Embassy of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo to the Court of Timour at Samarcand*, translated by Sir Clements R. Markham, K.C.B. Hakluyt Society (1859) Introd. p. iii.

[3] *The book of Ser Marco Polo*

13th cent. A.D. Marco Polo reached China by land and returned by the long sea passage, *viâ* the Straits of Malacca, Malabar and Persia, after an absence of twenty-four years (1271–1295). His work gives the first account of India by a Christian writer since that of Indicopleustes in the sixth century A.D. But the mercantile enterprise of Venetian and Genoese traders, like the missionary zeal of the friars who preceded and followed them, proved powerless to keep open the Black Sea route when the Turks threw themselves across the path. A similar fate befel the attempts of Christian land-explorers by way of Syria and Egypt. Yet the list of such European travellers[1] during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, including the remarkable journey of the Russian Nikitin, bears witness to the persistence which they brought to the task. Two of the great land-travellers overlap the discovery of the Cape route. One of the last of them, Ludovico di Varthema, found the Portuguese struggling for a settlement in India, was present at their sea-fight

the Venetian, by Colonel [Sir] Henry Yule, C.B. [K.C.S.I.] 2 vols. (ed. 1875)—a monumental work of suggestive criticism and original research.

[1] Noteworthy among them, Marino Sanuto, a Venetian nobleman, 1300–1306; Oderico di Pordenone, a Beatus of the Roman Catholic Church, 1316–1330; John de Marignolli, a Minorite friar, 1338; Sir John Mandeville, the Englishman of marvels, 1327–1372 (?); Don Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, a Spanish ambassador to the Court of Timur, 1402–1406; Nicolo Conti, a Venetian nobleman, 1419–1444; Athanasius Nikitin, a Russian, 1468–1474; Hieronimo di Santo Stefano, a Genoese, 1494–1499; Ludovico di Varthema, a Bolognese, 1503–1508. Most of these travellers appear in the various early Collections of Voyages, or have been edited for the Hakluyt Society or by Continental geographers of our time.

with the Zamorin in 1506, and took service under Portugal as a factor in Cochin.

The achievement that rescued the Indian trade from the thrall of the Infidel, more effectively than combined Christendom had ever delivered the sacred places of Palestine, was the work of a nation which even then ranked among the small ones of Europe. But, with the exception of the imposing figure-head of the Holy Roman Empire, the contrast between the leading and the lesser States at the beginning of the fifteenth century was by no means so marked as it is now. The modern first-class Powers, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, Great Britain, were not yet built up. Spain was still divided between Castile, Aragon and the Moors. Europe remained a continent of principalities, duchies, counties, little oligarchies, and little republics. The Mediterranean States that had engrossed the Indian trade during the Middle Ages were cities rather than countries. The new Power destined to supersede them was essentially a nation: a nation still aflame with the patriotism that had won its independence, and cherishing an undying hatred against the Moors whom it had driven forth. 15th cent. A.D.

In the thirteenth century Portugal attained its European limits. At the end of the fourteenth it entered on a career of splendour under a singularly able and long-lived line of kings. John I. the Great of the house of Aviz and his four successors ruled from 1385 to 1521, and raised their country from an outlying strip on the Atlantic to the ocean- 13th and 14th cent. A.D.

outpost of Christendom. Their combined reigns form the heroic age of Portugal. That period commenced with a firm alliance with England; it ended with the complete establishment of the Portuguese in India. It is marked throughout by a fierce hostility to the Musalmans, and by a spirit of exploration which in Portugal succeeded to and absorbed the spirit of the Crusades.

The English alliance formed the keystone of the policy of John the Great. The friendship of Portugal and England had, indeed, been of slow and solid growth. Towards the close of the twelfth century a body of London crusaders halted on their way to the Holy Land to help the Portuguese against the Moors. The end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries found King Diniz 'the Labourer' in close correspondence with our Edwards I. and II. In the middle of the fourteenth century a marriage was negotiated, although not carried out, between Edward the Black Prince of England and the daughter of Affonso IV. of Portugal. In 1352 Edward III. issued a royal proclamation commanding his subjects thenceforth and for ever to do no harm to the Portuguese; next year a commercial compact was signed in
1386 London; and on May 9, 1386, the Treaty of Windsor united the two countries by a close alliance.[1]

[1] Confirmed by Henry IV., on February 16, 1400. *Syllabus of Rymer's Fœdera*, edited by Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, vol. ii. p. 550. I note twelve other references to Portugal in the *Fœdera temp.* Henry IV.

The claims of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster and son of Edward III., to the throne of Castile for his Spanish wife, brought about a still nearer connection with Portugal. The Portuguese King discerned in those claims a source of support in his hereditary struggle with the Castilian dynasty. It seemed, indeed, as if the States of Western Europe naturally ranged themselves into a league of England, Portugal and Flanders against France, Scotland and Castile.[1] In 1385, 1385
five hundred English archers under three squires of John of Gaunt fought on the decisive field of Aljubarrota which secured the independence of Portugal against Castile and placed the House of Aviz, with John I. as its head, on the Portuguese throne.

In July 1386, a couple of months after the 1386
Treaty of Windsor, John of Gaunt himself landed at Corunna with his Castilian princess, two daughters, 180 galleys, 2,000 lances, and 3,000 of the famous English archers.[2] One daughter he promptly married to John I. the Great of Portugal (February 2, 1387); the other daughter, by his Spanish wife, to the Prince of the Asturias, heir to the throne of Castile. He himself re-

[1] For the traditional English view of the relations between Scotland and France see Shakespeare's *Henry V.* act i. sc. ii.

[2] *Life of Prince Henry of Portugal*, surnamed the Navigator, by R. H. Major (Keeper of the Department of Maps and Charts in the British Museum), p. 21 (ed. 1868). Mr. Major's dates and arguments should be compared throughout with General Wauwermans' *Henri le Navigateur, et l'Académie Portugaise de Sagres*, Antwerp, 1890. The chronology of Portuguese discovery is still keenly debated.

nounced his Castilian claims, and imposed on his two sons-in-law a truce[1] which lasted till 1411.

Philippa, daughter of this masterful Englishman, 'time-honored Lancaster,' was worthy to be the consort of a great king and the mother of heroes. The friendship of England, which her marriage with John I. cemented, proved a tower of
15th cent. A.D. strength to her husband during his epoch-making reign of forty-eight years (1385–1433). In 1398 a body of English archers came to his aid, and in 1400 he was created a Knight of the Garter —the first foreign sovereign who received that honour. In 1415 our Henry V. sent provisions and troops to join the Portuguese expedition against the Ceuta Moors,[2] and again in 1428 a force of English lances heard King John of Portugal's battle-cry. That battle-cry was one dear to English men-at-arms, 'Saint George!' and as a Knight of the Garter John bore the dragon for his crest.[3] The recumbent statue of his English queen, Philippa, at Batalha shows the face of a beautiful woman, with finely cut features, a lofty forehead, and a look of firm sense. Simple and religious in her habits, carrying abstinence so far as to undermine her health, her chief pleasure in life was to make peace between enemies, and her great

[1] Henry IV. of England afterwards agreed to be a party to this compact. Syll. Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. ii. p. 555.

[2] Also granted a licence to export harness for men-at-arms and 350 lances to Portugal. Syll. Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. ii. p. 583.

[3] Major's *Prince Henry of Portugal*, p. 80 (ed. 1868).

occupation to educate her children. 'To do good was with her a necessity of existence.'[1] 15th cent. A.D.

Of the eight children whom this noble and devout Englishwoman bore to John I. of Portugal, the eldest survivor (called Duarte after his great-grandfather our Edward III.) succeeded to the Portuguese throne. Another son, Pedro, became famous as the royal land-traveller of his century; a third, Fernando, won by his chivalrous self-sacrifice and patient sufferings in Moorish captivity the title of The Constant Prince. But the most illustrious of them was her fifth child, born on Ash-Wednesday, March 4, 1394, and imperishably known in history as Prince Henry the Navigator. On coming of age in 1415 he won his spurs at the Portuguese siege of Ceuta, the Musalman stronghold of North-western Africa just within the Straits of Gibraltar. His splendid gallantry at the gate, where he stemmed, for a time alone, the rush of the Moors, and his calm intrepidity as a leader, gained the plaudits of Christendom. His biographer[2] states that the Pope, the Emperor of Germany, and the Kings of Castile and of England each invited the young hero to take command of armies.

The capture of Ceuta and its political consequences awakened a different ambition in Prince Henry's breast. Its conquest had converted a chief emporium of the Moors into a bulwark of Christendom against them. But Ceuta drew the

[1] Major's *Prince Henry*, p. 30.

[2] *Idem*, p. 44. *Cf. Discovery and Conquest of Guinea*, p. 16, (Hakl. Soc.)

15th cent. A.D. sources of its wealth—its gold-dust, ivory and tropical products—from the interior and the coast-districts of West Africa. How to reach these provinces of Nigritia by sea, and thus cut off the wealth of Morocco at its source, became the day dream of the young prince. His zeal for the aggrandisement of Portugal was combined with a passion for maritime exploration and an ardour to extend the dominions of the Cross. The first question which he set before him was whether the North-western coast of Africa should belong to Muhammad or to Christ. Portuguese chroniclers date his exploring expeditions as far back as his eighteenth year, 1412. But from a Bull of Pope Nicholas V., it seems likely that he definitely commenced this work after his exploit at Ceuta (1415), when he had just attained manhood.[1] In 1418, while still only twenty-four, he made his Great 1418 Renunciation and, turning his back upon the world, retired to the wind-swept promontory of Sagres at the southern extremity of Portugal.

On that barren spur of rocks and shifting sands and stunted juniper, with the roar of the ocean for ever in his ears, and the wide Atlantic before him inviting discovery from sunrise to sunset, he spent his remaining forty-two years, a man of one high aim, without wife or child. Amid its solitudes he built the first observatory in Portugal, established a naval arsenal, and founded a school for navigation, marine mathematics, and chart-making. Thither

[1] 'Ab ejus ineunte ætate.'

he invited the most skilful pilots and scientific sailors of Christendom, from Bruges near the North Sea to Genoa and Venice on the Mediterranean. Thence, too, he sent forth at brief intervals exploring expeditions into the unknown South: expeditions often unfruitful, sometimes calamitous, even denounced as folly and waste, but which won the African coast as an outlying empire for Portugal. 15th cent. A.D.

He died at Cape St. Vincent in 1460, having expended his own fortune together with his splendid revenues as Grand Master of the military Order of Christ on the task, and pledged his credit for loans which he left as a debt of honour to his nation. His tomb, in the same beautiful chapel 1460 where his English mother rests at Batalha, bears by the side of his own arms as a royal prince of Portugal, the motto and device of the Garter conferred on him by our Henry VI., and the cross of the Portuguese Order of Christ. On the frieze, entwined with evergreen oak, runs the motto which he solemnly adopted in young manhood—*Talent de bien faire*, the resolve to do greatly.[1]

The king, wrote Diogo Gomez, 'together with all his people mourned greatly over the death of so great a prince, when they considered all the expeditions which he had set on foot'—in the words of his monument on the gateway of Fort Sagres, 'to lay open the regions of West Africa across the sea, hitherto not traversed by man, that thence

[1] For this old significance of the motto, see Major, p. 44.

a passage might be made round Africa to the most distant parts of the East.'[1]

The maps of the two preceding centuries,[2] and especially the Laurentian portulan or chart of 1351, together with notices by the Christian and Arabian geographers of the same period, enable us to understand exactly what Prince Henry achieved. A tradition, for which the Revival of Learning was destined to supply a historical basis, came down through the dark ages that ships had sailed round Africa in very ancient times. The three years' voyage from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, sent forth by Pharaoh Necho (617–601 B.C.), seemed discredited to Herodotus on the ground that now forms its best evidence of authenticity. For who could then believe the mariners' tale that the sun which rose on their left hand during one part of their voyage rose on their right during the remainder?[3]

So little impression did the voyage make on the minds of sober men that Eratosthenes found no record of it in the Alexandrian library in the third

[1] UT · TRANSMARINAS · OCCIDENTAL · AFRICAE · REGIONES
ANTEA · HOMINIBUS · IMPERVIAS · PATEFACERET
INDEQUE · AD · REMOTISSIMAS · ORIENTIS · PLAGAS
AFRICA · CIRCUMNAVIGATA
TANDEM · PERVENIRI · POSSET

[2] The special collections bearing on the Portuguese discoveries are the Vicomte de Santarem's magnificent series of *Cartes des XIVe*, *XVe*, *XVIe et XVIIe Siècles* (Paris 1841) and of *Mappemondes et de Cartes du XIe au XVIIe Siècle* (Paris 1842); and *Die topographischen Capitel des indischen Seespiegels*, MOHÊT, by Bittner and Tomaschek (Vienna 1897). For particular maps see the Sanuto *Mappemonde* (1306–1320?) reproducing the Edrisi chart of 1154 (?); the Laurentian or Medicean portulano (1351); the Pizzigani (1367), the Catalan (1375), the Biancho-Cherso (copied 1447–1459), and Behaim's Nuremberg globe (1492).

[3] But *cf.* Mr. Macan's *Herodotus*, IV. V. VI.: note on IV. 42 (vol. i. p. 28, ed. 1895).

century before Christ, nor Marinus of Tyre in the 2nd A.D.[1] Hanno's shorter expedition down the western coast of Africa (*circ.* 570 B.C.) had the good fortune to be inscribed on a temple at Carthage, and passed thence into the geography of the Greek and Roman world. A century later (*circ.* 470 B.C.) a nephew of Darius undertook to circumnavigate Africa in commutation of a sentence of death by impalement, returned unsuccessful, and was executed by Xerxes.[2]

The legend of these expeditions, like those of the Insulæ Fortunatæ and Homer's blissful realms of utmost earth, waxed faint in the centuries of eclipse which followed the overthrow of Roman civilisation. Even to a friend of Ovid the Atlantic was a sea of darkness.[3] Two schools of geographers had arisen; one affirming the Atlantic to be a great lake with no outlet into other seas, the other maintaining the possibility of circumnavigating Africa. An Alexandrian philosopher of the seventh century A.D. thus sums up the opinion of his time. 'Certain men have supposed, following a foolish tradition, that the Atlantic is united on the south with the Indian Ocean. They pretend that several navigators have been carried by

[1] *Henri le Navigateur*, p. 35.

[2] Herodotus, iv. 43.

[3] Albinovanus makes Germanicus exclaim when he came upon the Atlantic—

'Quo ferimur? ruit ipsa dies, orbemque relictum
Ultima perpetuis claudit natura tenebris.'

Fragm. *De Navigatione Germanici per Occanum Septentrionalem.* Lemaire's *Poetæ Latini Minores* (Paris 1824) gives 'ruit ipse dies.' The Atlantic was to mediæval geographers the Mare Tenebrosum or Mare Mortuum to the Arabs, the Bahr-ul-Zulmat or Sea of Darkness.

accident from the Atlantic Sea to that Ocean, which is evidently false. For it would require that the ocean should extend quite across Libya, and even under the torrid zone. Now it is impossible for men to navigate there on account of the burning heat that prevails.'[1]

The Venetian map of Marino Sanuto (*circ.* 1306) embodies the same idea, and describes a great tract as uninhabitable by reason of the heat.[2] Even the light of the Moslem geographers grew dim. Ibn Khaldun, himself an African and well acquainted with the facts of African navigation just before Prince Henry's expeditions, describes the Atlantic as 'a green or black ocean into which ships do not venture far, for if they get out of sight of land they rarely find their way back.'[3]

Yet the legend of a passage round Africa to India lived. The Laurentian or Medicean map of 1351, although based on conjecture and vague tradition beyond the Gulf of Guinea, shows the trend of that Gulf to the eastwards, and a continuous passage round to the Red Sea. But Cape Non, about eight degrees down the African coast from Gibraltar, was reckoned, according to the

[1] Joannes Philoponus, *De Mundi Creatione*, lib. iv. cap. 5. Major, p. 108.

[2] Regio VII. Montium. *Cf.* the 'Circulus solis ardore torrens: Inhabitabilis' of the Planisphère in Vicomte de Santarem's Atlas (Paris 1842) representing the zones of mediæval geography.

[3] *Tarikh-Ibn-Khaldún*, Cairene edition, vol. i. pp. 37, 45 &c. Ibn Khaldun, *b.* 1332 A.D. at Tunis, son of a Berber father and Arab-descended mother, served as Chief Justiciary in Damascus and Egypt.

Portuguese proverb,[1] the safe limit of navigation in mediæval times, and continued to be so when Prince Henry commenced his explorations. Further south the promontory of Bojador, emphatically '*the* headland,' stretched into the ocean, and shut out the Sea of Darkness beyond it from the European world. Two Genoese galleys sailed in 1291 A.D. towards those latitudes 'that they might go by sea to the ports of India,' but never returned.[2] Indeed so barren of results had been the ancient Carthaginian expedition down the African coast, that only one example of passing Cape Bojador, and that a chance flotsam of shipwrecked Arabs, can be admitted between the voyage of Hanno in 570 B.C. and the fifteenth century after Christ.

To round Cape Bojador and open a path through the Sea of Darkness to the Indian Ocean —to the *thesauris Arabum et divitis Indiæ*—was the purpose of Prince Henry's life. It mattered not that unsuccessful voyages brought on him the reproaches of the Portuguese nobles. The patient prince realised that Cape Bojador was not to be passed by a leap, and set himself to gradually explore down the African coast. It was thus that he won his title as 'The Originator of continuous modern discovery,' and proved what one great man backed by a race of sailors can achieve, in spite of the doubts of science and the discouragement of grandees.

[1] 'Quem passaro Cabo de Não, ou voltará ou não:' Who passes Cape Non will return—or *not.*

[2] Muratori, quoted in full in Major's *Life of Prince Henry of Portugal*, pp. 99-100 (ed. 1868). Dante apparently refers to it: *Inferno*, canto xxvi.

14th cent. A.D. Neither in the islands of the Atlantic nor on the coast of Africa was he first in the field. Certain of the Azores had been reached by Portuguese ships steered by Genoese pilots at the beginning of the fourteenth century and appear in the Laurentian map of 1351. Two runaway lovers from England are said to have been blown south by a storm to Madeira in 1344 and to have perished there.[1] The Portuguese expedition to the Canaries in 1341 has been told by Boccaccio from the letters[2] of Florentine merchants at Seville. But these voyages yielded little or no result. It was reserved for Prince Henry to deliberately rediscover what had formerly been found, and to make discovery go hand in hand with commerce and colonisation.

15th cent. A.D. The same remark applies to the African coast. Beginning with the discovery, or re-discovery, of Porto Santo and Madeira in 1418–1420, the Prince steadily pushed his expeditions southwards until in 1434–1435 his captains rounded Cape Bojador[3] in latitude 26°, and opened up the Sea of Darkness beyond it to Christian ken. After that achievement further progress was only a question of time. Certain dates may however be noted. Between 1441 and 1444 his squadrons explored the African

[1] Robert Machin and Anne d'Arset or Dorset. Mr. C. L. Kingsford's recent examination of the evidence (Dict. Nat. Biog. xxxv. ed. 1893) compels the doubt which I indicate in the text, notwithstanding Major's verifications in 1868. Major gives the lady's name as Anne d'Arfet (p. 67).

[2] Brought to light again by Sebastiano Ciampi in 1827.

[3] *Les Colonies Portugaises*, Imprimerie Nationale, Lisbonne, p. 2 (ed. 1878), by M. E. Lobo de Bulhões. The prior claims of Genoese, Catalan and French navigators are discussed with much learning by Major (pp. 99-

coast to Cape Blanco and Arguin Bay: in 1447 they reached the Rio Grande within twelve degrees of the Equator—where 'the north star appeared to them very low.' By 1455-1456 they had fairly established intercourse with the natives along the shores of Senegambia. Before 1460 his captains had laid open the Cape Verd Islands to the Portuguese: and in that year Prince Henry died.[1] 15th cent. A.D.

To understand the part played by India in the later history of Portugal, and the patriotic sentiment with which the Portuguese still cling to their Indian possessions, we must realise the efforts which the discovery cost the nation and the slow steps by which it was achieved. The forty-two years of Prince Henry's explorations (1418-1460) only added eighteen degrees of latitude to the verified geography of the North-western African coast, from Cape Bojador to Sierra Leone,[2] or not four days' course of a steamship in our times. He barely penetrated the edge of the vast Sea of Darkness.

This small result from so much toil and devotion was due in part to the poor sailing qualities of his vessels; in part to the imperfections of his nautical instruments and to the rudimentary state of navigating science. The fleets of the Mediterranean had largely consisted

133) and dismissed as untenable.

[1] According to his monument at Sagres; or 1463 according to Wauwermans' *Henri le Navigateur*, p. 102, &c. The dates adopted in 1868 by Major should also be compared with those given in *Les Colonies Portugaises* ten years later.

[2] From N. Lat. 26° 23′ to 8°, according to *Les Colonies Portugaises*, p. 3.

15th cent. A.D. of galleys propelled by slaves. But oars could ill contend with the mighty waves of the Atlantic, nor was it possible to provide food for hundreds of rowers on the long voyages which Prince Henry planned. His first problem was to develop the oared galley or weak sailing craft of an inland sea into the ocean-going ship, and to supersede the thews of men with hungry mouths by the winds which ate nothing. The question of sails *versus* oars dates from the earliest period of navigation, and has been discussed by the latest naval historians.[1] Prince Henry required not only a new type of vessel but also a new adaptation of an old force to propel it. It was the Atlantic as against the Mediterranean, and the sailing ship as against the slave-rowed galley.

In this task, as in his actual discoveries, Prince Henry had predecessors. Contemporary drawings disclose the transition from the mediæval galley, a sort of beaked barge with upper structures for fighting men and the lower deck crammed with rowers, to the heavy galleon and galleasse, and the handier caravel with its lateen rig.[2] The caravel marks an early stage of the development of square into side sails which added much to the tacking power of ships, and enabled them to put

[1] Mr. Julian S. Corbett's *Drake and the Tudor Navy* (1898); *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, by Captain A. T. Mahan; *The Royal Navy*, by W. Laird Clowes and others (1897).

[2] The types are figured in Furtenbach's *Architectura Navalis* (Ulm 1629) and by Jurien de la Gravière, whose works (Paris 1885–1887) throw a flood of light on Mediterranean ship-construction.

the wind to its full use on ocean-voyages. Prince Henry adopted the caravel as his model for distant explorations and developed its navigating qualities. Cadamosto,[1] although a Venetian, declared that the Portuguese caravels—craft of fifty tons increasing in the sixteenth century to 200—were the best sailing ships afloat. 15th cent. A.D.

The rudeness of the nautical instruments and of the nautical science of the time was a hindrance to Prince Henry scarcely less serious than the imperfections in the rig and build of his ships. The magnetic needle had been to some extent utilised by Italian sailors in the twelfth century. But the early forms of the mariner's compass were too rough to be trusted on long voyages. Brunetto Latini (the tutor of Dante) who visited Roger Bacon at Oxford, probably in 1258, declared that its discovery 'must remain concealed until other times, because no master-mariner dares to use it, lest he should fall under a supposition of his being a magician. Nor would even the sailors venture themselves out to sea under his command, if he took with him an instrument which carries so great an appearance of being constructed under the influence of some infernal spirit.'[2]

An advance was made during the following century, but the Portuguese historian Barros records with reference to one of Prince Henry's early expeditions, that 'the Portuguese mariners of that time were not accustomed thus to venture

[1] Major, p. 309. [2] *Idem*, quoted, pp. 58, 59.

15th cent. A.D.

on the open sea, all their nautical knowledge being limited to coasting in sight of land.'[1] Prince Henry's instruments were a primitive astrolabe with a quadrant hung vertically from a ring held in the hand, and worked by the help of an alidade 'or ruled index having two holes pierced in its extremities through which the ray passed.'[2] Charts of any exact sort were almost confined to the Mediterranean: beyond Cape Non the conjectural outlines of the Christian mappemonde failed to yield practical guidance.

If it be necessary, in order to appreciate the position which India has held in the national life of Portugal, that we should bear in mind the slow labour of the discovery, it is not less needful to understand the motives which sustained Prince Henry in his life's task. His chronicler, Azurara, explains that, apart from mere exploration, the Prince greatly desired to abase the Moors, to establish trade with the West African coast, and to plant the Catholic faith among the heathen peoples there lying in a state of perdition. Grand Master of the Order of Christ, Prince Henry represented the Church militant in Portugal; as his order represented the crusading spirit of the Knight Templars to whose position and property in Portugal it had succeeded in the fourteenth century. It was with his revenues as Grand

[1] Major, p. 45.

[2] The astrolabe was not rendered really useful for navigation until Martin Behaim's improvements *circ.* 1480. See figure by Jurien de la Gravière reproduced in Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole's *Barbary Corsairs*, p. 104 (ed. 1890). I thank Mr. Lane-Poole for kindly reading these sheets.

Master that he defrayed the cost of his expeditions. 15th cent. A.D.

In 1454 King Affonso V. of Portugal granted to the Order of Christ, in return for the discoveries thus made, the spiritual jurisdiction over Guinea, Nubia and Ethiopia. A tribute of one-twentieth on all merchandise from Guinea, whether slaves or gold or whatever it might be, was secured to the Order of Christ by Prince Henry in 1458. The Portuguese nation was still deeply imbued with the crusading spirit. In 1458, two years before Prince Henry's death, when the Pope summoned the sovereigns of Europe against the Infidels, into whose hands Constantinople had fallen, Portugal made the most effective response. Prince Henry with 25,000 men captured Alcaçar Seguer from the Moors, replying to their offer of surrender that 'the King's object was the service of God, not to take their goods or force a ransom from them.'[1]

The three motives of Prince Henry—enmity to the Moslems, mercantile enterprise, and missionary zeal—profoundly influenced the whole history of the Portuguese in the East. As he aimed at outflanking the Moors in Africa by exploring down its western coast, so his greatest successors aimed at outflanking the Ottoman Empire by dominating the Red Sea. His commercial dealings on the African coast led to the slave-trade which poured an inexhaustible supply of cheap labour into Portugal, relieved the Portuguese from the

[1] Major, p. 301.

15th cent. A.D.

tillage of the soil, and set free large numbers to carry out the royal policy of adventure beyond the sea. A heavy price of national exhaustion had to be afterwards paid for this spasm of external enterprise; but while it lasted the energy was intense. Prince Henry's third motive, proselytism, after a brilliant period of promise, crippled the Portuguese power in India and ended in the horrors of the Goa Inquisition.

Although the discoveries of Prince Henry were bounded by narrow limits, the impulse which he gave to discovery was decisive. He left behind him not only an astronomical observatory, a naval arsenal, and a great school of cartography and scientific navigation, but also a system of continuous exploration. His squadrons consisted of Portuguese ships sailed by Italian or Genoese pilots,[1] and thus combined the nautical science of the Mediterranean with the hardy seamanship of the Atlantic. On his death his work was continued by three successive sovereigns of his house.[2] They found that the Sea of Darkness was no black ocean after all. Prince Henry's improvements had freed long voyages from their worst dangers, and the Portuguese captains, having once rounded the exposed shoulder of North-western Africa, pushed south through less turbulent waters. In

[1] It should be remembered that Columbus who represented Spanish discovery was a Genoese; John Cabot who pioneered for England in North America was a naturalised Venetian; Verazzani who did the corresponding work for France was a Florentine.

[2] Affonso the African, reigned 1438–1481; John II. the Perfect, 1481–1495; Emmanuel the Fortunate, 1495–1521.

1471 they passed the equator, and in 1484 they reached the Congo,[1] erecting crosses wherever they landed down the African coast, and carving on trees Prince Henry's motto, *Talent de bien faire*, together with the name of the Saint which they gave to the newly found land. 15th cent. A.D.

The great discoveries were taken possession of by an imposing ceremony. For example, having reached La Mina on January 19, 1482, 'on the following morning they suspended the banner of Portugal from the bough of a lofty tree, at the foot of which they erected an altar, and the whole company assisted at the first mass that was celebrated in Guinea, and prayed for the conversion of the natives from idolatry, and the perpetual prosperity of the church which they intended to erect upon the spot.'[2] The baptism of a native prince, or of a few negroes seized or lured on board, seemed to the chroniclers of that age the crowning achievement of exploration.

At length in 1486 Bartholemeu Dias, of a 1486
family of daring navigators, rounded the southern point of Africa, but far out at sea in a tempest. He reached Algoa Bay on the eastern coast. There his crews lost heart and demanded an immediate return. After a few days' sail further north to the Great Fish River, Dias had to give up his chance of being the discoverer of India. Bidding a sad farewell to the cross which he had erected on the island of Santa Cruz, he turned back. On his way home he sighted the southern headland to which

[1] *Les Colonies Portugaises*, p. 4. [2] Major, p. 323.

15th cent. A.D. he gave the name of Cabo Tormentoso, the Cape of Storms, but which his master King John II. re-christened the Cape of Good Hope, as a happy augury that the passage to India was now assured to his nation.

Meanwhile two episodes had occurred which determined the future course of maritime discovery. Columbus during his stay in Portugal, 1470–1484, married the daughter[1] of one of Prince Henry's commanders, and obtained access to his nautical journals, maps and instruments. 'It was in Portugal,' writes Ferdinand Columbus of his illustrious father, 'that the Admiral began to surmise that if the Portuguese sailed so far south, one might also sail westwards and find land in that direction.' This surmise was strengthened by the 'Imago Mundi' of Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly, who had copied the passages which supplied the inspiration to Columbus almost word for word from Roger Bacon's 'Opus Majus' written 143 years before.[2] It received confirmation from the travels of Marco Polo, and from the chart and letter of Toscanelli which reached Columbus while at Lisbon.

Columbus had made up his mind; but the spirit of Prince Henry the Navigator no longer inspired the Portuguese counsels. The mathematical board, to whom the new King, John II.,

[1] Felipa Moniz de Perestrello, to whose father Prince Henry had granted the commandership of the island of Porto Santo.

[2] The *Imago Mundi* was written *circ.* 1410 and printed *circ.* 1480–1490. Roger Bacon's *Opus Majus* was written in 1267. The whole subject is minutely examined in Major's *Prince Henry*, pp. 349 *et seq.*

referred the project in 1482, discredited it on scientific grounds. The King himself had political reasons for doubting whether a western route to India, even if found, would be advantageous to Portugal. The map drawn (1457–1459) in the last years of Prince Henry's life, showed the way round the southern point of Africa up to Sofala and 'Xengibar' on the East African coast. The subsequent discovery that the Gulf of Guinea trended almost due east seemed to disclose an even more direct course to India than was actually the case. 15th cent. A.D.

Not only did the southern route appear a certainty, but care had been taken to secure a monopoly of it for Portugal. The Bull of Pope Nicholas V. in 1454 conferred on the Portuguese King all Guinea as far as a certain large river reputed to be the Nile, but which was really the Senegal. A western passage across the Atlantic to India might prove a dangerous rival to the almost discovered passage round the southern extremity of Africa. What between royal hesitations and scientific scepticism, Columbus found that little was to be hoped from Portugal (1481–1483). King John II. listened to base counsels, and after trying to get a detailed plan from Columbus, sent out a secret expedition to secure the discovery on his own account. The surreptitious caravel was driven back by a storm and in 1484 Columbus quitted Portugal in disgust, to hawk about a new world at incredulous Courts during eight more weary years.

The other incident which affected the course of East Indian discovery is more honourable to

15th cent. A.D.

Portugal. Azurara records that one of Prince Henry's main objects was to find out whether any Christian peoples dwelt in the unknown African world. The old confused tradition of a Christian potentate Prester John, and of a Christian nation in Ethiopia, had received confirmation from friars since Prince Henry's death. King John II. of Portugal (1481–1495) resolved to seek out this lost Christian kingdom by sea and land. In August 1486 he sent forth with that object the ships under Bartholemeu Dias, which, as we have seen, discovered the Cape of Good Hope, but which only proceeded up the east coast of Africa to a little beyond Algoa Bay. After an unsuccessful land-mission by way of Jerusalem, John II. despatched Pedro de Covilham and Affonso de Paiva to gather information *viâ* Egypt about Prester John's country and the Indian Ocean.[1] Covilham and Paiva started in May 1487 (while Bartholemeu Dias was still absent on his sea-expedition with the same purpose) and travelled by Naples, Rhodes and Cairo to the Red Sea. At Aden they parted, Covilham sailing east in an Arab ship to the Indian coast and Paiva west to Abyssinia.

Covilham, the first Portuguese explorer in India, stayed some time on the Malabar coast, and visited the very cities which were destined to become the centres of Portuguese activity. On his

[1] An account of Covilham's journey is given from Francesco Alvarez (Lisbon 1540, abridged in Purchas ii. 1091) in the Introduction to *India in the Fifteenth Century*, lxxxii–xc, vol. xxii. of Hakluyt Society's Publications (1857).

return voyage he touched at Sofala, the spot on the south-eastern coast of Africa marked on the Portuguese map of 1457–1459, and thus supplied the missing link between the sea-discoveries round Africa and their ultimate goal in India. He also obtained some knowledge of the neighbouring island of Madagascar, known to the Moors as the Island of the Moon. 15th cent. A.D.

Charged with this all-important information Covilham hastened homewards, by way of the Red Sea. But at Cairo, on learning that his fellow-traveller Paiva was dead, he himself proceeded to Ormuz and eventually to Abyssinia the country of Prester John—where he married, rose to high office, and died after a residence of thirty-three years. Before leaving Cairo, however, in 1490, he sent home a report of his discoveries to the Portuguese King, with the pregnant message: 'That the ships which sailed down the coast of Guinea might be sure of reaching the termination of the continent, by persisting in a course to the south; and that when they should arrive in the Eastern ocean their best direction must be to inquire for Sofala and the Island of the Moon.'[1]

These striking words make Covilham the theoretical discoverer of the Cape route to India. They supplemented the news which Dias brought to Lisbon in December 1487 of his having rounded the southern point of Africa. The pious zeal of the Portuguese sovereign in seeking for the unknown Christian country of Prester John was thus

[1] *I.e.* Madagascar; *idem*, lxxxvi.

15th cent. A.D. amply rewarded by land and by sea. Dias' discovery of the Cape passage towards India rendered John II. uneasy lest Columbus' alternative route westwards should be taken up by a rival Power. On March 20, 1488, he accordingly wrote to Columbus at Seville accepting the offer of the great navigator for the discovery of new continents.[1] But Portugal had missed its chance. John II. during the remaining seven years of his life laboured amid sickness and domestic sorrow to strengthen his position on the African coast: Columbus in 1492 discovered for the Spanish crown the American islands which proved to be the outworks of a new world.

The discovery caused consternation at the Portuguese Court. To the King it seemed that a short cut had been laid open to India: Columbus himself believed to his dying day that Cuba formed part of Asia. The Portuguese sovereign did not at first despair of snatching the fruits of the achievement. His treaty of Alcaçora with Spain in 1479 had conceded to Portugal the exclusive right of navigation and discovery along the African coast, together with the possession of all known islands of the Atlantic save the Canaries.[2] Columbus records that King John II. affirmed in conversation with him the right of Portugal under this compact to the new Atlantic regions.

[1] *Colonies Portugaises*, p. 5.

[2] Confirmed by the Bull of Sixtus IV. (June 21, 1481) and by Innocent VIII. (September 12, 1484). For the Portuguese records used in this and the two next chapters, see *Alguns Documentos do Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, acerca das Navegações e Conquistas Portuguezas*. Lisbon 1892. For the text of Bulls I generally follow the *Editio Taurinensis*.

Meanwhile Columbus and his storm-tossed crew, having landed on their return voyage at St. Mary's Isle, February 18, 1493, were seized as prisoners by the Portuguese governor. Even after their release, and their reception in Portugal with outward marks of honour, it was proposed to make away with Columbus—another base counsel of courtiers which King John had this time the magnanimity to reject. Spain proved equally prompt. By the middle of April 1493, Columbus was in the presence of Ferdinand and Isabella at Barcelona; and on May 3, Pope Alexander VI., himself a Spaniard, granted three Privileges[1] securing to their Catholic Majesties the exclusive right to the newly discovered lands. 1493

This feat of diplomatic activity, hardly to be surpassed in our own time of telegraphs, was at once detected to have trenched on previous papal grants to Portugal; and next day, May 4, a Bull was issued to reconcile the conflicting titles. Spain was to have all lands discovered or to be discovered, and not occupied by any Christian prince at Christmas 1492, to the west and south of an imaginary line one hundred leagues west and south of the Azores and the Cape Verd Islands, which the Bull vaguely takes as one group.[2] No

[1] *Tituli*, in the language of the Vatican Chancery, or less accurately *Bulls*. At pp. 214–216 I examine this transaction from documents kindly supplied to me by Mr. Reddan of the British Foreign Office.

[2] 'Ac quibuscunque personis, cujuscunq' dignitatis, etiam imperialis et regalis, status gradus, ordinis vel conditionis, sub excommunicationis latæ sententiæ pœna quam eo ipso, si contrafecerint, incurrant, districtius inhibemus ne ad Insulas et terras firmas inventas et inveniendas detectas et

other nation was to sail thither for trade or any other purpose without permission of the Spanish crown. Portugal objected to this line as too near to the African coast. After much negotiation, a dividing line between the two nations was fixed at 370 leagues west of the Cape Verd Islands by
1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, and sanctioned by a Bull of Julius II. in 1506. The final Bull of Leo X. in 1514, while confirming previous ones, gave to Portugal an exclusive right of discovery throughout the rest of the globe.[1]

To Protestant writers these papal proceedings have appeared in a somewhat distorted light—as the partition of an unknown world by a Pontiff who had himself no title to it. In point of fact, they exhibit the normal action of international law and diplomacy as then established in Europe, and they formed the only course that could have been adopted, short of war. The Pope, if he no longer stood forth as the conscience of Christendom,

detegendas versus Occidentem et Meridiem, fabricando et construendo lineam a Polo Arctico ad polum Antarcticum, sive terræ firmæ et Insulæ inventæ et inveniendæ sint versus Indiam aut versus aliam quamcunq' partem, quæ linea distet a qualibet Insularum quæ vulgariter nuncupantur de los Azores y Cabo Verde centum leucis versus Occidentem et Meridiem ut præfertur, pro mercibus habendis, vel quavis alia causa accedere præsumant absq' vestra ac heredum et successorum vestrorum prædictorum licentia speciali.' The Bull is printed in full in App. B, pp. 327–332, of Mr. G. E. Weare's *Cabot's Discovery of North America*, 1897.

[1] 'Tam a Capitibus de Bojador et de Naon, usque ad Indos, quam etiam ubicumque, et in quibuscumque partibus, etiam nostris temporibus forsan ignotis.' Lisbon *Bullarum Collectio*, p. 50. See an instructive monograph by Mr. Bourne in Yale Review for May 1892, p. 45.

represented after the fashion of that age what we now call the concert of Europe. 15th cent.

It is not needful to explore the pretensions of mediæval Rome to the sovereignty of the world. By the time of Columbus such secular claims of papal supremacy had narrowed themselves to two main functions: the settlement of disputes or the sanction of treaties between Christian princes, and the ratification of conquests or discoveries made in non-Christian lands. The annals of Spain and Portugal afford many examples of the exercise of this authority. Indeed the recognition of the Portuguese as a political entity dates from the Bull of Alexander III. in 1179 affirming their independence. Their exclusive right to the discoveries made by Prince Henry the Navigator and his successors in the fifteenth century rested on a similar international basis. In 1454 Pope Nicholas V. authorised Portugal to invade and conquer all infidel or pagan countries, and to enslave their inhabitants. Anyone infringing on this grant was to fall under the wrath of God and of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul. After reciting the zeal and labours of Prince Henry, His Holiness granted as a perpetual possession to Portugal all lands discovered or to be discovered south of Capes Non and Bojador. The Bull of Sixtus IV. in 1481 assigned the spiritual jurisdiction of these countries from Cape Bojador *usque ad Indos* to the Portuguese Order of Christ. Such instruments were then the title-deeds of nations.

In these grants the Popes merely exercised

1493 an authority regarded in that age as essential to the peace of Christendom. When therefore the discoveries of Columbus raised rival claims between Spain and Portugal, both parties sought the decision of Rome as to how much of the unknown world had already been assigned to Portugal, and as to what remained available to Spain. Pope Alexander VI., the whole Sacred College consenting, at first acted hastily on the representations of Spain; he amended his decision the next day, perhaps[1] on the representation of Portugal; and the theoretical line of demarcation could be shown authoritatively on the chart only after years of nautical research and diplomatic wrangling.

By the Treaty of Tordesillas, between Spain and Portugal, June 7, 1494, each nation was to despatch one or two caravels to the Canaries with pilots and 'astrologers' to mark off 370 leagues west of the Cape Verd Islands. Apart from international intrigues, the first essential towards the ascertainment of the line, namely the verified measurement of a degree on a great circle, was not arrived at till a century and a half later, in 1669. The line appears on the Cantino map of 1502; but a precise determination of longitude, on which the demarcation depended, was beyond the resources of that age.

Such questions of detail did not affect the authority of the papal award either more or less

[1] The Portuguese intervention is not proved.

than technical difficulties of delimitation in Central 1493
Asia would invalidate a boundary treaty between Russia and England. All sovereigns within the concert of Christendom accepted the Pope's partition of the unknown world between Portugal and Spain. Even princes, like our later Tudors, who renounced their spiritual allegiance to Rome, shrank for a time from openly assailing a political settlement which had become part of the public law of Europe.

I have dwelt on that settlement, because it explains much that has hitherto been obscure, and not a little that has hitherto seemed unreasonable, in the action of European nations in Asia. It enables us to understand how the Portuguese came habitually to speak of all India as their own, although they never possessed more than a few petty settlements on its coast. It throws light on the long hesitation of Protestant England before she struck boldly into the Indian seas on her own account. It legally justified the stigma of piracy affixed by Spain and Portugal to our intrusion within their demarcated line. While the Dutch East India Company were 'rebeldes,' as representing the Protestant revolt against Spain, the English East India Company were 'piratas,' as representing the Protestant intrusion on the papal settlement of the unknown world. This term still clings to the English in the Portuguese memory, and was revived against us during the strained relations of 1891. Even the British sovereigns, which long

formed the chief gold currency of Portugal, were popularly known as 'piratas.'[1]

It may seem as if the rounding of the Cape by
1487 to 1497 Dias in 1487, and Covilham's instructions in 1490 for completing the route to India, should at once have opened up Asia to Portugal. But in 1490 King John II. was seized by the lingering malady, supposed to have been caused by drinking poisoned water, which overshadowed the rest of his life. On his partial recovery in 1491 he had to lament the death of his only son; his queen was attacked by a sickness, almost mortal, in 1493; and the afflicted monarch struggled through a renewal of his illness only to find his kingdom devastated by famine in 1494, and to die in October 1495. His successor, Emmanuel the Fortunate, at once revived the long suspended plan of Indian discovery. In 1496 preparations were made on a scale never before attempted, and in July 1497 Vasco da Gama sailed from the little chapel on the Tagus,[2] which Prince Henry had built for administering the Sacrament to outward-bound and home-returning mariners.

In the preceding month of May 1497, John Cabot embarked from the Severn with a crew of eighteen men to seek for India westwards across

[1] Report to the Secretary of State for India in Council on the Portuguese Records relating to the East Indies at Lisbon and Evora, by F. C. Danvers, Registrar and Superintendent of Records, India Office, London, 1892, p. 21, footnote. The derivation of pirate (πειρατής) as one who makes wrongful attempts stands out in this application of the word to us as wrongful intruders in Portuguese waters. For the mediæval uses of the word see Du Cange, *s.v.* Paris ed. 1866.

[2] At Restello or Belem.

the Atlantic. On June 24, or exactly a fortnight 1497
before Da Gama left Lisbon, Cabot discovered North America for England, instead.[1]

Da Gama's squadron, insignificant as it may appear to modern seamen, marked a century of progress since Prince Henry's day of small things. Even as late as 1486 Bartholemeu Dias went forth to round the Cape of Good Hope with only two ships of fifty tons each and a provision tender. Da Gama's fleet in 1497 consisted of the 'San Gabriel' of 120 tons carrying his own flag, the 'San Raphael' of 100 tons commanded by his brother, a caravel of fifty tons, and a smaller craft laden with munitions. Nor was the improvement in their equipment less striking. Considerable difficulties exist in tracing the early development of the rig of ships. But Columbus enumerates all his sails on October 24, 1492—a fair supply ; [2] and drawings exist, if we could but be sure they were authentic, of Da Gama's two ships and caravel. They were built of carefully chosen wood, strongly fastened with iron, carried 160 men, and each had a triple store of sails, spars and rope. The improvement of the astrolabe by Martin Behaim in 1480 gave

[1] This date is placed beyond doubt by the excerpt from the Bristol civic records, reproduced by Mr. G. E. Weare in his *Cabot's Discovery of North America*, p. 116 (1897). His landfall was apparently in Newfoundland.

[2] Kindly summarised for me by Sir Clements Markham, K.C.B., as follows: 'Mainsail, main topsail, sprit sail, fore sail, mizzen, two bonnets which were strips of canvas laced to the leeches of the mainsail in fine weather.' See also *Archéologie Navale*, par M. Jal, 2 vols. with woodcuts, Paris (1840) ; and W. S. Lindsay's *History of Merchant Shipping and Ancient Commerce*, 4 vols. with illustrations.

1497 Da Gama facilities for navigation unknown to Prince Henry, nor were his nautical instruments as a whole inadequate.[1]

Vasco da Gama finally sailed from the Tagus on Saturday, July 8, 1497,[2] reached Calicut on the Indian coast on May 20, 1498, and returned to Lisbon in August or September 1499:[3] successful indeed, but having lost his brother, half his ships, and more than half his crew. That memorable voyage has a whole literature of its own. It supplied the national epic of Portugal and many a glowing page to the Portuguese historians. It has been examined and re-examined by modern nautical critics. It is made to move afresh before our eyes by one of the most picturesque, yet most practical, travellers of our time.[4] Da Gama not only found the way from the Cape of Good Hope over the Indian Sea, but he shaped his course

[1] See the section on Nautical Instruments in Sir R. F. Burton's *Camoens, his Life and Lusiads*, pp. 381–386, vol. ii. (ed. 1881).

[2] *Roteiro da Viagem*: Hakluyt Society's Translation, p. 1 (1898).

[3] 'Le 29 juillet d'après quelques auteurs, le 29 août selon d'autres, et encore le 18 septembre d'après Gaspar Corrêa, il entre dans le Tage.' *Colonies Portugaises*, p. 6. The much-disputed chronology of the voyage is given by the Hon. Henry E. J. Stanley in his *Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama and his Viceroyalty* from the *Lendas da India* of Gaspar Corrêa, Hakluyt Society (1869). Corrêa had not access to the *Roteiro*, and his dates are untrustworthy.

[4] See vol. ii. of Sir Richard F. Burton's *Camoens, his Life and Lusiads*, 2 vols. (1881), his English edition of *Os Lusiadas*, 2 vols. (1880) and the Hon. Henry E. J. Stanley's *Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama* (Hakluyt Society 1869). Mr. Ravenstein's *First Voyage of Vasco da Gama* being a translation of the journal kept on the voyage (*Roteiro da Viagem que em descobrimento da India pelo Cabo da Boa Esperança fez Dom Vasco da Gama em* 1497) is now the standard English work on the subject (1898).

direct through mid-ocean from the Cape Verd Islands to the Cape of Good Hope, and thus made the first passage across the South Atlantic. 1497-8

The expedition, like those of Prince Henry and his royal successors in exploration, was the work of the Portuguese dynasty rather than of the Portuguese people. King Emmanuel gave from his own hand to Vasco da Gama the banner of the squadron, embroidered with the cross of the military Order of Christ. The Council of State was almost unanimous against the enterprise, and the popular clamour burst forth as the ships sailed from the shore.[1] This clamour, which had from time to time been raised against the royal policy of Indian exploration during the previous eighty years, finds a mouthpiece in the imprecations which close the fourth Book of the Lusiad.

Camoens wrote in the generation immediately succeeding the events which he described, and was intimately acquainted with the contemporary feeling in regard to them. He makes a venerable figure arise, with arm waved to heaven as the ships set sail, and denounce the madness of a monarch who, with an enemy at his gates, seeks the meteor fame of conquest in an unknown world. This dynastic as opposed to a popular impulse forms the key to the Portuguese history in India. One attempt after another by the crown to hand over the Indian trade to public enterprise failed. It

[1] Osorio thus describes the scene on the beach: 'A multis tamen interim is fletus atque lamentatio fiebat, ut funus efferre viderentur. Sic enim dicebant: "En quo miseros mortales provexit cupiditas et ambitio!"' &c.

1498-9 may be doubted, indeed, whether any European people in the fifteenth century had the cohesion or stedfastness necessary to carry out the explorations which ended in the discovery of the Cape route to India, except under pressure from a line of resolute kings. It is certain that the Italian republics had not. But it is equally certain that, in spite of the devotion of Portuguese sovereigns and the heroism of the Portuguese chivalry, the curse of the weird prophet of the Lusiad, amid whose maledictions Da Gama departed, in the end came true—the prize a shadow or a rainbow blaze.[1]

The expedition struck, however, a chord of Portuguese national feeling. Both King and people regarded it as a continuation of the Crusades: a crusade on a larger scale and with better prospects of plunder. Camoens opens the seventh Book of his Lusiad by reproaching Germany, England, France and Italy for their coldness to the sacred cause; calls them once more to Holy War; and shames their silence by declaring that Portugal will single-handed fight the battle of God. His contempt for these Gallios of Christendom is only equalled by his hatred of the Moslems and his travesty of their faith. In the mythological machinery of the Lusiad, Bacchus stands forth as the genius of Islam while Venus pleads the cause of the Christians. Bacchus appears to a priest of the Kuran in the form of Muhammad[2]—the founder of a religion of abstinence from wine! No

[1] Mickle's translation, ii. p. 42, for the spirit not the letter.

[2] *Lusiad*, book viii.

doubt Camoens had in his mind the celestial Venus 1498-9
and the Indian Bacchus. His ignorance of the Moslem creed is as complete as his confidence in his own. The noble Portuguese cavalier would no more inquire into the truth of his religion than into the honour of his mistress. He might know nothing about either, but he was equally convinced of both.

This confidence, light-hearted yet profound, led alike to the success and to the failure of the Portuguese in India. It plunged them into military enterprises, rendered glorious by acts of individual valour, but far beyond their collective strength. It impelled them on a career of religious proselytism, illustrated by beautiful examples of personal piety, yet ending in political atrocities which left an indelible stain on the Christian cause. The missionary spirit of the military Order of Christ, with the sword in its hand and the Cross on its banner, had animated its Grand Master Prince Henry and the sovereigns of his house who, during eighty years (1418–1498), carried out the work of continuous discovery. It burned in Da Gama's breast as he fell on his knees in sight of the Indian shore. It breathes in the prophetic strains of the Lusiad, and in that magnificent vision of a Christian Indian empire which the Portuguese, as the heaven-sent successors of St. Thomas, were to build up.[1] It excuses the ex-

[1] *Lusiad*, book x. The centenary commemoration of Vasco da Gama's discovery in next May (I print this in February 1898) will probably throw new light on many doubtful dates and questions. Among publications issued with a view to that celebration are *O Premio da Descoberta, uma certidão da Casa da India*

aggerated view of Portuguese historians in regard to their real position in India, and their perpetual confusion of personal heroism with political achievement.

The epic of Vasco da Gama is an allegory of his nation's story in the East. His last night on shore he watched in prayer at the chapel of Belem like a true crusader, commending himself and his cause to God. He commenced his voyage amid royal honours and popular misgivings; he conducted it with undaunted courage to success; he returned in a blaze of triumph—amid which he himself crept away to a lonely retreat on the beach, to mourn for the brother and brave comrades buried on far-off shores or gone down in the mighty waters.

por Luciano Cordeiro, Lisbon 1897: *Die topographischen Capitel des indischen Seespiegels* MOHÊT; Bittner and Tomaschek, Vienna 1897; *O Descobridor do Brazil Pedro Alvares Cabral*, pelo Visconde de Sanches Baêna, Lisbon 1897; and Ravenstein's monumental work. Much also is to be expected from Mr. H. Reade's careful editing of the *Roteiro da Viagem de Vasco da Gama* in the *Calcutta Review.*

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHRISTENDOM AND ISLAM FOR THE INDIAN SEAS

1500–1600

THE Portuguese landing was fortunate both as to 1468
place and time. The India which Da Gama reached in 1498 was not the great empire of the Mughals, but a narrow shore-strip shut out from the rest of the continent by a mountain wall, and itself partitioned among petty rajas. The two ranges of the Eastern and the Western Gháts which run down the opposite coasts of the peninsula, have from time immemorial determined its political geography. The Eastern Ghâts stretch in fragmentary spurs and ridges along the Madras side, receding far inland and leaving broad tracts between their base and the sea. This open region, everywhere available for civilised settlement, became the seat of the ancient kingdoms of Southern India. The Western Ghâts, on the other hand, form the sea-buttresses of the Bombay Presidency, with a contracted space,[1] sometimes a mere palm-tree

[1] 'Whose seaward-sloping coast-plain long hath fought
'Gainst Ocean's natural ferocity.'
Os Lusiadas, canto vii. p. 262 of Sir Richard Burton's translation (ed. 1880).

1498 fringe, between them and the shore. At places they rise in magnificent cliffs and headlands out of the ocean, and justify their name as the colossal 'landing-stairs' from the deep.

It was on this shut-off western coast that the Portuguese alighted, and it was destined to remain the sole theatre of their conquests within India. Its chief port, Calicut, off which Da Gama anchored in May 1498, was the capital of one of many rajas who had seized the fragments of the prehistoric kingdom of Chera. According to native tradition the last Hindu sovereign[1] of Chera, on his conversion to Islam in the ninth century A.D., had divided out his dominions and piously sailed for Medina. The main part of his territories went to form the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar in the interior of the peninsula. Out of the residue, Musalman adventurers from the north carved for themselves inland States, which had coalesced under the Bahmani dynasty in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries A.D. The coast-strip of Malabar, excluded from these larger kingdoms by the mountain-wall of the Ghâts, was left to be scuffled for by seaport-rajas, of whom the Zamorin of Calicut became the chief. The size of Calicut may be inferred from the legend that it took its name[2] from its limits having been fixed at the distance at which the crowing of a cock in the chief temple could be

[1] Cheramán Perumál, literally the Great Man of the Chera Folk, said to have been buried at Safhár on the Arabian coast 831–832 A.D. Logan's *Malabar*, i. 195–196 (3 vols. Madras 1887–1891). Rowlandson's *Tahafat-ul-Mujahidin* p. 55.

[2] Koli-Kukkuga, 'Cock-crowing,' or Koli-kotta, 'Cock-Fort.'

heard. Its ruler, although supported by allies or 1498
mercenaries dwelling among the hills, bore the title of Zamorin, literally the Sea-Raja,[1] and derived his importance from ocean-commerce.

The Portuguese might have searched India in vain for a spot better suited to their purpose. Their three objects were conquest, commerce and conversion. For each of these three objects, the Malabar coast-strip afforded free scope. Its chiefs were too petty to resist even a small European Power. They welcomed foreign merchants, as the greater part of their revenues consisted of dues on sea-trade. They allowed liberty of religion in their little shore domains, and they were accustomed to a local population of Jews and Christians whose political existence in India dated from a period more ancient than their own.

As regards the power of the coast-rajas, even the most important of them, Calicut and Cochin, were merely two among half a dozen patches of the Malabar strip: all Malabar had formed but one eighth of the single kingdom of Kerala;[2] and the entire kingdom of Kerala was only one of the fifty-six countries of India recognised by Hindu

[1] Zamorin, the European form of the Tamil *Sámúri*, still used in official addresses to the Calicut chief. Sámúri or Támúri is a colloquial rendering of the Sanskrit Sámudri, a patronymic meaning 'Son of the Sea.' It represents a curtailed paraphrase into Sanskrit of the ancient Malayáli title, Kunnalakkōn = King (*kon*) of the Hills (*kunnu*) and Waves (*ala*). Sir Henry Yule's derivation from *Sámundri* can scarcely be accepted —perhaps it is a misprint.

[2] A dialectical form of Chera. Malabar contained eight of the sixty-four *grámas* of Kerala; and Kerala formed one of the fifty-six *deshas* of ancient India. Sir Richard Burton's *Goa*, pp. 186-187 (ed. 1851).

1498 geography. After Kerala broke up, its largest fragment, Vijayanagar, was reported with eastern exaggeration to have 'three hundred ports each one of which is equal to Calicut.'[1] The Portuguese were themselves on so small a scale that they may well be excused if they over-estimated the importance of the princelets with whom they came in contact. Their whole view of their territorial conquests within India was, in truth, out of perspective.

Affonso de Albuquerque in 1507, when the Portuguese had but two or three little forts on the Indian coast, spoke of his master in diplomatic correspondence as 'King of Portugal and Lord of the Indies.'[2] The Indian titles assumed by the Portuguese sovereigns, and further exaggerated by their courtiers, were yet more absurdly grandiose. The over-estimates of the Lusiad may plead the license of poetry, but even the Lisbon dictionary-maker rises in flights of fancy when he touches an Indian word. The name of that respectable coast-chief the Zamorin is explained by Bluteau to mean 'Supreme emperor and God upon earth.'[3] The Portuguese conquests on the Indian continent were never equal in extent to one of the hundred divisions of the Mughal empire, nor ever contained the average population of a single one of the 250 British Indian districts of our day.[4] The real

[1] *Voyage of Abd-er-Razzak* (A.D. 1442) p. 19, vol. xxii. Hakluyt Soc. Publications, 1857.

[2] *Commentaries of Afonso d'Alboquerque*, vol. i. p. 107.

[3] Dom Raphael Bluteau: *Vocabulario Portuguez.* Lisboa, 1720, *s.v. Zamorim, Samorim*, 'supremo emperador & Deos na terra.'

[4] The Portuguese possessions in

'India Portugueza' was the dominion of the 1498
Eastern seas: a mighty achievement for so small a nation.

The isolated coast-rajas of Malabar weie not only on a scale with which Portugal could fairly cope, but they gladly opened their harbours to strangers. Those harbours, sometimes mere roadsteads, had formed the regular meeting marts of Indo-European commerce from prehistoric times. After touching at Ceylon the junks from further Asia met the Arab ships at Quilon, Cochin, Calicut and Cannanore, all on the Malabar strip. Even the merchantmen from Egypt, who traded direct with Ceylon and Malacca, usually crept up the Malabar shore before striking across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Malabar had thus an unbroken policy of commerce with the West, more ancient even than its appearance in Indicopleustes as 'Malé where the pepper grows.' If the Peutingerian Tables may be trusted to represent the facts about 226 A.D., Rome had two cohorts stationed at Cranganore[1] on the Malabar coast to protect her trade at that early date, and had already erected a local temple to Augustus. In the heroics of the Lusiad as rendered

India contained about 1,605 square miles, and over half a million inhabitants; out of the 1½ million square miles, and 289 million inhabitants of all India in 1891. Their present square mileage is not much less within India than at the height of their power, and their population is probably greater.

[1] Kodungallur, the Mouziris of the Greeks, and maritime capital of the Chera Kingdom. *Malabar*, by William Logan, Collector and Magistrate of the District, i. 192–199. For Ibn Batuta on the importance of the Malabar ports, cf. *ante*, p. 48, note 2.

by Sir Richard Burton :

> 'Great is the country rich in every style,
> Of goods from China sent by sea to Nyle.'[1]

The Malabar chiefs were tolerant of the religions of the many nations who traded at their ports. Indeed the native population itself professed widely diverse forms of faith. Hinduism, which made Northern India its own, had more slightly impressed itself on that secluded southern coast. The lower classes and hill-tribes still clung to their primitive pre-Hindu rites ; the military race of Nairs proudly asserted, as they still assert, their non-Hindu system of family life and inheritance. The chiefs were either semi-Hindus or manufactured into high-caste Hindus on their accession to the throne —as at least one of them is to this day. The strictly Hindu element was a small one, made up of Brahmans whose ancestors had brought their faith from the north, or of subsequent converts. But although few in numbers the Brahmans held a conspicuous place as holy men, and as councillors of the rajas.

This religious freedom was characteristic from early times of the emporiums along the Asiatic sea-route. Abú Zaid when mentioning the foreign colonies in Ceylon (*circ.* 916 A.D.) records that 'the king allows each sect to follow its own religion.'[2] Manichæans, Musalmans, Jews and Christians were alike welcome at the Malabar ports. The coast-rajas

[1] *Os Lusiadas*, Canto vii. Stanza 41 (ed. 1880).

[2] Abú Zaidu-l-Hasan of Siráf translated in Sir Henry Elliot's *History of India as told by its own Historians*, 8 volumes, vol. i. p. 10 (see for date p. 2), ed. 1867. Cf. Renaudot p. 84 (London edition 1733

had specially favoured religions of the Messianic type. If the connection of the Malabar Jews with Solomon's fleets must be relegated to legend, traditions carry back their arrival to their escape from servitude under Cyrus in the sixth century B.C.[1] They tell how later colonies came after the final destruction of the Temple, bringing with them the silver jubilee trumpets. A copper grant proves that they were recognised by the Chera sovereign as self-governing communities at the beginning of the eighth century A.D.[2] These prehistoric Jewish settlements formed in the time of Da Gama, and continue to form at this day, a distinctive feature of the South-west Indian seaboard.

Even more important were the Nestorian communities on that coast. They took their name of 'St. Thomas Christians' from the tradition that the Doubting Apostle had preached throughout India and obtained the seal of martyrdom near Madras in 68 A.D. As I shall examine their supposed history in a later volume,[3] it must here suffice to say that the Portuguese found the St. Thomas Christians both numerous and powerful in Malabar. They preserved under a broken succession of Bishops an early Asiatic form of the faith. Metal plates attest their existence as organised commu-

[1] Logan's *Malabar*, i. 247.

[2] *Idem*, i. 252, 266, &c.

[3] An account of them, from the evidence available to me in India from 1870 to1880, forms Chapter IX. of my *Indian Empire*. But what were then considered primary sources have since been superseded by the local researches of Mr. William Logan, Dr. Burnell, and Professor Gundert; embodied in Logan's *Malabar* (Madras 1887), *The Indian Antiquary* (Bombay), and the *Madras Journal of Literature*.

nities in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D. These Malabar Christian and Jewish grants, flotsam of the wreckage of perhaps a thousand years, are written in a long disused primitive alphabet[1] of the Malayálam language. The St. Thomas Christians enjoyed a rank equal in name at any rate to the Nairs, and are said to have, like them, supplied soldiers to the coast-rajas. They also held office in the great Hindu Court of the interior. In 1442 an Indian Christian[2] acted as prime minister to the king of Vijayanagar—the suzerain Hindu State of Southern India.

The Arab traders found the same friendly reception at the Malabar ports after their conversion to Islam as in their old Sabæan days. Their name of Máppillas, or Moplahs, was an honourable one, apparently in ancient times shared with the Christians.[3] Those now fiercely bigoted Musalmans were in the time of Da Gama composed of two classes: descendants of early Arabian settlers who took the mild Indian view of other faiths; and recent arrivals from Egypt or the Persian Gulf, inflamed with religious hatred which the

[1] Known as Vatteluttu. The Jew and Christian copper grants are given in full as Appendix xii. to vol. ii. of Logan's *Malabar*, pp. cxv–clxiii (Madras Government Press 1887).

[2] Nimeh-pezir by name. *Voyage of Abd-er-Razzak*, p. 41. Hakluyt Society, 1857. Varthema (1503–1508) found St. Thomas Christians at Kayan Kulam. Travels of Ludovico di Varthema, Introd. lxix, Hakluyt Soc. 1863. A Malabar Christian, Michael Jogue, conducted Cabral's negotiations with the Cochin Raja in 1500.

[3] Máppilla, contracted from *mahá pilla*, 'great child'—an old honorific title among the Nairs of Travancore. The Musalmans were known as Jonaka or Chonaka Máppillas to distinguish them from the Christian or Nasrán Máppillas.

Crusades had fanned, and to which the fall of the Grenada Saracens added fresh fury. This distinction between the old Arab settlers in Malabar and the foreign population of traders from Arabia must be borne in mind. The coast-rajas and their native subjects were pleased to do business with newcomers, whatever their creed. But the Arab and Portuguese strangers brought with them an explosive fanaticism always ready to blow religious toleration into the air. An avowed object of the greatest of the Indo-Portuguese governors, Albuquerque, 1509–1515, was to strip the shrine of Mecca and carry off the body of the False Prophet, with a view to ransoming the Holy Temple of Jerusalem in exchange.[1] In his Letters and Commentaries, as in the Papal Bulls, the struggle between Christendom and Islam, and the crusading spirit of the Portuguese, stand revealed.

If the Portuguese were fortunate as to their place of landing in India, they were even more so in the time of their arrival. The great Hindu over-lordship of Vijayanagar in the interior was beset by the newer Musalman kingdoms, and had no leisure for the petty politics of the coast-strip.
In 1564 Vijayanagar finally went down before the 1564
Moslems on the field of Talikot after an existence of four and a half centuries. Its capital can still be traced far inland in the Madras District of Bellary—vast ruins of temples, fortifications, reservoirs and bridges, with a remnant of 693 human

[1] *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso d'Alboquerque,* Hakluyt Society (1875–1884), vol. iv. p. 37.

beings amid a population of hyenas, jackals, and snakes.[1]

At the coming of Vasco da Gama the Musalman kingdoms of the south were also in the throes of dissolution and new birth. The Bahmani dynasty, formed from the coalition of the Musalman adventurers in the fourteenth century, began to break up in 1489, and by 1525 its disintegration was complete.[2] The Portuguese arrived just as this once powerful kingdom was evolving itself through internecine wars into the Five Musalman States of Southern India. Four of the five cared nothing for the isolated coast-strip outside their mountain wall. The fifth only intervened when stung by insult; and its intervention was cut short by the distractions incident to the succession of a boy-prince.

The inland Hindu kingdom and the five inland Musalman States of Southern India, although more powerful than any of the coast chiefs such as the Zamorin of Calicut, were themselves insignificant compared with the great Powers of the north. But at that time the Afghan sovereignty in Northern India was dwindling to the vanishing point. The invasion of Tamerlane in
1399 1398-1399 had left the Delhi monarchy in ruins, and the next century passed in flickering attempts to revive it. Some of the Delhi Sultans ruled only a

[1] See article *Hampi* in my *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. v. (ed. 1885), and pp. 339-340 of my *Indian Empire* (ed. 1893).

[2] The Persian materials for the Bahmani dynasty will be found in Sir Henry Elliot's vols. iv. vii. viii.: and Firishta ii. 283, 558 (ed. 1829). See also Travels of *Ludovico di Varthema*, 1503-1508, Hakluyt Society, 1863; Introduction lix, lxx.

few miles around their capital. Hindu princes and Musalman soldiers of fortune set up for themselves, till at length in 1526 the Mughal invasion from Central Asia swept away the wreck of the old Indo-Moslem dynasties. Yet another thirty years of feebleness elapsed before the accession of Akbar, the real founder of the Mughal Empire. When Vasco da Gama landed in 1498 the old order of things alike in Northern and in Southern India was passing away: the new order had not yet emerged.

The Portuguese, therefore, found a free hand 1498
in dealing with the petty coast chiefs. The Zamorin of Calicut received them graciously and looked forward to an increased customs-revenue from their trade. But the foreign Arab merchants, then the most powerful community at his port, perceived that the new ocean-route must imperil their ancient monopoly by way of the Red Sea. They accordingly incited the Court officials to intrigues which nearly ended in a treacherous massacre. At length Da Gama departed with rich cargoes, presents, and a letter from the Zamorin to the Portuguese king proposing an interchange of commerce. On the passage up the coast, before striking west for Africa, Da Gama lay in at Cannanore. Here the Raja, being on a still smaller scale than the Zamorin, is said to have loaded the Portuguese with gifts—'more spices and merchandise than the vessels could hold '[1]—and

[1] *The Portuguese in India*, by Frederick Charles Danvers, Superintendent of Records in the India Office: vol. i. pp. 60–61 (ed. 1894).

signed with his own hand a treaty of friendship written on gold leaf.

1499 The return of Da Gama to Lisbon in 1499 with a freight which repaid sixty times the cost of the expedition,[1] called forth an outburst of mercantile enthusiasm such as had never thrilled a European nation. It seemed as if the Portuguese King and people were come into a sudden fortune beyond the seas. King Emmanuel, after loading Da Gama with wealth and honours, assumed the dignity of 'Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India.' His claim to possess the non-Christian world to the east of the Atlantic dividing line was perfectly clear from the point of view of European public law. It had been solemnly granted by papal Bulls and ratified by Spanish treaties. Pope Alexander VI. by a further Bull in 1502 confirmed the new style of Lord of the Conquest[2] of India &c. which the Portuguese King added to his titles.

The monopoly of Indian dominion and trade, thus legally secured to Portugal, was interpreted by her in no illiberal spirit. It appeared in some sense as a trust which she held for Christendom. In 1500 the King declared the commerce with India 'which by the grace of God our Lord we discovered and hold in our power' to be open on equal terms 'to all our natives and likewise to the foreigners who are in our kingdoms and who hold

[1] Danvers, i. 64.

[2] 'Conquest' had then, however, a less definite meaning.

our letters of naturalisation.'[1] The terms were 1500
that the ships employed should be of at least 200 tons burden, and should pay to the royal treasury one fourth of what 'in good time they should bring in return.' This charter was to hold for two years, and although many changes, not for the better, afterwards took place, the Portuguese system during the next half-century allowed other Christian nations to profit at Lisbon by the Indian trade—an opportunity of which English merchants largely availed themselves.

King Emmanuel lost no time in trying to convert his claims to the 'Conquest of India' into a reality.[2] In 1500 he despatched a fleet of thirteen

[1] Preamble to 'Charter of License for India,' dated June 29, 1500. India Office MS. series of Portuguese records, *Corpo Chronologico*, vol. i. p. 1. In quoting these documents I invariably use the MS. translation made under orders of the Secretary of State for India.

[2] The primary sources for the Portuguese history in India during the sixteenth century are, the records in the Archivo da Torre do Tombo, the Pombal collection in the Bibliotheca Nacional (Lisbon), the Da Cunha Rivara collection (Evora), and the archives at Goa. The Lisbon and Evora records have been examined, under the superintendence of Mr. F. C. Danvers, on behalf of the Secretary of State; the Goa records I examined myself. Among printed contemporary or primary authorities the following deserve a chief place. *Itinerario de Ludovico di Varthema Bolognese* (4to. Rome 1510) for the actual state of Malabar 1503-1508: Hakluyt Society's translation, 1863. *Commentarios de Afonso d'Alboquerque* published by his son, Lisbon 1557. Hakluyt Society's translation, 4 vols. 1875, 1877, 1880, 1884. The *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque*, edited by R. A. de Bulhão Pato under the direction of the Royal Academy of Lisbon, and to be compared with the four MS. volumes of Albuquerque's letters in the India Office translation, London. The *Lendas da India* of Gaspar Corrêa who went to India in 1514, and died at Goa some time between 1561 and 1583. His *Lendas da India* is a contemporary record,

1500 ships strongly armed with artillery, manned by the boldest sailors and steered by the most skilful pilots of the time. It also carried an abundant provision for proselytism in eight Franciscan Friars, eight chaplains, and a Chaplain-Major. Its commander, Pedro Alvarez Cabral, after discovering Brazil[1] on the way out, was well received by the Zamorin at Calicut. With his sanction the Portuguese established a factory or agency-house on shore for the purchase of spices. After capturing an Arab ship off the roadstead as a present to

begun during the Government of Albuquerque whom he served as a Secretary, and coming down to the Government of Jorge Cabral (1549–1550). It forms the mine out of which many works, such as the Hon. Henry E. J. Stanley's *Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama*, have been quarried. João de Barros (1496–1570), an official of the Casa da India at Lisbon, from contemporary documents to 1539 in his *Asia Portugueza*: the India Office MS. translation of Biker's Treaties; Diogo do Couto, who died at Goa in 1616, from 1526 to 1600; Fernão Lopes de Castanheda (went to Goa 1528, died 1559); Damião de Goes (1501–1573); and the Bishop Jeronymo Osorio (1506–1580) *De Rebus Emmanuelis Regis Lusitaniæ*, published at Lisbon in 1571, are of special value as derived either from actual residence in Goa or from eye-witnesses and documents. *O Chronista de Tissuary* by J. H. da Cunha Rivara, commissioned in 1858 to inquire into the Portuguese archives at Goa, &c. Cf. Faria y Sousa; also Burnell's *List of Books and some MSS. relating to the History of the Portuguese in India Proper*, Mangalore, 1880.

[1] Brazil was held to come within the Portuguese sphere, as lying east of the Atlantic demarcating line, 370 leagues from the Azores. The authorities for Cabral's expedition are Thomas Astley's *Collection of Voyages* (4 vols. 1745–1747), vol. i.; Johan Lodewyk Gottfried's *De aanmerkenswaardigste en alomberoemde Zeeen Landreizen der Portugeezen*, &c., Leyden 1727, vol. i.; J. F. Laharpe's *Abrégé de l'Histoire Générale des Voyages* [Prévost's], 24 vols., Paris 1816, vol. i.; Gaspar Corrêa's *Lendas da India*; *Navegação do Capitão Pedro Alvares Cabral*, S. F. Trigoso; *O Descobridor do Brazil*, Baêna, Lisbon 1897.

the prince, Cabral hastened the somewhat tardy 1500
collection of cargo by seizing a Moslem vessel in the harbour. These lessons in the Christian methods of armed trade made the foreign Arab merchants realise that the struggle between them and the Portuguese was for life or death. They sacked the Portuguese factory at Calicut, slaying the chief agent and fifty-three of his men. Cabral retorted by destroying ten Arab ships, and sailed down the coast to Cochin, burning two more Calicut vessels on his way.

Cochin, a rival port to Calicut, loaded his fleet with spices on fair terms. Cabral signed a treaty with the local Raja; promised to make him some day Zamorin of Calicut; and established a house of agency on shore with a factor and six assistants to provide cargo for the next ships from Portugal. Friendly overtures from the neighbouring coast-rajas of Quilon and Cannanore, with a visit to the latter roadstead, proved that there were plenty of trading places besides Calicut on the Malabar seaboard. Unfortunately Cabral carried off, he says by accident, a hostage who had come temporarily on board at Cochin. To the honour of Indian clemency be it recorded that the Raja took no reprisals against the defenceless Portuguese factors left in his power. Cabral returned to Lisbon in July
1501 with a rich freight, but having lost seven of 1501
his thirteen ships in distant and tempestuous seas.

Before his arrival the King had sent forth, in April 1501, another squadron of four vessels

1501 under João da Nova, who pursued the same system of plundering and burning the Calicut ships, and laying in freight at the rival Malabar ports where the foreign Arabs were either not so numerous or more under control.

The experience gained by Cabral formed the starting-point of the Portuguese policy in the East. King Emmanuel had the choice between peaceful trade at half a dozen Malabar roadsteads, or an armed monopoly founded on the coercion of the chief port, Calicut, and the destruction of the Arab commerce. He chose the armed monopoly. Cabral took the first step by leaving behind a factory at Cochin—a measure on which Da Gama had not ventured at any Indian port, and which involved a protective system of some kind. At first it seemed as if the protection could be secured by a Portuguese squadron in Indian waters, and by severe reprisals for injuries done to factories on shore. Accordingly in the spring of 1502 the King sent forth a great fleet of twenty ships under Vasco
1502 da Gama as Admiral of the Indian Seas, with instructions to leave five caravels to guard the Malabar coast.

Da Gama's first voyage in 1497-1499 had been one of discovery: the object of his second was to secure a permanent foothold on the Indian coast for armed commerce. In both cases he thoroughly accomplished his task.[1] On his second expedition

[1] This second expedition of Da Gama occupies pp. 277-379 of Stanley's *Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama*, from Corrêa's *Lendas da India*: Hakluyt Society, 1869.

in 1502, he bombarded Calicut and destroyed 1502
its Arab merchant-fleet. At four[1] other of the Malabar ports he established close commercial relations, and left behind factories at two of them, together with a squadron under his flag-captain as Captain-Major of the Indian Sea. At one factory, Cannanore, he landed by permission of the Raja garrison-guns, balls and gunpowder; but buried them out of sight to avoid offence to the natives.

Da Gama's successes were, however, stained by cruelties never to be forgotten.[2] On capturing the Calicut fleet he cut off the hands, ears and noses of the crews, eight hundred men, and sent them heaped up with dry leaves to the Raja to make a curry of. The teeth of the prisoners were beaten down their throats with staves. A Brahman messenger was compelled to confess himself a spy under the torture of live coals. His lips and ears were cut off, the ears of an unclean animal—a dog—were sewn to his head; and the mutilated wretch was returned to the Zamorin. Da Gama's flag-Captain, Vincente Sodré, revenged some insulting words, real or imaginary, of which the Cannanore Raja complained, by flogging the chief Arab merchant of the place till he fainted, filling his mouth with dirt and tying over it a piece of bacon.

Da Gama returned a second time triumphant
to Lisbon in 1503. But he left the Zamorin and 1503

[1] Cochin, Cannanore, Quilon, and Baticala. Baticala lay north of Cannanore.

[2] We should remember, however, that mutilation was then common in Europe, and that Correa is our chief authority for Da Gama's cruelties.

1503 the Arab merchants burning to avenge the tortures and outrages he had inflicted. They attacked the Cochin Raja, seized his capital, and demanded the surrender of the Portuguese factors left under his protection. The Cochin chief bravely held out in spite of defeats and distresses until relieved by the arrival of the next fleet from Portugal in September 1503.

Two divisions of that fleet under Affonso de Albuquerque and his cousin Francisco de Albuquerque laid the foundation of the shore defences of the Portuguese in India. The third division under Antonio Saldanha explored the East African coast, plundering and burning such Moorish craft as it met right up to the Red Sea, and thus initiated the policy of cutting off the Indian Musalman trade from its Egyptian base. The squadron left behind under Da Gama's flag-captain Sodré had in the same year, 1503, carried the war into the enemy's waters. After cruising for a time along the Malabar coast, to protect the Portuguese factories, Sodré struck across the Indian Ocean to intercept the Egyptian traders as they passed out of the Red Sea, but he got wrecked off Socotra and perished together with three ships. In India the two Albuquerques built a fort at Cochin by consent of the Raja whom they had rescued from the clutch of Calicut; established a new factory at Quilon, and severely punished the Zamorin. In his agreements with the coast chiefs, Affonso was careful to secure the ancient rights of the St. Thomas Christians and a chapter of his

Commentaries is devoted to the subject, At Quilon he insisted 'that the civil and criminal jurisdiction should be under the control of the native Christians as it had always been hitherto,' and commanded the Portuguese factor whom he left behind 'to act in all things conformably to their counsel.'[1] Affonso de Albuquerque after quar- 1504
relling with his cousin Francisco, returned to Lisbon with a rich cargo in July 1504: Francisco was lost on his way home together with the squadron under his command.

Their departure gave the signal for renewed hostilities by the Zamorin against Cochin. But Duarte Pacheco, the captain of Albuquerque's lately erected fort with its garrison of 100 to 150 Portuguese and 300 native soldiers, feebly aided by the Cochin levies, beat back all attacks, and finally routed the Zamorin's huge forces by land and sea. Pacheco thus showed in 1503-1504 that the Portuguese position could be best secured by supporting one rival raja against another, and by strengthening a small body of Europeans with disciplined native troops under European command. For the recruitment of such troops good materials existed among the brave military caste of Nairs, the Malabar Christians, and the old Musalman settlers who had little sympathy with the bigoted newcomers from Arabia and Egypt.

[1] *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso d'Alboquerque*, translated from the Portuguese edition of 1774 (Lisbon), vol. i. by Walter de Gray Birch senior assistant of the Department of Manuscripts in the British Museum, Hakluyt Society, 1875, vol. i. chapter v. p. 14.

The Hindu Zamorin began to realise his
1504 mistake in allowing himself to be dragged into opposition to the Portuguese by the fanatical Arab traders at his harbour. Pacheco gave an equally useful lesson at Quilon, where the Arabs tried to force the Hindu queen into a similar antagonism. The gallant Pacheco, who had so splendidly maintained the cause of his country against overwhelming odds, was on his return to Lisbon received with royal smiles, and his achievements were preached in every church throughout Portugal. He was then imprisoned on false charges, and was released only to live in distress and to die in penury.

The next expedition under Lopo Soarez de Albergaria, in 1504, consisted of thirteen of the largest ships ever built in Portugal. It continued the policy of unsparing destruction against the ports in which the Arab influence prevailed; laid part of Calicut in ruins; burned Cranganore and all the vessels in its harbour, sparing only the houses and churches of the St. Thomas Christians. The richer and more prudent among the Arab traders, hopeless of protection by the coast-rajas against the yearly squadrons from Portugal, put their remaining wealth on board a great flotilla to carry them back to the Persian Gulf and Egypt. But Soarez caught the rich fleet before it could escape, captured seventeen of its ships, slew 2,000 men and broke the Arab supremacy on the Malabar coast.

During the six years since Da Gama returned

to Lisbon in 1499, the Portuguese commerce had passed through four stages. First: the original plan was to regard the ships as floating factories which should buy up spices at the Indian ports and convey them to Lisbon. Second: in 1500–1501 Cabral established a permanent agency on shore; in 1502 Da Gama's second expedition increased the shore agencies, and made secret provision for their defence. Third: in 1503 Albuquerque no longer thought it needful to bury the Portuguese cannon underground, and turned the Cochin agency into a fortified factory with a garrison of European and native soldiers under Portuguese officers, while his colleague Saldanha struck at the base of the Arab trade at the mouth of the Red Sea. Fourth: in 1504–1505, Pacheco and Soarez dealt a decisive blow to the Arab interest at the South Indian ports, cut off the retreat of the Arab traders to the Persian Gulf, and secured to Portugal the command of the Malabar waters.

History, ancient or modern, records no achievement of armed commerce so rapid, so brilliant, and so fraught with lasting results. Portugal in the first enthusiasm of her great discovery had, under a resolute monarch, put forth all her strength. Not only the Moslem world, but also the Mediterranean republics, woke up to find a new power established in India which was destroying their Eastern trade by way of the Red Sea. The results of that awakening, and the unholy coalitions between Venetian and Turk which it brought about, will presently appear. King Emmanuel perceived that

he had a task on his hands, and perils impending, with which his yearly system of armed merchant fleets was unable to cope.

The absence of a permanent Portuguese head in India had led to abuses and gave a temporary character to the most brilliant victories. 'If Your Highness does not send us aid all will be lost,' the agent at Cochin wrote on the rumoured coming of
1504 a Turkish fleet in 1504. 'I further certify to Your Highness that if we had in this land one who should govern us as is due we should have for your service, Your Highness might well sleep soundly, and so long as this be not so, believe me, the very governors themselves are the very Rumes (Turks), both for the land and for the Fidalgos who serve in her.'[1] King Emmanuel resolved on a change of policy which would remove all doubts as to the permanence of the Portuguese stay on the Malabar coast, and as to his determination to hold what his fleets and soldiers won. In March 1505 he sent
1505 forth Dom Francisco da Almeida, a nobleman of illustrious rank, with a force such as had never sailed to India, and with instructions to assume the title of Viceroy on his arrival.

The task assigned to the first Christian Viceroy of India was threefold. As the Portuguese occupation

[1] Letter of Alvaro de Mendoça for the King, dated Cochin, January 8, 1504. India Office MSS. In the correspondence the Turks or Egyptians usually appear as the Rumes. Constantinople, the seat of the eastern Roman empire, is still known in India as Rum: and the word is applied generally to Roumelia, Turkey, and Asia Minor. *Áin-i-Akbari*, vol. iii. p. 369, note 1. Blochmann and Jarrett's edition, 3 vols, Calcutta (1873, 1891, 1894).

was to be permanent, Almeida was to firmly secure 1505
the base on the East African coast, whence the fleets started across the Indian Ocean to Malabar. This he did by erecting a strong fort at Quiloa, by reducing Mombassa to dependence, by drawing tighter the Portuguese hold on Melinde, and by establishing a Portuguese pilot service for the Indian seas.[1] Having thus secured the strategic command of the Zanzibar coast from Mozambique up to the equator, Almeida proceeded to the second part of his task—the coercion of the Malabar ports at which the foreign Arabs still struggled for the upper hand, and the strengthening of the Portuguese factories on shore. His third duty was to break the Moslem power at sea, not alone the armed merchantmen of Calicut, but the regular navy with which the Mameluk Sultan of Egypt now menaced the existence of Portugal in the East.

If the Portuguese feats of arms in India had been brilliant, the policy which directed and supported them at Lisbon was far-reaching and profound. King Emmanuel discerned that it was no longer a question of destroying the Arab commerce on the Malabar coast, or of intercepting it at the mouth of the Red Sea. It had become a struggle for the command of the whole Indian Ocean—the third and last act in the long conflict between mediæval Christendom and Islam. In the central arena of that conflict, Palestine and

[1] Quiloa, *Kilwa* (always to be distinguished from Quilon on the Malabar coast) lies north of Delagoa Bay and south of Zanzibar: Mombassa to the north of Zanzibar; and Melinde still further north, near the Formosa Bay of the modern maps.

the Byzantine Empire, the Moslems remained the victors after centuries of fighting. In its western arena, Spain and Portugal, Christendom had tardily triumphed. The battle-ground was now to be shifted to the Far East. The great Moslem powers realised this fact as clearly as King Emmanuel himself. It was in vain, however, that the Mameluk Sultan of Egypt threatened to slay all Christians and demolish the Holy Sepulchre, if the Pope did not stop Portuguese aggression in the East. In vain, too, the Venetians who found their trade by way of Egypt imperilled, joined the Sultan in trying to frighten His Holiness into putting pressure on the Court of Lisbon. The Pope was somewhat frightened; King Emmanuel not at all. To the papal representations His Majesty piously replied that his Indian policy tended to the propagation of the Faith and to the extension of the Holy See. He knew that he had turned the flank of Islam, and that he had the sympathy of Catholic Europe in this final and greatest of the Crusades.

1505 The force entrusted to Almeida was on a scale adequate to the work to be done. Twenty-two ships, of which thirteen were to remain on guard in India, carried with them a huge store of munitions of war and 1,500 soldiers besides their crews. In four years (1505–1509) Almeida and his gallant son Lourenço overthrew the remaining power of the Arabs at the Malabar ports, and defeated another great effort of the Zamorin at sea, destroying his fleet of 84 ships and 120 galleys, and

slaying 3,000 Musalmans. In 1506 Lourenço 1506
carried the Portuguese influence southward to Ceylon and received the homage of the native prince to the King of Portugal. The Ceylonese ruler agreed to pay a tribute of cinnamon and elephants, in return for which the Portuguese were to defend him against all enemies.

Meanwhile Egypt was arming. The Mameluk Sultan, finding Venetian intrigues and papal remonstrances alike powerless to stay the Portu-
guese progress, sent forth in 1508 a great expedi- 1508
tion under Admiral Emir Husain [1] with instructions to effect a coalition with the Indian Musalman sea-powers. The junction with the Moslem fleet of the Northern Bombay coast had already been made, when Lourenço Almeida was ordered with a few ships to prevent their further union with the remnant of the Calicut or southern squadron. All he could do was to throw himself across their path, and at the price of his own life to give his father time to gather the Portuguese forces. A cannon shot broke the young hero's leg at the first onset; but he had himself placed on a chair at the foot of the mainmast, and continued quietly to issue his orders till a second ball shattered his breast. The Moslem victors gave him honourable burial, and respectfully congratulated Almeida on a son who, at the age of twenty-two, had covered himself with imperishable glory.

In the following spring, 1509, Almeida in 1509
person defeated the combined Moslem fleets off

[1] The Mir Hoçem or Mir Hozem of the Portuguese records.

Diu, and slew 3,000 of their men. The ... of the Turks upon Egypt, ending in its ... in 1516, gave the Mameluk Sultan of Cai... nearer home, and disabled him from furthe... peditions on a valid scale to the Indian coa...
1509 Almeida's victory off Diu on February 2, 150... secured to Christendom the naval supremacy in Asia, and turned the Indian Ocean for the next century into a Portuguese sea.

The first Christian Viceroy of India had done his work, but even while he was doing it King Emmanuel's views were taking a wider range. The task of Almeida was to secure the command of the Indian Ocean, and he declined to divide his forces by maintaining garrisons not absolutely indispensable on shore. 'The greater the number of fortresses you hold,' he wrote to the King, 'the weaker will be your power. Let all our forces be on the sea; because if we should not be powerful at sea (which may the Lord forbid) everything will at once be against us.' This conviction grew upon him, 'now we have wars with the Venetians and Turks of the Sultan.' 'With the force we have at sea we will discover what these new enemies may be, for I trust in the mercy of God that He will remember us, since all the rest is of little importance. Let it be known for certain that as long as you may be powerful at sea, you will hold India as yours: and if you do not possess this power little will avail you a fortress on shore; and as to expelling the Moors (Musalmans) from the country, I have found the right way to do it, but it is a

long story, and it will be done when the Lord pleases and will thus be served.'[1]

But a sea-policy, with forts at a few dominating positions on the coast, no longer satisfied Almeida's master. King Emmanuel determined to combine the command of the Indian waters with conquest on shore. The first five years of annual expeditions from 1500 to 1505 had given the Portuguese the upper hand in the armed commerce of the Malabar coast. The following four years under Almeida, 1505–1509, left them masters of the Indian Ocean. The next six years, 1509–1515, were under Affonso de Albuquerque[2] to see them grow into a territorial power on the Indian continent. Emmanuel the Fortunate, during his long reign from 1495 to 1521, planned and directed the whole, from the fitting forth of Vasco da Gama on his voyage of discovery to the adornment of the Portuguese capital in India with public buildings, churches and monasteries.

Affonso de Albuquerque, on his return from his first Indian expedition in 1503-1504, had impressed his own magnificent ideas on the royal mind. In
1506 he was sent out as second in command to 1506
Tristão da Cunha with a fleet of sixteen ships to secure the mouth of the Red Sea against Egypt,

[1] Letter from Francisco de Almeida to King Emmanuel, published in the *Annaes das Sciencias e Litteras* for April 1858, and quoted in Professor Morse Stephens' *Albuquerque*, p. 40. Clarendon Press (ed. 1892).

[2] Albuquerque signed his name Alboquerque, and this form is retained in the *Commentaries*. Except in quotations from these works, or for other special reasons, I use the form Albuquerque which modern practice has adopted; as also Affonso for Afonso.

while King Emmanuel despatched another powerful fleet to assail the Turks in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean expedition was somewhat irrelevant; the Grand Turk at Constantinople being as little likely to aid the rival sultan of Egypt as Venice was to honestly help the Portuguese. But the double attack in European and Asiatic waters, if disclosing a flaw in Emmanuel's foreign intelligence, attests the thoroughness of his strategy. The fleet under Da Cunha and Albuquerque, after further strengthening the Portuguese line of communication up the East African coast, took Socotra from the Musalmans near the mouth of the Red Sea. Da Cunha then sailed to India to collect cargo, leaving Albuquerque with six ships in supreme command in the Arabian waters,
1507 August 1507.

Albuquerque's fixed idea was to render every capture by the Portuguese arms a permanent acquisition to the Portuguese crown. He found in Socotra a dominant population of Musalmans and an inferior class of Asiatic Christians, corresponding in some respects to the St. Thomas Christians of Malabar. The Musalmans he dispossessed of their lands: the old-world relics of Eastern Christianity he baptized into Catholicism; giving them, as the price of their prompt conversion, the palm-groves seized from the Musalmans. Having built a strong fort and erected a Franciscan monastery, Albuquerque left Socotra in charge of his nephew, and sailed for the Arabian coast. There, amid mutinies of his captains and troubles

of many sorts, he bombarded Kuriyat and Muscat, and imposed a treaty on Ormuz designed to secure to Portugal the outlet of the Persian Gulf (1507-1508).

His plan was to cut off Ormuz from her natural supports by making himself master of the smaller harbours at the mouth of the Persian Gulf,[1] and thus to dominate the Red Sea route from the north-east as his fortress at Socotra threatened it—from too great a distance—on the south. The mutiny of his commanders in January 1508 arrested the complete execution of this project. But in September 1507 the King of Ormuz had submitted to a treaty written 'in letters of gold and stops blue'[2] acknowledging that he received 'from the hand of the Captain in Chief the kingdom and seigniority of Ormuz, from which he the Captain in Chief had dispossessed him by force of arms,' and agreeing to pay a yearly tribute to the King of Portugal with a sum down at once 'to defray the men's pay which the Captain in Chief brought with him.'[3] In the autumn of 1508 Albuquerque went on to India having vowed not to cut his beard until he built a fort at Ormuz, and leaving the King and his minister to digest these words. 'Have I not already many a time told thee that I was no corsair but Captain General of

1507–8

[1] *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, vol. i. p. 67. Hakluyt Society, 1875.

[2] *Idem*, i. 131. The 'stops' were doubtless the diacritical marks.

[3] India Office MS. translation of Portuguese 'Treaties,' vol. i. pp. 1–4, dated September 1507 (quoting Castanlreda, lib. ii. cap. lxiii.).

the King of Portugal: an old man and a peaceable one?'[1]

1508 Middle-aged the great Admiral certainly was, as he had been born in 1453; but whether peaceable, may be judged from the joint remonstrance which his captains addressed to him at Ormuz on January 5, 1508. 'Sir, we do this in writing because by word of mouth we dare not; as you always answer us so passionately.'[2] Yet it was a generous fire that burned in those sunken eyes and lighted up the worn face. The ringleader of his rebellious captains, João da Nova, to whom he had been forgiving in vain, died in poverty at Cochin in 1509. 'But Affonso de Albuquerque forgot all that he had been guilty of towards himself and only held in memory that this man had been his companion in arms, and had helped him in all the troubles connected with the conquest of the kingdom of Ormuz like a cavalier, and ordered him to be buried at his expense with the usual display of torches, and himself accompanied the body to the grave clad all in mourning.'[3]

Albuquerque arrived at Cannanore in December 1508, and produced secret orders which he carried from the King, appointing him to the supreme command in India on the expiry of the Viceroy Almeida's three years of office. He found Almeida preparing to revenge his son Lourenço slain in the gallant attempt to prevent the coalition of the

[1] *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, i. 237.

[2] *Idem*, i. 169.

[3] *Idem*, ii. 49.

Egyptian fleet with the Calicut ships.[1] Albu- 1509
querque chivalrously acknowledged the father's claim to be himself the avenger of the noble youth, and accepted Almeida's plea that his three years of office did not expire till January 1509. In February 1509 Almeida, as we have seen, defeated the combined navies of Egypt and the Indian coast with terrible slaughter off Diu. But after his return victorious to Malabar he refused to give up his office, eventually threw Albuquerque into prison, and threatened to send him in chains to Lisbon.[2] The arrival of the yearly fleet under a high officer of State, Dom Fernão de Coutinho, Marshal of Portugal, put an end to these stormy proceedings. On November 5, 1509,[3] Almeida surrendered the supreme command to Albuquerque, and on his voyage home was killed at Saldanha Bay by the assegais of a Kaffir mob whose sheep his crew had stolen.

The six years of Albuquerque's governorship (1509–1515) raised Portugal to a territorial power in India. They are made to move before us in his own letters,[4] and in the 'Commentaries' written from his papers after his death. They were years of magnificent projects, and of heroic

[1] *Vide ante*, p. 117.

[2] Almeida had assumed office on September 12, 1505. *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, ii. 48. The struggle occupies the first 48 pages of vol. ii.

[3] *Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque* from February 6, 1507 to December 6, 1515, with other undated letters, published under the direction of the Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa, 4to Lisboa 1884.

[4] Translated for the India Office, and forming four folio MS. volumes entitled *Albuquerque's Letters*.

1509 to 1515 accomplishment. To Albuquerque's far-reaching mind the struggle was not with a few port-rajas on the Malabar coast, but with the combined forces of the Musalman world. Was the Asiatic sea-route to belong to Christendom or to Islam? Imperfectly acquainted with the conflict for Egypt between the Ottoman dynasty of Constantinople and the Mameluk Sultans of Cairo, it seemed to him, as it did to the Indian coast-princes, that the whole power of the Rumes, or Turks in the widest sense of the word, would sooner or later be hurled against him. 'The cry the Rumes are coming,' he wrote, 'menaced me at every step.'[1]

The magnitude of the danger explains and justifies the vastness of his designs to meet it. Some of those designs, as narrated by his biographers, belong to the region of romance. 'There are two actions,' writes Machado, 'suggested by the magnanimity of his heart which he determined to perform. One was to divert the channel of the Nile to the Red Sea[2] and prevent it from running through Egypt, thereby to render the lands of the Grand Turk sterile; the other to carry away from Meca the bones of the abominable Mafoma [Muhammad], that, these being reduced publicly

[1] 'Afonso d'Alboquerque to the King,' dated April 1, 1512 (p. 8 of India Office MS. translation).

[2] Authentic information (beyond Covilham's report and Fra Mauro's map) about Abyssinia, where this feat was to be performed, did not reach Portugal till many years after the death of Affonso de Albuquerque in 1515. See *Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia during the years* 1520–27, by Father Francisco Alvarez: translated by Lord Stanley of Alderley, Hakluyt Society, 1881.

to ashes, the votaries of so foul a sect might be confounded.'[1] 1509 to 1515

Apart from such grandiose conceptions, his policy was an extremely practical one, and formed a strategic whole. It consisted of three series of operations. The first series was designed to intercept the Moslem trade at its base in the Nile and Euphrates valleys, by occupying the mouths of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. 'For it was there,' he explained, 'that His Highness [the King of Portugal] considered we could cut down the commerce which the Moors of Cairo, of Meca and of Juda carry on with these parts.'[2] This he partially accomplished by building a strong fortress at Ormuz (1515), blockading and besieging Aden, and trying to incite the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia to attack Egypt from the south. How vague was his knowledge of that semi-fabulous realm of Prester John may be inferred from Albuquerque's repeated requests for miners skilled in rock-excavation from Madeira, to tunnel a passage for the Nile through the Abyssinian mountains to the Red Sea, and thus destroy the irrigation of Egypt.[3] Partial as was his success in cutting off the Musalman trade of Asia from its Egyptian base, his operations combined with internal

[1] Diogo Barbosa Machado, in the *Bibliotheca Lusitana, Historia Critica e Chronologica*, tom. i. p. 22, quoted in *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, i. p. xli.

[2] *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, iii. p. 117.

[3] *Idem*, iv. 36; 'so as to ruin Cairo,' iv. 206–207. Francisco de Albuquerque (not the brother of Affonso) wrote to the King, October 20, 1513, 'that he who should hold the fortress in Harquiquo or the land of Prester John will be Lord of India.' India Office MSS.

1509 to 1515 disputes among the Moslems to render 'the cry the Rumes are coming'—only a cry as long as he stood guard.[1]

The second series of Albuquerque's operations was directed against the Musalman trade in the Malabar ports. Those ports collected the pepper and ginger of the South Indian coast, and formed emporiums for transhipment of the more precious spices—the cinnamon, mace and cloves—of the further East. Albuquerque determined not only to bring under strict control the old calling places of the Asiatic trade-route on the Malabar littoral, but also to concentrate their commerce at a Portuguese harbour further north. He wanted a port which should command alike the trade of the southern and of the northern Bombay coast. He found what
1510 he wanted at Goa, and in 1510 he seized it. Its position, half way between the ancient trade roadsteads in Malabar and in Gujarat, enabled the Portuguese to dominate the whole shore-line of Western India from the Gulf of Cambay to Cape Comorin. The old ports of Quilon, Cochin, Cannanore and Calicut had to submit to the restrictions placed on them in the interests of Goa. No Musalman ship could safely trade in Malabar waters without a pass from the Christians. The conquest of Goa put the seal on Portuguese naval supremacy along

[1] How alarming was that cry may be seen from volume i. of the *Corpo Chronologico* (India Office MS. translation), *e.g.* Letter for the King under date March 29, 1512; other undated letters, apparently from the same hand, at pp. 21 and 24 of pencil paging; and of December 2, 1516.

the South-west Indian coast. It also involved 1509 to 1515
territorial rule in India.

Albuquerque's third series of operations struck at the sources of the Musalman trade in the Far East. The Malabar ports were merely intermediaries for the great volume of Moslem commerce which had its origin in Malacca or the Spice Archipelago, and its terminus at the Egyptian ports of the Red Sea. Albuquerque resolved to cut off that commerce at its fountain-head, by seizing Malacca.[1] 'For when Malacca is taken,' he exhorted his captains, 'the places on the Straits must be shut up, and they,' the Moslems, 'will never more be able to introduce their spiceries into those places.'[2] In 1508 King Emmanuel had despatched an expedition under Diogo Lopes de Sequeira to explore Madagascar on one side of the Indian Ocean and the Malay peninsula on the other. Sequeira after a friendly reception by the Sultan of Malacca, set up a factory, but underwent the usual experience of hostility from the Arab traders and treachery from the Court officials. He found himself compelled to sail away, leaving the factory and twenty Portuguese at the mercy of the natives. A squadron, despatched from Lisbon in 1510 to rescue these prisoners, was retained by Albuquerque in India to assist in the capture of Goa. In 1511 Albuquerque himself undertook the task, captured Malacca, built a fortress, and established a firm Portuguese government which

[1] For importance of Malacca in 14th century, *ante*, p. 47.

[2] The *Commentaries*, iii. 115–119 give the whole argument.

1509 1515 amid varying fortunes dominated the Malay Peninsula for a hundred years.

Albuquerque thus carried out his threefold plan by partially cutting off the Arab commerce from its western base at the mouths of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea; by establishing a Portuguese control at Goa over the half-way marts on the Malabar coast; and by the conquest of Malacca, the most lucrative source of Moslem commerce in the Far East. The strategic design for converting the Indian Ocean from a Moslem to a Christian trade-route was complete. It only remained for his successors to fill in the details. By brilliant feats of arms and by not less skilful diplomacy they made themselves masters at dominant positions around the edge of the great Asiatic basin from the African coast to the Spice Islands. The achievement would have been a splendid one for the greatest of European powers. Accomplished by one small Christian kingdom it makes the history of Portugal read like a romance.

Albuquerque died in December 1515 outside the Goa bar; never having been raised to the dignity of Viceroy, superseded as Governor, yet lifting up his hands to heaven and giving 'many thanks to our Lord.'[1] 'In bad repute with men because of the King,' he had exclaimed when he heard of the arrival of his successor, 'and in bad repute with the King because of the men, it were

[1] For the last pathetic scene, read the *Commentaries*, vol. iv. pp. 195-196.

well that I were gone.' No public statue of him exists 1515
in Lisbon, so far as I could find. Half a century elapsed after he had 'finished all his troubles without seeing any satisfaction of them,' before the final step was taken in the career of Portuguese supremacy which he had marked out. In 1571 the Lisbon Court divided the Asiatic seas into three independent commands, with a Portuguese Governor at Mozambique for the settlements on the African coast; a Portuguese Viceroy at Goa for the Indian and Persian possessions; and a Portuguese Governor at Malacca for the islands of the Far East.

From the time of Albuquerque the inexorable issue between Catholicism and Islam in Asia stands forth. Each side firmly believed itself fighting the battles of its God. 'I trust in the passion of Jesus Christ in whom I place all my confidence,' Albuquerque declared in 1507 before entering on his governorship, 'to break the spirit of the Moors.'[1] 'The first ground of our policy,' he wrote four years later, 'is the great service which we shall perform to Our Lord, in casting the Moors out of this country, and quenching the fire of the sect of Mafamede [Muhammad], so that it may never burst forth again hereafter.'[2] 'May God never permit,' writes a Portuguese
commander in 1522, 'that by our neglect and sins 1522
should be lost what has cost so much of the martyrs' blood.'[3] The most precious gift brought

[1] *Idem*, i. 108. [2] *Idem*, iii. 116.
[3] Letter from Pedro de Faria for the King, January 18, 1522. India Office MSS.

to Goa by an ambassador, real or pretended, from Abyssinia was 'the wood of the Holy True Cross.'[1] The Moslems, appealing with equal confidence to Allah, called the Faithful to the sacred war. 'We desire nought else but to be close to God,' runs
1539 their summons in 1539. It denounces the aggressions 'of the Christians of Portugal,' and warns an Indian prince that, if he holds back, his 'soul will descend into hell.'[2]

To 'the martyrs' blood' of the Portuguese, and the relic of the Blessed Rood from Abyssinia, the Moslems oppose their 'Holy Fleet.'[3] First the Arabs of the Indian ports supply 'the fighters for the faith.' Then the Mameluk Sultan of Cairo sends armaments. Finally enters on the scene the mighty power of the Turkish Empire, which deemed its subjugation of Egypt incomplete as long as the Portuguese threatened the Red Sea. The Arabs of the Indian ports quickly succumbed to the cavaliers of the Cross. The Mameluk Sultans of Egypt, hard pushed by the Ottomans from the north, could make no headway against the Portuguese in the east. But the Turks, or 'Rumes,' turned back the tide of Christian conquest in Asia.

'The cry the Rumes are coming,' which afflicted Albuquerque, for ever resounded in the ears of his successors. When the Portuguese

[1] Letter of Duarte Barbosa for the King, January 12, 1513. India Office MSS.

[2] Solimão Baxa (Sulaiman Baksh) to the Ruler of Cambaia (Cambay), May 7, 1539. India Office MSS.

[3] *Idem.*

closed the Malabar shore route to the Moslem world, the Arab ships struck boldly across the Indian Ocean from Aden to south of Ceylon, passing through the Maldive Islands or far out at sea. When the Portuguese secured the strong position of Diu at the north entrance to Indian waters, the Turks constantly harassed that station, and tried to outflank it by menacing the Portuguese factories westwards on the Persian Gulf. When the Portuguese sought the enemy in the Red Sea, they were often repulsed, and their momentary successes at Aden ended in lasting failure. In vain the Lisbon Court tried to make a few years' arrangement with the Turks, offering in 1541 to supply pepper in exchange for wheat, and passes for Moslem ships in Indian waters in return for free entrance to Aden and the Arabian ports of the Red Sea.[1]

The unholy project came to nought. Four years later, in 1545, the Turks boldly attacked the 1545
Portuguese Diu; in 1547, their janissaries appeared before Portuguese Malacca; in 1551 and again in 1581 their galleys sacked Portuguese Muscat. In the next chapter we shall see a rough demarcation arrived at between the Portuguese and Turkish spheres of influence on the Persian coast—but a line ever shifting with the fortunes of a ceaseless war. After the union of the two Iberian crowns in 1580, as before it, the Portuguese in Asia remained the

[1] Instructions to Duarte Catanho dated February 10, 1541. India Office MSS. The authority for these Instructions, however, seems doubtful.

outflanking force of Christendom against the Turk. They not only drained the Ottoman resources, by intercepting the flow of wealth from India to Egypt and Constantinople. They also compelled a diversion of the Turkish fighting power from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The 'martyrs' blood' of the Portuguese, poured forth during a century on the Indian Ocean, was a constant factor in the conflict between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottomans in Europe—that long grapple between Christianity and Islam fought out on the line of the Danube and summed up by the sea-fight of Lepanto (1571).

The story of Portugal's work in Asia will, I trust, be one day told to the English-speaking world in a manner worthy of the theme. For such a history ample materials, printed and manuscript, are now available. My present object is merely to bring into view the struggle between Islam and Christendom for the Indian Ocean in the century preceding our own appearance on the scene. I dare not expand these preliminary chapters by the deeds of heroism and chivalrous devotion on both sides. Nor is it permitted to me to attempt even the most rapid sketch of the separate expeditions, with their skilful combination of sea and land power, which secured the triumph of Portugal on the Indian coast-line. I have had to mention the successive armaments sent forth during the years following Da Gama's discovery, for almost each of them marked a stage in the swift development of

the Portuguese power in the East. But the long rule of Affonso Albuquerque gave fixity to the programme. It becomes possible, therefore, to pass over subsequent operations however important in themselves, and to trace the main lines of policy by which his great design was accomplished.[1]

[1] I would here express my gratitude for the courteous aid which I received during my examination of the materials at Lisbon; and especially to the erudite and accomplished Visconde de Castilho, who placed at my disposal many works from his valuable collection of 'Olisiponiana;' to Senhor Raphael Basto for access to the original Bulls and archives of the Torre do Tombo; to Senhor Gabriel Pereira and his assistants in the Bibliotheca Nacional; to Baron Danvers; to His Excellency Admiral Amaral, late Minister of Marine, President of the Lisbon Geographical Society, and to Senhor Luciano Cordeiro its indefatigable secretary, to whom geographical science in Portugal is largely indebted for its recent remarkable progress, and for its installation in one of the most magnificent Society-houses in the world. Also to Mr. H. Reade for kindly looking through the proof sheets of this volume which deal with the Portuguese settlements in India.

CHAPTER IV

THE PORTUGUESE POLICY IN THE EAST

1500–1600

1500 to 1600 The actual achievement of Portugal in Asia was not a land-empire but the overlordship of the sea. Her sphere of influence stretched eastwards across the vast basin six thousand miles from the African coast to the Moluccas, and northward four thousand miles from the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf. Her political frontier, that is the line which she had more or less continuously to hold, was not defended by rivers or mountains. It was the open edge of the ocean following, at the height of the Portuguese power, a sinuous route from Natal north-east to Ormuz, from Ormuz south-east to Cape Comorin, from Comorin north-east again to Bengal, then south-east to Malacca, Java and the Spice Islands—a jagged semi-circle of over 15,000 miles. That a small European nation, then numbering perhaps not more than a million of souls, should continue to hold this frontier was impossible when stronger European rivals came upon the scene. That Portugal should have held it for a century against the Musalman world is an enduring glory to herself and to Christendom.

How to make the most of her slender resources 1505
in this stupendous task was, from the arrival of her first Viceroy, Almeida, the supreme problem of Portugal in India. Almeida (1505–1509) believed, as we have seen, that the solution lay in an exclusively sea-policy, supported by as few forts as possible at dominant positions on the Indian coast. Albuquerque took a wider view. He realised that the command of the sea, separated by a fourth of the globe from his European base, must depend upon a line of shore supports whence he could draw both revenues and supplies. 'My will and deter- 1511
mination is, as long as I am Governor,' runs his famous speech to his captains at Malacca in 1511, 'neither to fight nor to hazard men on land, except in those parts wherein I must build a fortress to maintain them.' [1]

'If it be the wish of our Lord,' he wrote to the 1512
King in 1512, 'to dispose the commerce of India in such a manner that the goods and wealth contained in her should be forwarded to you year by year in your squadrons, I do not believe that in all Christendom there will be so rich a king as your Highness. And therefore do I urge you, Senhor, to work up warmly this affair of India with men and arms and strengthen your hold in her, and securely establish your dealings and your factories. And that you wrest the wealth of India and business from the hands of the Moors, and this by good fortresses gaining the principal places of

[1] *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, vol. iii. 115-119.

business of the Moors.'[1] The Moslem opposition 'will subsist in India so long as they do not see in your power the principal forces of the country, and good strongholds or a power of men to keep them at peace.' Albuquerque thus sums up his demand—either a great fleet and an army, or the seizure and fortification of the principal towns 'on the shores of the sea.'

1513 Again in 1513, as regards attacks from the Rumes or Turkish Empire, 'I hold it to be free from doubt that if fortresses be built in Diu and Calicut (as I trust in Our Lord they will be), when once they have been well fortified, if a thousand of the Sultan's ships were to make their way to India, not one of those places could be brought again under his dominion.'[2] 'I would strongly point out,' he had written to King Emmanuel in 1510, 'the uselessness of sending any more ships to these waters, as the supply of vessels here is ample. What we require is a large supply of arms, ammunition, and materials of war.'

In carrying out this policy, says Machado, 'he erected with an expense equal to their magnificence the fortresses of Malacca, Ormuz, Calicut, Cochin and Cannanore, inscribed on whose stones his name is handed down to posterity under the

[1] Letter from Affonso de Albuquerque to King Emmanuel of Portugal dated April 1, 1512. No. IX. in India Office MS. translation. An altogether remarkable piece of plain-speaking to His Majesty, dealing with the whole question of Indian policy from the Red Sea, along the Indian coast and eastwards to Malacca, in 75 folio pages.

[2] *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, vol. iii. p. 200.

glorious title of Founder of the Portuguese Empire in the East.'[1]

Albuquerque's plan of seizing strongholds, wherever convenient on the coast, might easily degenerate into a system of piratical descents. As a matter of fact, Goa, by far the largest acquisition of the Portuguese in India, was captured with the aid of a famous corsair, Timoja, during the absence of its lawful prince. But however we may stigmatise such attacks, they merely extended to Asia the state of war then chronic between Christendom and Islam in Europe. The Papal Bulls seemed to the sixteenth century the literal fulfilment of the Scriptural promise and command. 'Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel.'[2] The Portuguese historian De Barros denied to unbelievers the international rights pertaining to States within the comity of Christendom. A similar sentiment may be cited from our own Coke, and although Coke's view was afterwards condemned by Lord Mansfield, it is not the less representative of the age to which it belonged.[3]

[1] Diogo Barbosa Machado, in the *Bibliotheca Lusitana, Historica Critica e Chronologica*: quoted, *Commentaries*, vol. i. Preliminary matter, p. xxxix.

[2] Psalm ii. 8, 9.

[3] The question is fully discussed in the Hon. H. E. J. Stanley's Introduction pp. xxix ff. to *The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama*, from Corrêa's *Lendas da India*, Hakluyt Society, 1869. Stanley quotes *Coke's Reports*, Calvin's Case, iv. 29.

The Holy See distinguished, indeed, between negative unbelievers who had never heard of the faith, and positive unbelievers who having knowledge of the faith, received it not, or subsequently renounced it.[1] King Emmanuel of Portugal met the difficulty from the outset, by embarking in
1500 1500 A.D. a band of friars[2] with his expedition of 1,200 fighting men, and instructing Cabral as follows. 'Before he attacked the Moors and idolaters of those parts with the material and secular sword, he was to allow the priests and monks to use their spiritual sword which was to declare to them the Gospel . . . and convert them to the faith of Christ . . . And should they be so contumacious as not to accept this law of faith . . . and should they forbid commerce and exchange . . . in that case they should put them to fire and sword, and carry on fierce war against them.'[3] The Portuguese King thus regularised his position from the theological point of view. The same sentiment of no common faith, no common rights, still influences the European attitude to the African races; but for the words Christianity and paganism, we now use the terms civilisation and barbarism.

In carrying out the doctrine of lawful war against all unbelievers, with whom no express compact existed to the contrary, the Portuguese

[1] In condemning the Inquisition we should not forget that it seemed at first a defence of Christian Spain against Islam.

[2] *Ante*, p. 106.

[3] De Barros: Decade i. lib. v. cap. i. (quoted in Stanley's *Vasco da Gama*, pp. 186–187).

were led into cruelties, in part common to that time, but in part arising from their peculiar position in Asia. Their force was so small that they thought it needful to punish without mercy any resistance or revolt. This necessity for terrorising the superior numbers of their enemies may explain, it can never excuse, the atrocities which stained their history in the East. Such severities became a fixed principle of their policy from the second voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1502.[1] The Bishop Osorio blames Almeida (1505–1509) for torturing and executing his prisoners after the battle of Diu, and reprobates the conduct of a captain who in 1507 threw the crew of an Arab ship sewed up in sails into the sea, although they had not defended themselves, and held a Portuguese passport.[2] Almeida 'blew his prisoners from guns before Cannanore, saluting the town with their fragments.'[3] On the capture of Brava, the Portuguese soldiers 'barbarously cut off the hands and ears of women, to take off their bracelets and earrings, to save time in taking them off.'[4]

These were not exceptional barbarities. The permanent attitude of the Portuguese to all Asiatics who resisted was void of compunction.

[1] But *cf. ante*, p. 109, note 2.

[2] Stanley's *Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama*, xxix–xxxii. Hakluyt Society, 1867.

[3] Damião de Goes (*Chronica do Felicissimo Rey Dom Manoel*, Lisbon 1566–1567); Stanley, *ut supra*, xxxiii.

[4] *Asia Portugueza*. Lisbon, 3 vols. 1666–1675. (*The Portuguese Asia* of Manuel de Faria y Sousa, translated by Captain John Stevens, London, 3 vols. 1695, vol. i. p. 116).

To quote a few examples from contemporary manuscripts; a letter to the King of Portugal in
1518 1518 speaks of the people of Dabul as 'dogs' who 'do not want but the sword in hand.'[1] In 1535, at the capture of the petty island of Mete near Diu, 'all were killed, without allowing a single one to live, and for this reason it was henceforward
1540 called the Island of the Dead.'[2] In 1540 the Zamorin was compelled to agree to cast out of his dominions all who would not accept the terms imposed, 'and if they should not wish to go, he
1546 will order them to be killed.'[3] In 1546, says the official report of the siege of Diu, 'we spared no life whether of women or children.'[4]

I cut short the list of horrors. The Portuguese cruelties were deliberate rather than vindictive. Even a high-minded soldier and devout cavalier of the Cross like Albuquerque believed a reign of terror to be a necessity of his position, and that, in giving no quarter, he best rendered service to Christ and acted with the truest humanity in the long run to the heathen. So inherently noble was he felt to be, that in after years both Hindus and Muhammadans were wont to repair to his tomb, and there, as in the presence of his shade, to call upon God to deliver them from the tyranny of his

[1] Letter from João de Lima for the King, dated Cochin December 22, 1518. India Office MSS.

[2] Contract between the King of Gujarat and Nuno da Cunha, Captain-General and Governor of India, dated October 25, 1535, footnote. India Office MSS.

[3] Contract between the Viceroy Dom Garcia and 'the King of Calicut,' dated January 1, 1540. India Office MSS.

[4] Letter of Manuel Rodrigues for the King, dated Diu, November 24, 1546. India Office MSS.

successors. Yet even his lofty soul stooped to the 1507
atrocities of cutting off the ears and noses of his prisoners,[1] of hunting in rowing boats after despairing wretches who had thrown themselves overboard and hacking them to pieces in the water,[2] and
of slaying the women and children of captured 1510
towns.[3] Terrorism had to take the place of strength. It was a device to which the Portuguese were compelled by plans of conquest beyond their national resources.

The main object of the Portuguese in Asia was a monopoly of the Indo-European trade. I propose, without dwelling on individual feats of arms, to briefly show how that monopoly was secured, partly by treaties and partly by war; how it was maintained by a combined naval and military force; what the monopoly consisted of, and the mercantile methods by which it was worked.

The more important treaties of Portugal in the East followed a common type, and Albuquerque's first engagement with Ormuz may be taken as an illustration of the whole.[4] In that instrument
the 'King of Ormuz' (1) acknowledges himself 1507
a vassal to the Portuguese sovereign, (2) grants a

[1] At Kuriyat in 1507 and at Kalhat in 1508.

[2] Off Ormuz in 1507.

[3] At the second capture of Goa 1510 and at Malacca in 1511.

[4] They may be studied in detail in the *Collecção de Tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da India Portugueza fez com os Reis e Senhores com quem teve relações nas partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde o principio da Conquista até ao fim do seculo xviii*, por Julio Firmino Judice Biker, 10 vols, 8vo. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1881–1885. I invariably quote from the India Office MS. translation (2 vols. folio).

1507 site for a factory and fortress, (3) submits to a yearly tribute and agrees to a payment towards the expenses of the troops which had coerced him.[1] These three main heads of political dependence, a fortified factory, and a tribute or money payment, supplied the model for subsequent treaties, wherever the Portuguese found themselves strong enough to enforce them. They were the standard of subjection which the Portuguese sought to impose on the coast-powers from the Red Sea to the Moluccas. The system developed into an endeavour to exempt Portuguese vessels from dues at the Indian ports, and to extract a revenue for Portugal from the local customs tariff. But the length of the coast-line to be coerced, and the unequal forces employed for the task, render generalisations unsafe. The treaty-history of Portugal in the East may be best understood from some characteristic examples.

Calicut, being defiant and one of the strongest positions on the Indian coast, for a time treated on
1513 advantageous terms. The compact of 1513,[2] provided for the exchange of pepper and ginger at fair rates for the Portuguese imports, allowed the Calicut Zamorin to send two trading ships under Portuguese passes to Ormuz during the current year, and agreed that Portuguese merchandise should pay dues. A fortified factory was then built and the

[1] 'Conditions of the Peace Treaty made by Affonso de Albuquerque and the King of Ormuz, September 1507.' India Office MS. translation, vol. i. pp. 1–4.

[2] Executed at Cannanore, October, 1513, but dated December 24, 1513. India Office MSS.

bond was soon drawn tighter. By the treaty of 1515 1515
the Zamorin of Calicut expresses a desire to serve Portugal; will allow no enemies of Portugal to enter his harbour; gives exemptions to Christians, even to Christian converts; and is to pay half the shipping dues to the Portuguese.[1] The process of coercion went on till in 1540 the Calicut Zamorin 1540
agreed to sell 'all the pepper' and 'all the ginger there may be on his lands to the King our Lord,' to harbour no enemies of Portugal nor to make war on her friends, to give up his trade with the Arabian coast, to allow none of his subjects to sail thither, and to keep no war vessels or even armed rowing boats.[2] By this time Calicut, her Chief and her commerce, were in the grip of the Portuguese fort.

Other towns on the Indian seaboard must be dealt with more briefly. The Portuguese in their struggle with Calicut entered into engagements with rival coast-chiefs which they could not always fulfil. In 1500–1501 Cabral, having signed a treaty 1501
with the friendly Cochin Raja, promised some day to make him Zamorin of Calicut. After wars and distresses suffered by the little State in the Portuguese cause, the Cochin Raja thus pours out his sorrows to King Emmanuel in 1513. 'Your 1513
Highness sent me a golden crown, as a sign that I was crowned the chief King of the whole of India. . . . And your Governor especially crowned me as king, and he declared on oath that he would make

[1] Treaty of February 26, 1515.

[2] Treaty of January 1, 1540, executed, characteristically enough, on board a Portuguese galleon, the 'S. Matthias.' All treaties are quoted from the India Office MS. translation.

1513 me the chief king of all India, and assist me against anyone who should come upon me. And I also promised to assist him against whoever should come upon them and to stand to the defence of your fortress until death, and in this manner they swore to it by oath in the church.'[1] Yet after twelve years these fine promises remained empty words, and here was Albuquerque in 1513 making treaties with Calicut to the detriment of Cochin.

Quilon, with its Portuguese factory and fort since 1503, being still weaker than Cochin fared worse. Certain disturbances having taken place at Quilon during the absence of the Queen, the church
1516 of the old St. Thomas Christians is in 1516 to be rebuilt, and the Christians favoured as formerly, and treated 'even better if that can be.' Further if any native 'whether Gentile or Moor or any other description whatever should wish to become a Christian, that he be free to do so without anyone preventing him, or any obstacle offered whatever.'[2] The death of the Portuguese factor at Quilon, for which the disclaimers of guilt by the Queen and her chiefs were accepted, was punished by a fine of
1520 200,000 pounds of pepper. By the treaty of 1520 the St. Thomas Christians were further protected, and received a site under the guns of the Portuguese fortress; the monopoly of all pepper grown in Quilon was secured to the Portuguese King; and all Portuguese ships were to pay their dues to him.[3]

[1] Letter from the King of Cochin to the King Emmanuel, dated Cochin, December 11, 1513.

[2] Treaty dated September 25, 1516.

[3] Treaty of November 17, 1520;

Finally the Portuguese were to be exempt from dues 1540
'in the quays of the sea, where the embarcation takes place for Cochin.'[1]

The Portuguese hold on the Persian Gulf was in like manner tightened. In 1515 Albuquerque completed the fortress at Ormuz. By the treaty
of 1523,[2] the Portuguese are to pay no dues at 1523
Ormuz except on exports, and the whole kingdom of Ormuz is to be delivered up on demand to the King of Portugal. Meanwhile in each year, Ormuz shall pay in lieu of giving over the Customs House, 'in tributes and vassalage to the King our Lord in silver, gold, and seed pearls, to the value of the land 60,000 xerafins.' All Christian renegades are to be handed over to the Captain of the Portuguese fortress, and no Moslems shall carry arms in Ormuz save the attendants on the King and town magistrate. Any other Moor wearing arms 'shall on the second offence be flogged, and on the third be put to death.' Moslems are to pay duty on all merchandise, Portuguese are to be exempt. The Moslems are to maintain a chief of police who should be a Christian and 'twenty Christian men
who walked with him.' Six years later a heavy 1529
fine was laid on Ormuz for the death of the Portuguese magistrate, and the customs revenue was allotted until payment should be realised.[3] In

and Note delivered to the Queen of Quilon, dated March 21, 1519.

[1] Capitulations dated October 25, 1540.

[2] This agreement made at Medina July 15, 1523, affords a striking illustration of the process by which the Portuguese demands were increased.

[3] Order of Nũno da Cunha dated August 27, 1529.

1540 1540 a customs house and certain revenues were formally made over to the Portuguese, subject to allowances to the Ormuz Court—'in payment of tributes,' says the King of Ormuz not without pathos, 'which I am obliged to pay.'[1]

While the entrance to the Persian Gulf thus passed completely under the Portuguese, it also marked the western limits of their shore-power on the Indo-Egyptian route. Their attempts to
1513 seize the mouth of the Red Sea failed. In 1513 Albuquerque, after a bloody siege of Aden, was repulsed with slaughter, and could only cannonade the town and burn the ships in the harbour. The brave Arabs had no intention of yielding their stronghold, from which they could swoop down on the Red Sea passage, to Christian, Egyptian, or Turk. In 1516 the Sultan of Cairo failed, as Albuquerque had failed, to capture Aden. Soon after there came an overwhelming fleet of forty Portuguese ships and 3,000 soldiers, and the battered fortress offered to surrender. But the fleet sailed on to attack the Moslem navy in the Red Sea, and by the time it got back to Aden the defences were repaired and the offer was withdrawn. The Turks, when they wrested Egypt from the Mameluk Sultans in 1517, perceived that Aden was necessary to complete their conquest. During the struggle which followed, the Aden ruler submitted at moments to the
1524 Portuguese. In 1524 and again in 1530 he 'rendered himself a vassal to Dom João of Portu-

[1] Articles of 1540: Farmán dated 948 A.H., and February 27, 1543.

gal' and agreed to pay a yearly tribute, with the 1530
gift of 'a crown of gold' as first-fruits to His Majesty.[1]

Such submissions, however, were merely Arab feints to gain a breathing space. In 1538 Soly- 1538
man the Magnificent closed the struggle by an expedition which captured Aden. But even the forces of the Ottoman Empire at its zenith only won the place by stratagem. The Turkish sailors were carried ashore on beds pleading for the hospitality which Musalmans everywhere show to the sick of their religion. The ruler of Aden received them generously, was gratefully invited on board the Turkish fleet, and then treacherously hanged. For a time Solyman the Magnificent dominated the whole Arabian coast from Aden, strengthened by 100 guns and a garrison of 500 Turks. But before the middle of the century the Arab population rose, and handed over the fort in despair to the Portuguese. Aden
was finally retaken by the Pasha of Egypt in 1551, 1551
and remained amid varying fortunes a Turkish outpost until 1630, when it passed again to the Arabs of the Yemen province.[2] From Albuquerque's attack in 1513 onwards, it stood defiant

[1] 'Capitulations concluded between Heitor da Silveira and the King of Aden, 1530.' Castanheda states that the formal deeds drawn on these capitulations could not be found in the Indian archives. India Office MS. translation of Portuguese treaties, vol. i. p. 73.

[2] *An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia*, by Captain F. M. Hunter, Assistant Political Resident (1877), pp. 162–164. Captain Hunter gives a valuable bibliography of the history of Aden in his Appendix A, pp. 197–202.

just outside the limits of the Indo-Portuguese power.

While Aden thus prevented the complete execution of Albuquerque's scheme for cutting off the Moslem trade from its Egyptian base, his designs on the sources of that trade in the Far East were more fully carried out. The cheaper spices of the Indian coast, pepper and ginger, he secured by his command of the Malabar ports. The Moslem monopoly of the cinnamon of Ceylon, and of the precious cloves and mace of the Archipelago, was broken by Albuquerque's seizure of Malacca (1511), with subsequent captures and treaties by his successors. My business, however, is with India, and I dare not follow the brilliant track of Portuguese achievement in Eastern Asia. The Moluccas or Spice Islands, the richest jewels in the Portuguese crown when formally made
1529 over by Spain in 1529,[1] became not only a source of trade but of tribute; Tidore, for example, pay-
1564 ing in cloves.[2] In 1564 the king of the Moluccas yielded to Portugal the dominion and lordship of the whole of his territories.[3]

The Portuguese sovereign, indeed, gave full powers to his Captain in Malacca 'to take possession or part possession as the case may be of any lands, places and islands,' which that officer or his subordinates should 'discover or arrive at;'

[1] 'Clauses of the Peace effected between Dom Jorge de Menezes Captain of Maluco, and Fernão de la Torre, in Tidore 1529.'

[2] Capitulations with the King of Tidore, 1530.

[3] Farmán dated February 12, 1564.

and 'to acquire in my name the lordship of the 1532
said places, lands and islands.'[1] Under these powers the royal arms of Portugal were fixed up on many a remote shore, a flag with the cross of Christ being handed to the inhabitants, and a green bough delivered by way of ratification.

'Having come to the island Amene' (a poor 1560
little islet a mile and a half in diameter in the Laccadives) runs one treaty which may serve as an example of how the system practically worked, the Portuguese Commodore 'went on land and destroyed it and slew many people, and took a great number, and coming to a convention of peace'—it was agreed that the rulers should make over the group of islands to the King of Portugal and pay a tribute of cocoa-nut fibre, with the pledge of a green branch 'in sign of peace and obedience,' 'for as much as they did not wish to be vassals of any other king or lord.'[2]

If this was Portugal's short way with the naked islanders of the Laccadives, she had an ascending scale of refinement in dealing with the more powerful rajas of the Indian coast and Eastern Archipelago. The treaties leave more or less to the native rulers the jurisdiction over their own subjects. While insisting strongly on the privileges of native Christians, and placing them under the jurisdiction of the Portuguese fort, they generally respect the rights of the professors of other faiths. The treaty with the warlike King of

[1] Preamble to the treaty with the Island of Sunda, dated January 27, 1532.

[2] Treaty of February 4, 1560.

1534 Gujarat guaranteed the revenues of the Bassein mosques, 'and what preaching should take place in them,' from 'any innovation whatever.'[1] In the Moluccas the Viceroy agreed that 'no Portu-
1539 guese should enter into the mosques of the Moors; and on his entering and doing evil things, he shall be apprehended by the Moors or by the Christians and delivered up at the fortress, for me to punish according to his fault. Forasmuch as I think it to the service of the King my Lord that the mosques be guarded against the Portuguese, and be as honoured as are our own churches.'[2] In at least one case conversions were forbidden on either side,[3] but were often provided for on the side of the Christians. Some protection was even attempted for the pagodas or temples of the Hindus.[4] The contract of 1520 provided against the killing of cows in the Quilon State.[5]

I have dwelt on the treaty-aspects of the Portuguese policy in the East, not merely because they illustrate the actual dealings of Portugal with Asiatic States, but because such engagements became in the next century a factor in European diplomacy. One of the initial difficulties which the English East India Company had to face was the Portuguese claim that the princes of the Indian coast and Spice Archipelago were, under these

[1] Treaty of December 1534.

[2] Contract made by the Viceroy Dom Garcia de Noronha with Niza Muza (Maluco), April 22, 1539.

[3] Contract with the King of Gujarat, October 25, 1535.

[4] Contract with Mealecão (Malik Khan), dated April 24, 1555.

[5] Made by Lopes de Sequeira, November 17, 1520.

treaties, subjects to the Portuguese crown, and that their territories formed part of the Portuguese dominions.[1]

The Portuguese clearly understood that their power depended on their fleet, and showed a wise jealousy of sea-rivals. But the shipbuilding of the Atlantic so greatly excelled that of the Indian Ocean, that only two States of Western India could seriously imperil the Christian squadrons. The navies of Calicut and Gujarat, aided by the Egyptian admiral, had matched themselves against
the Viceroy Almeida, and their defeat at Diu was 1509
followed up by treaties to prevent their reconstruction. Calicut in the south was not allowed to keep war-vessels or even armed rowing-boats.
Gujarat on the north had, in 1534, to agree that no 1534
warship should be built in any of her ports, a condition re-enforced by subsequent treaties.[2] The same unsparing policy which flogged and sentenced to death the Arabs of Ormuz who ventured to carry arms, also put an end to naval construction at alien Indian harbours.

Portugal further coerced the naval States of Western India by a chain of settlements at strategic points up the coast. Besides the fortress factories already mentioned on the southern Malabar seaboard, the four important positions of Goa, Bassein close to our Bombay, Daman on the

[1] Circular letter of Queen Elizabeth to the Kings of the East Indies: February 1601 (?), *First Letter Book of E.I.C.* p. 20.

[2] Treaties with the King of Gujarat dated Dec. 1534, March 27, 1537, and Dec. 23, 1543.

Gujarat shore, and Diu at the point of the Kathiawar peninsula, were turned by conquest or treaty into Portuguese strongholds.[1] The island fortress of Diu commanded the approach to India from the Persian Gulf just where ships rounded into the Gulf of Cambay, and formed a bulwark against the Arab, Egyptian, or Turkish line of attack. Its conquest and retention cost the Portuguese more blood and treasure than any other of their Indian possessions.

Goa, their principal settlement, dominated the
1510 South Indian ports, as Diu controlled the coast-route on the north. The pirate chief Timoja proposed to Albuquerque that as the lord of Goa[2] was dead (in reality absent) they should seize the place. This they easily did in March 1510. But the rightful sovereign, a son of the Ottoman Sultan Amurad II., whose romantic adventures had ended with his carving for himself the kingdom of Bijapur in Southern India, hurried back to Goa and drove out the Portuguese in May. During three months of terrible sufferings and heroic endurance, the Portuguese were wind-bound in the estuary within the Goa bar, and exposed to a superior force on shore. But eventually they got to sea, and on the King being again called away by disturbances in the interior, they recaptured Goa with the help of the pirate Timoja in November 1510.

[1] An account of these places will be found in my Imperial Gazetteer of India (14 vols. ed. 1885–1887). Cf. Dr. Gerson da Cunha's *History of Chaul and Bassein*, Bombay 1876.

[2] Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur, one of the five Musalman States of Southern India formed out of the old Bahmani kingdom.

Its rightful sovereign, Yusuf Adil Shah the king of Bijapur, died in the following month (December 5). His son was a minor, and during the first years of his reign it was all his ministers could do to hold together the more important inland provinces of the Bijapur kingdom. The outlying island of Goa and its region of creeks and estuaries remained with the Portuguese.

The pirate Timoja who first urged Albuquerque to seize it, and whose forces bore an important part in its capture and recapture, received a substantial share of the spoils. He obtained the revenues of a district in free gift, was appointed chief Aguazil or administrator of the lands of Goa, and captain of the native population. The revenues of the whole annexed territories, Goa Island excepted, were made over to him in return for a fixed rental, together with the responsibility for their defence. That daring and unscrupulous corsair was exactly the sort of adventurer then founding dynasties in India. Had he lived he might have set up a coast kingdom of his own; and proved a troublesome neighbour to the Portuguese. But here again fortune favoured the
Christians. This Timoja only enjoyed his new 1511
accession of power for a year, and died in 1511.

As Diu was the Portuguese outpost which controlled the passage into Indian waters on the north, so Goa became their central place of arms and commerce half way down the coast. Its nucleus, or Island of Goa proper, was defended by rivers or creeks on both sides from the mainland, and by

capes on the north and south from the extreme fury of the monsoons. The silting of the channels which now impedes the approach was then in an earlier stage, and the Goa anchorage, with twenty-one feet at high water and eighteen at low,[1] sufficed for the largest shipping of that time. In 1641–1648 Tavernier regarded it as one of the best harbours in the world.[2] It was, in fact, an earlier Bombay, guarded yet not cut off from the mainland by marine backwaters or river-arms, and nearer than Bombay to the ancient ports of Indo-European commerce. Although Goa Island was but nine miles long by three broad, the trade of the western coast was gradually concentrated at its quays.[3] Its natural advantages were developed by a skilful system of treaty restrictions and exemptions at the expense of the old Malabar ports; and even the silting up of the channels was for a time overcome by moving the town nearer to the sea.

The old Goa which Albuquerque captured is now a city of empty convents and monasteries; mounds of broken bricks, once palaces, buried under rank grass; and streets overgrown with cocoa-nut

[1] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 112 (Bombay 1878) on the authority of Corrêa (*Lendas da India*, ii. 54). *Alboquerque's Commentaries* give a less depth, ii. p. 88.

[2] *Les six voyages de Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Baron d'Aubonne.* Part II. p. 115, Paris.

[3] The Velhas Conquistas, or Goa and the adjacent districts (as distinguished from the Novas Conquistas long afterwards acquired), comprised Ilhas, Salsette and Bardez with an aggregate area of 222 square miles. Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. i and p. 111. The original materials are Da Cunha Rivara's *O Chronista de Tissuary*, his *Inscripcões Lapidares da India Portugueza* (Lisbon 1894), and other works: with F. D. D'Ayalla's *Goa Antiga e Moderna* (Lisbon 1888) from secondary sources.

trees and jungle. The churches rise mournfully amid the desolation. '*Il ne reste plus de cette ville que le sacré*,' said the Superior of the Augustinian Convent in 1827: '*le profane en est entièrement banni*.'[1] 'The river washes the remains of a great city;' wrote Sir William Howard Russell fifty years later, in 1877, 'an arsenal in ruins, palaces in ruins, quay walls in ruins—all in ruins.' The still older Goa, built by the native kings, I could only trace by little square rice fields which marked the ground plan of fortress courts and palace quadrangles. Panjim and New Goa, which became the residence of the Viceroy in 1759, are threatened with a like deterioration. But a railway, built by British enterprise, now connects Marmagao with the Southern Maratha line, and holds out hopes of a return to commercial importance.

Yet before its decay, Goa had a carnival of 1510 to 1600
prosperity which proves what a commercial war-policy can for a time effect. 'Goa Dourado' or Golden Goa was a place of fabulous wealth to the plain London merchants who were struggling into an East India Company under Elizabeth. 'Whoever hath seen Goa need not see Lisbon,' ran the Portuguese proverb.[2] It combined the riches of

[1] *Instituto Vasco da Gama*, vol. iii. p. 154. I take the opportunity of acknowledging my obligations, as an Honorary Member of the Society of this name at Goa, to my learned *confrères*.

[2] *Quem vio Goa excusa de vêr Lisboa.* The travellers to whom we are chiefly indebted for contemporary accounts of Goa at the height of its luxury and during the first stages of decline are: John Hugo Linschoten who went to Goa in 1583 and whose

1510 to 1600 commerce with the splendours of ecclesiastical pomp and a powerful military court. The work of the community was done by slaves, whose toil chiefly supplied the incomes of the Portuguese inhabitants;[1] for in Goa no Portuguese of decent birth could follow a trade without disgrace, nor could his wife busy herself in domestic labours without losing her social position. The only respectable livelihoods were the Church, the army, and Government employ—with buccaneering and sea-going commerce in a few vigorous hands.

The intensely military spirit, and its contempt for peaceful industry, ended in a reaction of profligacy and sloth. Portuguese society in Goa divided itself into two idle populations—an idle population of men in the streets and gaming saloons, and an idle population of women in the seclusion of their own homes. The gambling houses, sumptuously furnished and paying a heavy licence-tax to the Government, were the resort of

Itinerario, Voyage ofte Schipvaert (Amsterdam 1596) has been translated into Latin, French (perhaps the best known), English and German: François Pyrard de Laval, who served as a soldier at Goa in 1608–1610, and whose *Discours du Voyage des François aux Indes Orientales* (Paris 1611) has been repeatedly republished in France, abridged by Purchas and issued in Portuguese at Goa. Among others may be mentioned the English merchant Ralph Fitch (1583–1591) (Hakluyt, Purchas, and Pinkerton's Collections); Pietro della Valle, at Goa 1623–1624 (*Viaggi di*), with translations in French, English, Dutch and German; Sir T. Herbert, *post* 1626 (*A Relation of some Yeares Travaile*, &c. 1634 and 1677); and John Albert de Mandelslo (*Schreiben von seiner ostindischen Reise*, Schleswig 1645 and 1647, English ed. 1658, French ed., 1727); Tavernier and later writers.

[1] *Historical and Archæological Sketch of the City of Goa, with A Statistical Account of the Territory of Goa*, by José Nicolau da Fonseca, Bombay 1878, p. 161.

dancing girls, jugglers, native actors and buffoons— 1510 to 1600
haunts of iniquity, in which the more determined players stayed sometimes for days together and were provided with board and lodging.[1] The ladies of Goa soon obtained an equally unenviable name. Shut up as much as possible from male society, they lounged half-dressed through the tropical day, singing, playing, quarrelling, gossiping with their flattering slaves, 'and especially devising means to elude the vigilance of their husbands.'[2] A European *Zanana* life grew up and produced ugly consequences. A lady valued herself in her female coterie upon the number and daring of her intrigues. The travellers who visited Goa during its prime tell strange tales of the hardihood with which the Portuguese matrons pursued their amours—not scrupling to stupefy the husband with drugs, and then admitting the paramour to his chamber.[3] The perils of such interviews gave zest to jaded appetite, and the Goanese became a byword as the type of an orientalised community, idle, haughty and corrupt.

But the Portuguese of Goa, although clad much like natives in their own houses save for the large rosaries round their necks, and with their children running 'up and down the house naked till they begin to be old enough to be ashamed,' made a splendid appearance when they stirred abroad. The ladies in gorgeous apparel were carried in not less gorgeous litters, guarded by domestics, to the great functions

[1] Da Fonseca, p. 159.
[2] *Idem*, p. 161.
[3] Da Fonseca, on the authority of Linschoten and François Pyrard, *Goa*, p. 162.

1510 to 1600 of the Church—their 'dress mostly of gold and silver brocade adorned with pearls, precious stones, and with jewels on the head, arms, hands, and round the waist; and they put on a veil of the finest crape in the world which extends from head to foot.' They wore no stockings, but slippers studded with gems, and raised on cork soles 'nearly half a foot in height.' 'They do not wear any mask but paint their cheeks to a shameful degree.' 'These ladies, when they enter the church, are taken by the hand by one or two men, since they cannot walk by themselves on account of the height of the slippers.' Each is thus helped 'to her seat some forty or fifty paces off, taking at least a good quarter of an hour to walk that distance, so slowly and majestically does she move'[1]—after the fashion of the high-born Venetian ladies of that time.

When a gentleman rode forth he was attended by a throng of slaves in gay and fanciful liveries, some holding painted umbrellas, others displaying richly inlaid arms; while his horse glittered with gold and silver trappings, jingling silver bells, reins studded with precious stones, and gilt stirrups wrought into artistic patterns. The poor aped the rich and resorted to amusing makeshifts to exhibit an air of grandeur. Gentlemen who lived together had a few silk suits between them in common. 'These they used by turns when they went out, and hired the services of a man to hold an umbrella over them as they strutted through the streets.'[2]

[1] Da Fonseca, quoting Pyrard, pp. 165-6.

[2] *Idem*, p. 164.

As Goa declined its pride and poverty increased. 1510 to 1600
Tavernier (1648) relates how once wealthy families were reduced to seeking alms, yet they did not put aside their vanity. The Portuguese matrons, like the Roman lady in Juvenal, went forth on their round of beggary in palanquins, attended by servants who delivered their petitions to those whose charity they implored.

I have dwelt on the interior life of Goa for it represented, on a more magnificent scale, the social types and standards of the other Portuguese settlements in India. The European force by which those settlements were maintained was a comparatively small one; probably never exceeding 8,000 men; although I have failed to obtain conclusive evidence on this point. For the projected expedition against Diu in 1522, on which the 1522
Portuguese desired to concentrate their whole power, six thousand men were requested.[1] In 1524 the King was bluntly told that 'if Your Highness had in India 4,000 of such men as' a certain captain, 'they would perform greater feats than what is now done by the 7,000 or 8,000 who are walking about here.'[2] In 1535 the Viceroy in Goa prepared 1535
to meet the great Turkish armament with 7,000 men and 120 ships.[3] These numbers refer to supreme efforts of Portugal in the East: and they were only in part made up of Europeans. Albu-

[1] Letter of Pedro de Faria for the King, January 18, 1522. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter of Dom Jorge de Albuquerque for the King, dated Malacca, January 1, 1524. India Office MSS.

[3] Letter of Martin Affonso de Mello for the King, Bassein, October 6, 1535. India Office MSS.

querque's plan submitted to the King in 1512 involved a force of 3,000 men for three years.[1]

The practice of enlisting native soldiers commenced with the first foothold obtained by the
1504 Portuguese in India. In 1504 Pacheco defended
Cochin with a garrison of 300 Malabar soldiers
and 100 to 150 Portuguese—besides the levies
under the native king. Albuquerque employed
200 native soldiers in taking Goa (1510), and 1,000
of them at a single position during its subsequent
defence. His Indian troops consisted partly of
1510 Nairs, partly of the ancient native Christians of
Malabar, and it was a native Christian soldier who
first forced his way through the arsenal door into
the city.[2] After its final recapture, Albuquerque
advanced with a mixed force of 1,000 Portuguese
and 2,000 native troops. How far the native
soldiers in these early operations were drilled, it
is difficult to say, but the contemporary records
disclose bodies of Asiatics as a regular part of
the trained Portuguese forces, both on shore and
in distant sea-expeditions. To quote only a few
examples. Albuquerque employed a mixed force
of 1,700 Portuguese and 830 Indians against Aden
in 1513; and 1,500 Portuguese with 700 Indians
1516 against Ormuz in 1515; while Soarez in 1516
sailed for the Red Sea with 1,200 Portuguese,
800 Indian soldiers and 800 Indian seaman.[3]

[1] Letter of Affonso de Albuquerque for the King, April 1, 1512 (No. IX. of vol. i. *Albuquerque's Letters*, India Office MSS.).

[2] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 140, footnote, quoting Corrêa's *Lendas da India*, ii. 149.

[3] F. C. Danvers' *Portuguese in India*, vol. i. p. 334, *et in al. loc.*

The last instance exhibits a high proportion of natives for that early period, but the Portuguese employed Asiatic troops in increasing numbers. The cavalry remained for the most part European; the infantry consisted largely if not chiefly of Indians. In 1520 the commandant of Goa seized 1520
part of the adjacent mainland with 250 horse and 800 Canarese foot-soldiers. Even in the distant Archipelago, the attacking force at Bantam in 1525 was made up of 600 Portuguese and 400 Malays. As the slave population increased in the Portuguese settlements by capture, purchase and traffic, it was employed in military service. Human beings were cheap in India in those times of wars, raids and famines: a slave was valued in Bengal at fourteen shillings, 'and a young woman of good appearance at about as much again.'[1] For the great expedition against Aden in 1530 Nuno da 1530
Cunha got together a fleet of 400 vessels, most of them small craft fitted out by natives, with a force of 3,600 Portuguese soldiers, 1,460 Portuguese sailors, 2,000 Indian soldiers, 5,000 Indian seamen, and 8,000 slaves.[2] In 1542 Fort Sangaça was relieved by a force of 160 Portuguese, 20 horse, and 2,000 natives. In 1567 the Malacca garrison consisted of 1,500 men, of whom only 200 were Portuguese. In 1570 a thousand slaves were joined 1570
to the regular troops for the defence of Goa.[3]

[1] Letter of João de Lima for the King, from Cochin December 22, 1518. India Office MSS. The price, 'six tangas,' was equal to six rupees at say 2*s.* 4*d.* to the rupee. Sir Henry Yule's Glossary, p. 682 (ed. 1886).

[2] Danvers, i. 400.

[3] Da Fonseca, p. 149.

The truth is that the Portuguese settler soon became an unmanageable and a reluctant foot-soldier. Albuquerque, following the example of Alexander the Great in his Asiatic conquests, and of Hamilcar in Spain, encouraged his troops to marry native wives. The Lisbon Court supplied dowries for these unions which at once created the nucleus of a female Catholic population, and yearly added infants to the Faith. It soon appeared, however, that such nuptials had another
1513 aspect. In 1513 Duarte Barbosa raised his voice against 'paying more for marriages to men who afterwards became Moors, than the worth of what Goa has produced up to the present, or ever will produce.'[1] But the priests defended the system, the Government provided posts for the husbands, and the records show a frequent desire that 'the married people' should be greatly favoured.[2] A languid population of half-breeds sprang up, and employment had to be found for them. In 1569 the attacking force on Parnel included 100 Portuguese, 50 Moorish horse, and 650 half-caste soldiers.
1566 Three years previously, in 1566, a militia, chiefly natives and half-breeds, had been organised for Goa —divided in 1630 into a body of regulars 2,500 strong, and a defensive reserve of 5,000 men.

As the flow of pay from the treasury dried up, the Portuguese soldiers and their half-caste descendants degenerated into a military mob;

[1] Letter from Duarte Barbosa for the King, dated January 12, 1513. India Office MSS.

[2] *E.g.* Letter from Ferdinand Nunes for the King, dated September 7, 1527. India Office MSS.

selling their muskets to native princes; and stooping to every disgrace to fill their stomachs. In 1548 1548
the King of Portugal was implored to allow war-service grants to the soldiers, 'for they walk day and night at the doors, begging for the love of God. And if it would but end here it would be a lesser evil. But they go over to the Moors because they give them wages and allow them to live at their own liberty.'[1] What stipends they received they gambled away.

The native infantry were disciplined and directed by Portuguese officers, but sometimes led by their own. Antonio Fernandes Chale, for example, a Malabar native Christian, held important command under Portuguese generals, and was raised to the dignity of a Knight of the Military Order of Christ. Slain in action in 1571, he received a 1571
State funeral at Goa. In the previous year 1570, the Viceroy manned the defensive works of Goa against Adil Khan with 1,500 native troops under Portuguese officers, holding his little force of 700 Portuguese as a reserve to support whatever position might be hardest pressed. 'I certify to Your Highness,' wrote Pedro de Faria to the King as early as 1522 about the Calicut troops, 'that they are as good as ours,' and are practised in shooting three times a week.[2] The differences in drill and weapons were not so decisively in favour of the European system in the sixteenth century as

[1] From Dom João Henriquez for the King, dated Goa, October 27, 1548. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter dated January 18, 1522. India Office MSS.

they afterwards became. The chivalrous confidence of the first Portuguese adventurers in their Christian saints, degenerated among their half-caste successors into a vague hope of supernatural
1549 succour: a habit of 'always awaiting the benefits of our Lord working miracles on our behalf—which is a trying thing.'[1]

I have confined my survey to the period preceding the union of Portugal with the Spanish crown in 1580. After that event the necessities of Spain in Europe did not give the Portuguese a fair chance in India. But even before it, the resources of Portugal were being exhausted. The African slave-trade which had supplied forced labour for the tillage of Portugal, and set free the coast peasantry especially in the South[2] for enterprise beyond the seas, had eaten like a canker into the nation. In the sixteenth century whole districts of Portugal were partitioned into great estates cultivated by slaves, and denuded of their free population, who flocked to the capital. The Portuguese in India in like manner depended more and more for their subsistence on slave labour, and for their defence on Indian troops. The officers of the Indian Department at Lisbon and at Goa embezzled pay for 17,000 soldiers, while only 4,000 were actually kept up.[3] The native troops became

[1] Cosme Annes for the King, dated Cochin December 30, 1549. India Office MSS.

[2] Algarve and the Southern provinces supplied down to our own century the best Portuguese sailors and boatmen. *Sketches of Portuguese Life*, p. 34 (1826).

[3] Da Fonseca, *Goa*, p. 38.

masters of the situation. After many troubles they had to be disbanded: and, when re-established on a different footing, commenced in our own day a fresh course of mutiny and revolt.

That Portugal succeeded even for a time in imposing her supremacy on the Asiatic trade route was due to her fleet. Between 1497 and 1497 to 1612
1612 no fewer than 806 ships were employed in the Indian trade; of which 425 returned to Europe, 285 remained permanently on the Asiatic stations, and ninety-six were lost.[1] Their ordinary size varied from 100 to 550 tons, armed with cannon, and fitted out for purposes both of freight and war.[2] The ambition of the naval constructors of Portugal outran their technical skill, and ended in floating castles which could not stand the Indian voyage. Twenty-two of these unseaworthy monsters were lost between 1579 and 1591, partly due to overlading and partly to their unwieldy size. The 'Madre de Deos,' a huge erection with 'three close decks, seven storeys, a main orlop, a forecastle and a spar deck of two floors,' measured 165 feet from beak to stern, and nearly 47 feet across the second 'close deck.'[3] Besides the ships from Europe, vessels of the hardest teak were built in the dockyards of Goa and Daman. One of them,

[1] *Livro em que se contém toda a Fazenda e Real Patrimonio dos Reinos de Portugal, India, e Ilhas Adjacentes:* ordenado por Luiz de Figueiredo Falcão, secretario de El-Rey Filippe II. From the original MS. Lisbon 1859, 4to pp. 194–196.

[2] The contemporary documents classify the fleet under 'galleons and galleys, foists, galliots, and lateen caravels,' besides junks and other native craft in the port-to-port trade. Letter of Pedro de Faria for the King, dated January 18, 1522, &c. India Office MSS.

[3] Da Fonseca, p. 37.

the 'Constantina,' constructed about 1550, doubled the Cape of Good Hope seventeen times and lasted twenty-five years.

I have said that the Portuguese had a coast-line of over 15,000 miles to hold in Asiatic waters. But their fleet enabled them to choose any point along that line for attack, and to concentrate on it their whole force. They could deliver their blow at their own time; if successful they left a garrison; if unsuccessful they disappeared below the horizon: having struck terror, or sometimes compelled submission, by the atrocities inflicted for resistance. The whole coast of Asia from the Red Sea to the Eastern Archipelago was thus menaced by an invisible foe from the ocean, whose movements defied calculation, whose attack was often irresistible, and whose vengeance always cruel. No such fleets had ever been seen in Asia, and the Portuguese treaties took care that none should grow up. As Portugal never acquired inland territories in India Proper, and as her possessions were mainly confined to patches on the seaboard, this system sufficed for their defence, long after her military vigour had declined. But its effectiveness depended on the absence of any other naval force; and when the maritime nations of Northern Europe broke in upon the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese power collapsed.

It would be wrong, however, to underrate either the skill or the heroism with which their sea-power was built up. From the orders[1] of King

[1] Letter of the King to Affonso de Albuquerque, dated March 2, 1514. India Office MSS.

Emmanuel in 1514 for an examination of the ports, anchorages, and distances in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, marine surveying dates in Asia. In spite of discrepancies in the results,[1] a mass of material was collected during the next century, and geographical names attest the exploring activity of Portugal from the coast of Africa to China and Japan. The knowledge thus acquired was put to good use for purposes of strategy. The Portuguese found they could command the whole Asiatic trade-route by squadrons at three points on its course—the outlet of the Red Sea, the passage round Ceylon, and the Straits of Malacca. When Aden, which would be as a 'key in the hands of Your Highness,'[2] could not be captured, the fortress island of Diu became to the Portuguese, from 1535 onwards, an Aden nearer to their Indian base. Its naval station caught the Red Sea and Persian Gulf ships as they rounded the Peninsula of Kathiawar towards the Indian coast. Portugal thus held the three angles, at Diu, Ceylon, and Malacca, of the great triangle whose two southern sides formed the route of the spice trade.

The naval advantages won by Portuguese strategy were maintained by Portuguese valour. Whether the native powers covered the sea with their small craft, or strengthened their fleet with a huge junk carrying 1,000 fighters—'the most

[1] *E.g.* as to the depth of the Goa harbour given in Corrêa's *Lendas da India* and *Alboquerque's Commentaries*—a discrepancy susceptible of explanation.

[2] Letter of M. Affonso de Mello for the King, October 6, 1535. India Office MSS.

monstrous thing that was ever seen by man, and took three years to make'[1]—they went down before the galleons and caravels. The bare official narratives of such encounters read like epics in epitome. A captain whose coat of mail caught in the pegs as he leapt on an enemy's ship, there remained till he was hewn to pieces through his armour. Another Portuguese vessel 'they made a porcupine of' with fiery darts and 'assegais'[2]—heroic self-sacrifices, and deaths worthy of Sir Philip Sidney.

But the Portuguese did not trust alone to strategy or valour to secure their supremacy along the Asiatic trade-route. They boldly struck into the wars and intrigues of the native princes from Africa to the Moluccas, securing substantial returns for their support, and finding in each dynastic claimant a stepping-stone to power. In 1505 Almeida drove out the ruler of Quiloa on the African coast and set up his own nominee. In the same year the Portuguese killed the King of Sofala on that coast and controlled the succession. In 1510 Cochin on the Malabar coast became the arena of intrigues between Albuquerque on the one hand and the Zamorin of Calicut on the other; Albuquerque expelling the Zamorin's candidate and re-establishing the titular raja of Cochin. In that year also, Albuquerque successfully supported one brother against another for the chiefdom of

[1] Letter of F. Pires de Andrade, Captain of Malacca, February 22, 1513. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter of Dom Jorge de Albuquerque for the King, dated January 1, 1524, &c. India Office MSS. For four great Governors, *post*, p. 311.

Onor; the price being submission to the King of Portugal. In 1511 he agreed to aid the King of Pacem in Sumatra against a rebellious governor, on the King offering to become a vassal of Portugal. Albuquerque not only entered into the family intrigues of native States but he adopted their methods. In 1513 the Zamorin of Calicut was hostile, his brother friendly, to Portugal. Albuquerque offered, if the brother would poison the Zamorin, to secure for him the throne; and the compact was duly carried out.[1]

An eloquent essayist has ascribed to Dupleix the original idea of building up a European power in Asia by taking advantage of the rivalries of Native Princes, and by the employment of disciplined native troops.[2] Such a statement merely shows that India, while within the ample range of Macaulay's genius, lay outside the area of his exact knowledge. More than two centuries before the Frenchman reached India, the design had been deliberately formed and successfully carried out. Affonso de Albuquerque claimed no credit for the discovery; he merely extended the policy of his more commonplace predecessors, and handed it on to successors who worked out its natural development. Almost any one of their intrigues might, with a change of geographical names, stand for an intrigue of Dupleix. To cite but a single example. In 1521 the Portuguese having agreed to reinstate

[1] *D'Alboquerque's Commentaries*, iv. 71, 72.

[2] *Essay on Lord Clive*: Macaulay's *Works*, vol. vi. pp. 391-392 (ed. 1866).

a Sumatra king who had been expelled, overthrew and killed his rival, and secured their own nominee on the throne in return for his submission to Portugal.

The idea of employing disciplined Indian troops, and of using Indian succession contests, as engines for European aggrandisement, was not struck out by the wit of any one man. It was the necessity of the European position in Asia, and it was recognised as such by the Portuguese from the moment they secured a footing on the Malabar coast. The Indian anarchy from 1500 to 1550, which preceded the firm establishment of the Mughal Empire, gave them half a century to carry out their design. The grasp of the Mughal Empire after 1550 held such schemes in abeyance during nearly two hundred years. The fall of the Mughal Empire rendered possible a revival of the old Portuguese policy, and from the struggle which ensued, England emerged the sovereign power in India.

The drain upon Portugal for her armies and fleets in Asia, although far beyond her normal resources, was for a time richly repaid by the monopoly of the Indo-European trade. The volume of that trade may be inferred from the statements that 806 Portuguese ships were employed in it
1497 to 1612 between 1497 and 1612, and that the ordinary cost of construction and equipment of a single vessel intended for India, with the pay of the captain and crew for one voyage, was calculated at 4,076*l.*[1] Such returns do not include ships captured in Asiatic

[1] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 37.

seas or built in Indian dockyards, and, assuming their accuracy, the total number of vessels engaged in the trade can scarcely have been less than one thousand during the century of the Portuguese monopoly. The annual fleet which brought home the Indian cargoes numbered, in the palmy days of the Portuguese commerce, twenty sail.[1] Regarding the value of the trade, it is more difficult to form an estimate. To the Portuguese cavaliers and chroniclers the achievement of their nation in India was a romance of military prowess and of missionary zeal. The commercial aspects they kept as much as possible in the background. Indeed, Faria y Sousa apologises for referring to the expeditions of certain years as 'what they did was in relation to Trade, a subject unbecoming a grave History.'[2] We have to trust to accidental notices rather than to continuous statements.

I have mentioned that the first cargo brought home by Vasco da Gama was reckoned to have repaid the whole cost of the expedition sixty-fold. Cabral returned to Lisbon in 1501 with a freight 1501
of precious spices, perfumes, porcelain, pearls, rubies and diamonds. In 1504 Albuquerque followed with 'forty pound of pearls and four hundred of the small, a diamond of wonderful bigness,' and other costly articles.[3] The gains of trade were augmented by the profits of piracy—for every Moslem or heathen

[1] Da Fonseca, p. 24—probably including vessels convoyed by the King's ships.

[2] Faria y Sousa's *Asia Portugueza* (Captain John Stevens' translation) vol. i. p. 253. London 1695.

[3] *Idem*, i. 73.

ship was a fair prize. A single Calicut vessel in 1501 yielded, among other treasure, 1,500 costly pearls. In 1503 another capture contained 'an idol
1503 of gold weighing thirty pound,' with emeralds for eyes, a huge ruby on his breast, 'and part of him covered with a cloak of gold set with jewels.'[1] In return for gems, and for the pepper, ginger, cinnamon, mace, nutmegs, cloves, drugs, dyes, porcelains, perfumes, carved work, art products, and textile marvels of the East, the main commodity sent from Portugal, as from the old Roman Empire, was silver. But she also exported woollen fabrics, to a large extent woven from English fleeces on Flanders looms, linens, red cloth of State, Genoa velvets, cutlery, metal work, hardware, corals, glass, mirrors and chemicals.[2]

Besides the direct commerce with Portugal, the port-to-port trade from the Malabar coast to the Persian Gulf on the one side, and to Malacca and the Far East on the other, yielded large returns. One of its most profitable commodities was opium, obtained from Arabia and Egypt. Opium had been known in China from at least the eighth century A.D.; and Duarte Barbosa found the Chinese junks taking it in the time of Albuquerque as a return freight from Malacca.[3] It soon appeared that opium

[1] Faria y Sousa, i. 69. (Ed. 1695.)

[2] The interchangeable articles of Indo-European commerce are discussed with erudition by Sir George Birdwood, in the *Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for the Paris Universal Exhibition of* 1878; in his *Report on the Old Records of the India Office* (reprint of 1891), and his *First Letter Book of the East India Company* (1893).

[3] The original evidence will be found in Dr. Edkin's *Historical Note on the Poppy in China*: and Duarte Barbosa's *Coasts of East*

could be grown in India, and Francisco de Albuquerque proposed in 1513 that its importation from 1513
Arabia should be prohibited, or should be made a monopoly of the Portuguese sovereign.[1] When the supply was cut off in reprisal for the Portuguese attempt on Aden, Affonso de Albuquerque recommended 'the poppies of the Azores to be sown in all the fields of Portugal,' 'because a shipload would be used yearly in India, and the cultivators would gain much, and the people of India are lost without it if they do not have it to eat.'[2] It was not on the soil of Portugal, however, that the wealth of Asia was to be reaped. Nor did the attempts to reach the inland gold-fields of Africa, although led by a Cap- 1569
tain-General[3] bearing the lofty title of 'Conqueror of the Mines,' yield permanent results. The plunder of the Moslem ships, tributes and ransoms from the coast-chiefs, and above all sea-trade, formed from first to last the revenue of Portugal in the East.[4]

As regards the home-trade, one Portuguese ship brought back a freight worth, at a moderate com- 1592
putation, 150,000*l.*, besides jewels not reckoned in the account.[5] As regards the port-to-port trade in Asiatic waters, the voyage from Goa to China or

Africa and Malabar, Hakluyt Society, 1866. *Cf.* Birdwood's *First Letter Book of the E. I. Company*, liv–lxii.

[1] Letter of Francisco de Albuquerque for the King, dated October 20, 1513. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter of Affonso d'Albuquerque for the King, Dec. 1, 1513.

[3] Francisco Barreto, 1569.

[4] I summarise in this sentence many notices in Faria y Sousa's *Asia Portugueza* which covers the period of the Portuguese power in Asia down to 1640.

[5] The 'Madre de Deos,' 1592. The cargo of the captured carrack 'San Filippe' sold in 1587 for 108,049*l.* *Calend. of State Papers, Domestic*, 1581–1590, p. 428.

Japan yielded to the captain for freight alone 22,500*l.*, and from Goa to Mozambique 5,400*l.*; besides the gains from his private trade, which were equally great.[1] As regards the profits of piracy, or the seizure of non-Christian ships, a single captain[2] sold prizes during the space of two years aggregating about 110,000*l.* The tributes from coast-princes and the customs dues of Goa, Diu and Malacca alone were estimated at about 120,000*l.* The King's share in the tributes, customs, and prizes taken by his own ships, was reckoned at 1,000,000 crowns a year, say 225,000*l.*, and would have been double that amount, but for the frauds of the officials.[3] His actual *clear* revenue from India was given at 154,913*l.*[4]

The trade profits to the royal treasury should have been enormous, but were reduced by the many hands through which they passed. The Portuguese sovereigns were willing to allow their subjects to benefit by Eastern commerce. Prince Henry the Navigator had, in the first half of the fifteenth century, encouraged a company formed for trading to his discoveries on the African coast. It soon became evident that the fifteenth-century world could not be opened up by private enterprise.

[1] W. Julius Mickle, quoting Faria; *The Lusiad*, vol. i. p. cxci.

[2] Pedro da Faria, 1541–1542. Danvers, i. 455–456. I take the *silver* ducat and the crown each at about 4*s.* 6*d.* *Letters received by the E. I. Coy.* i. 336 (1896).

[3] Faria y Sousa's *Asia Portugueza*, Captain Stevens' translation, vol. iii. p. 418 (London, 1695).

[4] Meneses' *Tractate*, Purchas' *Pilgrimes*, pt. ii. pp. 1506–1533 (London, 1625).

The African and Canaries trade became a monopoly
of the Royal family, and merchants engaging in it
had to take out a licence and render a part of their
profits to the sovereign or his representative. On
the finding of the Cape route, King Emmanuel in 1500
like manner offered to share the Indian trade with
his subjects, on condition that one-fourth of the
returns should be paid to His Majesty.[1] Again,
however, private enterprise proved unequal to the
task, and for the next eighty-seven years the trade
of India was conducted at the risk and for the
behoof of the sovereign. The Royal monopoly of
spices alone was estimated at 45,000*l.* a year;
and His Majesty's profit from the general trade
at 150,000*l.* Adding this to the 225,000*l.* from
prizes, customs, &c., the King's share should have
amounted to 420,000*l.* a year. But the profits were
eaten up by the expense of the armaments.[2]

The King however still desired to interest his
subjects in the enterprise. In the second voyage
of Vasco da Gama (1502), each mariner and officer 1502
of the Indian fleets was allowed to bring home for
himself a certain quantity of spices, paying as
freight one-twentieth of their value. A similar
policy of permitting their crews 'to load some
small thing in their cabins,' and a modest per 1530
centage on the profits of the voyage, was after-
wards advocated for the port-to-port trade in
Asiatic waters.[3] Such a system could perhaps be

[1] Charter of June 29, 1500: *Corpo Chronologico*, India Office MSS.

[2] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 24. Mickle's *Lusiad*, i. cxc. (1798). The evidence for these sums is doubtful.

[3] Letter of Affonso Mexia for

kept under check in the return fleets to Lisbon. At the distant Indian harbours it defied control, and quickly grew into a competing private trade on a great scale. The sweets of sudden and surreptitious wealth turned the Portuguese officials into unscrupulous adventurers, careless of their master's interest in their own haste to be rich.

The abuses incident to such a system fill many
1513 pages of the letters home. As early as 1513 a cavalier was charged with fraudulent dealing in the rice required for the Portuguese Government.[1] Of two galleons allowed for the King's trade, one was lost through overloading, while the captain freighted the other with his private cargo.[2] Certain of the ships sent 'to guard the mouth of the
1518 Strait' will, the King was informed, 'after selling their rice depart full of gold, and will not care a straw for our service.'[3] A practice arose of coercing the coast-rajas into vending their spices to the officials engaged in private trade, while the King's ships could only obtain freights at enhanced rates. Pressure was put on the native merchants, and several ports were almost deserted by them, as they had to pay heavy dues which the Portuguese captains corruptly evaded. 'The whole [Royal]
1530 trade is being lost which afforded the revenues of Your factory. Your Highness has not nor will

the King, dated January 15, 1530. India Office MSS.

[1] Letter of Francisco de Albuquerque for the King, October 20, 1513. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter from Affonso Mexia, dated Cochin, December 30, 1528. India Office MSS.

[3] Letter from João de Lima, December 22, 1518. India Office MSS.

have from Malacca any profit as long as the trade 1530
is being done by the captains'[1]—who would not pay the customs levied from the Gentiles and the Moors. Many other letters tell the same story. It was felt to be irregular, however, to employ as ambassador an officer who had bought up all the merchandise in the town, 'and who seems to be going rather to do his own trading.'[2] Native vessels, on arriving at a port, were not allowed to sell their cargoes until the Factory had bought what it wanted to make up the King's shipment, and this royal privilege the Portuguese officials converted into a device for buying on their own terms the commodities for their private trade. The result
was thus pithily summed up in 1527: 'The 1527
native merchants neither will give to, nor have any trade with, Your Factory, from which proceeds great loss to Your Highness.'[3]

These were acknowledged abuses. But apart from such abuses, the system led to a perpetual conflict of interest between the Royal Trade and the officials as private traders. The commanders in charge of the King's ships sold their private cargo first, and secured a return freight for themselves, before disturbing the market by transactions on His Majesty's account. In 1530 the Bengal voyage from Malabar yielded the captain 2,450*l.* and only 78*l.* to the King—a flagrant case

[1] Letter from Affonso Mexia for the King, January 15, 1530. India Office MSS.

[2] Dom Francisco de Lima to the Governor of India, September 9, 1548. India Office MSS.

[3] Letter from Fernando Nunes for the King, September 7, 1527. India Office MSS.

1530 reported to Lisbon.[1] The Royal Trade to Ormuz on the West and to Malacca on the East suffered from the same cause; as 'the captains buy and sell their own goods and not for the King.' The 'gift of a voyage' became a recognised quittance for pay withheld or embezzled by the treasury officers, and with good luck in prizes might mean a fortune. It also formed a provision for a clamorous kinsman or a cast-off mistress, and one Governor was reported to have appointed forty of
1541 his relatives to charges and voyages.[2]

This system, from the first disastrous to the Royal Trade, soon proved also a source of political weakness. As early as 1524 complaints arose that the captains 'do not want war, as it is too expensive and bad to endure, and of small gain and little advantage.'[3] In 1542 a new Governor found the Royal service in great straits owing to the number of officers who had left it to turn merchants—a business which 'offered greater chance of profit and less danger to life and limb.' After three years' experience he was anxious to resign, 'as he saw around him only corruption and dishonesty.'
1549 In 1549 a confidential report thus summed up the position: 'Each one considers only himself.'[4]

[1] Namely 7,000 pardaos to the captain and 70,000 reis to the King. After considering the evidence of D'Acunha and others I accept Sir Henry Yule's equivalents of the pardao at 7 shillings and of 1,000 reis at 1*l.* 2*s.* 4*d.* Letter from Affonso Mexia for the King, January 15, 1530. India Office MSS. *Cf.* Yule's *Glossary*, p. 839 (Ed. 1886).

[2] Letter of Manuel Coutinho for the King, November 26, 1541. India Office MSS.

[3] Jorge de Albuquerque for the King, January 1, 1524. India Office MSS.

[4] Cosme Annes for the King, December 30, 1549. India Office MSS.

The Portuguese sovereigns did not see the wealth of Asia thus slip through their fingers without efforts to cheek the malpractices in the East. At one period, indeed, they attempted to exclude not only their own servants but also the native merchants from any share in the trade. This close system, when strictly enforced, drove the Asiatic ships from the Portuguese harbours. For a time it threatened ruin to the lucrative horse trade of Goa, which imported the fine breed of the desert in Arab vessels and resold the animals at a great profit to dealers from the inland Courts of India. During the cold season of 1521–1522, 1522
the usual supply of about a thousand horses had dropped to under a hundred in the Goa market. 'How can Your Highness expect the merchants of Ormuz to bring us horses,' says a plain-speaking correspondent, 'if they cannot trade in supplies or in any other commodity?' 'Your Highness by wanting to take all to yourself, nevertheless derives no advantage.'[1]

While so strict a monopoly kept away the native merchants, it merely shifted the private trade of the Portuguese officials to harbours which were less closely watched. 'Your factory at Cochin,' adds the same writer, 'is always in debt; the captains of the said vessels that come here making themselves very rich.' The native merchants 'will lose what pleasure they had in trading.' 'Let Your Highness order your ships to be laden and com-

[1] Letter of Pedro de Faria for the King, January 18, 1522. India Office MSS.

mand the ports to be opened' to native vessels. 'There are none now, because Your Highness wills to close the ports'—except to your own trade.

An attempt to remedy this state of things by granting passes to native ships, and by forbidding trade to officials, proved unavailing. The pass-system opened up a wider scope for private trading, by allowing the Portuguese servants of the Crown to employ native craft to carry their own ventures.
1524 By a Proclamation of 1524, the penalty to a native captain found in Indian waters without a Portuguese licence [1] was death and seizure of his ship and property. The officials took care, before granting the permit, to secure a lion's share in the profits of the voyage. Everyone, sometimes the Governor himself, was in the conspiracy, and prosecutions merely strengthened it by the judicial sanction of acquittals. 'Which thing did not astonish me,'
1548 wrote a candid observer, 'because the Procurator of Your Highness is one to get his salary.' [2]

The Portuguese sovereigns were, in fact, unable to check the corruption even of the Indian Department at Lisbon, and proved powerless to control their distant servants in the East. After the union of Portugal with the Spanish Crown in 1580, the drain of the Netherlands war crippled the public funds required for the Indian commerce, and in 1587 the Royal Monopoly of the spice trade was

[1] For such a passport, see Purchas' *Pilgrimes*, b. iv. ch. 10; and for its illusory protection, Macpherson's *Commerce with India*, p. 25.

[2] Letter from Limão Botelho for the King, December 24, 1548. India Office MSS.

sold to a body of capitalists under the name of the Companhia Portugueza das Indias Orientaes. The officials in Asia, fearing the loss of their illicit gains, threw every obstacle in the way, and the speculation did not yield the hoped-for profits. In 1697 a new syndicate, called the Companhia do Commercio da India, received a charter in return for a yearly subvention of 2,763*l.* to the Crown.[1] After a four years' struggle with the officials in the East this undertaking also collapsed. The attempts of Portugal to found an East India Company failed; but they gave a hint to Europe as to the possibility of corporate private enterprise in Asia—a hint of which the Dutch and English availed themselves. 1587

The Portuguese officials in India defended their clandestine commerce on the ground of the insufficiency of their salaries. Da Gama's and Albuquerque's companions had gone forth as crusaders and cavaliers, with little thoughts as to the wages of their service. Their aim was glory or death in a Holy War. But the love of fighting spent itself, and the 'martyrs' soon wanted pay for their 'blood.' At first they looked chiefly to prizes at sea, to the plunder of captured towns on shore, and to the gifts of native princes, voluntary or enforced, at every port from the African coast to the Moluccas. These gifts, originally intended for the King, were diverted to his servants, and soon grew into bribes. In 1522 His Majesty was urged

[1] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 24. In 1731 and during our American war further attempts at Portuguese companies were made in vain.

to substitute fair salaries for such gratifications which already interfered with the course of justice.[1] But the Lisbon Government could never make up its mind to this course. The European 'soldiers were miserably paid and miserably fed, the captains receiving each a salary of twelve shillings per month, and living only on rice and fish.'[2] A commander of a ship of war, rejoicing in the lofty title of Capitão de Mar e Guerra, was paid 'less than a Dutch sergeant.' The sea-captains did not suffer, however, as they exercised some control over the local treasuries. They paid their own claims, whether there was much or little left in the coffer, and seized the best part of the goods of patients who died in the hospitals.[3] In 1530 the Malacca coast was left without a sufficient guard, 'because in it there are no fifths and perquisites, nor what to claw, as there is in other voyages.'[4]

Some of the Portuguese exploits form a very romance of robbery. One free lance, Nicote, having taken service under the sovereign of Pegu, rebelled against his master, was proclaimed King, and was finally impaled in front of his own fort in order, as the Burmese sarcastically remarked, 'that he might the better look to it.' The island which Sancho Panza hoped for, and received, as a reward for his services, has been cited as an

[1] Letter of Pedro de Faria for the King, January 18, 1522. India Office MSS.

[2] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, pp. 181–182.

[3] Letter of Fernando Nunes for the King, September 7, 1527. India Office MSS.

[4] Letter of Affonso Mexia for the King, January 15 1530 India Office MSS.

invention out of keeping with the realism of 'Don Quixote.' But more than one incident in the Asia Portugueza of the sixteenth century may have supplied the idea for Sancho's Barataria. In the middle of that century Jordão de Freitas, having 'converted' the King of Amboyna, obtained the island as a gift to himself.[1] Islands were cheap in the boyhood of Cervantes. Indeed, John Cabot, when exploring the Atlantic for England in 1497, had set the example by giving away an island to his Genoese barber—who ever afterwards regarded himself as a count.[2]

If the system produced bitter fruits in Asia, it had its roots in Portugal herself. Not only could the Lisbon Court never screw up its courage to give fair commercial salaries for fair commercial work, but it used India as a refuge for depraved or destitute hangers-on upon its bounty. As the slave-tillage of Portugal concentrated large tracts among a small body of great proprietors, the lesser nobility and gentry sank into indigence.[3] Their blood disdained the degradation of trade at home, and the antechambers of the grandees were besieged

[1] Danvers, i. 525. Amboyna afterwards passed to the Portuguese crown. Cervantes was born in 1547.

[2] *John and Sebastian Cabot*, by C. Raymond Beazley, M.A., Fellow of Merton College (1898), a very valuable work, published after most of this volume was in type.

[3] For the history and effects of slavery in Portugal, particularly in Algarves and the South, see *Das Origens da Escravidão Moderna em Portugal* por Antonio Pedro de Carvalho (Lisbon 1877); Wauwermans' *Henri le Navigateur et l'Académie Portugaise de Sagres* (Antwerp 1890); and local notices in Latouche's *Travels in Portugal* (London, 2nd ed. N.D. 1875 ?)

by poor relations clamouring for employment or bread. India seemed to offer, if not a fortune, at any rate a grave. In either case the suitor was got rid of. It became the asylum for those who had claims that could not be satisfied, or who had rendered services that could not be acknowledged, or had received promises that could not be fulfilled. Young women were shipped off from Lisbon with the dowry of an appointment in India for the man who would marry them. One favoured damsel carried in her trunk the governorship of Cranganore. The multiplication of offices was pushed to an extent which would have been ludicrous, if it had not proved fatal, in Portuguese India. But even nominal posts could not be invented to keep pace with the demand. Each of the four outward ships of a single year 'brought sixty persons more or
1530 less without pay.'[1]

The ravenous hordes thus let loose on India made the race-name of Christian (Firingi)[2] a word of terror—until the strong rule of the Mughal Empire turned it into one of contempt. Their

[1] Letter of Affonso Mexia for the King from Cochin, January 15, 1530. India Office MSS.

[2] Firingi represents through Arabic and Persian the 'Francos, quo nomine omnes passim Christiani . . . dicuntur.' Jarric, *Thesaurus*, iii. 217. 'The Portugals which they call by the name of Fringes.' W. Burton in Hakluyt, v. 32. 'Nom qu'ils donnèrent aux Portugais, lorsque ceux-ci abordèrent dans leur pays, et c'est un terme qui marque le souverain mépris qu'ils ont pour toutes les nations de l'Europe.' Sonnerat, i. 58 (1782). 'In India it is a positive affront to call an Englishman a Feringhee.' Elphinstone, quoted in Sir T. E. Colebrooke's *Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone*, ii. 207 (1884). See for a fuller history of the word Sir Henry Yule's *Glossary*, pp. 269, 270 (1886).

buccaneering in the narrow seas, their pirate nests on the Bay of Bengal, their plunder of the coast and island princes, lie beyond the scope of this sketch, which merely attempts to indicate the policy, without narrating the transactions, of the Portuguese in the East. Wherever they went they snatched at riches ; and even in remote China, in the presence of a power which might have crushed them like nutshells, they could not abstain from pillage. In 1527 Diogo Calvo reported that 'no land is so rich as China,' or could more cheaply supply the Royal arsenals in India. The ports were open, but his brother is kept as a hostage at Canton on account of the Portuguese 'slaying and robbing.'[1] The Indian settlements, which were the first destination of the adventurers from Portugal, perhaps suffered most. In 1549 things were going 'from bad to worse' at Cochin.[2] In
1552 the civic authorities of Goa at length laid their 1552
miseries before the King. 'In India there is no justice, either in your Viceroy, or in those who are to mete it out.' The one object is 'the gathering together of money by every means.' 'There is no Moor who will trust a Portuguese.' 'Senhor, we beg for mercy, mercy, mercy. Help us Senhor, help us Senhor, for we are sinking.'[3]

[1] Diogo Calvo to the King, January 17, 1527. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter of Cosme Annes for the King, December 30, 1549. India Office MSS.

[3] Letter of the Judge and Aldermen of Goa for the King, November 25, 1552. India Office MSS.

CHAPTER V

ENGLAND'S ATTEMPTS TO REACH INDIA IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

1497–1599

THE Portuguese soon found that they had other rivals in the East besides the Turks. No Christian nation at the end of the fifteenth century seriously disputed the Papal award. But England, France, Venice and Spain scrutinised its terms with keen eyes, and tried for a share of the Asiatic trade by every means within the strict letter of the Bull and the treaties based upon it. England's century of failures, from 1497 onwards, to reach India without infringing that settlement, disciplined our nation to distant maritime enterprise, and forms the main subject of this chapter.

1500 The Venetians strove to bolster up the old land-routes through Syria and Egypt, as against the Cape passage, and outraged Christendom by abetting the Mameluke Sultan in his struggle with Portugal for the Indian seas. They thus retained the trade with Alexandria and the Levant—a monopoly which they had in time to share with the Turkey Company of England and the Medi-

terranean merchants of Marseilles. The Venetians realised, indeed, that the ultimate victory must be with the Cape route, and proposed to divide its profits with Portugal in the West while encouraging the Turkish onset against Portugal in the East. In 1521 the Court of Lisbon refused an 1521
offer of the Republic of Venice to buy up all the spices yearly brought to Portugal, over and above what Portugal itself required.

To the east of Suez, Venice made herself felt not by her actual presence but by her intrigues. In the Indo-Portuguese archives she appears vaguely as an ill-wisher to Portugal and a confederate of the Turk. The Indian letters to Lisbon report such incidents as the arrest of a seditious Venetian pilot,[1] or the apostasy of a Venetian who had turned Moor;[2] rumours of joint preparations by the Turks and Venetians against the Portuguese; and apprehensions of the Turks and Venetians lest Portugal should block their Red Sea route by the capture of Aden. Of the French we hear little in the Indo-Portuguese records during the sixteenth century except that—'the French will 1531
be ill-advised if they come seeking us.'[3]

Spain proved a more serious rival. The demarcation Bull of 1493 overlooked the fact that the earth is a sphere. The Portuguese had, indeed, only to pursue their discoveries far enough to the

[1] Letter of the Licentiate Pedro Gomes for the King, from Cochin, November 2, 1520. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter of Juda Marcos, February 2, 1568. India Office MSS.

[3] Letter from Dom Joam d' Eça for the King, July 1, 1531. India Office MSS. But see *post*, p. 215.

east of the dividing line, and the Spaniards to push theirs far enough to the west, in order that the two nations should meet angrily on the other
1521 side of the globe. This they did in 1521. Magellan, disgusted by the ingratitude of Portugal for his services under Albuquerque in the East Indies, offered in 1517 to find out for Spain a new road to Asia. Starting from Seville with five ships in 1519, he coasted down the American continent till he discovered the straits which bear his name. Then striking north-west across the Pacific he made the Philippine Islands, where he was killed in 1521. But his squadron proceeded to the Moluccas, which had already been reached by the Portuguese *viâ* the Cape of Good Hope. One ship of Magellan's five succeeded in returning to Seville in 1522, having sailed round the world and thus opened a lawful route for Spain into the East Indian seas.

When the consternation of the Lisbon Court calmed down, the difficulty was found susceptible of diplomatic settlement. The Bull of 1493, in partitioning the undiscovered world between Spain and Portugal, started from an imaginary line in the Atlantic. It implied, however, a complementary line half way round the earth, say 180 degrees distant, as the boundary of the two nations in Asiatic waters. But the sea-mathematics of that age were unequal to the accurate determination of either line, although the second Borgian map[1]

[1] By Diego Riebro of Seville, a cosmographer in the service of Charles V., and whose vague delineation of the Atlantic line in-

in 1529 attempts to show both. Charles V. of Spain had, as Emperor, too many wars on hand in Europe to wish for further complications in the East. He possessed, moreover, in America, an India nearer home: an India which, instead of draining the mother-country of specie every year to carry on trade, was beginning to pour into her treasury inexhaustible stores of silver. Charles V. wanted the sinews of war, and he could not pay his armies in nutmegs and cloves.

Notwithstanding his promise to the Spanish 1529
Cortes in 1523, during the first enthusiasm of Magellan's discoveries, to defend them, Charles V. in 1529 sold his claims to the Moluccas for 350,000 golden ducats (say 170,000*l.*) to Portugal. By the same Convention of Saragossa he accepted an Asiatic boundary line between the two Catholic nations at 297½ leagues east of the Moluccas, reserving to Spain the right of annulling the bargain on repayment of the money.[1] This disposed for the time of the difficulty, and the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580—solemnly confirmed in 1581—seemed to render the settlement final.[2]

dicates that the map was made in the Spanish interest apropos of the Convention of Saragossa.

[1] Contract and Convention made at Saragossa between King João III. and the Emperor Charles V., dated April 22, 1529.

[2] As a matter of fact after Portugal regained her independence in 1640, the demarcation of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions beyond the Atlantic line, chiefly in South America, formed the subject of many altercations and treaties between those nations; as in 1681–1682, 1750, 1761, 1773, 1777, practically ending with the settlement confirmed by the Treaty of Prado in 1778.

But diplomacy in Europe proved powerless, then and for two centuries afterwards, to quell the stormy passions of European rivals in Asia. The Portuguese jealousy had already been excited by the influx into India of Castilian Jews driven forth from Spain. Albuquerque proposed to make
1513 short work with these unhappy emigrants, and asked leave to 'exterminate them one by one as I come across them.'[1] On the Spaniards attempting to trade at the Moluccas, the Portuguese captains waited for no orders from home, and after a fierce struggle of some years drove them out. In 1528
1528 they forced the King of Tidore, the chief sovereign in the Moluccas, to promise never again to allow the Castilians to enter his river. The Saragossa Convention of 1529 between Spain and Portugal provided that any Europeans except Portuguese who came within the line then agreed on should be punished as corsairs.[2] But fighting still went on between the armed merchant ships of the two nations on the Indian seas.[3] 'In this manner do we go on day by day with these dogs, enemies of our Holy Faith,' a despairing Spaniard wrote of
1532 the Portuguese in 1532, 'the knife for ever at our throats, swallowing a thousand deaths.'[4]

The struggle only flickered out after the native

[1] Letter for the King, dated December 15, 1513. Danvers, i. 287. The proposal included Jewish refugees from Portugal.

[2] The India Office MS. translation of this instrument occupies pp. 55-65 of Biker's *Treaties*, vol. i.

[3] *E.g.* Letter of Dom Joam d' Eça for the King [of Portugal], July 1, 1531. India Office MSS.

[4] Letter of Fernando de la Torre for the Emperor Charles V., from Gilolo (in the Moluccas), March 1, 1532. India Office MSS.

princes surrendered their islands to the Portuguese or bound themselves by treaties absolutely to exclude the Castilians from their ports. At length in 1545 the Christian commanders came to an 1545 agreement: each side solemnly purging itself as 'blameless of the cockle which the Enemy of Mankind had commenced to sow.'[1] But the cockle of discord soon sprang up afresh. By a later treaty in the same year, the Spaniards surrendered their artillery and gave hostages as a guarantee that they would really evacuate Tidore; while their soldiers were offered service under the Portuguese.[2] The monopoly of the two Catholic nations in the East, thus established, was destined to be drawn still closer by the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580.

The attitude of England to Portugal seems, on 1489 the other hand, to have been cordial. Ten years before the finding of the Cape route, the old friendship between the two nations had been cemented afresh in 1489 by a 'ratification of the Perpetual Peace.'[3] When therefore our Henry VII., inspired by Da Gama's discovery, determined to explore on his own account, he was careful to respect the rights of his 'dearest brother and kinsman the King of Portugal.' In 1500 and 1502, in granting

[1] Declaration of Peace celebrated by Jordão de Freitas, Governor of Ternate and of the Moluccas islands, with the General of New Spain, in the name of their Sovereigns, January 8, 1545. India Office MSS.

[2] Treaty of November 4, 1545, Danvers, i. 467.

[3] Dated August 18, 1489. Sir T. H. Duffus Hardy's *Syllabus of Rymer's Fœdera*, ii. 723, O. xii. 387.

somewhat wide charters to certain Bristol and Portuguese adventurers to sail under the English flag into all heathen countries of the seas, and to erect his royal banner on whatever island or continent they should discover, Henry VII. expressly provided that they should not intermeddle with the possessions of the King of Portugal or other friendly Christian prince.[1] Spain and Portugal, secure in the Papal award, looked on unperturbed, and in 1521 Henry VIII. entered into a compact with the two nations against their common enemies and those of Christendom.[2] In 1527 Charles V., Emperor and King of Spain, is said[3] to have offered to sell his claims to the Moluccas to Henry VIII. This possible cause of a quarrel with Portugal came to nothing, and in 1529 the dispute between the two Iberian kingdoms was adjusted, as we have seen, by the Convention of Saragossa,
1529 while Henry VIII. joined with them in negotiations for a general peace of Europe and league against the Turk.[4]

The truth is that England believed herself on the eve of discovering a nearer way to India than either the Straits of Magellan or the Cape of Good Hope. In 1476 a Danish (or Polish?) pilot, John Scolus, is reported somewhat obscurely to have got

[1] Rymer's *Fœdera*, xiii. p. 37 (ed. 1704-1735).

[2] Dated London, March 9, 1521. *Calendar of State Papers*, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII., vol. iii. part ii. par. 2098 (ed. J. S. Brewer).

[3] On the authority of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, according to Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, ii. 69 (ed. 1805).

[4] Commission to Earl of Wiltshire and others; dated January 21, 1529. *Calendar of State Papers*, *ut supra*, iv. part iii. par. 6155.

to the passage north of Labrador,[1] and 'in 1477 Columbus himself learned from English sailors of Bristol the management of an ocean voyage when he visited Ultima Thule'[2] (Iceland). In 1480, a 1480
vessel of eighty tons sailed from Bristol under Captain Thylde, the pioneer of continuous English exploration, to discover a land to the west of Ireland called 'Brasylle'—the Irish O'Brasil or Island of the Blest. He failed, but according to the Spanish ambassador, the Bristol merchants sent out two to four vessels every year from 1491 to 1498 on the same search.[3]

When, therefore, Columbus believed he had 1492
found a way to India south-west across the Atlantic in 1492, and mistook Cuba for Japan, the Bristol merchants redoubled their efforts by a north-western route across the same ocean. All such expeditions assumed the rotundity of the earth, and the vagueness of the Papal Bull of 1493, which embittered the relations of Spain and Portugal, gave cover to the English proceedings. That Bull excluded intrusion only towards 'the west and south,'[4] explicitly repeating these terms four times over, and making no reference to discoveries by the north.

The practical monopoly of Spain was to reach

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, par. 21. Pontanus, *Rerum Danicarum Historia*, p. 763. Amster., 1631.

[2] Sir Clements Markham, K.C.B. *Journal of Royal Geographical Society*, June 1897.

[3] Letter of Pedro de Ayala to their Catholic Majesties, dated July 25, 1498. *Calendar of State Papers*, Spain, 1485-1509, vol. i. 168-179.

[4] '*Versus occidentem et meridiem.*'

India by a south-west route, the practical monopoly of Portugal was to reach India by a south-east route; the English resolved to find India by a north-western or north-eastern passage. Spain saw that this might lead to an infringement on the Portuguese claims and on her own,[1] but she did not press the point so as either to threaten a rupture or to prevent the English voyages.

1493 Indeed the Bull of 1493, by referring exclusively to discoveries towards the west and south, left the north open; and the Spanish ambassador himself admitted that the Bristol merchants had been yearly exploring in that direction before the Bull was granted. 'You write that a person like
1496 Columbus,' runs a letter to him from their Catholic Majesties in 1496, 'has come to England for the purpose of persuading the King to enter into an undertaking similar to that of the Indies, without prejudice to Spain and Portugal. He is quite at liberty.'[2] The ambassador had been sent to England to negotiate a marriage between Princess Katherine of Spain and Arthur, Prince of Wales. In the previous decade our Henry VII. missed the offer of the Genoese Columbus, which would have made England the discoverer of the south-western route.[3] In 1496 he granted letters patent to the

[1] Letter from Ferdinand and Isabella to the Spanish ambassador in London, dated Tortosa, March 28, 1496, and from the ambassador to their Catholic Majesties, *circ.* July 25, 1498. Printed in full in G. E. Weare's *Cabot's Discovery of North America*, pp. 111, 159.

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, Spanish, vol. i. p. 89.

[3] See chapters xi. and xiii. of *The History of the Life and Actions of Christopher Columbus*,

Genoese Cabots—John and his three sons—to sail under the royal flag by the north, east, and west. The south is significantly omitted from the license.[1]

John Cabot, a Genoese by birth but a naturalised citizen of Venice, appears to have visited Mecca, had sojourned in Portugal and Spain, and settled in England. With the aid of the Bristol merchants and the sanction of King Henry's patent, he at length set forth from the Severn on May 2, 1497, 1497
in one small vessel the 'Mathew,' with a crew of eighteen, of whom seventeen were Bristol men. He hoped to reach Asia by the North Atlantic, as Columbus was then supposed to have reached it by the south, and 'to make London a greater place for spices than Alexandria.' He returned on August 6, having in reality discovered North America, but in the opinion of his contemporaries having gained for England 'a great part of Asia, without a stroke of the sword.'[2]

Slowly and with much reluctance did England abandon this belief. Yet the voyages of 1498, 1500, 1502, and subsequent years made it evident that America was not Cathay. The latter name, Cathay or Cataya, the old land travellers had vaguely applied to Tartary and China. In the sea voyages now to be described, it included also the

by Ferdinand Columbus (Churchill's *Voyages*, vol. ii. pp. 496 ff. ed. 1752).

[1] 'Ad omnes partes, regiones et sinus maris orientalis occidentalis et septemtrionalis.' Letters Patent dated March 5, 1495-6; printed in full by Weare, pp. 96–100.

[2] Letter from Raimondo de Soñcino to the Duke of Milan, dated December 18, 1497. Printed in full by Weare, pp. 144–150.

northern shores of Asia. A copious and contentious literature has grown up on the pretensions of Sebastian, son of John Cabot, to have been the true discoverer of North America, and on his, perhaps juster, claim to have definitely given shape to the conception of a north-west passage to India. The idea of such a passage took possession of the stubborn English mind.

Of the resolute efforts to convert that idea into an accomplished fact I must only narrate the
1527 most memorable. In 1527, Master Robert Thorne addressed a book to Henry VIII.'s ambassador at the Court of Charles V., urging the King of England to become a merchant like the King of Portugal, and advocating in great detail the north-western route. His father was one of the discoverers of Newfoundland, he himself had dwelt in Seville, and adventured 1,400 ducats in the Indo-Spanish fleet of 1527; with which sailed 'two Englishmen sent to discover "the Islands of the Spiceries."'[1]

'Now then, if from the said New Found Lands the sea be navigable,' he argued, 'there is no doubt but sailing northward and passing the pole, descending to the equinoctial line, we shall hit these islands, and it should be a much more shorter way than either the Spaniards or the Portugals have.'[2] He estimated the length of the Spanish

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, par. 2.

[2] Richard Hakluyt's *Divers Voyages to America*, ed. by J. W. Jones, p. 48; Hakluyt Society (1850). See also *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, vol. iii. p. 809 (1625), and Hakluyt's *Voyages*, vol. ii. p. 129 (1599-1600). There are discrepancies in the names of the ships and details of the voyages.

route by the south-west Atlantic at 4,200 or 4,300 leagues, while the English route by the north-west would be only 2,480 leagues. Two ships were despatched in this year, including, according tc Hakluyt's account, the 'Dominus Vobiscum'—'The Lord be with you.' One of the vessels perished off Newfoundland; the other returned, leaving the possibility of a north-western passage much as it was before.

A more persistent attempt was made in 1536 1536
by Master Hore of London—'a man of goodly stature and of great courage and given to the study of cosmography.' With him went 'many gentlemen of the Inns of Court and of the Chancery, and divers others of good worship desirous to see the strange things of the world'[1]—sixty men in all, of whom thirty were well born. Starting in April 1536 from Gravesend in two small vessels (one of 120 tons) they reached the coast of Newfoundland. There the crews were driven by starvation to eat each other's flesh. In vain Hore upbraided them 'in a notable oration, recounting how these dealings offended the Almighty.' They cast lots as to who should next die, but 'such was the mercie of God that the same night there arrived a French ship in that port well furnished with victual, and such was the policie of the English that they became masters of the same, and changing ships and victualing them, they set sail to come into England.'[2] The haggard survivors
reached Cornwall in October 1536, so worn by 1536

[1] Hakluyt's *Voyages*, ii. 129 (1600). [2] *Idem*, p. 131.

hunger and misery that one of them could not be recognised by his own father and mother save by a wart on his knee. The French captain, whom they had plundered, afterwards appealed to Henry VIII. His Majesty, however, was so moved by the sufferings of the English crews 'that he punished not his subjects, but of his own purse made full and royal recompense unto the French.'

The next expedition which must be noticed was
1553 the famous one of Sir Hugh Willoughby in 1553 to find a passage by the north-east. Sebastian Cabot stands arraigned as a disloyal son who filched his father's achievements to fabricate a reputation for himself. But he was also a skilled geographer and an indefatigable projector of voyages. Born in Bristol, and associated with his father in the patent of Henry VII. for the expedition which in 1497 discovered North America, he became dissatisfied with the meagre rewards of Henry VIII. for his map-making, and about 1513 repaired to Spain. There he found employment under King Ferdinand as a cartographer and member of the Council of the New Indies.

After various vicissitudes, during which he retransferred his services to England and back again to Spain, Sebastian Cabot finally returned to
1547 England in 1547, and gained distinction as arbitrator in an old-standing dispute between the London merchants and the Hanseatic colony of Germans in that city. When further consulted by the London merchants as to the depression of trade, due to the disturbed state of Europe, he

advised them boldly to strike out a path for themselves north-east to Asia, and under his impulse, on December 18, 1551, what is in reality the first 1551
English East India Company was formed. Its capital consisted of 6,000*l.* in 25*l.* shares,[1] with Sebastian Cabot as governor for life, and eventually twelve councillors for the voyage.

The daring project met with impediments, and it was not until May 1553 that the little squadron 1553
could start. It consisted of three ships of 160, 120, and 90 tons, each with a pinnace and boat. Its object was 'the discovery of Cathay, and divers other regions, dominions, islands, and places unknown.'[2] It carried a complete set of instructions 'by the Right Worshipful Master Sebastian Cabota Esquier, Governor of the Mystery and Company of the Merchants Adventurers of the City of London,' and letters from 'the Right Noble Prince Edward the Sixth, sent to the kings, princes, and other potentates inhabiting the north-east parts of the world.'[3] We shall see that this double precedent of mercantile ordinances and royal missives was followed by the more permanent East India Company of 1600. Sir Hugh Willoughby, Knight, commanded as admiral or 'Captain General,' and Richard Chancelor went as pilot-in-chief.

Into the controversy which surrounds this 1553

[1] *Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation*, by D. Macpherson, 4 vols. 1805; vol. ii. p. 114.

[2] 'Journal of the Voyage,' May 10 to September 18, 1553; *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 5.

[3] *State Papers, ut supra*, paras. 3 and 4.

voyage I need not enter.[1] It suffices for Willoughby's fame that he was the first Englishman to reach Nova Zembla; that the results of the expedition led to an overland trade by way of Russia into Asia; and that he laid down his life in the attempt. From August 23 to September 18, 1553, Willoughby coasted the shore of northern Russia with two vessels of the squadron, and tried to explore inland. Here his diary comes to an abrupt close, although it would appear from a Will
1554 that he was alive as late as January 1554. In that long winter darkness he and the crews of his two ice-bound ships—about seventy men in all—perished of cold and starvation: freezing to mummies as they died. The next explorer found the weird company about two years later, Willoughby still sitting in his cabin with his diary and papers before him. According to Milton a strange fate befel the poor corpses on the attempt to bring the vessels home: 'the ships being unstaunch, as is supposed by the two years wintering in Lapland, sunk by the way with their dead and them also that brought them.' [2]

Richard Chancelor, the second in command, had got separated from Willoughby in a storm off the Lafoden Islands. He eventually reached Archangel, and obtained from the Russian sovereign, Ivan the Terrible, a grant of freedom of trade for English ships. On his return a new

[1] See *Narratives of Voyages towards the North-West in search of a Passage to Cathay and India, from* 1496 *to* 1631, by Rundall. Hakluyt Society, 1849.

[2] *History of Moscovia*, John

company was formed to take advantage of this grant, with a charter from Queen Mary in 1554, 1554
under the title of 'the Merchant Adventurers for the Discovery of Lands, Countries, Isles, &c. not before known or frequented by any English.' Persons not members of the company nor licensed by it, who should venture into the Russian dominions, were to forfeit their ships and merchandise, one half to the English Crown and one half to the company.[1] The monopoly grew into the powerful organisation known as the Russian or Muscovy Company, which by many voyages, perils, and diplomatic arrangements, established a trade through Russia to Persia; was a rival of the great East India Company; and lasted till towards the end of the eighteenth century.

This sea-and-overland expedition by the north-east had been chartered by Queen Mary in 1554 for the purposes of trade as well as of discovery. I must not pause to relate how Chancelor and Burrough [2] promptly started in 1555-1556 to open up the path: or how its agent Anthony Jenkinson 1555
reached Moscow in 1557, dined with the Tsar 'at six o'clock by candle-light,' and penetrated to Bokhara, where he met the traders from India and Cathay. It was not an overland route but a northern passage by sea that had taken hold of the English imagination; and the trade by way of the Volga and the Caspian formed no answer to

Milton's Prose Works, v. 420 (1848).

[1] The provisions of Mary's charter of 1554 were closely followed by Elizabeth's charter to the East India Company in 1600.

[2] After whom 'Burrough's Straits.'

the problem which English seamanship had set itself to solve.

1558 The death of Queen Mary put an end to constraints that had arisen out of her Spanish marriage, and with the accession of the Protestant princess in 1558 a host of projectors appeared.[1] A rivalry sprang up between the advocates of the north-west and the north-east passage. In 1565
1565 Anthony Jenkinson urged on Queen Elizabeth a north-east exploration by sea 'to set forward this famous discovery of that renowned Cathay.' In 1566-1567 [Sir] Humphrey Gilbert wrote his Discourse 'to prove a passage by the North-West to Cathay and the East Indies,' and offered to find it by the 'travel hazard and peril of my life,' on condition that he and his heirs should be secured in the fruits of the discovery.[2]

But the great north-western attempt of Elizabeth's reign was the three voyages of Frobisher.[3] Martin Frobisher, merchant, mariner, and on occasion corsair, had for fifteen years nourished a scheme for a passage north-west to Cathay. On his travels he met with Michael Lok, an adventurer equally daring, a more exact student of geographical science, and possessed of wealth earned by sea-trade. Lok's father, while on

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, Noel Sainsbury's *Introduction*, pp. viii., ix. (1862).

[2] *Idem*, par. 13. Memorial of Humphrey Gylberte to the Queen.

[3] They occupy many pages of the *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616; and disclose the details of the once doubtful fourth voyage made over to Fenton's command.

business at Dunkirk in 1533 had torn down the Papal Bull excommunicating Henry VIII., rose into high favour with that sovereign, became alderman and sheriff of London, and died Sir William Lok in 1550. His son Michael having commanded a ship of 1,000 tons in the Levant, and being stirred by 'the great traffic into the East Indies' which he had seen in Spain, financed Frobisher's first voyage.

After unsuccessful negotiations with the Muscovy Company, a charter was obtained from
Elizabeth in February 1575 for a north-west 1575
expedition in favour of Lok, Frobisher and such others as would adventure.[1] Lok subscribed 738*l.*
of the total 1613*l.* required, and on June 12, 1576, 1576
their two little barks of 25 tons each, with a pinnace of ten tons, and thirty-four persons all told, sailed from Gravesend under Frobisher's command. The pinnace was soon lost, one of the barks parted company in a storm and came home, but Frobisher went on, entered the straits to which he gave his name, and returned to Harwich on October 2, 1576—bringing great hope 'of the passage to Cataya which he doubted nothing to find and pass through.' Among his trophies were an Esquimaux with his canoe, whom he had enticed to the side of his little vessel, then stooping over the side had with his own arms 'caught the man fast and plucked him with main force, boat and all, into his barque.' [2]

[1] Memorial of Michael Lok: *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 27.

[2] *The Three Voyages of Martin.*

1576–7 Frobisher also brought home certain pieces of stone which an Italian assayer, Agnello, declared to contain gold. Money was quickly forthcoming for a second voyage at a cost of 4,500*l.*; the Queen subscribing 500*l.*, afterwards raised to 1,000*l.*; the Lord Treasurer, Lord Admiral and other high officers 100*l.* each. Even Philip Sidney caught the fever and put down for this and the next voyages 25*l.*, then 50*l.*: modest sums, but apparently beyond the young poet-courtier's purse, as he figures in 1579 among the Adventurers who had not paid their subscriptions—a defaulter for 77*l.*[1]

1577 Frobisher's second expedition, consisting of his former two little barks with 'one talle shippe of her Majestie,' started on May 26, 1577. His hope was to pass into the 'Mare Pacificum or Mare de Sur by which he may go into Cataya, China, the East India, and all the dominions of the great Cane [Khan] of Tartaria.' But his fixed resolve was to find more of the gold-bearing stone. On September 23 he returned to Milford Haven, bringing home a quantity of the supposed ore, went to Court, and received from Queen Elizabeth 'great thanks and most gracious countenance.' The new northern land discovered on this voyage Her Majesty named the Meta Incognita—the

Frobisher in search of a passage to Cathaia and India by the North-west. Reprinted from the 1st ed. of *Hakluyt's Voyages*, with MS. documents from the State Paper Office. Edited by Rear-Admiral Richard Collinson (Hakluyt Society, 1867).

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 138. See, however, par. 94.

unknown Turning-post into Asia—and designed to send thither chosen soldiers and discreet persons to form a settlement.

The hope of gold now wrought like a frenzy. 1577–8
It seemed as if England had within her grasp not only a passage to the East Indies about half as short as the Spanish route, but also stores of bullion which would reduce to contempt the silver of Spanish America. A German assayer, Schutz, engaged that two tons 'shall yield in fine gold' twenty ounces,[1] and although the mint officials gave no certain sound, it was resolved to secure at once 5,000 tons of the ore. 'The north-west passage is almost wholly lost sight of,' says Mr. Sainsbury in summarising the State Papers; 'gold is the pith, heart and core of most of the correspondence.'[2]

On May 31, 1578, Frobisher sailed on his third 1578
voyage from Harwich with eleven ships. The Queen herself graciously wished him farewell at Greenwich. He carried the hopes and fears alike of the city and the Court; and the divine blessing was sought by strict articles 'to banish dice and card playing' 'and to serve God twice a day, with the ordinary service usual in churches of England.' The password for the crews was 'Before the world was God:' the countersign, 'After God came Christ his Sonne.' Amid tempests and ice-dangers so dire that Frobisher, 'when all hope should be past . . . resolved with powder to burn and bury

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 61.
[2] *Idem*, Introduction, xv.

himself and all, together with her Majestie's ships, and with this peal of ordnance to receive an honorable knell'[1]—the fleet secured its cargo of ore, and returned to England on October 1, 1578.

The gold mania rushed to a climax. Wild rumours spread as to the value of the freight; an ominous silence followed, then angry fears. Finally in 1583 the assay of William Williams proved that two hundred weight of 'Frobisher's ore' yielded but two minute particles of silver, not the size of a pin's head, which were fastened with sealing wax to the margin of the report.[2] The three voyages had cost 20,160*l.*; involved terrible sufferings in stormy and ice-bound seas; and left ruin behind. Frobisher seems to have adventured what little he had, and in 1577 (?) his wife represented her hard fate to Secretary Walsingham as 'your humble oratrix, the most miserable poor woman in the world.' A widow of good estate when she married Frobisher, she and her children are in a wretched room at Hampstead ready to starve, and prays for help in collecting an old debt of 4*l.* to save them from famishing.[3]

The miseries of Michael Lok were more drawn out. He had contributed or truly expended 6,250*l.* on the three voyages, he declared to the Privy Council in 1579—all the goods he hath in the world, whereby himself, his wife and fifteen children are left to beg their bread, 'except God

[1] Frobisher's *Three Voyages*, *ut supra*, p. 248.

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 228.

[3] *Idem*, par. 43.

turn the stones at Dartford into his bread again."[1] No miracle took place. After lying long in the Fleet Prison and failing in attempts to re-establish himself in life, Lok was in 1614-1615, at the age of 83, still being prosecuted for debts incurred for the Cathay Company thirty-five years before.

Meanwhile English exploration had not stood still. As the great struggle with Spain drew on, the Protestant spirit of England rose, and in 1578 1578
Drake broke into the Pacific by the south-western route and visited the Moluccas, all Papal Bulls notwithstanding. Elizabeth hesitated to follow up to its mercantile uses her privateering hero's voyage round the globe (1577–1580). But during the recriminations which ensued with Spain, she found it necessary to challenge the Catholic monopoly of the Asiatic trade based on the Papal settlement of 1493. The Pope's award became a disputed 'donation of the Bishop of Rome.' 'The use of the sea and air,' she argued, 'is common to all,' 'as neither nature, nor public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof.'[2] Drake's voyage into the forbidden oceans, and Elizabeth's challenge of the international system on which the interdict rested, opened up possibilities of a southern passage which the East India Company, twenty years later, turned into facts.

These possibilities and the ruin and discredit in which Frobisher's search for gold had ended, somewhat abated the national interest in the

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 124.

[2] *History of Elizabeth*, by William Camden, Clarencieux King at Arms, p. 255 (ed. 1675).

northern routes. But expeditions still went on. 1580 In May 1580, the Muscovy Company sent out two vessels of forty and twenty tons, the joint crews numbering but fourteen men and two boys, to discover a north-eastern passage to the 'dominions of the mighty prince the Emperor of Cathay.' One of the little barks, under Jackman, perished at sea; the other, under Pet, discovered the straits which bear his name between Waigatz and Russia, but was forced back by ice, and returned to England in December 1580.[1]

1582 After much negotiation a fourth voyage was entrusted to Frobisher, which marks the growing resolve of England to penetrate to Asiatic seas, by the forbidden southern route. Its object was to 'be only for trade and not for discovery of the passage by the north-east to Cataya,' unless the information could be incidentally obtained. Frobisher declined the command, and in June 1582[2] the ships sailed under Captain Edward Fenton with designedly ambiguous instructions. 'You shall take your right course to the isles of the Moluccas for the better discovery of the North-West passage,' provided that the discovery may be made 'without hindrance of your trade;'[3] and also to find a north-east passage if, on the same conditions, he could. The main idea seems to

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616 (17 men), paras. 147–150. See also *The Three Voyages of William Barents to the Arctic Regions.* Introduction, lxxv.–lxxx. Hakluyt Society, 1876.

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, Introduction, xxiv.

[3] *Idem*, paras. 187, 184, &c.

have been to reach the Moluccas by the Cape of Good Hope, or if needful by the Straits of Magellan, to open trade and to establish small settlements at places, to fight the Spaniards if attacked, and to inquire whether the northern passages which had defied all efforts from Europe could not be opened out from Asia. It was a vast enterprise, with a squadron of four ships aggregating 740 tons, besides pinnaces and shallops, provisioned for thirteen months, and with a subscribed capital of 11,600*l.*, of which 2,000*l.* were invested in merchandise.[1]

After a year's absence Captain Fenton returned 1582–3
to Plymouth in May 1583 with a sad tale of failure. He has been accused of deviating from his instructions, with the design of seizing the Island of St. Helena, 'theire to be proclaimed Kyng.' It is certain that he took six months to reach Brazil. Contrary winds and want of victuals, he wrote to Burleigh, then prevented him from passing the Cape of Good Hope, while the news of a great Spanish fleet at the Straits of Magellan deterred him from attempting that route. He decided to traffic, or buccaneer, along the coast of Brazil; fought a battle with a Spanish squadron; and came back with the empty words that, but for these mishaps, he dares well assure the Lord Treasurer they had brought home in honest trade above 40,000*l.* or 50,000*l.*[2]

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, paras. 182, 183, &c. The contingency of the Magellan passage is provided for in the Instructions, par. 187.

[2] *Idem.* paras. 221, 225, 229, &c.

As a matter of fact, he bartered away one of his ships to the Portuguese, lost another at the River Plate, quarrelled with his officers, buried forty-five of his men, and did nothing. It still took men of the Drake and Cavendish stamp to break into the Indian seas. But the union of the Crowns of Spain and Portugal under Philip II. in 1580 gave a new incentive to the task. Appar-
1583 ently in the very year of Fenton's return, 1583, the danger to Europe of allowing Spain to enjoy both Portugal and the East Indies was publicly discussed. The remedies proposed were for England to seize and fortify the Straits of Magellan; to take and keep Port St. Vincent in Brazil, and to discover the north-east passage with all speed.[1]

The time for these heroic measures had not come. Yet the next few years saw memorable attempts both to the north and the south. In
1585–7 1585, 1586 and 1587 John Davis made his three great voyages, in each of which he felt convinced that he had found the North-west route. As the result of the first, he announced to Walsingham, on October 3, 1585, 'that the north-west passage is a matter nothing doubtful, but at any time almost to be passed, the sea navigable, void of ice, the air tolerable and the waters very deep.'[2] On returning from the third he declared, in September

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, par. 233. Date doubtful (1583 ?).

[2] *The Voyages and Works of John Davis, the Navigator.* Edited by Albert Hastings Markham. Hakluyt Society, 1880, p. xix.

1587, 'the passage is most probable, the execution easy, as at my coming you shall fully know.'[1]

Davis discovered much, but he had not found the outlet, and he became a mark for the scoffer.
The crisis of the Spanish Armada in the following 1588
year absorbed the whole energies of the nation, and his alleged north-western route ended in disbelief and contempt. Yet although mistaken, he was honest, and in 1595 he still held that 'it seemed most manifest that the passage was free and without impediment towards the north, but by reason of the Spanish fleet and unfortunate time of Mr. Secretary's death, the voyage was omitted and never sithins attempted.'[2]

Events had taken place which fixed the eyes of the nation on a very different route. On the assumption of the crown of Portugal by Philip II. of Spain in 1580, one of the rival claimants, Don Antonio, Prior of Crato, appealed to arms, was defeated, and sought shelter in England. The union of the two Iberian monarchies, with the command of the joint resources of the East and West Indies which it gave to Philip, seemed a
menace to all Europe. France and England drew 1581
closer together, and Elizabeth encouraged the fugitive Antonio to the furthest limits short of a rupture with Spain. Some relief she could openly afford to an unfortunate prince in whose veins the blood royal of England, even if tainted

[1] *Idem*, p. 59.

[2] *The Worldes Hydrographical Discription*, by John Davis (1595).

by illegitimacy, flowed. In November 1581 the Spanish Ambassador gave check to her hesitating designs and official disclaimers by demanding the arrest of the pretender. The armed ships bought for Don Antonio in the Thames, he declared, had sailed past the Queen's own window at Greenwich with the flag of Portugal displayed. 'Your Majesty will not hear words, so we must come to cannon, and see if you will hear them.' Elizabeth, without raising her voice, told him that if he used such threats she would throw him into a dungeon. But she was not yet prepared for an open breach with Philip.[1]

She was willing, however, to see her subjects do what she feared to undertake. The Spanish monopoly of the Magellan route had been challenged during the diplomatic wrangle arising out of Drake's voyage round the world in 1577–1580.
1586 In July 1586 Thomas Cavendish set forth with three small ships[2] on the same course. Philip II. had attempted to forestall such irruptions into the Pacific by a fortified settlement commanding the Straits of Magellan. But Cavendish found the miserable colonists dead or fleeing from the place, which he contemptuously named the Town of Famine. Pillaging, prize-taking, and burning to

[1] Don Antonio's adventures in England are detailed in the printed Calendars of State Papers, described by perhaps a too loyal pen in William Camden's *History of Elizabeth* (pp. 264 ff. ed. 1675), and with picturesque sidelights on the Queen's vacillations in Froude's *History of England* (vol. xi. p. 438, &c. Ed. 1870, pp. 198–200, Ed. 1893).

[2] Of 140, 60, and 40 tons respectively, with crews aggregating 123 men.

the water's edge, he raided up the Pacific coast of Spanish America, buccaneered through the Spanish and Portuguese islands of the Indian Ocean, and finally returned by the Cape of Good Hope with one surviving ship to England, in September 1588; to be sung in ballads and flattered by the Court.

Two months before his arrival Spain had 1588
struck her long suspended blow. In the summer of 1588 the Invincible Armada came and perished. Even Elizabeth felt that the time for pretences was past. In the following year, 1589, she received a memorial setting forth the benefits to the realm of a direct trade with India and praying for a royal licence for three ships.[1] Leave granted, the capital was raised, and in April 1591 the first 1591
English squadron sailed round the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian seas. One of the three ships, the 'Merchant Royal,' had to be sent back to England from Table Bay, laden with victims of the scurvy. Of the two which sailed on, the 'Penelope' went down in a tempest with the commodore or 'General' George Raymond and all hands. But Captain James Lancaster in the 'Edward Bonaventure' passed up the African coast to Zanzibar, crossed over to Cape Comorin, reached the Malay Peninsula, and returned by Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope.

Atlantic hurricanes buffeted him about from

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616. October 1589: par. 239. Cf. Hakluyt, and Sir Clements Markham's *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Kt.*, Hakluyt Society, 1877.

the West Indies to Newfoundland and back again. While on shore with most of the crew, his sole surviving ship was blown far out to sea with only five men and a boy on board, but she at length reached England. Captain Lancaster, after generous succour from French vessels, him-
1594 self arrived at Rye in 1594. Of 198 men who had rounded the Cape of Good Hope with him in 1591, barely twenty-five again saw their native land. But they brought back a precious cargo of pepper and rich booty. The only dangerous enemies they had met were the scurvy and the storm. Lancaster's voyage tore the Papal award of 1493 into shreds, and with it the charter of the Catholic monopoly in the Indian seas.

We must be careful, however, not to over-estimate the binding force of the Bull of 1493. I have said that at the end of the fifteenth century no Christian nation seriously disputed the papal award.[1] But the outbreak of free thought during the first quarter of the sixteenth, which grew into the Reformation in Germany and England, was also represented in France by the struggle of Francis I. with the Pope. The witty king among his courtiers would have liked to see the testament of Father Adam which authorised his Holiness to

[1] The monopoly of 'the larger half of the planet,' wrote Sir J. Seeley perhaps too widely, 'was claimed by Spain not on the ground of any treaty concluded with England or any other country, but on the ground of a Papal Bull issued at the beginning of the sixteenth century.' *The Growth of British Policy*, i. 204 (Ed. 1897). *Cf.* 269.

divide out the world. For a moment, indeed, Francis I. seemed disposed to give practical effect to his jibe. The Florentine Captain Verazzani, whom he commissioned to make discoveries to the North-west,[1] adventured about 1524 southwards 1524
within the demarcation line.

The expedition failed. The explorer was eaten by cannibals, or, as is supposed with less likelihood, was captured by the Spaniards and hanged at Madrid, and the Eldest Son of the Church never repeated the attempt. When the Huguenots be- 1555-64
came a power in France, during the middle of the century, the forward party settled colonies on the coasts of Brazil and Florida.[2] But the Brazilian settlement lapsed to the Portuguese, the Florida colonies were destroyed by the Spaniards and were chiefly remembered in France as episodes in the Protestant movement. Such infringements of the papal award formed maritime incidents of greater religious or political struggles. The punishment provided by the Bull of 1493 was excommunication; and to sovereigns like our Henry VIII., who had broken or were about to break with the Roman See on other grounds, the sentence ceased to have terrors. To James I., and to Protestant rulers like Cromwell or the champions of Flemish and Dutch liberty, the Bull was null and void.

[1] Vivien de Saint-Martin's *Histoire de la Géographie et des Découvertes Géographiques*, p. 374 (Paris, 1873). But see also L'Abbé Prévost's *Histoire Générale des Voyages*, vol. xiii. p. 20, 1756.

[2] In 1555, 1562 and 1564. Vivien de Saint-Martin's *Histoire*, pp. 376-377.

Meanwhile the papal settlement had passed into the public law of Europe. It is not needful here to inquire whether the Bull of 1493 was only *ad spiritualia*.[1] The treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 and the Convention of Saragossa in 1529, practically, although not expressly based upon it, were diplomatic facts backed by powerful armies. If Henry VIII. had challenged the principle of the Bull embodied in these instruments, he would have run the gauntlet of Portugal, Spain and the Empire. If Elizabeth had as Queen openly encroached within the Spanish line, she would have had to reckon with Philip II. It did not suit her to do so until urged on by his war preparations, and emboldened by the destruction of his Armada. During nearly a century England tried to reach India by every possible route not precluded by the treaties which gave effect to the Bull—through the ice-bound seas of the North-west and the North-east, overland across Russia by means of the Muscovy Company, and due east, as we shall

[1] After searching the Torre do Tombo and Bibliotheca Nacional at Lisbon, I satisfied myself that the three Tituli of May 3, 1493, do not exist in the Portuguese archives: the grant of May 4, which superseded them, will be found in the ordinary *Bullariums*. I am indebted to Mr. J. H. Reddan, of the British Foreign Office, for copies of the former rare instruments, and for courteous and valuable aid. A collation of the documents confirms the conclusion that they were intended to convey to Spain not only possession and jurisdiction, but also exclusive trade. The first *Inter cætera* of May 3, 1493, and the superseding *Inter cætera* of May 4, both in identical words, visit with '*excommunicationis latæ sententiæ pœnâ*' all who shall intrude '*pro mercibus habendis*.'

presently find, by way of the Sultan's dominions and the Levant.

The other Protestant sea-power of Northern Europe had adopted a similar policy. As early as 1565 the Dutch established a factory[1] on the north Russian route, and soon began to explore eastwards towards Cathay. Uncertain attempts, Dutch or Swedish, followed.[2] In 1593 commenced the series of determined efforts of Holland to reach Asia by the North-east passage, which have placed William Barents in the foremost rank of Arctic explorers.[3]

His first voyage occupied the summer of 1594, 1594
and brought him through storms and ice-floes to the Islands of Orange. On the second voyage in 1595 he found the strait south of Waigatz Isle blocked with ice, was imprisoned by the frozen masses at Idol Cape, but eventually reached Staten Island. Heroic as had been the achievement, the States-General decided that they could not expend public money on further attempts to discover a North-eastern passage, with so little prospect of a pecuniary return. But to encourage private

[1] At Kola, under the impulse of Philip Winter-Köning. *The Three Voyages of William Barents to the Arctic Regions*, by Lieutenant Koolemans Beynen, Introd. p. vi. Hakluyt Society.

[2] For the early Dutch or Flemish ventures see the *Itinéraire Historique, Politique, Géographique &c. des VII Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas*, par Guillaume le Febure. (The Hague, 2 vols. 1781–1782); *Mémoires sur le Commerce des Hollandois* (Amsterdam, 1717). Wauwermans, Bonnassieux, and the Dutch writers are referred to in subsequent footnotes (pp. 233, 336, &c.)

[3] Graphically detailed in Lieutenant Koolemans Beynen's *The Three Voyages of William Barents*.

adventurers they offered a large reward in case of success. A third expedition accordingly started in
1596 May 1596, with Barents as Pilot-in-Chief, and keeping more to the North reached Spitzbergen. They were forced 'in great cold, poverty, misery and grief to stay all that winter'[1] at the Haven of Nova Zembla, and the much-enduring Barents died on the return voyage to Holland in the following spring. By this time the Dutch, like the English, were resolved to reach India by the South, in defiance of Spanish treaties and papal Bulls. From freedom in religion sprang the freedom of the sea.

Not only had the diplomatic settlement of the undiscovered world, based on the papal partition, broken down, but the methods of exploration had profoundly changed. Mediæval sea-trade rigorously enforced the maxims of secret commerce. Venice, like Carthage of old, punished with death the revealer of a maritime route, and the export of charts of discovery was a capital crime.[2] The Adriatic merchants raised a wall of mystery between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. They 'laboured to make us strangers to the Great Turk, the Egyptians and bordering countries, and brought them to that ignorance of our nation, that they thought England to be a town in the kingdom of London,'[3] wrote Sir William Monson. In 1424 the

[1] *The Three Voyages of William Barents*, pp. cxxxiv. 99, 198.

[2] *Henri le Navigateur*, by Lieut.-Général Wauwermans, pp. 67, 92 (Antwerp, 1890).

[3] Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts, printed in Churchill's *Voyages*, vol. iii. p. 408 (1752).

Doge had considered a copy of the travels of Marco Polo, together with a map (probably the precious Medicean portulan of 1351) as a State gift worthy to accompany the thanks of the Republic to Prince Pedro of Portugal for his good offices in negotiating a treaty with the Emperor.[1]

This doctrine *du secret commercial*, which weighed heavily on early exploration, ceased to be tenable in the sixteenth century. Prince Henry's cartographical school at Sagres, in the fifteenth, had done much to render available the then existing stock of knowledge regarding the undiscovered world. But it was the application of the Flemish printer's and graver's art to map-making at the beginning of the sixteenth century that gave the death-blow to secret commerce. A magnificent school of cartography grew up at Antwerp and Bruges; a school ennobled by master-minds like Mercator, Ortelius and de Jode, and fertile in processes of map-reproduction destined to make the discoveries of one nation the common property of all.[2]

15th cent.

16th cent.

The Netherlands school of geographers rendered possible the developments in maritime commerce which culminated at the end of the sixteenth century in the English and Dutch East India Companies. It started from the theoretical cosmography of the Ptolemaic system, and the Roman

[1] *Henri le Navigateur*, p. 77.

[2] *Histoire de l'Ecole Cartographique Belge et Anversoise du XVIe Siècle*, par le Lieutenant-Général Wauwermans, Président de la Société Royale de Géographie d'Anvers, 2 vols. (Bruxelles, 1895). A valuable work.

16th cent. itineraries of which the Peutingerian Tables (*circ.* 226 A.D.) form a striking example. To these it added the actual discoveries, and some of the conjectural errors, embodied in the mappemondes and portulans of the middle ages. The voyages of Columbus and Da Gama made the mediæval charts obsolete. On the ruins of the old cosmography the Italian and Dutch map-designers built up a new geography, and the Antwerp map-printers published it to the world.

The system of secret commerce had thus to give place to a doctrine of exclusive right founded on priority of discovery. This doctrine, crudely expressed in the demarcation Bull of 1493 and elaborated by later diplomacy, gave a monopoly to the first comer. The drift of affairs in the next two centuries disclosed, however, that such national monopolies afforded no final settlement for the newly found regions of the globe. The right of discovery had to submit to modifications based on the plea of non-effective occupation.[1] But from first to last, monopoly was the guiding principle; the monopoly secured by secret trading, the monopoly of the papal Bulls and treaties founded thereon, the monopoly given by the right of discovery, and the monopoly derived from that right modified by

[1] This view, as further developed in the seventeenth century, is well expressed in a Spanish State Paper, *circ.* 1670, by a member of Philip IV.'s Privy Council. It fears that France will successfully assert her right at Rome to intrude on the Spanish colonies, 'on the ground that Spain does not know how to manage or hold them.' I thank Mr. Reddan of the Foreign Office for extracts from this document, which is in his possession.

effective occupation. To this long tradition of monopoly the English and Dutch East India Companies became the residuary legatees, and it profoundly influenced their whole history. 16th cent.

If, during nearly a century, the Portuguese maintained the monopoly of the Indian trade, they for a time enforced it in no grudging spirit towards other Christian nations. Beyond Lisbon to the south, indeed, all intruders were treated as pirates, and misleading reports were spread, according to the maxims of secret commerce, about the dangers of the route.[1] But in 1500, immediately after Da Gama's discovery, the Portuguese King admitted naturalised foreigners to trade with the East at Lisbon itself, and he cordially entered on a project for an Indian mart in Northern Europe. Bruges, the outlet to the North for the Eastern trade by the mediæval land paths, had decayed, owing partly to the blocking of the Asiatic routes by the Turks, partly to the vengeance of Maximilian of Austria for its revolts, but permanently in consequence of the silting up of its river and ports. The Portuguese King made Antwerp the entrepôt of Indian produce for Northern Europe, and the opening up of a new branch of the Scheldt, by the scouring of the channel about 1504, gave it a sea approach such as Bruges had not even in the height of her prosperity enjoyed.[2]

[1] Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, vol. ii. p. 55; and for the secresy enjoined on Spanish map-makers, ii. 158—under pain of death, says Prince Roland Bonaparte, *Premiers Voyages des Néerlandais*, p. 5 (Versailles, 1884).

[2] Wauwermans' *Histoire de*

16th cent. Lisbon thus became the port of transhipment between the East and the great colonial mart of Antwerp. During the first half of the sixteenth century England's direct traffic with Lisbon was small, although we find Henry VII. granting a charter in 1500 to a joint company of English and Portuguese adventurers,[1] and Portuguese merchants figure among the residents in London with whom the Venetians were in 1507 licensed to trade.[2] But between Antwerp and London an enormous traffic grew up. Antwerp not only supplied England with the precious stones, fine fabrics, spices, drugs and dyes of the East, but she took in return and distributed to Europe the raw materials and manufactures of England. The long list of these exports and imports in 1560 is summarised below.[3]

1550 In 1550 the Emperor Charles V. found that the English merchants employed 20,000 persons in

l'Ecole Cartographique Belge et Anversoise, i. 203–205, 210, &c.

[1] *Ante*, p. 192.

[2] The instrument took the form of an indemnity, '*Depardonatione pro Mercatoribus Venetiarum*,' dated 24 March, 1507. Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. xiii. p. 161 (1712).

[3] 'To England, Antwerp sends jewels and precious stones, silver bullion, quicksilver, wrought silks, cloth of gold and silver, gold and silver thread, camblets, grograms, spices, drugs, sugar, cotton, cummin, galls, linens fine and coarse, serges, demy-ostades, tapestry, madder, hops in great quantities, glass, salt fish, metallic and other merceries of all sorts to a great value; arms of all kinds, ammunition for war, and household furniture. From England, Antwerp receives vast quantities of fine and coarse draperies, fringes, and other things of that kind to a great value; the *finest wool*, excellent saffron in small quantities; a great quantity of lead and tin; sheep and rabbit skins without number, and various other sorts of fine peltry and leather; beer, cheese, and other sorts of provisions in great quantities; also Malmsey wines, which the English import from Candia.' Macpherson quoting Guicciardini, *Annals*, ii. 131.

Antwerp, and he refrained from imposing the Inquisition on the city, lest it should drive the Englanders away.[1] They did business with a Portuguese colony on the Scheldt, and no fewer than 300 wealthy Spanish families had their domicile in Antwerp.[2] Over 500 vessels are reported to have sailed in or out in one day, and the ships and small craft were said to aggregate 92,000 a year.[3] 16th cent.

This centre of the world's traffic, *Dives Antwerpia*, almost at our doors, gave an impulse to the mercantile spirit in England. 'Clear-sighted persons at Court' advised, as early as the reign of Henry VIII., a policy of colonial enterprise in place of interference in the continental wars. 'Let us,' they said, 'in God's name, leave off our attempts against the *terra firma*, as the natural situation of islands seems not to suit with conquests of that kind. Or, when we would enlarge ourselves, let it be that way we can, and to which, it seems the eternal providence has destined us, which is by sea. The Indies are discovered, and vast treasure brought from thence every day. Let us, therefore, bend our endeavours thitherwards; and if the Spaniards and Portuguese suffer us not to join with them, there will yet be region enough for all to enjoy.'[4]

[1] Macpherson, ii. 106, on the authority of J. Wheeler in 1601, Secretary to the Merchant Adventurers, and, as such, perhaps likely to over-estimate their importance.

[2] Thys, *Histoire des Rues et Places d'Anvers*, p. 256: Wauwermans, i. 208.

[3] Thys, pp. 253, 254.

[4] Macpherson's *Annals*, *sub anno* 1511, ii. 39, on the authority of Lord Herbert.

16th cent. From the outset, therefore, the Indies formed the goal of English maritime enterprise in the sixteenth century.[1] The efforts to reach that goal by a North-west or a North-east passage I have already described. But Elizabeth did not confine her attempts to the North alone. As far back as 1553 English ships began to make their way to the coast of Guinea—an infringement of Portuguese rights profitable to the Portuguese themselves, and placed
1572 on a treaty basis in 1572.[2] The occasional seizures and reprisals which followed did not seriously disturb the amity of the two nations; and England's friendship on the Newfoundland bank was worth some concessions in the South. For the English had the best ships engaged in the Atlantic fisheries, and, although in 1577 they numbered but fifteen as against fifty Portuguese and a hundred Spanish, they were said to give the law to the rest.[3]

Elizabeth's diplomacy enabled her adventurers to push not only southwards by Guinea, but also
1577 eastwards through the Mediterranean. In 1577 she sent a mission to the Emperor of Morocco, with the result that the English merchants secured a firm footing and gradually ousted the Portuguese from the trade.[4] In 1579 her envoy to the Ottoman Sultan obtained permission for
1579 English merchants to resort freely to the Levant, and in 1581 she granted a charter of incorporation to the Turkey Company. After the joint Armada

[1] *Ante*, p. 195.

[2] Macpherson's *Annals*, *sub anno* 1572, ii. 153.

[3] *Idem*, ii. 159, on the authority of Hakluyt.

[4] *Idem*, ii. 159, on the authority of Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts.

of Spain and Portugal against England perished in 1588, Elizabeth extended the scope of this
corporation in 1593 to India, under the title of the 1593
Governor and Company of the Merchants of the Levant.[1]

The union of the Spanish and Portuguese
crowns in 1580 was to the Protestant sea-powers 1580
of the sixteenth century what the closing of the eastern land routes by the Turks had been to Christendom in the fifteenth. Again a great necessity arose for a new departure in Indo-European commerce. Portugal was dragged at the heels of Spain into her suicidal grapple with the Reformation; and the Catholic monopoly of the Indian trade went down with the Armada in the English Channel and North Sea. From the moment that Philip II. added Portugal to the Spanish monarchy, the English and Flemish adventurers foresaw the end. In 1580 divers London traders petitioned the Council for Elizabeth's consent to an expedition direct to India; a year later the Dutch made a similar application to William I. The life-and-death struggle which followed, by united Spain and Portugal on the one hand against England and the Netherlands on the other, was fought out, not by royal fleets and armies alone, but also by the merchants of the rival nations. The Dutch and Spanish war of commercial edicts scarcely makes itself heard in history amid the din of battle, the shrieks of street

[1] Bent's *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant* (Hakl. Soc.) *The Early Chartered Companies*, Cawston and Keane, pp. 68, 72, 73.

massacres, the groans from Inquisition chambers,
and the inrush of the ocean through the dykes.
But it gave a staggering blow to the Catholic
monopoly of the Indian trade. In 1585, for
1585 example, Philip II. ordered the seizure of all Dutch
ships in Spanish waters. The States-General re-
torted by forbidding any Dutch vessels to trade
with Spain or Portugal under pain of forfeiting
both ship and goods. If these menaces had some
ring of empty shouting in front of the battle, they
1585 soon acquired a very real meaning. Spain ruined
Antwerp. The States-General issued ten proclama-
tions between 1585 and 1600 against trade with
Portugal or Spain.[1] In 1595 the States-General
forbad all navigation of Dutch vessels within
Spanish waters, and in 1596 sent a ship of war as
far as Calais to arrest any Dutch craft on its way
to Spain, Portugal, or Italy.[2]

England, thus deprived of her Indian trade
through Antwerp, had meanwhile met the difficulty
in the Elizabethan fashion. The open enmity au-
1585 thorised by the rupture of diplomatic relations with
Spain in 1584–1585, broke out into blows between
a Portuguese ship of the East Indian fleet and
two English vessels in 1586. In 1587 Drake
captured off the Azores the 'San Filippe,' a great
carrack bearing the King's Saint-name, and laden
with an Indian cargo which yielded 108,049*l.* of
1592 prize-money.[3] In 1592 Sir John Burrough swooped
down on the homeward-bound Indian ships near the

[1] Danvers, ii. 104.

[2] *Idem*, ii. 107.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, Domestic, 1581–1590, p. 428.

Isle of Flores, drove one ashore, and took the other —the 'Madre de Deos,' almost the largest vessel belonging to the Portuguese crown, with a cargo valued at 150,000*l*. Such windfalls, however, proved a poor substitute for England's regular Indian trade through Flanders, now stamped to death under the heels of Spanish armies. Leave was at length obtained from Elizabeth to strike into the direct Indian trade, and in 1591, as we 1591
have seen, the first English squadron sailed round the Cape of Good Hope.[1]

When showing how the Turkish seizure of the ancient land paths constrained Christendom to seek an ocean route to India, I added a caution not to exaggerate the effects of that single cause. So now that Philip II.'s crusade against the Reformation stands disclosed as a compelling influence which led the Protestant Powers of the North to break into the Eastern seas, we should not forget that it was only the last and most imperious of many influences that had been at work. At the end of the fifteenth century Portugal held a unique position, with the geographical science of the Mediterranean at her back, and the unexplored Atlantic in front. At the end of the sixteenth, owing to improvements in navigation and the labours of the Flemish map-makers, she had to share these advantages with the maritime nations of Northern Europe. Sooner or later the Catholic monopoly must have collapsed. That it collapsed at the particular moment, and in the exact way that it did,

[1] *Ante*, pp. 213-214.

resulted from the same spirit of military and religious aggression to which it owed its birth. For the Portuguese Order of Christ and the conversion of the infidel, we have but to substitute the Spanish infantry of Alva and the persecution of the Protestants. The exalted fervour with which Da Gama, after his solemn vigil, received the sacred standard on the Tagus beach in 1497, breathes in Don John's ejaculation as he marched forth from Namur with the Pope's banner floating over him in 1578. 'Under this emblem I vanquished the Turk; under the same will I conquer the heretics.'[1]

Not only had the Catholic trade through Lisbon and Antwerp been crushed, but the still older channel through Egypt and Venice was now closed. From the blocking of the Syrian trade routes by the Turks in the fifteenth century to far on in the sixteenth, Venice had been a chief intermediary between England and the East.[2] Her
1587 'argosy' to Southampton in 1587 perished miserably, and what between the anti-Catholic movement in England and other causes, the trade came to an end. It was a great ship of 1,100 tons, richly laden, with an English pilot on board. The entrance by the Isle of Wight was extremely dangerous for the unmanageable monster in a high October sea, and the pilot refused to attempt it. But the Venetians compelled him by force.

[1] *Philip II. of Spain*, by Martin A. S. Hume, p. 178 (1897).

[2] 'The Venetians engrossed the whole route upon those seas.' Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts, printed in Churchill's collection of *Voyages and Travels*, iii. 408 (1752).

'When the poor man,' wrote an eye-witness, 'neither with persuasions nor tears could prevail, he did his best to enter the Channel of the Needles; but such was the greatness of the waves, and the unwieldiness of the ship, not answering her helm, that she struck upon the Shingles, where she, her goods, and company, except seven poor creatures, perished.'[1] So in the very autumn before the Spanish Armada strewed the coast of Ireland with her timbers, the last[2] shipment from Catholic Venice was wrecked off the Isle of Wight.

If the destruction of the Armada threw open the ocean to the Protestant Powers of the North, Spain still remained mistress of the Mediterranean. She commanded the Straits of Gibraltar, and as the sovereign power of Sicily, Sardinia, Naples, and the Duchy of Milan, she controlled the commerce of the great inland sea. Her naval supremacy only ended where that of the Turks began. As the conflict between England and Spain became more bitter, Philip II. consoled himself in some measure for the loss of the Atlantic by tightening his grasp on the Mediterranean highway. The English Levant Company, expanded in 1593 into 1593
an overland Indian company, found itself menaced. The union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, in this respect also, compelled the Eastern trade to seek a new route.

Among concurrent causes which led to the

[1] Churchill's *Voyages*, iii. 408.

[2] *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*, by W. Cunningham, D.D., p. 26 (Cambridge University Press, 1892).

founding of the Dutch and English East India Companies the travels of Linschoten and Fitch held a distinctive place. From 1583 to 1589, John Huyghen van Linschoten of Haarlem dwelt at Goa in the train of the Portuguese Archbishop. A keen observer, and a Dutchman at heart, Linschoten on his return to Europe in 1592 placed at the service of his country the stores of knowledge which he had accumulated in Indo-Portuguese employ.[1] The States-General granted him a licence to publish his work in 1594, and although the First Part, or the Itinerario proper, was not completed till 1596, the Second Part, setting forth
1595 the routes to India, was available in 1595. Its effect was instantaneous. In 1595 a squadron of four ships was despatched under Cornelius Houtman 'to the countries lying on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope,' and the journals of the voyage show that Linschoten's sailing directory was used on board.[2] Houtman returned in 1597, having lost two-thirds of his crews, done little in actual trade, but bringing back a treaty with the King of Bantam which opened up the Indian Archipelago to Holland.[3]

Linschoten's work was in some sort a revelation. All Northern Europe learned that the path lay open

[1] The standard English record is now *The Voyage of John Huyghen van Linschoten to the East Indies*, from the old English translation of 1598. 2 vols. (1885.) Edited by the late Arthur Coke Burnell, Ph.D., and P. A. Tiele; whose dates I follow, pp. xxv.–xxvii, &c.

[2] Tiele, *ut supra*. Introduction, p. xxxvi.

[3] *Itinéraire Historique, &c. des Pays-Bas*, ii. 247–248 (1781). Danvers, ii. 106.

to India, and that the Indian system of Portugal was rotten to the core. English and German translations appeared in 1598, two Latin translations in 1599, and a French translation in 1610.[1]
The preface to the English edition in 1598[2] sounded 1598
like a trumpet call to the nation, and gave a direct impulse to the founding of the East India Company. It speaks of the 'great provinces, puissant cities, and unmeasurable islands' of the Indies. 'I doo not doubt, but yet I doo most heartily pray,' it adds, 'and wish that this poore Translation may worke in our English nation a further desire and increase of honour over all Countreys of the Worlde' by means of 'our Wodden Walles.'[3]

England had, meanwhile, received a similar impulse of her own, and from a native source. In 1591 Ralph Fitch returned to London with a marvellous tale of travel. The first Englishman who dwelt in India was Thomas Stephens, of New College,
Oxford,[4] 1579, unless we accept the legend of 1579
Sighelmus of Sherbourne's pilgrimage to the tomb of St. Thomas near Madras, in the reign of King Alfred. As rector of the Jesuits' College at Goa, Stephens' letters to his father are said to have quickened the desire of the English merchants for
direct trade with the East. In 1583 Ralph Fitch 1583
set forth with three principal companions bearing letters from Queen Elizabeth to the King of Cam-

[1] Tiele's Introduction to Linschoten's voyage, p. xl.

[2] By W. P. (generally supposed to be William Phillip).

[3] Quoted, Tiele, *ut supra*, lii.

[4] Birdwood's *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, pp. 196–197 (1891).

bay and to the Emperor of China.[1] They journeyed by the Euphrates valley to Ormuz, where they were arrested by the Portuguese, and carried thence as prisoners to Goa.

1584 Emerging from this captivity in 1584, Fitch visited the Court of the Emperor Akbar, in Northern India; one of his companions married a Native woman, another entered the Mughal service, a third had turned monk at Goa.[2] But Fitch went on. After many adventures in Burma, Malacca, the 'Golden Chersonesus' and Bengal, he again explored the Portuguese misrule in Cochin and Goa, and thrilled
1591 London in 1591 with the magnificent possibilities of Eastern commerce. The effect was, as we have seen, the expansion of the Turkey Company into an East India Company in 1593, with a charter to trade through the Grand Seignior's 'countries overland to the East Indies.'[3] Its ultimate consequences were more important. Fitch had done for England perhaps less than Linschoten did for Holland. But the less sufficed.

It now became a race between England and Holland for the capture of the Indian trade. Houtman's expedition of 1595–97, under the impulse of Linschoten, was quickly succeeded by

[1] Fitch's journey, *Voyage to Ormus and so to Goa, &c*, (Purchas, vol. ii. book 10) is just referred to in the *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616 (par. 239). But his influence is disclosed in Linschoten's Voyages (1598), Hakluyt's Navigations (1599), and the Court Minutes and Letter Books of the E. I. C., edited by Stevens, Birdwood, and Foster.

[2] Of their ends different accounts are given.

[3] Cawston and Keane's *Early Chartered Companies*, p. 73 (Ed. 1896).

others. In 1598 five other Dutch squadrons sailed, 1598
including the one under the famous Van Neck, whose return with more treaties and a rich freight intoxicated the nation.[1] Houtman himself went forth on a second expedition, in which he and many others were treacherously slain.[2] The survivors returned in 1600. Between 1595 and 1601 no 1595–1601
fewer than fifteen Dutch expeditions started for India by the Cape of Good Hope or the Straits of Magellan.[3] By that time associations for Eastern trade had been formed throughout the United Provinces, and in 1602 they were amalgamated by the 1602
States-General into the Dutch East India Company.

England pressed hard after Holland, although with less certain steps. It seemed, indeed, that

[1] *Itinéraire Historique, Politique, etc. des Pays Bas*, ii. pp. 249, 261.

[2] His official title was General, but he was usually called the Baas (*i.e.* Boss). John Davis sailed with him as Chief Pilot. Birdwood's *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, p. 185 (Ed. 1891.)

[3] *Les Premiers Voyages des Néerlandais dans L'Insulinde* (1595–1602) par le Prince Roland Bonaparte, thin 4to, Versailles, 1884: *Extrait de la Revue de Géographie*, 1884. For details of these fifteen voyages see *post*, p. 334. Apart from Burnell and Tiele's monumental volumes (*ante*, p. 230, footnote [1]) the principal contemporary works which I have consulted for the first Dutch voyages are *Le Premier Livre de l'Histoire de la Navigation aux Indes Orientales par les Hollandais*, par G. M. A. W L., identified as Willem Lodewijcksz, Amsterdam, 1598: a beautiful folio in vellum with illustrations, a *sati* among others: Bodleian Library. *The Description of a Voyage made by certain Ships of Holland into the East Indies*, translated out of Dutch into English by W. P. [William Phillip]; to which is added *The Sea Journal, or Navigation, of the Hollanders into Java*; dedication dated 16th January, 1597(8). See also *Voyage d' Orient de Cornelis de Houtman*, Middelburgh, 4to, 1597: Churchill's Voyages, vol. viii. London, 1752; and Tiele's laborious *Mémoire Bibliographique sur les Journaux des Navigateurs Néerlandais*, Amsterdam, 1867.

1591-1594 Captain Lancaster's heroic voyage of 1591–1594 had given the lead to our nation, and if followed up it would certainly have placed us first in the race. But Elizabeth still cherished some flickering fancies about Spain; the States-General indulged in no illusions regarding Philip II., and had got beyond hopes or fears. Moreover England had rival interests—the Muscovy Company with its old route through Russia, and the Turkey Company with its new charter for trade to India by the Levant: for Holland the question was the Cape route or none. During Lancaster's absence in the Asiatic seas Elizabeth heard from Seville that, rather than let the English trade with the Indies, the Spaniards 'will sell their wives and children.' [1]

1596 However, in 1596, she consented to an expedition of three ships, mainly at the charge of Sir Robert Dudley, and gave it a letter to the Emperor of China.[2] The little squadron under Captain
1598 Benjamin Wood was obscurely heard of in 1598 as having captured two [3] Portuguese treasure-ships on their way from Goa to China, but not a single man returned to England to give an account of its fate. The English crews were killed off by sickness till only four men remained, and they were cast ashore on a small island near Puerto-Rico. Of this miserable remnant, three were murdered by

[1] Date uncertain (1593 ?). *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 245.

[2] *Idem*, par. 250, 16th July, 1596. The ships were 'The Bear,' 'The Bear's Whelp,' and 'The Benjamin.' The chief merchant adventurers were Richard Allen and Thomas Bromfield.

[3] *Idem*, par. 254. 'Three Portuguese ships,' says Macpherson, *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 76, 4to, 1812.

Spaniards for the sake of the treasure they had with them. The fourth, after relating his sad story to the Spanish officers of justice, was poisoned.[1] The loss of this expedition hung like a cloud over the English merchants, while the Dutch were drinking deep to the Indian treaties and rich cargoes of Van Neck. 'Thus perished,' wrote a despondent British chronicler, our 'attempt to open a passage into India.'[2]

The check was only for a moment. In 1598 1598
the English translation of Linschoten's *Itinerario* made the London merchants realise afresh the splendour of the prize and the certainty that it was about to pass from the Catholic South to the Protestant North. The report that the Dutch had bought up ships in England[3] for a new voyage 1599
stung our national pride. In 1599 the London merchants gave countercheck by an enthusiastic subscription of 30,133*l.* for an East Indian voyage, and begged the Queen's royal assent to the expedition 'for the honour of our native country, and for the advancement of trade of merchandise within this realm of England.'[4] The commercial rivalry between Holland and England—that rivalry which was to outlast generations, to profoundly affect our European policy and national antipathies, to burn British ships in the Medway, and to stamp the tragedy of Amboyna in letters of blood upon our Asiatic history—now stood revealed.

[1] Macpherson, *ut supra*, p. 76.

[2] Quoted, *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 250.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 258.

[4] *Idem*, par. 257.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRST ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY

1600

THE English East India Company was essentially the child of the Elizabethan age. When the London merchants met together in Founders' Hall
1599 on September 22, 1599, with the Lord Mayor presiding, they had before them three models of Indian trade: the Portuguese royal system, the semi-State pattern of the Dutch, and the English mixed method of armed private commerce, represented in its war aspects by Drake's buccaneering adventures and in its more peaceful developments by the Levant Company.

The Portuguese system had been created by a dynasty; it was worked by, and for the benefit of, the crown. Its ships were the King's ships, its cargoes were bought and stowed by the King's people, the purser or financial superintendent of the voyage was nominated by the King's Secretary, and the officers were appointed by the Admiralty.[1] Even when the King granted a licence to private merchants, as in the case of the Fuggers of Augsburg, their factors had cabins and a diet

[1] *The History of the European Commerce with India*, by David Macpherson, p. 22 (4to. 1812), on the authority of Linschoten.

assigned to them on the royal ships. As we have seen, however, Portugal's national achievement in the East was not traffic alone, but, in the patriotic vaunt of her historian, 'cities, islands, and kingdoms first groaning under our feet, and then worshipping our Government.'[1] Such a system of direct dynastic trade was alike alien to the genius of the English nation and to the caution of Queen Elizabeth.

The Dutch model came nearer to English ideas. During the long struggle with combined Spain and Portugal, the Dutch had to pay their armies and to feed themselves by sea-trade. How Holland, whose wind-swept fens did not yield crops to keep the people alive for much more than half the year, accomplished this feat, and turned her despairing land-revolt into a triumphant oceanic war, forms a brilliant chapter in European history. Her national safety so vitally depended on maritime trade, that it became as clear a duty of the Dutch Government to promote private commerce as it was for private commerce to fight the battles of the Republic. The States-General not only subsidised expeditions of discovery, but when the failure of such expeditions compelled them to withhold direct support from the public purse, they still offered a large reward to private adventure.

This semi-national character stamped itself almost, although not quite, from the first on the Dutch East India Company. The Dutch voyages 'to the countries lying on the other side of the

[1] Faria y Sousa's preface to *Asia Portugueza*, vol. i.

Cape of Good Hope,' which we have seen inaugurated by Houtman in 1595, were at once recognised as attacks upon united Portugal and Spain. In September 1598 great preparations against the Flemings in the Indian Archipelago were reported from Lisbon to Cecil. This was no mere 'Portugal brag,' as the correspondent supposed.[1] During the previous summer Philip II. had ordered his Indian fleet to close in on the Hollanders at the Straits of Malacca, and to impress whatever private shipping might there be found to aid in their destruction.[2] Portuguese influence with the native princes was to be vigorously directed to shut out the Dutch.[3] No wonder the separate States of Holland felt that something more than their individual support to the various Dutch companies
1602 was demanded. In 1602 all the local groups of the East India adventurers in the United Provinces were amalgamated into one powerful company by the States-General with the enormous joint capital of 6,500,000 florins, say 540,000*l.*, and a central board of representatives from the subscribing States.[4]

This nationalising of the Dutch East Indian trade carries us three years beyond the meeting of the London merchants in September 1599. But

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, under date 30th September, 1598, par. 254.

[2] Prescript to Cosmo de Laseta, dated Lisbon, 17th March, 1598. India Office MSS.

[3] *Idem. Cf.* letters of the King for the Governors of India, dated Lisbon, 22nd January, 1598. India Office MSS.

[4] I take the florin at twenty pence, as given in Sir Isaac Newton's tables made in the year 1700; quoted p. 39 of Ede's *Complete View of the Gold and Silver Coins of all Nations* (1808 or 1809?). For the exact figures, *vide post*, p. 338.

from Houtman's first voyage in 1595, the influences which rendered such a centralisation inevitable were at work in Holland. Before describing the feebler corporate system which the English adventurers worked out for themselves, it is needful to understand what an united East India Company on the Dutch quasi-national basis really meant.

The States-General in reorganising the East India companies of the several States into one association in 1602, granted to the new body cor- 1602
porate the exclusive right of navigation to the east of the Cape of Good Hope and to the west of the Straits of Magellan for twenty-one years.[1] The chief shareholders were the great merchants of Amsterdam and of the other subscribing States, but all inhabitants of the Low Countries were entitled on payment to join. The Republic vested in the company the power to make war or peace, to seize foreign ships, to establish colonies, construct forts, and to coin money.[2] On the other hand, the States-General enforced from the company not only an oath of fidelity and certain customs-dues, but also the right to call for and supervise its accounts. The whole charter reads like a Protestant counterpart of the privileges granted to Portugal by the Bull of 1493, except that religious proselytism drops

[1] The primary sources for the Dutch East India Company will be mentioned *post*, p. 336. Useful abridgments will be found in *Mémoires sur le Commerce des Hollandois*, particularly pp. 213–239 (Amsterdam, 1717); *Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce*, par Pierre Bonnassieux, pp. 46 et ff. (Paris, 1892): and the *Itinéraire Historique, politique etc. des VII Provinces-Unies*, vol. ii. 260, ff. (The Hague, 1781–1782).

[2] Bonnassieux *ut supra*.

out of view, a commercial company takes the place of the King, and instead of the *pœna excommunicationis latæ* against rivals or intruders, we have the direct arbitrament of the sword.

This strongly knit corporation had a governing body not unworthy of its national character. The Board consisted of sixty directors, assigned to the several States in proportion to the subscriptions received from them. It was closely connected, both in the person of its directors and in its public policy, with the States-General. Hardly had it been established than it began to build forts in the East, to appoint governors, and to make treaties with native princes in the name of the Stadtholder of Holland.[1]

I have passed on three years beyond the English proposals of 1599, in order to give a connected view of the constitution of the great rival company with which the London adventurers were destined from
1601-1603 the date of their first actual voyage (1601–1603) to contend. The London merchants who met together under the Lord Mayor in Founders' Hall in September 1599, had no such ambitious scheme of a quasi-State organisation in their minds. They sought a remedy for a block that had taken place in the Indian trade. Their Muscovy company, dating from Queen Mary's charter in 1554, had failed to establish a direct overland commerce with India, and even its dealings with Russia and North-eastern

[1] As the natives could not understand the abstract term States-General. Bonnassieux, *Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce*, pp. 46–47.

Europe had of late dwindled away.[1] Sir Walter Raleigh lamented that formerly 'we sent store of goodly ships to trade in those parts, and three years past we set out but four, and this last year two or three.' The Dutch have gained all the foreign freight, 'whilst our ships lie still and decay, or go to Newcastle for coals.'[2]

The other English route to Asia, represented by the Turkey or Levant Company, had during the same period met with great difficulties. What the pirates of the Caspian and the Tartars of the Volga were to our Muscovy Company, the Barbary corsairs and the fleets of Philip II. proved to the Levant corporation. The Barbary corsairs were bought off by large sums, amounting in one year to 2,000*l*. The gauntlet of the Spanish navy had also to be
run, and in 1590 our homeward Levant squadron of 1590
ten vessels only forced their way through the Straits of Gibraltar after a pitched battle with twelve great Spanish ships.[3] His Catholic Majesty could grip our Mediterranean trade by the throat in the passage between Spain and Africa, as he hoped to strangle the Dutch trade in the narrow seas of Malacca. So highly did the Dutch rate the diffi-
culties of our Mediterranean route that in 1597–99 1599
they raised the price of pepper against us from 3*s*.

[1] For the difficulties of this route, and the losses incident to it, see Cawston and Keane's *Early Chartered Companies*, Chapter IV. Ed. 1896.

[2] *Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander and other Nations* [date uncertain]; the *Works of Sir Walter Raleigh Knt.*, vol. ii. pp. 114, 124. Ed. 1751.

[3] Cawston and Keane, p. 72.

to 6*s*. and 8*s*. per pound, and other spices in proportion.[1]

Influential members of the Levant Company,[2] thus finding that their extended charter of 1593 availed little for an overland trade to India, led the
1599 movement in September 1599 for a voyage direct round the Cape. That movement, although it derived a patriotic impulse from the Dutch purchase of ships in London for their Indian expeditions,[3] seemed to spring out of the embarrassments of our Mediterranean trade. Among its most active promoters were Richard Staper and Thomas Smythe, two of the original founders of the Levant Company. Richard Staper is described in the first charter to

[1] Sir George Birdwood's *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, p. 199 (Ed. 1891); Macpherson's *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 77 (1812).

[2] *Ante*, pp. 224–5, 229, 232.

[3] Resolution of the assembly of Committees dated 25th September, 1599. The India Office sources which I chiefly use in this chapter are (1) The Court Minutes of the East India Company, 1599–1603, reprinted with typographical fidelity in Mr. Henry Stevens of Vermont's *Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies* (1886): (2) The First Letter Book of the East India Company, reproduced with similar fidelity in Birdwood and Foster's *Register of Letters, &c. of the Governour and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies*, 1600–1619 (1893): (3) *Letters received by the East India Company from its servants in the East*, 2 vols. 1602–1615, Danvers and Foster (1896–1897): (4) The MS. series of Court Books subsequent to 1603 in the Record Department of the India Office: (5) Noel Sainsbury's volumes, the *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, are useful for other periods, but unfortunately *The First Letter Book* was not available to Mr. Sainsbury, as it had been lost sight of for thirty years. The principal non-official materials are the *Annals of the Honorable East India Company* by John Bruce, a valuable original work compiled in his capacity of Historiographer to the company, 3 vols. 4to. 1810: *The History of the European Commerce with India*, by David Macpherson, 4to. 1812, and the second volume of his *Annals of Commerce*, 4 vols. 4to. 1805.

the Levant Company in 1581 as having, with Sir 1581
Edward Osborn, 'at their own great cost and charges found out and opened a trade to Turkey,' 'whereby many good offices may be done for the peace of Christendom, relief of Christian slaves, and good vent for the commodities of the realm.'
At the beginning of 1599, Richard Staper and his 1599
associates in the Levant Company 'engaged Mr. Mildenhall, a merchant of London, to go to the Court of the Great Mogul,'[1] with a view to open up the Indian trade. In September of the same year Staper appears in the first list of subscribers to the East India voyage, in the first list of committees or directors,[2] and as constant in his attendance at their meetings or 'courts.'

Thomas Smythe, also named as a founder of the Levant Company in its charter of 1581, was appointed the first Governor of the East India
Company by its charter of 1600. Many other 1600
directors or servants of the East India Company were, or had been, engaged in the affairs of the Levant Company. Indeed it appears that the new company at first entered its proceedings in one of the record books of the old, and 'that the book originally belonged to the Levant Company but was

[1] Macpherson, p. 77 (1812). *State Papers*, 1513–1616, East Indies. Staper's monument in St. Helens, Bishopsgate St., describes him as 'the chiefest actor in the discovere (*sic*) of the trades of Turkey and East India.'

[2] *Court Minutes*, for 22nd, 24th and 25th September, 1599, &c. Stevens, pp. 1–8. The word *Committee* in the Court Books refers to the committeeman or individual to whom the trust was committed, not to the body of committeemen as in later times. *Cf.* trustee.

afterwards used by both Companies in common.'[1] If this statement goes a little too far, the evidence tends 'to show that the East India Company was partially an outgrowth of the Levant Company.'[2]

It was an outgrowth that at first seemed destined to be nipped in the bud. The more ambitious of the 101 merchants and citizens who put down their names for 30,133*l.*[3] on September 22,
1599 1599, contemplated a single voyage to begin with, but not a single voyage alone. Three days later they resolved to ask the Queen to grant them 'a privilege in succession and to incorporate them in a company, for that the trade of the Indias being so far remote from hence, cannot be traded but in a joint and a united stock.'[4] They also prayed for her assurance that their ships, when ready, should not be detained on plea of the public service; for a privilege to export foreign coin or its equivalent from the realm; and for freedom from export-customs on the goods sent forth by their first six voyages.

Queen Elizabeth, ever the lady patroness of private adventure, signified her gracious assent to certain of the promoters 'who have bene at ye Court.'[5] But her Privy Council held back. In
1598 the previous year, 1598, France had made a separate peace with Spain by the Treaty of Vervins, and

[1] Mr. Henry N. Stevens' preface to the *Court Minutes*, p. vii. *Dawn of British Trade* (1886).

[2] Index to *ditto*, p. 295.

[3] In sums varying from 100*l.* to 3,000*l.* The original list is printed in full in Stevens' *Court Minutes*, pp. 1–4.

[4] *Court Minutes* of the 25th September, 1599. Stevens, p. 8.

[5] *Court Minutes*, 16th Oct., 1599. Stevens, p. 10.

Elizabeth was by no means anxious to be left sole champion of the Netherlands' cause. It seemed indeed as if the Anglo-Spanish war, which had dragged through the fourteen years since 1585, was at last about to close. Accordingly, the Privy Council threw over the East India adventurers, rather than risk a new grievance to Spain. On October 16, it refused the privileges they sought, 1599
so as not 'to forego the opportunity of the concluding of the peace. Whereupon the adventurers' resolved to postpone their voyage to more propitious times.[1]

Meanwhile they set to work to make out a good case for a grant of privileges on a wider scale. This incapacity for knowing when it was beaten appears throughout the whole career of the Company. If it succeeded or if it failed, it went on. The adventurers drew up an ingenious document intended to gain their point whether the peace was concluded or not. They asked the Privy Council to require from the Spanish commissioners a list of all Spanish possessions east of the Cape of Good Hope. Foreseeing that Spain would not consent to this, they themselves set down the names of twenty-one places, from Sofala on the East African and Diu on the North-west Indian coast, to Macao in China and Manilla in the Philippines, to which they admitted the Spaniards and Portuguese had a right. 'Yet there remaineth,' they went on to say, 'that all the rest rich kingdoms and islands of the East, which are in number very many, are

[1] *Court Minutes*, 16th Oct., 1599.

out of their power and jurisdiction, and free for any other princes or people of the world to repair unto.' [1]

1599 Of these they enumerated seventeen countries or kingdoms, from Madagascar off Africa to 'the rich and golden island of Sumatra,' 'the most mighty and wealthy empire of China,' 'and the rich and innumerable isles of the Moluccas and the Spicerie.' Their list acknowledges the Spanish claim to the old Portuguese settlements on the western coast of India, and to Tidore and Amboyna in the Moluccas. But it claims Bengal, Java and the Eastern Archipelago in general as still open to the world. 'In all these and infinite places more, abounding with great wealth and riches, the Portuguese and Spaniards have not any castle, fort, block-house or commandment.' The memorialists cite in support of their case twelve Portuguese, Spanish and Italian authors of European repute, besides nine English and Dutch. Their most important piece of evidence was 'the notable intercepted Register, or Matricola, of the whole government of the East-India, [captured] in the *Madre de Deos*, 1592.'

The document ignored the papal partition of the world in 1493, together with the treaty settlements based upon it, and only recognised the title of effective occupation.[2] It marked an earlier stage

[1] This remarkable document is printed in Bruce's *Annals*, pp. 115–121, *sub anno* 1599, from the original in the State Paper Office.

[2] The question arose again in the Spanish negotiations of 1602 as to whether an open trade should be insisted on, or whether 'it were

of the ideas which received their full development in Cromwell's attack on St. Domingo half a century later, on the ground 'that the said island was not entirely occupied by Spain.'[1] The 'Bull must be trampled under foot,' Sir John Seeley remarks of this development in 1654, 'Protestant Englishmen must assert their right of settling and acquiring territory.'[2] It is needless to say that Spain was not in 1600, nor for many years to 1600
come, prepared to accept this new departure in international law. What the memorialists then asked was that Spain should schedule her Indian settlements on the assumption that all the East, not in her actual possession, lay open to the world.

Queen Elizabeth, while perhaps smiling at the short cuts of merchant diplomacy, gravely referred the memorial to the learned Fulke Greville. His reply[3] to Sir Francis Walsingham does not carry the case much further, but it forms the masterpiece of East Indian political geography in the Elizabethan age. Taken along with the map of the world in 1600[4]—Shakespeare's 'new map with the augmentation of the Indies,' scored over by lines and curves like Malvolio's fantastically

best to leave this point clean untouched.' *Calendar State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 306.

[1] Seeley, quoting the French Ambassador. *Growth of British Policy*, p. 72, vol. ii. Ed. 1897.

[2] *Idem*, p. 74, vol. ii.

[3] Printed in full by Bruce from the original in the State Paper Office: *Annals*, pp. 121–126, vol. i.

[4] Drawn by the mathematician Edward Wright and reproduced with vol. 59 of the Hakluyt Society's Publications, 1880; *Voyages and Works of John Davis*, Admiral A. H. Markham's Introduction, pp. xxxiii–iv, lxi, &c.

smiling face,[1]—it marks the exact point which English knowledge of the Asiatic seas had reached, when the East India Company started on its independent career of maritime discovery.

Such academic dissertations, however interesting to posterity, little affected the policy of the
1600 moment. In 1600 the Spanish negotiations came to nothing, and the English adventurers ceased writing minutes and began to buy ships. They had, as a body, remained in abeyance from October 1599 to September 1600, yet the prompt action which followed their next general meeting shows that their leaders had not been idle. The discussions of the intervening months had opened a grander vista of Eastern enterprise alike to the nation and the Crown. It was no longer a question of a voyage or voyages, but of an armed and chartered monopoly for the permanent Indian trade.

Having at length received the Queen's assent, the adventurers reassembled in Founders' Hall on September 23, 1600, exactly a year after their first abortive start in 1599. They at once appointed a committee of seventeen, including Alderman Thomas Smythe and Mr. Richard Staper of Levant Company fame, to arrange for the voyage.[2] Next day the committee proceeded to Deptford and bought the 'Susan' of 240 tons for 1,600*l.*; and within a week[3] the 'Ascension' of 260 and the 'Hector' of 300 tons. A pinnace, the 'Guift'

[1] *Twelfth Night*, Act iii. Scene ii.

[2] *Court Minutes* of 23rd September, 1600. Stevens, pp. 11, 12.

[3] *Court Minutes* of 25th, 26th, and 29th September, 1600.

of 130 tons, was afterwards purchased for 300*l*. as a victualler to accompany the fleet,[1] and to be cast off at sea at the discretion of the commander.[2] But the adventurers wanted something more powerful than ordinary trading craft, and on October 7, 1600, after a good deal of haggling, they bought for 3,700*l*. the 'Mare Scurge,' a warship of 600 tons, from the Earl of Cumberland, who had built her to prey upon the Spanish trade. This strongly armed cruiser, under her changed name of the 'Red Dragon,' finally 'The Dragon,' became the flagship of the Company. Her refitment was pushed on with vigour, the committee providing a barrel of beer daily for the shipwrights, so that 'they leave not their work to run to the alehouse.'[3] 1600

It soon appeared indeed, that, during its year of silent incubation, the enterprise had altogether outgrown its original scale. A much larger capital would be required for the voyage, and the 30,133*l*. subscribed in September 1599 had to be more than doubled, to 68,373*l*., before the expedition set forth. So great a sum could only be raised by the help of a royal charter wide in scope and continuous in character. The petition of 1599 to the Queen for a warrant to fit out ships[4] and to export bullion would not now suffice. It had developed into a scheme for incorporation

[1] *Court Minutes* of 17th February, 1601, &c.

[2] Sir George Birdwood's Introduction to Stevens' *Court Minutes*, p. xii. But see p. 264. Bruce gives the size at 100 tons (i. 129), Danvers' Report on the Marine Records at 130 tons. Introduction, p. v.

[3] *Court Minutes* of 10th October, 1600.

[4] *Idem*, 25th Sept. 1599.

somewhat on the model of the Levant Company, but with larger powers, a wider area of business, and a longer term of monopoly.[1]

1600 On December 31, 1600, Queen Elizabeth granted a charter in this sense, 'for the Honour of our Nation, the Wealth of our People,' 'the Increase of our Navigation, and the advancement of lawful Traffick to the benefit of our Common-wealth.'[2] It constituted the petitioners into 'one body corporate and politick, in deed and in name, by the name of the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies,' with legal succession, the power to purchase lands, to sue and be sued, and to have a common seal. It vested the management of the Company in a governor and twenty-four committee-men, who were to be annually appointed in July: the first set being named in the charter, and including Thomas Smythe as Governor and Richard Staper, the two original founders of the Levant Company who had most actively promoted the new East Indian enterprise.

The charter secured, for fifteen years from Christmas, 1600, the exclusive privilege of the Indian trade, that is with all countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan, except such territories or ports as were in the actual possession of any Christian prince in amity

[1] The Levant or Turkey Company's Charter of 1593 gave only twelve years.

[2] Letters Patent, dated 31st December, 1600; 43rd Elizabeth. *Charters granted to the East India Company from* 1601, 4to. [N.D.] The authoritative version, collated from four texts (three being early MSS.), is that given at pp. 163–189 of *The First Letter Book*. The original document is not extant.

with the Queen (unless by his consent), to the body corporate, and to their sons not being under twenty-one years, their apprentices, factors, and servants. It also empowered the Company to make bye-laws, and to punish offenders against them by fine or imprisonment, as far as consistent with the laws of the realm. All the Queen's subjects were prohibited from trading within the geographical limits assigned to the Company, unless under its express licence, on pain of forfeiting ship and cargo, imprisonment or other punishment.[1] 1600

So far the charter provides for the creation and management of the Company, its continued existence for fifteen years, its powers to hold property, its right to trade to any country of the Indian seas not in actual possession of a friendly Christian prince, its exclusive privilege to do so as against all other subjects of the Queen, its power to grant licences of internal trade to outsiders, and to discipline by fine or imprisonment its own members and servants for breaches of its bye-laws. The charter ignores the Spanish claims, founded on the Bull of 1493, but respects rights derived from actual possession—the position taken up by the adventurers in the previous year.

These powers, as against third parties, foreign or domestic, were supplemented by considerable privileges as against the Crown. The Queen, considering the hazards of an untried trade, and the Company's ignorance as to what English goods will be vendible in India, exempts from export

[1] E. I. C. Charter, pp. 3–14, 21, 22.

1600 duties the outward cargoes of the first four voyages, and allows six to twelve months credit for the payment of the customs on their homeward freights. Indian goods brought by the Company may, after once paying the import duty, be re-exported without further dues. For the first voyage the company may export Spanish or other foreign silver[1] coin and plate to the amount of 30,000*l.*, but in the case of subsequent voyages the company must re-import within six months the equivalent of the silver exported by it. As the nature of the voyage compelled the ships to start at a particular season of the year, the charter provided that, even 'in any time of restraint,' the Company should be empowered to send forth annually 'six good ships and six good pinnaces well furnished with ordnance and other munition for their defence, and five hundred mariners, English men,' unless the Queen requires them for her own service.[2] If the trade prove unprofitable to the realm, it may be revoked on two years' notice from the Crown; if beneficial, the charter shall be renewed on the expiry of the fifteen years for another like period.[3]

The body corporate thus created represents both as to the nature of its business, and as to the mechanism for conducting it, the final stage of sea-enterprise in the Elizabethan age. As regards the nature of its business, Elizabethan maritime adventure had started with voyages mainly of

[1] Gold, says a significant marginal note to the charter, is not included. *Calendar of State Papers*, 1513–1616, East Indies, par. 281.

[2] E. I. C. Charter, pp. 19, 20.

[3] *Idem*, pp. 25, 26.

discovery, but with an eye also to the Indian trade. Such voyages are summed up in Frobisher's North-western expeditions [1] (1576–1578), beginning in exploration and ending in a gold mania. They developed into the voyages, partly of discovery though chiefly for plunder, of whose corsair-commanders Drake forms the heroic figure-head. But side by side with these buccaneering ventures grew up more peaceable yet armed enterprises whose chief, if not sole, object was trade. Of this last class the Levant or Turkey Company long survived as the type. The East India Company exemplifies that type of armed sea-trade on its largest scale, and with the fullest powers of expansion and of self-defence.

So also in regard to its working mechanism the East India Company stands to us as the final expression of the co-operative principle in the Elizabethan period. From the very first the adventurers declared 'that the trade of the Indias being so far remote from hence cannot be traded but in a joint and a united stock.' [2] From the first also they insisted that the contributions of members should be in money, and not in kind: that neither ships nor goods should be accepted from any adventurer 'as his stock' or in lieu of his subscription in cash.[3] A corporation so constituted seems closely to resemble a modern joint stock company, but the resemblance is by no means complete. Its

[1] *Ante*, pp. 203–206.

[2] *Court Minutes*, 25th September, 1599.

[3] *Court Minutes*, 24th September, 1599.

nature was rather that of a modern syndicate formed to obtain from the Crown a concession of the East India trade for a certain number of years, and then to work the concession by means of successive new syndicates or groups of subscribers from among its own members for separate voyages, but under its corporate control.

In such latter-day comparisons, however convenient for illustration, there lurks a constant source of error. For the institutions of Elizabethan England were formed not on new patterns for the future but upon the models of the past. The East India Company, like the Levant or Turkey Company, was built on the deep foundations of mediæval trade. It proceeded on the principle that the protection of trade formed a duty of the sovereign, that protection involved regulation, and that it was beneficial for the nation that each trade should be placed under a guild or corporation with powers of self-management and internal control. Such guilds, while generally deriving their authority from the Crown, were chiefly composed of the members of a specific trade, and were designed to defend its interests. No citizen could practise the incorporated trade or craft without being admitted a brother of the guild. But every member once admitted was free to set up business on his own account. A mediæval town was thus honeycombed with a number of little corporations, each having the monopoly and management of a separate trade, but whose members were all at liberty to trade for themselves under rules formed for

their common good. These early attempts to combine the strength of co-operation with freedom of individual initiative survive, after many metamorphoses, in the London City companies. Their modern representatives, in an active state, are 'Lloyd's'[1] and the Stock Exchange.

As handicrafts grew into manufactures, and as trade expanded into commerce, the system developed into corporations for foreign enterprise, such as the Merchants of the Staple, the Fraternity of St. Thomas à Becket afterwards the Merchant Adventurers, and the Muscovy Company. Each company held a charter from the sovereign creating it a corporate body, and assigning to it the exclusive privilege of a certain class of business, with powers to regulate the conduct of the business in the common interest of the members. While the stability of corporate management was thus secured, the individual liberty of each member was, down to the time of Queen Mary, generally maintained. But the sea-commerce of Elizabeth, especially during the long state of war with Spain from 1585 to her death in 1603, demanded the 1585–1603
strength of a closer union. Her last great charter, that of the East India Company, marks the final stage of the process. It gave powers as ample as ever from the Crown to the corporate body, but it further fortified those powers by curtailing the individual liberty of the members. The corporate body could alone send forth voyages, and could alone conduct them: the separate members could

[1] Martin's *History of Lloyd's*, chap. xv. &c. (1876).

no longer trade on their own account. The loss of private initiative was the price paid for the increased strength of corporate action.

The East India Company may thus be regarded as the mercantile expression of those forces of union which so profoundly modified our national growth under Elizabeth. Yet it was in no sense a national enterprise, or a semi-national association like the Dutch East India Company. The Queen allowed a private group of her subjects to adventure their capital in the East India trade, and granted them such privileges as did not interfere with her own foreign policy. When their interests clashed with her foreign policy, she did not hesitate to withdraw her support, and the adventurers had to wait a year, after receiving her gracious assent,[1] until the failure of the Spanish peace negotiations again gave her a free hand.[2]

While, however, the Company was not a national one, it drew its very existence from the Royal prerogative. Not only did its monopoly as against all other English subjects, its partial exemption from customs, and its right to export bullion depend on a grant from the Crown, but it had to invoke the aid of the Crown in the daily conduct of its business. No single voyage could be equipped without a separate commission from the sovereign.[3] Warrants from the Lord Treasurer

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 260.

[2] The chances of the Company rose and fell with the fluctuations of parties, the older politicians like Burleigh being for peace, the younger like Essex or Raleigh for war, and Elizabeth wavering.

[3] These commissions, from that of Elizabeth dated 24th January,

for the passage of victuals from port to port, or for restraining the sale of pepper until the king's stock shall be disposed of, and Royal warrants for each separate voyage, occupy many pages of the records. Even in its internal management, the directors (or 'Committees') were constantly running to the Privy Council whenever a difficulty arose. Thus if defaulters would not pay up their subscriptions to a voyage,[1] or if a further subscription were required,[2] or if coercive powers were needed to float a North-west expedition,[3] or if carpenters had to be pressed for fitting out the ships,[4] or if an unsuccessful captain had to be dealt with,[5] it was to the Lords of the Council or my Lord Treasurer that the Company applied. It was also from their Lordships, and my Lord Admiral and Mr. Secretary, that the company received rebuke for slackness in its duties.[6]

The 'Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies' was, therefore, in many senses a 'Regulated Company:' regulated as to its general

1601, onwards to 1619, generally appear in full in the *First Letter Book of the East India Company*, Birdwood and Foster (1893).

[1] *Court Minutes* of 9th January, 1601, 11th April, and 22nd April, 1601, &c. I uniformly convert the Old Style dates of the *Court Minutes* into the New Style, and make the new year begin on 1st January instead of March 25th.

[2] *Court Minutes* of 1st April, 1601, 6th July, 1601, &c.

[3] *Court Minutes* of 29th March, 1602, &c.

[4] *Court Minutes* of 10th October, 1600.

[5] *Court Minutes* of 24th November, 1602.

[6] *Court Minutes* of 13th October and of 5th November, 1601. See also for the general relations of the Company to the Crown, the *First Letter Book of the East India Company*, which largely consists of Royal Commissions Warrants, and communications thereon.

powers by Royal charter; regulated as to each particular voyage and as to its internal management by the Privy Council and the Crown; very strictly regulated as to its individual members by its own governing body, consisting, under the charter, of the Governor and twenty-four committee-men. It thus stands as the perfected type of the Regulated Companies which formed the intermediate link between the mediæval trade guilds, and the modern commercial associations under the Companies' Acts. The personal independence of members of the earlier Regulated Companies was transferred from the individual member to the group of subscribers to each voyage. Their liability was limited to their individual subscriptions. Yet the Company, acting as a whole, could increase the amount of a separate subscription by a *pro ratâ* levy, to meet the requirements of the voyage.[1]

This early form of limited liability and joint stock has never, so far as I am aware, been examined from the actual records of a corporation. Adam Smith's classical passage still forms the best account of the Regulated Company.[2] But his reflections are biassed by a misconception as to the origin of such privileged bodies. 'In the greater part of the commercial States of Europe,' he writes regarding the protection of trade by the

[1] *E.g.* For the first voyage an extra call of 2*s.* in the pound, *Court Minutes* of 1st April, 1601; and in all a levy of 4*s.* in the pound above the subscribed sums, *Court Minutes* of 6th July, 1601. These levies required for their enforcement the aid of the Privy Council.

[2] *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, book i. chap. i.

Ruling Power, 'particular companies of merchants have had the address to persuade the legislature to intrust to them the performance of this part of the duty of the Sovereign, together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with it.'[1] Such eighteenth-century philosophising does not sufficiently allow for the natural development of the Regulated Company from the mediæval trade guild, a development not due to the 'address' of 'particular companies of merchants,' but a necessary adaptation of old forms to the growing requirements of trade. Instructive as are Adam Smith's historical sections on Regulated Companies, they are from an outsider's point of view.[2]

I propose, from the contemporary records of the East India Company, to show the actual working of the Regulated system in its mature Elizabethan growth. Admission to the 'one body corporate and politic' of 'the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies,' might be obtained by purchase of a share in a voyage, or by redemption, or by presentation, or by patrimony, or by apprenticeship. The last four methods require few words. Admission by patrimony, that is of sons of members on reaching twenty-one years of age, and by apprenticeship, was provided for in the charter.[3] Apprenticeship

[1] *Wealth of Nations*, J. R. McCulloch's edition, p. 330 (Ed. 1850).

[2] *Idem*, McCulloch's edition, pp. 330–334. Cawston and Keane, correct so far as they go, unfortunately worked on too small a scale in their *Early Chartered Companies* to allow of a complete examination of the system, pp. 9–11 (1896).

[3] *Charters granted to the East India Company*, p. 12.

also came to include foreign employment, as in the case of Samuel Husbands, 'in regard he had served the Company ten years in India.'[1] The apprentice or servant, on admission, paid a small sum, from ten to forty shillings, for the poor.[2] In the case of sons born after their father had ceased to be a member, admission was 'of grace not of right,' and on payment of a fine say of 10*l*.[3] Admission by presentation or a faculty, 'for the making of a free man,' was occasionally granted to some nobleman or powerful member.[4] Admission by redemption became common when the Company got into low water, and grew anxious about keeping up its numbers. Under this system it admitted members for such cash payments as it could obtain.[5] In 1619 the rate was confirmed at 100*l*. During the distresses of the Civil Wars the price fell to 5*l*., and in October 1647, fifteen new members were admitted for that modest sum.[6]

The original and main method of admission was the one which heads my list (p. 259): namely, by purchase of a share in a voyage. The subscribers to the first voyage were practically the petitioners for the Charter of 1600, and they were included by name in the Charter as forming the Company, or were afterwards incorporated into it

[1] *MS. Court Book*, No. 19, p. 59.

[2] *MS. Court Book*, No. 19, p. 42.

[3] *MS. Court Book*, No. 15, pp. 159, 174. Also *State Papers*, E.I. 1617–1621, par. 791.

[4] Thus Joseph Jackson received the gift of his freedom on presentation by Sir John Spencer, *Cour[t] Minutes*, 13th October, 1601.

[5] An interesting case of hag[gling] from 100*l*. plus 100 mark[s] down to 20*l*. is recorded in *MS. Court Book*, No. 17, pp. 47, 48.

[6] *MS. Court Book*, No. 20, p. 7[?]

'in as large and ample manner,' 'as if their names had been contained in the patent.'[1] The amount of contribution which entitled a subscriber to the freedom of the Company (or one 'share') was originally 200*l.*[2] For the second Cape of Good Hope voyage in 1604 the minimum share was fixed at 100*l.*[3] 1604
But this arrangement threw undue power into the hands of small holders at meetings of the General Court of proprietors. Of the 205 subscribers to the third voyage in 1607, a majority or 108 were 1607
for sums under 200*l.* The Company resolved, therefore, to strengthen the hands of the leading members who had a serious stake in the business, and raised the minimum subscription to 500*l.* in the fourth voyage of 1608. To induce small capitalists to come forward, however, they were allowed to join their subscriptions under the name of one person who had the right to vote for an aggregate stock of 500*l.*[4] The 'share' or amount of capital which thus entitled a subscriber to the full privileges of a Freeman, and therefore to a vote, varied at different periods. In 1619 it was 100*l.*

In a certain sense, therefore, the Company was identical with the subscribers to the first voyage, and it had a capital of 68,373*l.* subscribed for the voyage. But as soon as it expended that capital on the first voyage, from which no return could

[1] *Court Minutes*, 9th January, 1601, 6th July, 1601, &c.

[2] *Court Minutes*, 24th September, 1599, and 9th January, 1601. In the first list of 101 adventurers (22nd September, 1599) six subscribe under 200*l.*

[3] *Court Minutes*, 13th September, 1601.

[4] Macpherson, p. 86 (1812).

be expected for several years, it ceased as a company to have any capital of its own for further voyages. Its business was, therefore, to plan voyages, to obtain the Royal sanction for each voyage, and to recommend each voyage for subscription to its members, to receive the subscriptions as a separate fund applicable to the particular voyage, to buy ships and goods for the voyage, and finally to divide the profits among the individual group of subscribers who had found the capital for the separate voyage. Putting all this in very modern terms, the Company was, as I have said, a syndicate with a concession for the Indian trade during fifteen years, and it worked its concession by forming minor groups, theoretically among its own members,[1] to find the capital for each separate voyage—the management of all the voyages remaining in the hands of the parent syndicate, and the liability of the minor groups being limited to the separate voyage to which they individually subscribed. Their liability might, however, be extended to a forced contribution to a further venture, if fresh capital could not be raised from a new group of subscribers.

To any one accustomed to work a limited liability association under the Companies' Acts this system bristles with divided interests. As a matter of fact, it in time developed a complexity

[1] At first the subscribers were almost always Freemen of the Company. Afterwards, and especially during the distresses of the Civil War, the practice of throwing open the separate subscriptions to outsiders was resorted to.

which ultimately destroyed it. But to its Elizabethan founders it seemed simple enough. When the money subscribed for a particular voyage had been invested, and the ships sent out, the Company usually rested a while from its labours. Then the 'Committees,' or some enterprising member, started a project for another voyage, and a general court was held to consider the proposal. If agreed upon, 'a title or preface' to a new 'book of contribution' was drawn up setting forth the objects of the voyage and the capital required for it. Members present who wished to join the fresh venture put down their names for various sums; and the book was then delivered to the Beadle 'to be carried to all the several freemen of this fellowship to set down their several adventures in' the 'voyage.'[1] The Beadle went round with the book, and if he brought it back with a full subscription list, good and well. If not, certain influential brethren, practically the directors or committee-men, were appointed to take it round again to the members, and 'to persuade and encourage them to proceed in the said adventure.'[2] In some cases the contributors to one voyage were induced or compelled to provide the capital for another. Thus, the subscribers of the first voyage had to submit to a *pro ratâ* levy for the second; and the subscribers of the third voyage had to take up the fifth and share the profits of the two.

The capital for a further voyage having been

[1] *Court Minutes*, 14th September, 1601.

[2] *Court Minutes*, 13th October, 1601.

provided, the Company bought the ships and goods for the voyage, drew up instructions for its conduct, and obtained the necessary powers from the Crown for sending forth armed vessels, marines and silver-specie or coin from the realm. This complicated business was mainly conducted by the Governor and committee-men, whose 'Court of Committees'[1] resembled the board of a joint-stock company at the present day. As the arrangements advanced, they were laid before a general court of the Company presided over by the Governor and attended by the committee-men, 'with the greatest [or greater] part of the generality.'

Very strict bye-laws regulated these meetings. The Beadle could be sent to summons any brother of the Company (usually a defaulting subscriber), and the meeting or 'Court' fined him a shilling for non-appearance, or sixpence should he come late. If he proved obstinate, a warrant for commitment from the Privy Council brought him to reason. No brother could speak above thrice on any matter 'upon pain of forfeiture of 3*s.* 4*d.* for every such excess in speech.' The fine for interrupting 'by whispering speech or talk' another brother in his lawful discourse was 2*s.* 6*d.*, while 'any uncivil or intemperate speeches or behaviour' were punished by a mulct of 10*s.* No brother could leave a meeting without permission before its close, under penalty of a shilling. Above all, 'when Mr. Governor or his deputy commandeth silence by stroke of the hammer' let every one hold his peace 'upon pain

[1] The Committees also guarded and sold the return cargoes.

of forfeiture of sixpence.' These fines, the precautions of serious citizens for the orderly conduct of their business, were enforced by sending those who would not pay them to prison, 'there to remain during the pleasure of the generality.' [1]

The record for the equipment of each voyage may be reduced in most cases to four documents. In the first place, there was the Royal Commission authorising the Company to undertake the individual expedition, and vesting in its commanders powers for punishing offences during the voyage, and for the 'quenching of all such mutiny, quarrels or dissensions that shall or may' arise.[2]

In the second place, the Company issued a commission or code of instructions to the 'General' or Admiral, and to the commanders of the ships, setting forth in great detail the scope and objects of the voyage, together with minute regulations for its conduct and trade.[3] In the third place, Royal Letters Patent authorised, when needful, the coinage of money or export of specie for the voyage.[4] In the fourth place, Letters Missive were sought from the sovereign to the foreign kings, princes and potentates at whose ports the ships were to trade. A curious circular letter of introduction from Elizabeth 'To the Great and Mighty King of ——' leaves the address blank; to be filled up and delivered at the discretion of the commander of

[1] *Court Minutes*, 11th January, 1602.

[2] Commission of Queen Elizabeth for the First Voyage, *First Letter Book of the East India Company*, p. 3.

[3] *First Letter Book*, pp. 4 51.

[4] *Idem*, pp. 196, 224, 282, 500, &c.

the expedition.[1] The subsequent letters from King James are usually directed to specified princes in the East.[2]

These four instruments stand out as landmarks of the separate voyages above a mass of correspondence and detail.[3] The example of a single voyage must serve to illustrate the routine proceedings for its sanction and equipment. Three months after the first voyage round the Cape of Good Hope, set forth (as we shall see) from Torbay on the 22nd of
1601 April, 1601,[4] the Company received a letter from 'one George Waymouth a navigator,' proposing a voyage for the discovery of the North-west passage to India. He asks whether the company will undertake it, or allow private men to do so, with a grant to them of the sole trade by that route for certain years if they discover the passage.[5] After an adjournment a general court decided to undertake the venture, and to raise the money by a voluntary levy of five per cent. on the subscriptions of the first voyage, from such members as chose to embark on the venture. A new subscription book was accordingly sent round to the brethren.[6] In
1602 January 1602 the court confirmed their proceedings by a 'standing and unchangeable decree' for

[1] *First Letter Book*, pp. 19-21.

[2] *Idem*, e.g. pp. 46, 105-110.

[3] In some cases the authority given by the Crown extended to more than one voyage, but the above represents the facts as accurately as they can be summarised in a single paragraph.

[4] Macpherson's *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 8. (1812).

[5] *Court Minutes*, 24th July, 1601.

[6] *Idem*, 7th August and 2nd September, 1601.

the expedition to discover 'the North-west passage 1602
to the East Indies.'[1]

Arrangements then proceed for the selection, survey, and purchase of two pinnaces with a total crew of 30 men at an estimated cost of 3,000*l.* Captain Waymouth agreed to conduct the voyage on payment of 100*l.* for his instruments, with a promise of 500*l.* if he discovered the passage, but without any remuneration if he failed. A question next arises as to whether the expedition will not infringe the chartered privileges of the Muscovy or Russia Company. The Muscovy Company take a high stand,[2] yet offer to admit into their brotherhood such members of the East India Company as contribute to Captain Waymouth's expedition. After a wrangle between the two bodies, the East India Company apply to the Privy Council, which directs the Muscovy Company either to agree to joint action with the East India adventurers or to bring their patent before the Council for a scrutiny of their claim. The Muscovy Company give way, and finally the East India Company, having fortified themselves by a legal opinion, draw up instructions for the voyage.[3]

A mass of detail follows, appointments of officers to the vessels, warrants for pork, wages, 'hides to make the mariners' cassocks, breeches and gowns.' The victualling is divided among three sub-com-

[1] *Court Minutes*, 11th January, 1602.

[2] As they did in 1574–5 to Frobisher's expedition. *Ante*, p. 203.

[3] Each step is minutely recorded in the *Court Minutes*, from 7th August, 1601, to 11th January, 1602.

1602 mittees, and formal articles of agreement between Captain Waymouth and the Company fill several pages. He is to pass through the Fretum Davies to the north-west to the 'Kingdoms of Cataya or China,' and not to desist from his course 'so long as he shall find those seas or any part thereof navigable.'[1]

The object of the expedition is, by means of a shorter northern route, to avoid 'the long and tedious course' round the Cape of Good Hope, and the 'many kinds of dangers offered therein.'[2] It was also thought that a less export of treasure from the realm would be required in trading with the nations of North Asia. A journal of the voyage is to be kept and a day-book of barters with the natives. Observations or discoveries are to be faithfully disclosed by Waymouth on his return to the Governor, deputy governor and committee-men of the Company, and kept secret from all else. By another agreement, 'John Cartwright of London, Preacher,' is appointed chaplain to the expedition at 3*l.* a month, only half of which is to be paid him unless one of the ships returns home by way of China.[3]

Armed with a letter from Queen Elizabeth to the Emperor of China and Cathay, the expedition went forth and returned unsuccessful. Its failure was ascribed to the faint-hearted exhortations of Preacher Cartwright, and the Directors demanded

[1] Indenture of [blank] April 1602. Stevens, pp. 211–214.

[2] *Idem*, preamble.

Court Minutes, 24th April, 1602. Mr. Cartwright was also allowed 15*l.* for outfit.

back from him 'the gowne and apparell' in which 1602
he was to have figured at the Chinese Court.[1] The Company also proceeded against Captain Waymouth before the Privy Council, but being satisfied with his defence, agreed to employ him on another voyage.[2] Into his further history I need not enter. The subscribers to the North-west expedition of 1602 lost their money, its separate business was wound up,[3] and the Company proceeded to form new groups of adventurers for voyages by way of the Cape.

I have dwelt on Waymouth's expedition for two reasons. It illustrates the relations of the Company to a particular voyage from the inception to the close of the venture; and it stands apart from the regular series of Cape voyages, so that I shall not have to again refer to it in my consecutive narrative of the Indian trade. The discovery of the North-west passage continued to be a dream of the East India adventurers, as it continued to be a dream of some of the most gallant seamen whom England has produced down to our day. In 1602 the Company resolved to make 'a final proof whether there be any passage or not,'[4] by means of Waymouth and another captain. In
1606 it granted a licence to John Knight to dis- 1606
cover the passage on his own account—in vain.[5]

[1] *Court Minutes*, 25th October, 1602.

[2] *Court Minutes*, 24th November, 1602.

[3] The balances due from defaulters were eventually deducted from their shares in the First Voyage by the Cape of Good Hope, *Court Minutes*, 18th October, 1602.

[4] *Court Minutes*, 24th November, 1602.

[5] *First Letter Book*, 10th April, 1606, p. 86. Knight's Journal has

1614 For years afterwards the project reappears, and in 1614 the Company was again being urged to seek a northern passage to Asia, with the promise of aid from the Emperor of Japan.[1]

The permanent machinery by which the Company carried on its business consisted from the first of a Governor, deputy governor, treasurer, and a board of 24 committee-men, annually elected in July.[2] The same men were frequently re-elected.[3] They were assisted by a secretary and accountant, also subject to re-election, and a small staff of clerks. As long as the Company's business consisted in sending out separate voyages, this permanent board of management (represented by the Court of Committees) was much stronger than any of the separate bodies of subscribers, and kept the conduct of the separate voyages in its hands. But before the middle of the century, as we shall see, the separate bodies of subscribers overpowered the central body of management. The board of 24 committee-men became rather shadowy. The Governor, deputy governor, and treasurer only retained their authority by acting as leading mem-

been printed by Sir Clements Markham as an appendix to the Voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Hakluyt Society, 1877.

[1] Letters from Richard Cocks, from William Adams in 1613, 1614, from Japan [several dates]. *Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, vols. i. & ii. Danvers and Foster.

[2] E. I. C. Charter. The treasurer is only referred to incidentally in this charter of Elizabeth.

[3] Thus Sir Thomas Smythe, the first governor, was re-elected continuously from 1603 to 1621, with one break in 1606–1607. William Leighton was re-elected secretary in 1607, 1608, 1609. *First Letter Book*, p. xi.

bers of the separate ventures, in addition to their functions as permanent officials of the Company. They thus exercised a unifying influence in the midst of conflicting and overlapping interests. For example, in 1647, when the adventurers of the Second General Voyage elected the committees who were to manage it, they expressly provided that 'at every meeting Mr. Governor, Mr. Deputy or Mr. Treasurer should be one.' [1]

The central board, including the Governor, deputy, treasurer and 24 committee-men, submitted all important arrangements for approval to meetings or 'General Courts' of the freemen of the company, and were sometimes, although very seldom, overruled by the voice 'of the generality.'[2] The capital which they managed consisted of the subscriptions for the separate voyages. Each new group of adventurers usually took over (under the direction of the Company) the factors and property of the preceding venture; and the Company thus acted as a link between the new group and its predecessor. The confusion of interests which arose out of this system will hereafter appear.

In the earlier stages of its history, the Company or central board of management not only invested the capital raised for each separate venture, and conducted its business, but also appointed its servants. It handed over the agents in the East from their original group of employers to succeeding groups. A permanent body of English

[1] *MS. Court Book,* No. 22, p. 2, August 1647.

[2] *Court Minutes* of the 8th and 10th December, 1600.

factors and employés in India thus developed and gave rise to many questions, such as private trade, which the Company strictly forbad from the outset, and licensed trade, by which it allowed its servants to take a share in the ventures of the separate voyages. In its attitude to its servants, the East India Company preserved the domestic responsibilities of the mediæval master-craftsman to his apprentices and men under his roof. At each factory the staff lived in one house, ate at the same table, met together for daily prayers, and had to be in by a certain hour at night. The early records are full of pious maxims and instructions as to brotherly conduct, 'no brabbles,' cleanliness of person, respect to superior officers and 'the preacher,' the care of health, and penalties for blasphemy or breaches of family morals. Gaming and dicing are strictly forbidden; excessive drinking and banqueting are denounced.

A single quotation from a strictly business letter, full of trade details, will illustrate this domestic aspect of the company. 'And because there is no means more prevalent to strengthen and confirm the ways of the godly in righteousness than the spirit of God which is the guide into all good
1610 motions,' the Company wrote in 1610, 'and no aid more pregnant to support and uphold the sinner from falling into wickedness than the grace of God . . . we exhort you in the fear of God to be very careful to assemble together your whole family [*i.e.* all the employés] every morning and evening, and to join together in all humility with hearty prayer

to Almighty God for his merciful protection.' 1610
'Settle such modest and sober government in your household that neither amongst themselves there be contentious quarrels or other occasions of strife.' 'Comport yourself both in your habit [apparel] and housekeeping in such comely and convenient manner as neither may disparage our business nor be accounted too excessive in expenses.'[1]

Such instructions entered into every detail of the common family life of the factory. Unnecessary shooting of salutes when captains went on shore, and the undue discharge of cannon at the drinking of healths, were repressed.[2] Nor without cause, as the Portuguese sometimes spent so much gunpowder in vain ceremonials as not to leave enough to work their guns.[3] Instead of salutes, it was eventually ordained that the English might cheer. They were to take an example from the Dutch, 'who are very careful, industrious, and diligent,'[4] and to 'trust none of the Indians, for their bodies and soules be wholly Treason.'[5] The Company always mingled business with piety, from the fitting out of ships at Deptford to evening prayers in the

[1] Instructions given by us the Governor and Committees for the Company of Merchants trading [into] the East Indies unto Lawrence Female our principal factor and the rest of our factors now employed in this sixth voyage. *First Letter Book*, pp. 322–323 (Birdwood and Foster).

[2] *First Letter Book*, p. 344.

[3] Letter of Antonio Lopes, Vicar of Ormuz, 18th November, 1529. India Office MSS. Five ships, with only 1½ barrel of gunpowder among them, shot off half of it in salutes on their arriving in port.

[4] *First Letter Book*, 11th March, 1607, p. 150.

[5] James Lancaster's Remembrance left in the East Indies, 1603. *First Letter Book*, p. 33.

Spice Islands, or the relief of English prisoners at Lisbon—to whom it sent 200 ducats with the admonition 'to comfort yourselves in the Lord.' [1]

'For the better comfort and recreation of such of our factors as are residing in the Indies,' runs another document, 'we have sent the works of that worthy servant of Christ Mr. William Perkins,' together with Foxe's 'Book of Martyrs,' and, one is glad to hear, 'also Mr. Hackluit's Voyages to recreate their spirits with variety of history.' [2] Even their coat of arms, for which they paid 'the King of Heralds' twenty marks in 1601,[3] bears witness to the Puritanism of the City merchant of that day. It was not the well-known shield of 1698, with its lions for supporters, a lion holding a crown above, and the stately device of *Auspicio Regis et Senatus Angliæ.* The earlier and almost forgotten arms of the Company displayed three ships in full sail, with a pious pun as motto, *Deus Indicat*, God points the way.

We are now in a position to understand the mechanism and the methods by which the first English East India Company was to make its bid for the Asiatic trade, as against the more powerful Dutch corporation, and the united forces of Portugal and Spain. To recapitulate, it was at once a Company for regulating the English trade to the East, and also for conducting that trade by subscriptions raised from successive groups of adventurers, who were generally members of its own body,

[1] *First Letter Book*, 14th August, 1609, p. 306.

[2] *First Letter Book*, 4th April, 1611, p. 419.

[3] *Court Minutes*, 1st May, 1601.

or were, as subscribers, admitted to it. In one respect it resembled the mediæval trade guild now represented by the London City Companies and 'Lloyd's;' in another respect it resembled the modern limited liability company. From the first there was a tendency to divided interests between the successive groups of subscribers who found the capital and the permanent Company who administered it. The conflict of these divergent forces determined the internal history of the Company from its first charter of Elizabeth in 1600 to its reconstitution by Charles II. in 1661.

From 1600 to 1612 there was a period of so- 1600–1612
called Separate Voyages, each of which was theoretically complete in itself, and was to be wound up on the return of the ships by a division of the profits. During this period the power of the central Company was supreme over each separate group of subscribers—subject, however, to the yearly election of its executive officers by the general body of members. But the system proved defective, as, owing to the length of the passage to India and the slow process of winding up, the separate voyages overlapped each other. It thus came about that the agents of several voyages were trading in India at the same time, and bidding against each other for spices and Indian products. Disputes and acts of ill-will ensued. Thus a ship of one voyage would refuse to carry home goods lying at Bantam for transport because they belonged to another group of adventurers.

1612-1661 The second period, from 1612 to 1661, was marked by efforts to remedy this state of things. It is known as the period of Joint Stocks. Each subscription was raised not for a single voyage, but for several, or to carry on the trade during a certain number of years. The central Company still managed the business of each successive Joint Stock, as it had managed the business of each Separate Voyage from 1600 to 1612. But as the Joint Stock group lasted over a longer period than the Separate Voyage, it tended to become stronger than the central Company, and to take the management of its business into its own hands. The idea was still present, however, that each Joint Stock would be wound up after a time and its profits finally divided, as in the case of the Separate Voyages. But practically the Joint Stock ventures and 'General Voyages' were found to overlap each other as the Separate Voyages had done, and a similar confusion resulted.

1661 A third stage was reached in 1661, when long adversity had taught the central Company and the Joint Stock groups alike that conflicting interests must be fatal to their existence in the East. The idea that the Joint Stock is in due time to be wound up gradually disappears. After the Restoration the practice of buying and selling shares becomes common. This indicates that the Joint Stock principle has passed the stage represented by the second period from 1612 to 1661, and that the system was approaching more closely to the Joint Stock companies of our own times.

CHAPTER VII

THE 'SEPARATE VOYAGES' OF THE COMPANY 1601–1612

The weakness in the constitution of the English East India Company made itself felt from the outset. Its capital proved insufficient for a single voyage; additional calls amounting to four shillings in the pound had to be levied from the subscribers, and in some cases to be enforced by warrants of committal from the Privy Council.[1] In the midst of these troubles the Governor, Thomas Smythe, fell under suspicion of complicity in the Earl of Essex's rebellion, and was thrown into prison. The Deputy-Governor's health broke down under the strain of fitting out vessels and coercing defaulters, and an *ad interim* Governor had to be suddenly chosen on April 11, 1601. Finally, however, the four ships,[2] which had dropped

[1] E.g. *Court Minutes*, 27th April, 1601.

[2]

Name of Ship	Tonnage	Number of crew	Commander
The Red Dragon (formerly the Mare Scurge) . .	600 tons	202 men	James Lancaster, Admiral of the expedition
The Hector . .	300 ,,	108 ,,	John Middleton
The Ascension . .	260 ,,	82 ,,	William Brand
The Susan . .	240 ,,	88 ,,	John Heyward
Total . .	1,400 tons	480 men	

1601 down from Woolwich in February, got fairly started from Torbay on April 22, 1601.

James Lancaster, the hero of the Cape voyage to India in 1591–1594, commanded the squadron, with a cargo of British staples, cloth, lead, tin, cutlery, glass,[1] &c., worth 6,860*l.*, and silver to the amount of 28,742*l.* Arriving at Achin, in Sumatra, 1602 on June 5, 1602, he delivered Queen Elizabeth's letter to the King, together with presents, received in return a treaty of amity, and was made welcome to the trade of the place. But unfortunately the pepper crop had failed in the preceding season, and Lancaster found that if his voyage was to be made a success, it must be by other methods than those of peaceful trade. The Company had, under the politic name of 'reprisals,' given him a strong hint 'to take such course therein as he shall think meet' with regard to enemies of the realm.[2] He interpreted this as a sanction to join the Dutch in an attack upon the 'Portugals,' still in a state of war with England, and captured a richly laden carrack of 900 tons. Having transferred her cargo to his own ships, he let the plundered Portuguese vessel go her way.

A good freight thus secured, Lancaster filled up his ships with spices at several of the islands, made a friend of the boy-king of Bantam, left a factory of English merchants and seamen, and 1603 returned to England on September 11, 1603. Two

[1] Bruce's *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, vol. i. p. 146 (1810).

[2] *Court Minutes*, 22nd January, 1601.

of his ships preceded him. On June 16 the Company had received the glad news that the 'Ascension' was in the Thames,[1] and forthwith ordered 'six suits of canvas doublet and hose *without pockets*,' for six porters to land her precious spices.[2] The profits, apart from the plunder, were very large. The pepper had cost at Bantam, including dues, under 6*d*. per lb., while the selling price in England in 1599 had been raised from 3*s*. to 6*s*. and 8*s*.[3] Its ordinary price was formerly 2*s*. 8*d*., and although it sank after the establishment of the Company to 2*s*. or even less, the returns were great. The gain on the finer spices was still larger. I find that 2,948*l*. paid in 1606 for cloves in Amboyna fetched 36,287*l*. in London in 1608.[4] 1603

These enormous profits on Indian commodities, ranging from 500 to 1,500 per cent., should at once have established the credit of the Company. But when the ships returned in 1603 the plague had brought business to a stand. Between December 7, 1602, and December 1, 1603, the Company declared that no fewer than 38,138 persons died of the pestilence in London; that all the merchants and people of condition had fled; and that 'trade hath utterly 1602–1603

[1] She brought 210,000 lbs. of loose pepper, 1,100 lbs. of cloves, 6,030 lbs. of cinnamon, and 4,080 lbs. of gum lacquer. *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 321.

[2] *Idem*; and *Court Minutes*, 16th June, 1603.

[3] Price of pepper at Bantam 5½ Spanish dollars of 4*s*. 6*d*. for a bag of 62 lbs., with one dollar of customs: say 29*s*. 3*d*. for 62 lbs. Adding share of dues on anchorage, the total cost could not have exceeded 31*s*. per bag, or 6*d*. per lb. See Macpherson's *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 82 (1812).

[4] Bruce's *Annals*, p. 155.

ceased within the City for almost this half year.'[1] When the plague abated, difficulties arose in disposing of the cargoes for cash. The subscribers had to take part payment in pepper, and sell it as
1609 best they might; nor was it until 1609 that the affairs of the first voyage of 1601 could be wound up and the profits finally distributed. They amounted to 95 per cent. on the subscription; a large return if it had been quickly realised. The ordinary rate of interest was then 8 per cent. per annum, and the 95 per cent. profits only yielded 9½ per cent. if calculated over the ten years from the subscription in 1600—not a tempting reward for a risky voyage and the long vexations of winding up.[2] But part of the 95 per cent. had been distributed in previous years.

As a matter of fact, the Company seemed on the return of its first expedition in 1603 to be at its last gasp. It required at once to find 35,000*l.* for seamen's wages and the King's dues; the plague had closed the market for its spices, and no money could be raised on loans.[3] The Charter of 1600 authorised the sending forth of 'six good ships and six good pinnaces at all times' during fifteen years, yet three years had passed and only four ships had sailed. Elizabeth seems to have
1601 expected a yearly expedition. In November 1601 she notified her 'mislike of the slackness of the Company,' 'propounding unto them the example of

[1] Letter into the East Indies from the Company, dated 2nd December, 1603. *First Letter Book*, p. 39.

[2] Macpherson, p. 87, &c.

[3] *Idem*, p. 83.

the Dutch, who do prosecute their voyages with a more honourable resolution.' [1] By 1603 the Privy 1603
Council lost patience at the prolonged delay, and the Company found itself compelled to project a second voyage.

The Governor had in 1601 been directed to examine the charter to see if power were given to compel members to contribute to a further venture.[2] A second voyage was resolved on, and the book sent round by the Beadle, but only the paltry sum of 11,000*l.* was subscribed.[3] The freemen declined even to attend the General Court to discuss the question, and had to be summoned afresh under 'a pain of twenty shillings upon every one that maketh default.' [4] Finally, in 1603, when the pepper ships came home, 'the Company resolved as a matter of necessity' that every subscriber of 250*l.* to the first voyage should advance another 200*l.* for a second voyage. 'In consideration of which he should receive pepper at a settled price to the amount of 500*l.*, which he should dispose of at his own discretion.' [5]

The four ships of the first voyage were taken over for the second, and sailed again from Gravesend in March 1604, but with a cargo of only 1604
1,142*l.* in goods. Its total freight, including specie, barely amounted to 12,302*l.*, as against the 28,602*l.* sent out by the first voyage. Even this slender equipment was only achieved by making the profits of the first voyage responsible also for the second,

[1] *Court Minutes*, 5th Nov. 1601.
[2] *Idem*, 7th August, 1601.
[3] *Idem*, 13th Oct. 1601.
[4] *Idem*, 5th November, 1601.
[5] Macpherson, pp. 83, 84.

so that practically the two ventures traded as a joint concern. Captain (afterwards Sir Henry) Middleton, in chief command of the squadron, loaded two ships with pepper at Bantam, where Lancaster had left a factory, and sent on the two others to Amboyna for the finer spices, particularly
1606 cloves. He returned to England in 1606, having lost the 'Susan' on the voyage. The joint profits of this and of the first voyage yielded, as I have said, 95 per cent., but the final division could not be made till 1609.

These timid ventures contrasted with the magnificent operations of the Dutch Company, with its capital of 540,000*l.* and its great yearly fleets. The English political economy of the day denounced the folly of sending forth the treasure of the realm; for the store of precious metals possessed by a country was then reckoned the measure of the nation's wealth. If we remember that the whole goods shipped by the first two voyages only amounted to 8,002*l.*, and the coin or specie to no less than 32,902*l.*, we may understand how strong the argument appeared. Gerard de Malynes laid his finger on this 'canker of the commonwealth.' He compared our export of bullion for spices to 'the simplicity of the West Indians' 'in giving the good commodities of their countries, yea gold, silver, and precious things for beads, bells, knives, looking-glasses and such toys and trifles.' [1]

[1] *A Treatise of the Canker of England's Commonwealth*, by Gerard de Malynes, p. 68 (London, 1601.)

While the political economists condemned the nature of the trade, the Crown grew more and more dissatisfied with its petty results. The East India Company, like the Levant and Muscovy Companies, had weathered the storm of popular indignation which led Elizabeth in 1601 to abolish 1601
most of the monopolies;[1] as so distant a trade manifestly demanded a strong corporate body vested with exclusive rights. But the accession of James I. opened the door to more subtle influences, and an expelled member of the Company, who was also a courtier, worked them for his own ends. Sir Edward Michelborne, a soldier-adventurer of good family in the reign of Elizabeth, appears among the patentees named in her charter to the Company in December 1600, but he does not seem to have actually put money into the concern.[2] He had, however, procured a letter from the Lord Treasurer to the Committees in 1600, recommend- 1600
ing his appointment 'as a principal commander' on the expedition. This the Company evaded on the ground that 'they purpose not to employ any gentleman in any place of charge or commandment in the said voyage,' lest 'the generality' should 'withdraw their contributions.'[3] In the following

[1] The instructive debate on Monopolies in the House of Commons, November 1601, may be conveniently read in Mr. G. W. Prothero's *Select Statutes and other Constitutional Documents illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I.*, pp. 111–117. Clarendon Press, 1894—a book to which I gratefully acknowledge my obligations.

[2] His name does not occur in the list of adventurers given at pp. 123–125, *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616.

[3] *Court Minutes*, 3rd Septem-

1601 year, 1601, Michelborne was disfranchised by the Company on the ground that he had not paid up his subscription to the first voyage.[1]

Having been implicated in the Essex rebellion, he had to digest his wrath as best he could during the remaining years of Elizabeth. But the accession of James gave him his opportunity, and in
1604 June 1604 he obtained a royal licence of discovery and trade from Cambay on the coast of India to China, 'notwithstanding any grant or charter to the contrary.' The reduced scale of the Company's second voyage which had lately sailed[2] gave colour to this infringement of its privileges, and the new grant was confined to traffic at places where the Company had not established itself. But Michelborne's ideas of 'trade and discovery' were founded on the buccaneering models of Elizabeth's reign. After eighteen months of piracy, during which he attacked the Dutch at Bantam, plundered a Chinese ship, and made the English name abhorred in the Eastern seas, he returned to England in
1606 1606, never to sail again.[3]

This first of 'The Interlopers' had seriously compromised the position of the Company in the Archipelago. 'If there should any more such as he be permitted by His Majesty to come into these

ber (a clerical error for October), 1600.

[1] *Court Minutes*, 6th July, 1601.

[2] 24th March, 1604. *Marine Records*, Introd. p. v.

[3] He afterwards made approaches to the Company, and offered advice for the Fourth Voyage. For his chequered career and piracies see *First Letter Book of the East India Company*, pp. 134, 135 *note*, 151, 164, 211, 213, 247, 262, 290 *note*, 314, and 318, 15th March, 1609, when he 'is dead almost a year since.'

parts,' wrote its factor at Bantam, 'our estate here would be very dangerous.'[1] King James had put an end to the nineteen years' state of war with Spain and Portugal by the treaty of 1604, and 1604
although the hostility between the nations in the East still smouldered, our captains could no longer obtain a cargo by rifling a Portuguese ship, as Captain Lancaster boldly did on the first voyage. While the Company had thus lost an enfeebled prey, it had made a powerful enemy. The Dutch were stronger in the East than the Portuguese and the English put together, and for Michelborne's attack on them a heavy price was to be paid. Their reprisals for Bantam ended in the tragedy of Amboyna.

The Company's third expedition, consisting of three vessels under Captain Keeling, Captain Hawkins, and Captain David Middleton, sailed in 1607, and brought home a rich cargo of pepper 1607
from Bantam and cloves from Amboyna, which, together with the profits of plunder, yielded 234 per cent. on the subscriptions. Before its tardy return the Company had almost lost heart. For on the arrival of the ships from the second voyage, in 1606, the difficulties of realising the profit seemed so great that 'most of the Members were inclined to wind up their affairs and drop the business.'[2]

[1] John Hearne to the East India Company, dated Bantam, 4th December, 1608. *Letters from Servants in the East*, vol. i. p. 20.

[2] Macpherson's *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 84 (1812).

They were stirred into fresh action partly by royal promises and partly by a new royal menace to their privileges—the grant to Richard Penkevell to trade to China and the Spice Islands *viâ* the North-west or North-east passage.[1] No real harm came to the Company this time; but it felt
1608 compelled to fit out a fourth voyage in 1608. It could only raise a capital of less than half that subscribed for the first voyage, and barely sufficient to equip two ships, both of which perished at sea.
1609 The contributors lost their money, and in 1609 only one ship could be sent out on the fifth voyage with a capital of less than a fifth of the subscription to the first voyage in 1601.

This proved the low-water mark in the Company's fortunes. The fifth voyage in 1609 was practically equipped by the subscribers to the third voyage, and the good management of the two left a profit of 234 per cent. on the joint venture. King James also began to interest hinself in his new subjects' enterprise beyond the seas. In 1609 he followed up an earlier grant by finally founding Virginia, the first great English colony, and he issued a new and more ample charter to the East India Company, securing to it 'the whole, entire, and only trade' into 'the East Indies.'[2] Any persons not licensed by the Company who 'directly or indirectly do visit, haunt, frequent, or trade,' 'into

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 358. Under date 9th January, 1607.

[2] Letters Patent of the 7th year of James I. (31st May, 1609). *Charters granted to the East India Company from* 1601 (Quarto, India Office, pp. 27–53).

or from any of the said East Indies,' shall incur the royal 'indignation' and the forfeiture of their ships 1609
and goods, half to the Company and half to the Crown. James closely adhered to the terms and even to the words of Elizabeth, but where a divergence occurs it tends to strengthen the Company. Thus the new Charter of 1609 was to be in perpetuity and not for fifteen years, like Elizabeth's. In case of the grant not proving profitable to the realm, a notice of three years, instead of two, was to be given by the Crown.

The East India Company now began to be the fashion. Elizabeth's Charter of 1600 was granted to the privateering Earl of Cumberland, and 217 commoners, chiefly City men. The list in King James's Charter of 1609 is headed by a powerful band of courtiers. It is addressed to 'Our right trusty and right well-beloved Cousins and Councellors, Robert Earl of Salisbury, our High-Treasurer of England, Charles Earl of Nottingham, Our High Admiral of England, and Edward Earl of Worcester, Master of Our Horse, and Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved, William Lord Cavendish, and Our Well-beloved Servant Sir Thomas Lake, Knight, One of the Clerks of Our Signet,' and other knights and gentlemen. Royal favouritism had become a power in the State, and it was highly convenient that the Earl of Salisbury, who stands first in the list of adventurers, should also have the control of the export of treasure from the realm and of His Majesty's Customs.[1] Men of rank

[1] See his letter dated 11th April, 1609, *First Letter Book*, p. 282.

sought the freedom of the corporation, and in July
1609 1609 the Earl of Southampton sent a brace of bucks to the Brethren 'to make merry withal in regard of their kindness in accepting him of their Company.' A venison committee was promptly chosen, 'who agree upon a dinner to be provided for the whole company at the Governor's house.'[1]

Under these happier auspices the unprecedented subscription of 82,000*l.* was raised for the sixth
1610 voyage of 1610, commanded by Sir Henry Middleton. Elaborate instructions were given for the conduct of its business, for the prevention of private trading by the Company's Captains or Factors, and as to the commodities to be purchased in the East—raw silk, fine book-calicoes, indigo, cloves and mace. The Company had in 1607 decided to build ships for themselves at their hired dock at Deptford, and they now took up this business on a great scale.
1609 In 1609 they launched a leviathan of 1,100 tons—the 'Trades Increase.' The King himself consented to name the ship, and came down to the docks accompanied by the Queen, the Prince and the Court, for the ceremony. The Company entertained him at 'a great banquet, all served on dishes and plates of china-ware [then a rarity more prized than silver plate] and His Majesty placed a great chain of gold and a medal about Sir Thomas Smythe's [the Governor's] neck with his own hands.'[2] The 'Trades Increase' 'for beauty, burthen,

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 448.

[2] *Marine Records of the late East India Company*, p. vii. (Folio, India Office, 1896). *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 476.

strength and sufficiency,' says a contemporary writer, 'surpassing all merchants' ships whatsoever'—proved, notwithstanding her royal sponsorship, an unlucky craft. After a brief career, while careening at Bantam, she was burned by the natives.[1] Her brave captain, Sir Henry Middleton,
died there soon afterwards, in 1613, it is said of 1613
grief.[2]

The next two voyages, in 1611 and 1612, were also on a large scale. Events had occurred in the East which rendered the English system of small
separate adventures extremely hazardous. In 1609 1609
the Dutch closed their long war with Spain by a truce for twelve years, and had no longer any cause for keeping well with the English in Asiatic waters. By this truce, ill observed as it was in the East, the Portuguese were also left more free to deal with the English intruders. About the same time our ships came into conflict with the Asiatic land powers. Sir Henry Middleton, com-
manding the sixth voyage (1610), was seized and 1610
imprisoned, together with many of his people, by the Governor of Mocha, on the Red Sea. Captain Hawkins also found opposition at the court of the Indian emperor, whither he had gone to arrange for a permanent factory at Surat.

Complications were thus arising on land and sea with which the English system of 'Separate Voyages' was manifestly unable to cope. Not
only therefore were the voyages of 1611 and 1612 1611-12
on a large scale, but a new element of combination

[1] *First Letter Book*, p. 47, *n*. [2] *Idem*, and Macpherson, p. 88.

1611-12 enters into their equipment. The separate subscribers of the previous six voyages become the 'joint adventurers' of the seventh in 1611. The following year they united so closely that the eighth voyage in 1612 was sometimes reckoned the First Joint Stock.[1]

I now summarise in tabular form the operations of the Company during its first twelve years of Separate Voyages. The following figures are extracted from a statement prepared about 1620 and reproduced in the India Office folio of 'Marine Records.'[2] They agree with the list of voyages given by the Company's historiographer, from whose 'Annals' I compile the column of profits.[3] But as the concluding ones were more or less joint undertakings with distinct branches, the number of separate expeditions is variously reckoned from nine to twelve. Thus the so-called 'tenth'[4] which fought Best's famous fight off Swally[5] is included by the Company's historiographer and in the Marine Records' List under the eighth: as also the 'eleventh,' which consisted of one ship detached from it. The 'twelfth' was likewise a single-ship expedition, commissioned chiefly to carry back the Persian ambassador.[6]

The difference in enumeration does not affect the

[1] Bruce's *Annals*, i. 160.

[2] Introduction, p. ix. I correct the New Style dates of the voyages from the *First Letter Book*, and not from Bruce or the Marine Records. They may vary according as the date of the Commission, or of the subscription, or of the actual sailing, is taken.

[3] Bruce's *Annals*, i. 146–162. Macpherson's enumeration differs, but can be reconciled.

[4] Commission dated 6th January, 1612. *First Letter Book*, pp. 437–440.

[5] *Post*, pp. 300–303.

[6] *First Letter Book*, p. xiv.

THE FIRST NINE VOYAGES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: 1601 1612

As shown in the India Office folio of 'Marine Records,' *with the profits added from Bruce's* 'Annals'

	Date of Voyage	Capital	Exported in Money	Exported in Goods	Cost of Ships and Victuals	Ships Sent out	Profits on the Venture
First	1601	68,373	21,742	6,860	39,771	4	95 p. c.
Second . . .	1604	60,450	11,160	1,142	48,150	4	95 p. c.
Third . . .	1607	53,500	17,600	7,280	28,620	3	234 p. c.
Fourth . . .	1608	33,000	15,000	3,400	14,600	2	{ Both ships wrecked
Fifth . . .	1609	13,700	6,000	1,700	6,000	1	234 p. c.
Sixth . . .	1610	82,000	28,500	21,300	32,200	3	$121\frac{3}{8}$ p. c.
Seventh . . .	1611	71,581	19,200	10,081	42,500	4	218 p. c.
Eighth . . .	1612	76,375	17,675	10,000	48,700	4	211 p. c.
Ninth . . .	1612	7,200	1,250	650	5,300	1	160 p. c.
		466,179	138,127	62,413	265,841	26	

main results. Macpherson, who takes the number of Separate Voyages at twelve, from 1601 to
1601-13 1612–1613, gives the total capital employed at 464,284*l*.[1] My table, which takes the number at nine, shows an aggregate capital of 466,179*l*.

The column of profits may awaken the envy of modern merchants. But they represent the gains both on the exports and the imports of the voyage, together with the results of 'cabotage,' or port-to-port barter, during the long stay of the ships in the East. On the return of each expedition, money had to be found at once to pay off the crews, and within a certain period for the King's customs. But the cargo could sometimes not be sold until the royal share of the pepper had been disposed of, and then only at long credits of eighteen months to two years. In many cases the subscribers had to take payment for their contributions in spices or calicoes, and to find a purchaser for them as best they could. The system of 'Candle-auctions,' by public notice hung up at the Royal Exchange, afterwards relieved them of this burden. According to that system, the Company offered the commodities brought home by the ships at its London mart, with an inch of lighted candle on the desk. As long as the candle burned, fresh offers could be received, and the goods were knocked down to the highest bidder before the wick guttered out. At such auctions, even before 1622, a hundred thousand pounds' worth of silk,

[1] *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 92.

indigo, or spices was sometimes disposed of in a single parcel.[1]

The candle-auction became the regular method for the East India Company's sales. Before it opened, 'a black list' of defaulters or others who had wronged the Brethren was read out, and the persons thus named were not allowed 'to bid at the candle.'[2] At one sale in 1667 over 400 lots were disposed of,[3] and the carpenter's bill 'for setting up and taking down the scaffolds in the Great Hall' shows that the auctions were attended with some ceremony.[4] But the Government preferred to deal more privately with the Company. Thus in 1669, when the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Ordnance wanted 400 lbs. of saltpetre, they declared 'it was not honourable nor decent for the King to buy at the candle as other common persons did . . . and therefore insisted to buy it by contract.'[5]

Before this system fully developed,[6] the divided interests arising out of the Separate Voyages led to a delay of six or eight years before the accounts of each expedition could be rendered. A non-official estimate gives the net profit at under twenty per cent. per annum on the capital invested: which 'would perhaps be reduced to a level with the

[1] *Lex Mercatoria*, by Gerard de Malynes, pp. 202-203, 1622.

[2] *MS. Court Book*, No. 25, p. 116.

[3] *MS. Court Book*, No. 26, p. 52a.

[4] *MS. Court Book*, No. 29, p. 112a.

[5] *MS. Court Book*, No. 26, p. 264a.

[6] For ordinary 'candle-auctions' at the Coffee Houses see the *City Mercury* of January, March, April, 1675, &c.

common interest of the time, if the expense of insurance were deducted.'[1] Without accepting this calculation, it is certain that under the Charter of Elizabeth (1600–1609) the Company found great difficulty in raising capital for each successive voyage. They make frequent appeals to the patriotic sentiment, declaring their adventure to be a 'public action' 'for the honour of our native country and for the advancement of trade,' and 'rather for the good of the Commonwealth of their country than for their private benefit.'[2]

The earlier voyages had been directed towards the Indian Archipelago, where the English trade had to be done either at islands in possession of the Portuguese, or at native ports in competition with the Dutch. King James's peace with Spain in 1604 technically shut out the Company from the Portuguese islands except with the consent of Portugal. For Elizabeth's Charter of 1600 had expressly precluded resort to any place or kingdom 'in the lawful and actual possession' of any Christian prince who already or 'hereafter shall be in league or amity with us, our heirs or successors, and who doth not or will not accept of such trade.'[3] This proviso was again inserted in King James's Charter of 1609,[4] and although European treaties had little effect beyond the Cape of Good Hope, the King's project of the Spanish marriage made

[1] Macpherson's *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 92 (1812).

[2] *Court Minutes*, 24th September, 1599, 30th October, 1600, 11th January, 1602, &c.

[3] Charters granted to the East India Company, p. 13.

[4] *Idem*, p. 52.

him anxious to avoid grounds of umbrage to the united Spanish and Portuguese crown.

While the English thus found their trade at His Catholic Majesty's settlements rendered dependent on the goodwill of their Portuguese rivals, they began to encounter a keen competition at the Dutch marts in the Archipelago. As early as 1603 that competition was felt by the Company in European prices,[1] and it soon complicated the relations of the Dutch and English in the East.
Michelborne's attack on the Dutch in 1605 was 1605
defended, and by many Englishmen condoned, on the plea of 'the insolences of the Hollanders.' The commander of the Company's fourth voyage (1608) was reduced by the Dutch intrigues at Achin to
barter his cargo with ships from Gujarat. The fifth 1608
voyage under Captain David Middleton met with
still stronger opposition after 1609. The Dutch 1609
truce with Spain in that year removed the need of any further complaisance to the English. Within ten years since the grant of Elizabeth's Charter, the English found their old Portuguese prey in the Archipelago placed by treaty beyond their grasp, and their old Dutch allies no longer in want of their help, and turned into bitter trade rivals.

The simple remedy, as it now appears to us, would have been to withdraw from the contest for the produce of the islands, and to open up a direct traffic with the Asiatic continent. But the simple method is not always the obvious one. The

[1] Letter of the Company to the Factors at Bantam dated December 1603. *First Letter Book*, p. 39.

tradition of Eastern commerce was that India only yielded the cheaper spices, pepper, and ginger, and furnished ports for transhipment of the more precious ones of the further East—mace, cinnamon, and cloves. To shift our factories from the Archipelago to India seemed at the time equivalent to giving up the direct trade in the most lucrative commodities, and sinking into middlemen like the early Arab merchants on the Malabar coast.

Nevertheless the English soon began to feel their way towards India itself. The mission of Mildenhall (or Midnall), sent forth by Staper and armed with a letter from Queen Elizabeth in 1599 to the Great Mogul, returned in 1602 with news of the high civilisation and boundless resources of the Indian Court. Captain Hawkins, of the third
1607 voyage (1607), proceeded to the Indian coast with a letter from James I. to the Emperor Jahangir, and obtained permission to establish a factory at Surat. But in spite of Hawkins giving a pledge of loyalty to the Emperor by marrying 'a white mayden out of his palace,' the Portuguese succeeded in getting the grant revoked, and Hawkins, after two and a half years of fruitless negotiation at the court of Agra, left in disgust. In 1609 the
1609 English obtained an unstable footing at Surat, and their letters begin to appear in the records of the Company.[1] On August 30, 1609, one of them sent home an exhaustive price-list of Indian goods and of English commodities vendible at that port.

[1] *Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, vol. i. pp. 23–40.

A main object of the sixth voyage of 1610 under 1610
Sir Henry Middleton was to establish a trade with the Red Sea. But Middleton's reprisals after his seizure by the Governor of Mocha stirred up the Moslem zeal against the English, and placed us in an awkward position to the Mughal Emperor.
Sir Henry's attempt to trade at Surat in 1611 was 1611
frustrated by a Portuguese fleet which barred his entrance to the river, and by the ill-will of the Musalman Governor, so that he was forced back upon the old marts in the Eastern Archipelago.[1]

Another expedition (1611), under the direction of two merchants who had been in the Dutch service, was intended to open up a trade between India and the Spice Islands. It sailed for Pulicat, the chief port of South-eastern India, and coasted up the Bay of Bengal as far as Masulipatam, north of Madras, buying calicoes which it carried for sale
to Bantam and Siam.[2] In 1611–1612 Captain Saris, 1611–1612
commanding the 'Clove,' was provided with a pass from the Turkish Emperor, ordering his governors on the Red Sea to admit the English to friendly trade.[3] But the Moslem ill-will, left behind by Sir Henry Middleton's 'rummaging of Indian ships,' rendered a traffic on shore impracticable. After a barter of cargoes enforced on Moslem vessels at sea, and something like a compact of piracy with Middleton, Captain Saris proceeded to
Japan, which he reached on June 12, 1613.[4] 1613

[1] The contemporary documents are given in *The First Letter Book*, pp. 328–356, and *Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, vol. i. pp. 42–131.

[2] Macpherson, p. 89.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] *Idem*, 90. It is needful to again mention that the numbering

There he found a solitary Englishman, whose story flavours of the time. William Adams, having served as master in Elizabeth's navy and in the English Company of Barbary Merchants, joined a Dutch fleet from Rotterdam to the East Indies as Pilot-Major in 1598. After long miseries the fleet got scattered, but Adams's ship reached Japan in April 1600, with the crew in a dying state. Adams was brought before the Emperor, examined as to his country and the cause of his coming, and then thrown into prison for six weeks. The Portuguese tried to get him put to death, but eventually he rose by shipbuilding into favour with the Emperor, and received an estate 'like unto a lordship in England.'[1]

1609 In 1609 the Dutch obtained leave to establish a factory at the port of Firando, in Japan, and two years later a Dutch captain received through Adams's influence ample privileges of trade. Adams then learned for the first time that the English had
1611 also penetrated into the Eastern seas. In 1611 he wrote a letter, full of sturdy pathos, to his 'unknown friends and countrymen,' giving an account of his adventures and of the trade capabilities of
1613 Japan. On the arrival of Captain Saris in 1613, Adams procured leave from the Emperor for an English factory, which was accordingly established, with the hopes of also opening out a trade to Corea

of the separate voyages differs in Macpherson from the sequence given by Bruce.

[1] His story is summarised at pp. xl, xli, and told by himself at pp. 142–152 of *Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, vol. i. (1896).

and China. Adams entered the Company's service on a salary of 100*l.* a year,[1] and made many voyages, although the project of a North-east passage, to which he, like many bold sailors of the day, looked forward, remained a dream.

The Emperor liked him so well as to prevent his return to his wife and child in England, and in due time Adams provided himself with a wife and two children in Japan.[2] He died in 1620, 1620
after seeing a persecution of the Christians by a new Emperor, and left his estate impartially to his English and Japanese families. A road in Yedo was named Pilot Street in his honour, and a native festival still annually commemorates the first Englishman who lived and died in Japan.

Wherever the English had gone they encountered the hostility of the Portuguese. It was not alone in the Moluccas and Philippines, where Portugal had rights based on actual possession of certain of the islands. But in the great empires of India and Japan also, where all Europeans were but humble strangers, the Portuguese determined that for the English there should be no thoroughfare. In Japan they would have had Adams executed; they plotted with the native governors against our settling on the Indian coast; they procured the revocation of the grant to Hawkins at the court of the Great Mogul. The treaty of

[1] Contract made with Captain William Adams at Firando in Japan, 24th November, 1613. *Letters received*, vol. i. pp. 310–312. The Dutch had done 'what they could to have gotten him from us,' by offers of a higher salary. *Idem.* p. 316.

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, 1617–1621, par. 930.

1604 tied the hands of our captains, and if James I. had one eye to his subjects' interests, he had the other to a family alliance with Spain.

Fortunately the Portuguese themselves brought about a collision. Their fleet had prevented our ships from landing at Surat in 1611, and compelled them to do what business they could by exchanging
1612 cargoes at sea. In 1612 Captain Thomas Best, with the 'Red Dragon' and a smaller vessel, the 'Hosiander,' arrived off Swally, at the mouth of the Surat or Tapti river, with orders from the Company to conciliate the goodwill of the Indian Emperor
Nov. 29 for trade on that coast. On November 29th four Portuguese ships, mounting over 120 guns, attended by twenty-six or thirty 'frigates,' or rowed galleys for boarding, appeared off Swally, with the intent to capture the two English vessels. Best saw that the Portuguese admiral and vice-admiral were separated by the tide and shoals from the rest. He promptly bore down on the two great ships in the 'Red Dragon,' but the 'Hosiander' could not get clear of her anchors, and the single English ship had to fight the desperate battle alone. He steered straight at the enemy, calmly reserving his fire till he got between the admiral and vice-admiral, and then delivered such a cannonade on either side that 'by an hour we had well peppered' them 'with some 56 great shot.'[1]

[1] *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, part i. pp. 459, 482 (ed. 1625). There are four narratives in Purchas, which I have compared with Thomas Aldworth's Letter under date Surat, 25th January, 1613 and the *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 638. For Aldworth, see *First Letter Book*, p. 437.

The 'Red Dragon' had her mainmast struck and her longboat sunk by cannon balls, but she anchored in sight of the Portuguese for the night. Early next morning (November 30) Best again steered into the enemy, now accompanied by the 'Hosiander,' which had got clear of her anchors and 'bravely redeemed the former day's doing nothing.' The mouth of the Surat estuary was then encumbered (as it is now closed for ships) by silt banks, and rendered dangerous by strong currents. The silt of the Tapti river, near whose mouth Surat lay, together with the deposits from the obstructed sea currents, had formed a long shoal dry at high water, along the coast. Inside this shoal lay the Swally anchorage, 7 miles long by $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile broad, with sandspits, and bars on the shore side—an ideal battle-ground for the skilful handling of the English ships against the superior numbers of the heavy Portuguese. Nov. 30, 1612

Three of the galleons were driven on the sands, the 'Hosiander' keeping up a fierce fire, 'and danced the hay about them so that they durst not show a man upon the hatches.'[1] At 9 A.M. the English captain, probably fearing to go aground himself with an ebb tide on the shallows, stood out into deeper water and anchored. The respite enabled the Portuguese frigates to come to the aid of the three galleons, which they 'shoared up with their yards,' and so got afloat again. In the afternoon, as soon as the tide permitted, the English renewed the fight, and kept it up till dark, when they anchored Nov. 30

[1] *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, part i. p. 482 (ed. 1625).

1612 in the estuary six miles from the Portuguese. At 9 P.M. the enemy sent a fireship down upon the 'Hosiander,' but the English sank her by a cannonade, at a loss to the Portuguese reckoned from 120 to 140 men on the engagement.[1]

Dec. 1 Next day, December 1 (1612), passed without fighting, the wearied combatants riding at anchor. On the 2nd, Best sailed twenty miles along the
Dec. 2 coast, hoping the enemy would follow, but they declined. Their rowed 'frigates,' which were helpful to them and annoying to us among the shoals and currents of the estuary, would have been easily disposed of by our ships in the open sea and with a steady breeze. Best anchored in the neighbouring bay of Moha, whence he aided the Mughal troops in besieging a pirate fort. On December 22 the Portuguese squadron, including the four great galleons, having reinforced itself at Diu, again hove in sight. At daybreak on the 23rd Best boldly attacked against overwhelming odds, and kept up the fight till 10 or 11 o'clock, or, as some say, till 2 in the afternoon.[2] The Indian soldiers crowded down to the beach to watch our two ships battling with a whole armada. The fight ended in the complete rout of the enemy, and Best chased the flying squadron for four hours.

It seemed, however, impossible that the enormous force of the Portuguese ships should not
Dec. 24 in the end prevail. But on December 24 (1612) a final engagement was fought. The Portuguese were decisively put to flight. We were, however, so

[1] Purchas, pp. 460, 467. [2] *Idem*, pp. 460, 480.

exhausted that the pursuit could not be pressed, and 1612
on the 27th Best's two ships triumphantly reopened Dec. 27
communication with our factors at Surat. During the month's fighting the enemy lost 160 men according to their own account, or 300 to 500 according to English estimates. Best lost only three, and the stout old 'Red Dragon,' not a new ship when bought from the Earl of Cumberland in 1600, had still six years of good service before her. Her end came in 1619, when she and two other English vessels were taken off Sumatra by six Dutch ships after a desperate fight. The Hollanders offered to restore her, but the English declined, as her captors 'had lamed her with misusage.'[1] The gallant Thomas Best rose to the height of his profession. He appears as late as 1637 as Master of Trinity House, and in 1638 on a commission to inquire into frauds in the supply of timber.

The severest combat took place before the eyes of the Mughal troops: 'all the camp standing by the sea-side looking on us.' This running-fight of a single month[2] broke the reputation which the

[1] *India Office MS. Records*, O.C., vol. vii. pp. 819, 821.

[2] The dates for Swally fight are curiously confused, and as I abstain from adverting to the errors of other writers, I beg that when I differ from my predecessors, it may be believed that I do so on sufficient grounds. To take this Swally fight as a single instance. Of the three independent narratives printed in Purchas which give dates, two (Best's and Boner's) are journals day by day, and give the date of the first fight as the 29th November, 1612. The same date is given by Thomas Aldworth and others in their official report from Surat on the 25th January, 1613. In Withington's abridged account (Purchas, p. 482, ed. 1625) the date appears as 29th October. Orme follows this mistake; Low copies it (*History of the Indian Navy*, p. 13); so also Wilson's edition of Mill (i. 29

Portuguese had won in India by the sea achievements of a hundred years. As a land-power they had sunk into insignificance on the establishment of the Mughal Empire in Southern India during the second half of the preceding century. The coast
1613 governors of that empire now turned with the tide in favour of the English, and Best found it easy to obtain sanction for a factory at Surat and at three other places around the Gulf of Cambay. By a formal instrument all grievances arising out of Sir Henry Middleton's reprisals were buried in oblivion; our merchandise was to be subject only to a moderate fixed duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; and in event of the death of the English factors, the Company's property was to be kept safe by the Indian authorities for delivery to our next fleet. This agreement with the Governor of Surat, in December 1612, was duly ratified by an Imperial *Farman*, or decree, delivered with Oriental pomp to Captain Best at Swally in January 1613.[1]

From this Imperial decree our legal settlement on the Indian continent dates.[2] It marks a new departure in the history of the English Company: a new departure which was to end in our withdrawal from the Archipelago and our establishment

footnote); the great history of *The Royal Navy* by Clowes (vol. ii. p. 33, ed. 1898); and the *Dictionary of National Biography* (art. Thomas Best). A rare slip of this sort only brings out in stronger relief the general merits of the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Bruce, as usual, is accurate.

[1] India Office Records, cited by Bruce, *Annals*, i. 164 (4to. 1810).

[2] Not our *first* settlement at Surat, as Bruce supposes, i. 163. See *ante*, p. 296, and *First Letter Book*, also *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, par. 449, &c.

in India. In the same year (1612–1613) the Company at home developed its system of separate voyages into what was known as the system of Joint Stock. By this change it sought to increase its strength so as to join on more equal terms in the contest of the European nations for the Spice Islands. But in its settlement at Surat it had unconsciously provided a retreat for itself to a wider sphere of action, when worsted in that struggle.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUGGLE WITH THE PORTUGUESE

1612–1622

1612 CAPTAIN BEST'S fight off Swally in 1612 sounded like a trumpet call to the nation. It found the Company ready to make a gallant response. Having resolved in 1612 to adopt the Joint Stock system, the committees raised an unprecedented subscription of 429,000*l.* in 1613[1]—about equal to the total of all the separate ventures since 1600. They thus got command of a capital which might almost vie with that of the Dutch Company, or with the State-resources of Portugal. The whole sum was not, however, called up at once, but was to be paid during four years for an annual voyage, so that the actual number of ships employed still remained insignificant compared with the long established fleets of our rivals.

Before entering on the political events which grew out of this development, let me briefly summarise its commercial results. The four voyages
1613-1616 extended from 1613[2] to 1616, with an average capital of 107,000*l.*; a fleet of about seven ships a year which exported goods and silver

[1] Bruce's *Annals*, i. 165. The whole capital of the separate voyages from 1600 to 1612 was only 466,179*l.*; *ante*, p. 291.

[2] The '1613 voyage' started early in 1614.

averaging 47,379*l.* on each voyage, and yielded an average profit of 87½ per cent. on the aggregate capital employed. The return would have been much larger but for the hostility of the Dutch and Portuguese. The two voyages of 1613–1614 are 1613-1614
said to have each yielded a profit of 120 per cent.: and one cargo bought for 9,000*l.* [1] in the East sold for 80,000*l.* in England.[2]

The following table [3] may now speak for itself.

The Four Voyages of the First Joint Stock

1613–1616

Date of Voyage	Capital	Exported in Money	Exported in Goods	Cost of Ships and Victuals	Ships sent out
	£	£	£	£	
1613	106,000	18,810	12,446		5
1614	107,000	13,942	23,000	272,544 (1613–1616)	9
1615	107,000	26,660	26,065		8
1616	109,000	52,087	16,506		7
	429,000	111,499	78,017	272,544	29

By the beginning of 1614 what is officially reckoned as 'the voyage of 1613' was ready. It consisted of four vessels; the flagship having been launched on January 1 under the name of the 'New Year's Gift,' 550 tons—armed and strongly built for trade or war. The command in chief was given to a captain of proved capacity for both. Nicholas Downton had been 'Lieutenant-General,' or second in command, under Sir Henry

[1] 40,000 reals of eight at 4*s.* 6*d.*

[2] Bruce's *Annals*, citing India Office Records, i. 167.

[3] Taken from the *Abstract of the Stock and Trade* [*ad*]*ventured by the Governor and Company of Merchants of London. Marine Records*, p. ix (folio, 1896). Columns iii., iv. and v. exceed column ii., probably due to carrying over items.

Middleton in the sixth voyage of 1610, which came to blows with the Turks in the Red Sea, and left a record of reprisals not soon forgotten by the Moslem world. After many adventures, and long trading in the East, Downton brought home his ship, the 'Peppercorn,' with her timbers strained
1613 and gaping, in the autumn of 1613, most of his crew dead, the remainder rotting with scurvy, he himself stricken by disease, and his half-sinking craft with difficulty making the Downs. His unconquerable endurance won for him the command of the great expedition then being fitted out,
1614 and in March 1614 he sailed as 'General' of the first Joint Stock voyage.[1]

He carried with him the amplest powers which the Company could desire or the Crown grant. For the discipline of his fleet, King James vested in him full power to execute the cruel chastisements then 'commonly used in all armies at sea,' with martial law for the punishment by death of mutiny or other capital offences.[2] As regards foreign rivals His Majesty gave much good advice mingled with some useful suggestions.

'For as much as at this present,' he declared, 'We are in amity with all Christian princes,' 'And because We are not ignorant of the emulation and envy which doth accompany the discovery of countries and trade, and of the quarrels and con-

[1] The journal of the 'New Year's Gift' preserved in the India Office, with preliminary entries, commences from 25th February, 1614 and ends November 1615. *Marine Records*, 1605–1701.

[2] Royal Commission to Captain Nicholas Downton. *First Letter Book*, pp. 449–450.

tentions which do many times fall out between the 1614
subjects of diverse princes when they meet the one with the other in foreign and far remote countries in prosecuting the course of their discoveries,' We charge you Nicholas Downton not to 'go about to set upon' any of our Christian allies, especially Spain, 'except you shall be by them first thereunto justly provoked.' If, however, this should happen, 'you shall not for any act or acts' needful in the case, 'be in danger or subject to the peril and penalties of our laws.' Above all you are 'to suffer no spoil to be made of any goods or merchandise' which 'shall be recovered by you,' 'but to see them safely brought home with their bills of lading,' so that We may adjust matters hereafter with the offending State.

Truly an Elizabethan commission drafted with an eye to making out an *ex post facto* diplomatic case worthy of the Great Queen, yet, in spite of its Jacobean pedantry, disclosing a clear perception of the realities of distant sea-trade. James recognised that European treaties had little effect beyond the Cape of Good Hope. He desired his subjects to abstain from offence, yet if offences must needs come, not to be the losers by them; [1] and to repel force by force.

Captain Downton thoroughly grasped the situation. Should spoliation be going, he was determined not to be the despoiled. The fundamental difference of view taken by England and by Portugal as to their relative positions in the East

[1] Royal Commission, *ut supra*, pp. 451-452.

inevitably led to conflict. From the moment that Da Gama's ships returned in 1499 the Portuguese dynasty affirmed its right to 'the sovereignty and dominion of all we have discovered,'[1] besides its wider claim under the Demarcation Bull of 1493 and the treaties based upon it. From the first Charter of Elizabeth to the London Company in 1600 the English Crown only acknowledged Portuguese rights based on 'actual possession,'[2] and altogether ignored the wider claim under the Demarcation Bull. But the 'discovery' of continents and of groups of islands scattered over great oceans and the 'actual possession' of them were widely different terms. The real question was—which of the two nations could enforce its view.

1622 Ten years, from Best's coast fight in 1612 to our capture of Ormuz in 1622, sufficed to decide this issue. The Portuguese were no longer the gallant little nation, in the first heat of independence, which opened the Cape route to India and made themselves masters of the Asiatic seas. In less than two centuries from 1385, when the field of Aljubarrota had freed Portugal from the standing menace of Castile, and launched her on a career of glory under the House of Aviz, that patriotic dynasty flickered out, and the Portuguese passed under the bigot rule of Philip II. The first half

[1] Letter from King Emmanuel to the Cardinal Protector, dated 28th August, 1499. Printed in App. A to Ravenstein's *Journal of the First Voyage of Vasco da Gama*, pp. 114-116 (1898).

[2] East India Company Charters, p. 13 (Elizabeth), p. 52 (James I.)

of their 'sixty years' captivity' to Spain (1580–1640) 1580-1640
sufficed to exhaust their resources in Philip's struggle with Dutch Protestantism, and to blight their national vigour.

Portugal ceased to be prolific of great men. The four successors of Albuquerque who stand out in Indian history belonged to the period before her 'captivity' to Spain. Nuno da Cunha (1529–1538), who opened out the Portuguese trade to Bengal; João de Castro (1545–1548), who defended the Portuguese possessions on the Western coast from Diu down to Goa against the native Powers, and strove to cleanse the Augean stable of Indo-Portuguese misrule; Constantino de Braganza (1558–1561), who conquered Daman and took up de Castro's task of internal reform; Luis de Athaide, Viceroy from 1568 to 1571 and again from 1578 to 1581, who stemmed for a time the rising tide of revolt against Portuguese oppression and beat back the Moslem coalition in India and the Archipelago—were the products of an independent Portugal. Her forced union with Spain (1580–1640) was barren of heroes.

In India also a great political change had taken place. Although Portugal had more than held her own in the scuffle of the petty coast rajas, she had never made an impression even on the small isolated kingdoms of the inland South; and after the extension of the Mughal Empire southwards she ceased 1572
to have any significance as an Indian land-power.

In the height of her naval supremacy she had felt her weakness on shore. 'We sit still,' wrote

one of her ablest servants, 'perishing without lands out of which to support ourselves, or find shelter.'[1] The little patches of Indian coast did not afford a land-revenue sufficient to support the administration in peace or to serve as a security for loans in
1546 war. In 1546, the chivalrous Viceroy, Dom João de Castro, having to raise a loan for the defence of Diu, ordered the body of his son, lately slain by the Moslems, to be exhumed, and given as a pledge for repayment. But the corpse had decayed. 'Thus,' he concludes, 'having nothing left in this world, neither gold, silver, nor any other property except the beard on my face, I send it to you to remain with you as a gage.'[2]

As the 'confusion of evils'[3] reached its height in their coast-settlements, the Indo-Portuguese, now degenerated into colonies of half-breeds, tried to wring a living from sea-plunder. Their naval system had from the first lent itself to piracy and corsair descents.[4] It developed into unrestrained buccaneering. The Portuguese caravels and galleys became the scourge of the Eastern routes. From their pirate nests on the Bay of Bengal they swooped down on the approaches to the Ganges, and terrorised the rich coast traffic of Arrakan and Burma. Sometimes a successful

[1] Letter of Cosme Annes for the King, dated Cochin, 30th December, 1549. India Office MSS.

[2] Letter from Dom João de Castro to the inhabitants of Goa, dated Diu, 23rd November, 1546; printed in *Sketches of Portuguese Life*, by A. P. D. G. London, 1826.

[3] Letter of Cosmo de Laseta for the King, dated Cochin, 15th January, 1602. India Office MSS.

[4] *Ante*, p. 137.

adventurer like Nicote founded for himself a brief dominion.[1] But hasty pillage, careless of the slaughter of infidels, was their main object. Gradually the Eastern sea-races from the Spice Islands to the Persian Gulf roused themselves against the Christian robbers. Ternate in the far Moluccas shook off the Portuguese yoke (1575– 1575-1576
1576); Malacca, their great half-way place of strength, was again and again attacked by the King of Achin. Ceylon rose against them. Their Indian piracies brought on them the vengeance of the coast princes, and at length the crushing wrath of the Mughal Empire.

Wherever we turn we see the same spectacle of oppression and ruin.[2] The Sular islanders of the most eastern archipelago would not on our first arrival come near our ships, as the Portuguese 'had used to take them and make slaves of them.'[3] At the western extremity of the Asiatic trade route the Shah of Persia sent an ambassador to Paris begging the King of France for help 'to drive the Portuguese out of the East Indies.'[4]

But it was not the piracies of the Portuguese that most deeply stirred the much-enduring Eastern races. In 1320, Marino Sanuto the elder had

[1] *Ante*, p. 182.

[2] Read chapters i. to v. of vol. ii. of Danvers' *Portuguese in India*, or take a single paragraph on page 11. For the Moslem account of these transactions, see among others the *Akhbár-i-Muhabbat* in Sir Henry Elliot's *History of India, as told by its own Historians*, vol. viii. 385 ff.

[3] *Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, vol. i. pp. 313-314 (from Richard Cocks).

[4] Thomas Alabaster to Secretary Cecil, 3rd September, 1603. *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, par. 323.

submitted his famous *Secretum Fidelium Crucis* to the Pope, for seizing the Egyptian route, and securing the proceeds of the Indian trade as a war-fund to retake Jerusalem.[1] To the Portuguese sovereigns and Grand Masters of the Military Order of Christ the conquest of the Asiatic Ocean seemed the true continuation of the Crusades. Their determined efforts to reach the Christian kingdom of Prester John, by land or by sea, ended in Da Gama's discovery of India. Seekers are apt to find what they go in quest of, and Da Gama's companions were at least half convinced that the Malabar temples were Christian churches. On their return, King Emmanuel at once wrote to their Catholic Majesties that when these 'Christian people' of India 'shall have been fortified in the faith,' they would help in 'destroying the Moors of those parts.'[2] To Rome he announced that 'the King [of Calicut] looks upon himself and the major part of his people as Christian.'[3] This exaggeration, although quickly corrected, served to perpetuate the legend of the Crusades.[4]

The Portuguese in fact, by a happy chance, landed on a strip of Indian coast to which the ancient trade route had brought Nestorian emi-

[1] *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*: Lieut.-General Wauwermans' *Henri le Navigateur*, pp. 27, 28; Anvers, 1890. The *Biographie Universelle* gives the date as 1321; vol. xl. p. 377 (1825).

[2] King Emmanuel to the King and Queen of Castille, July 1499. Printed in App. A to Ravenstein's translation of the *Roteiro* (1898).

[3] King Emmanuel to the Cardinal Protector, 28th August, 1499. *Idem.*

[4] Compare the first and the second letter of Girolamo Sernigi. *Idem*, pp. 125–126 and 137–138.

grants, and where Christians had long formed a recognised caste.[1] But the zeal of the new-comers could not rest satisfied with their good fortune. They resolved to turn the old 'St. Thomas' Christians into Catholics, and the infidels who came under their power they strove, by force or threats, to convert. That appalling narrative of cruelty and folly forms part of the general history of Christianity in India, and will be told in a subsequent volume. The early intermittent methods of the friars, who arrived with the annual fleets, blossomed into a native church under the apostolic
teaching of St. Francis Xavier (1542) and the 1542
Society of Jesus. But the saintly fervour of the great Jesuit proved too mild for the Dominican bigots who, in the complaint of the Goanese,
'cast souls into hell through fear.'[2] In 1560 the 1560
Inquisition was established in India under the Dominican Order. Its atrocities reached Europe in a perhaps exaggerated form.[3] But a Portuguese writer states that 71 *autos da fé*, or general burnings, were held in 173 years, and that at 'a few' of them, 4,046 persons were sentenced to various punishments, 121 being condemned to the flames.[4]

These savageries were perpetrated chiefly, but

[1] *Ante*, p. 99.

[2] Petition of the Judge and Aldermen of Goa for the King, dated 25th November, 1552. India Office MSS.

[3] *Relation de l'Inquisition de Goa* (Leyden, 1687; Paris and London, 1688), by the physician Dellon, who was imprisoned in its cells in 1674. Pyrard, Fryer, and other travellers have also left notices of the Goa Inquisition.

[4] Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 220, on the authority of a work published in Portugal in 1845 and other Portuguese materials. (Bombay, 1878.) Fifty-seven were burnt alive, 64 in effigy.

not altogether, on the unhappy Nestorian or 'St.
Thomas' Christians, who had dwelt quietly in
India for centuries before the advent of the Portu-
guese. Wherever the Portuguese established their
power, from Ceylon to the distant Spice Islands,
they tried to make conversions. Every convert
was a possible apostate, and to apostacy the
Inquisition showed no mercy. The tolerant spirit
which I have noticed in some of the early Portu-
guese treaties with native princes[1] seemed little
short of a denial of Christ to the zealot who in
1580 1580 united the crowns of Portugal and Spain.
Philip II. would have no paltering with either the
Indian infidels or the orthodox Nestorians. After
drawing the rope tighter round the neck of Indian
heresy in 1594, he delivered his stroke at the non-
1598 Christians in 1598. He learned that previous
viceroys had granted some tolerant provisions in
regard to the temples and worship of the native
faiths. 'I deem it good,' wrote his Majesty, 'that
they be revised by the Inquisitors and theologians
who reside in those parts.'[2]

In the following year he struck a more fatal
blow at the ancient native Christians. The Synod
1599 of Diamper in 1599 denounced Nestorius and his
heresies, and for a time extinguished the Indian
Nestorian Church. The sacred books of the 'St.
Thomas' congregations, their missals and church
ornaments, were publicly burned, and their conse-

[1] *Ante*, pp. 149, 150.

[2] Letter of the King for the Governors of India, dated Lisbon, 22nd January, 1598. India Office MSS.

crated oil was poured upon the flames. Their religious nationality as a separate caste was abolished, and for the next half-century the Malabar Christians chafed under a line of Roman Catholic prelates, and groaned beneath the Inquisition.[1] In the same year, 1599, in which the Synod 1599
of Diamper crushed the ancient Church of Malabar, the London merchants met in Founders' Hall to establish an East India Company.

Portugal thus entered on her struggle with England for the Eastern seas burdened with the traditions of the past and beset by the passionate vengeance which her attempt to enforce those traditions had aroused among the Asiatic races. She represented the reactionary spirit of mediævalism, as against the modern methods of the Protestant nations. To the English and the Dutch, the Indies were simply a new world for commerce, to the Portuguese they were a vast arena for mingled commerce and crusades. The Indian trade of Portugal had dwindled since her union with Spain in 1580. Philip II. wanted money for 1580
his wars. America supplied silver, the East Indies drained it away, and Philip could not any more than Charles V. pay his troops in pepper and cloves.

The Spanish King had guaranteed in 1580 the undisturbed enjoyment of the East Indian trade to the Portuguese, and he kept his word by neglecting

[1] The Decrees of the Synod of Diamper (*i.e.* Udayampura) occupy 346 pages of the *History of the Church of Malabar*, by the learned Michael Geddes, Chancellor of the cathedral church of Sarum, pp. 97–443 (London, 1694). See also La Croze's *Histoire du Christianisme des Indes*, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1758.)

their Indian possessions. His heavy war demands dried up the Portuguese supplies of money and men; and the capital which the Jews formerly furnished had been driven by persecution to Holland. Of the 806 vessels which Portugal sent to India, from the setting forth of Vasco da Gama in 1497 to the English sea victory off Surat in 1612, only 186 sailed during the thirty-two years after the union of the two Iberian crowns in 1580. But the deterioration was in quality as well as in numbers.
1497-1612 For of the 66 carracks or ships lost between 1497 and 1612, no fewer than 35 perished at sea during the thirty-two years of Spanish domination, besides four taken by the enemy.[1] In 1596 Spain became bankrupt and repudiated her public
1612 debts. In 1612, the English ambassador reported from Madrid that 'the Indian ships go much poorer than they were wont.'[2] Philip's ill-fated Armada of 1588 had given a deathblow to the sea power of Portugal as to that of Spain.

1603 The accession of our James I. in 1603 seemed to promise her a respite. Lerma, the all-powerful Spanish Minister, saw no reason, with the exception of the English claim to trade in the East Indies, for continuing the war. A large exception, yet within the range of diplomacy. The war-party in England, with Sir Walter Raleigh as their spokesman, fell into discredit; the squadron fitted

[1] For these and other details I am indebted to the official *Livro em que se contêm toda a fazenda e real patrimonio dos reinos de Portugal, India e Ilhas adjacentes*, pp. 194–196. (Lisboa, 1859.)

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 607.

out against Spanish trade in the last year of Elizabeth was stopped; and King James, in June 1603, issued a proclamation declaring that all prizes 1603
taken from Spain or Portugal after April 24 must be restored.[1] The treaty of peace, signed in 1604, was followed by a further proclamation in 1604
1605 against attacks on Spanish or Portuguese vessels. The pacific spirit reached even to the Indies, and in 1605 the Portuguese Captain-General 1605
gave the Governor of Manila a warrant to trade with the English.[2]

Then the pendulum swung back. In 1607 1607
Spain informed our ambassador that she could never be friendly with those who traded to the Indies.[3] In 1608 she proposed to occupy the Cape 1608
of Good Hope and there to intercept all ships proceeding to the East.[4] In 1609 the truce of 1609
Antwerp gave Spain a freer hand with the English, and the wrangle in 1610-1611 of the two govern- 1610-1611
ments over the Persian ambassador in Europe[5] flamed out in broadsides on the Indian coast.

However King James might hanker after marriages at Madrid, the English nation had made up its mind that in the Asiatic seas there could be no peace with Portugal. To this conviction Captain Nicholas Downton of the first Joint Stock voyage gave practical effect. Arriving in Swally Roads

[1] Sir T. Duffus Hardy's *Syllabus of Rymer's Fœdera*, ii. 831.

[2] *The Last East Indian Voyage* (according to the Bodley Catalogue, written by Sir Henry Middleton himself: paging cut off). (London, 1606.) But see Hakluyt Society's edition (1855).

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, par. 371.

[4] *Idem*, par. 419.

[5] *Idem*, pars. 588, 589, 600, &c.

1614 off Surat on October 15, 1614, with his four ships, and 'not having above four sick men in the whole fleet,'[1] he found the Mughal Governor besieging the Portuguese coast settlements of Daman and Diu. When the Governor pressed him to take part against the Portuguese, he refused 'for that there was peace between our King and the King of Spain.'[2] The Mughal Governor replied that if the English would do nothing for him, he would do nothing for them; but Downton sternly declared that he would not be hired to fight the Portuguese, yet would not be withheld from fighting if they first attacked him. The Governor accordingly forbad all trade on shore with the English ships.

1614 Dec. 6 On December 6, 1614, Downton heard that the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa was equipping a great force against him. It was to be on a scale sufficient to crush, without hope of escape, the insolent intruders into the Asiatic seas. Best's fight had taught the Portuguese the unwisdom of engaging the English with anything like equal forces, and the Viceroy gathered the naval strength of Portugal in Indian waters for one overwhelming attack. While collecting his armada at Goa he sent on some light vessels to occupy our atten-
Dec. 23 tion, and on December 23, 1614, twenty-two Portuguese 'frigates,' or rowed galleys, anchored

[1] Captain Nicholas Downton to the East India Company, dated 20th November, 1614. *Letters Received*, vol. ii. p. 168, see also p. 137. Where the dates differ from Purchas' *Pilgrimes*, part i. p. 500 *et seq.*, I follow the official letters from the East India Company's servants on the spot.

[2] *Purchas his Pilgrimes*, i. pp. 502–503. Swally lay round the north point of the Tapti estuary.

during the night in the shallows between our ships 1614
and the river mouth.[1] They were protected from us by sand-banks, and as traffic with the shore was forbidden by the native Governor, Downton could not victual or refit to enable him to take to sea. Moreover, like Best in 1612, he realised the advantage which the more skilful handling of the English ships gave amid the mud banks and currents of the Tapti estuary. The Portuguese thought they had shut him in among the shoals,
and he made the shoals fight for him. By Janu- 1615
ary 18, 1615, the whole Portuguese fleet had arrived, Jan. 18
including six great galleons, three smaller ships, two galleys, and sixty 'frigates' or rowed barges with 'twenty soldiers apiece and eighteen oars a side.'[2] The Viceroy of Goa, Don Jeronimo de Azevedo, commanded in person, flying his flag as admiral of the Indian seas.

The English were cruelly overmatched. The largest Portuguese galleon was of 800 tons burden and carried 260 fighting men with 28 pieces of ordnance. Five others were of 700 to 400 tons. The 'frigates' alone carried about 1,200 soldiers in addition to the rowers. The total strength of the armada amounted to 2,600 Europeans, whose duty it was to work 234 guns, besides the native crews to the number of 6,000,[3] who sailed

[1] Purchas' *Pilgrimes*, p. 505. For the tidal section of the Tapti River, see the official account of *Gujarat, Surat and Broach*, p. 8, *et seq.* Bombay, 1877. The point between the river mouth and Swally has projected further out since the time of the fight.

[2] Compare *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 935, with Purchas, part i. pp. 505, 519.

[3] Low's *History of the Indian Navy* for these totals, vol. i. p. 19 (1877).

1615 the ships. Downton, with his four vessels, 400 men,[1] and 80 guns of much inferior calibre, seemed caught in a trap: the Mughal Governor unfriendly on shore: the 'frigates' guarding the shallow entrance to the river: and the great galleons and galleys cutting off retreat to sea. But Downton felt that on that fight depended 'all hope of future times;' for if he were defeated, the Portuguese would make peace with the native Governor and the English would be expelled the country for ever.

What troubled him most was the unequal drudgery thrown on his men. The work of the Portuguese ships was done by slaves and 'inferior sea-people,' while their soldiers remained fresh for battle. The English crews, on the other hand, before actual fighting could begin, 'are first tired or half-spent with the labour of the ship, as heaving at capstern, and getting up our anchors . . . making them in hot countries both weary and faint.'[2] Downton poured out his heart in secret prayer, 'ever as I could be solitary, or free from others, very earnestly craving aid and assistance from the Lord of Hosts.'[3] But he showed a bold face to his crews, and asked all the captains and some of the mates of his little squadron to supper—

Jan. 19 January 19, 1615.

They assembled in a mood not less resolute

1615 than his own. Downton's plan was first to weaken

[1] Thomas Aldworth, dated Surat, 22nd October, 1614. *Letters received by the East India Company*, vol. ii. p. 137.

[2] Purchas, part i. p. 507.

[3] *Idem*, p. 506.

the enemy by luring some of them aground, as had 1615
happened during Best's fight at the same spot in 1612. Trusting to his superior seamanship, and to the quicker handling of his vessels, he accordingly, on January 20, 1615, sent the 'Hope' ahead of his Jan. 20
three other ships towards the southern sand, in the expectation that the great galleons would follow to seize her. But the Portuguese admiral, while keeping between her and the sea avoided the shoals, and Downton, thinking there would be no fighting that day, cast anchor, leaving the 'Hope' some way in advance.

The Portuguese swallowed the bait, and beset her with three vessels of light draught and 36 'frigates.' Before Downton could get clear of his anchors and come up, the enemy had rowed boldly round the 'Hope,' fastened themselves to her sides, boarded her thrice, and were thrice beaten back, finding 'no quiet here.' After the third bloody repulse, unable to unloose their swarm of grappled vessels under the English shot, they set fire to them and leapt overboard, expecting that the 'Hope' would perish in the circle of flames. They themselves trusted to be picked up by the galleons, but the fire from the other three English ships which had cut their cables and come to the rescue of the 'Hope' prevented succour to the despairing swimmers.

The galleons, now separated at ebb tide from our ships by a spit of sand, could only fire across it, doing some damage to rigging, but none to the hulls. Meanwhile the flames from the burning vessels

1615 caught the mainmast of the 'Hope.' By heroic efforts she at length cast them off, and they drifted on to the shoals, burning to the water's edge. Jan. 20 One hard day's battle, January 20, 1615, taught the Portuguese that, if they were to capture our squadron, it must be by fair fighting with their larger ships, and that their mosquito swarm of 'frigates' had better keep out of range. They cost us but five men killed: while a Persian reported that the Portuguese sent 350 men ashore to be buried at Daman, and Downton reckoned their loss at 100 men slain besides those drowned. Next Jan. 22 day, the 22nd, the Portuguese endeavoured to patch up a truce with the native Governor of Surat, but he, seeing the change of fortune, turned a deaf ear.

The Portuguese then tried a blockade. Their rowed 'frigates' held the shallows and partially cut off supplies from the shore, while their great Jan.-Feb. galleons and galleys, with a fighting force many times the number of our whole crews, anchored outside the English. There our four vessels lay, one of them disabled, between the crowd of 'frigates' protected by shoals and the line of warships to seawards. Downton says it was only the impossibility of renewing the burned mainmast of the 'Hope' that prevented his trying his fortune against the Portuguese Viceroy in deep water. But each morning and evening he fired off a volley at the enemy, aiming his best cannon at the Viceroy's prow—'which I did to try his temper.' The capture of the English ships seemed, however, only a

question of time. After two weeks of constant watch and patient endurance, on February 3, 1615, writes Downton, 'it pleased God, this day, at night when I had least leisure to mourn, to call to his mercy my only son.' 'The volleys aforesaid appointed to try the temper of the Viceroy,' he sternly adds, 'served also to honour his burial.' 1615 Feb. 3

But the spectacle of a great armada not daring day after day to attack four small ships had its effect on the native Governor's mind, and the Portuguese Viceroy found that the English temper could better sustain a blockade than his own could prolong it. So on February 8, the great galleons, having received further reinforcements, at last came 'driving up with the flood' against us only to 'make away as fast as they might' from our guns. The next day, February 9, after a like attack and retreat (probably a feint), they sent two fire-ships down on our little squadron, in the night. But the frigates that towed them lost heavily under our guns, and hastily cast off the fire-ships, which passed us without harm. On February 10 another attempt with fire-ships and frigates failed. Meanwhile Downton, fearing that the galleons might land their troops and march on Surat, had so disposed his ships as to attack them if they tried to disembark their fighting men. Feb. 8 Feb. 9 Feb. 10

The Portuguese Viceroy reluctantly realised that he was outwitted in strategy and beaten in fighting. On February 11, 1615, his unwieldy galleons, which had been reduced to inaction Feb. 11

1615 through fear of the shallows, dropped down Feb. 13 southwards to the bar, and on February 13, 1615, the armada sailed away and was no more seen. Downton admits that throughout the long struggle he never saw men fight more bravely than the Portuguese. He himself had obtained supplies from shore by means of country boats, armed by the English factory at Surat—craft which eventually mounted two to six small pieces of cannon and, under the name of grabs or gallivats, became the nucleus of our Indian navy.

The Mughal Governor watched the progress of the fighting, and probably felt that Downton's strategy had saved Surat from a land-attack by the Portuguese. He now threw himself heartily on the side of the English, pitched his camp with great state on the shore close to our ships, and amid mutual congratulations and Homeric pledges exchanged his Eastern sword 'with hilt of massie gold,' wrote Downton, for his own less costly English side-arms. After friendly entreaties to delay his departure, Captain Downton sailed for Bantam Aug. 6 and there died on August 6, 1615; leaving a name never surpassed for endurance and skilful valour. He had established the supremacy of the English over the Portuguese on the Indian coast. Next year, 1616, Captain Keeling boldly entered into a treaty with the Zamorin of Calicut, to seize the neighbouring Portuguese settlements, and to hand one of them over to the English.[1]

It is not needful to follow step by step the

[1] Macpherson, p. 96 (1812).

decline of a gallant enemy.[1] If the Portuguese, unwillingly linked to the decaying Spanish monarchy, could no longer conquer, they knew how to die. In 1616 a great carrack, carrying an 1616
admiral's flag, fought four smaller English vessels for three days; replying to our summons to surrender that 'Don Meneses had promised his master the King of Spain not to quit his ship: out of which he might be forced, but never commanded.' During two nights he hung out a lantern to show his track to his enemies[2]; on the third the battered hull drove upon the rocks and was set fire to by the remnants of her crew.

But valour could not stay the cancer of misrule. The abuse of patronage which had shipped off young women from Lisbon with the gift of an Indian appointment as their dowry for a husband to be picked up at Goa,[3] reached its height after the forced union of Portugal with Spain in 1580. The sale of Indian offices was an illicit trade at the Court of Philip II.; under Philip III. of Spain it became a source of the public revenue. The Lisbon fleet of 1614 carried orders to the Goa Viceroy 'that all commands and high appointments that would be likely to yield money were to be put up to sale, there being then no other visible means whereby to provide for the wants of the administration.'[4] Old incumbents were ruthlessly

[1] For notices of our prizes and successful engagements before the capture of Ormuz in 1622 see *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617-1621, pars. 47, 127, 303, 344.

[2] Chaplain Terry's *Voyage to East India* (1616), p. 40, ed. 1655.

[3] *Ante*, p. 184.

[4] Danvers, ii. p. 173.

dispossessed, and were succeeded by men who clutched at everything, to repay the price of their unstable appointments. In 1637, and perhaps on other occasions, the auction included the
1618 command of fortresses. In 1618 two English ships took a Portuguese carrack with 517,500*l.* in specie, 'which was the pay of all the soldiers in the East Indies.'[1] The Spanish kings began to look upon the East Indies as a mere drain to their silver supply from America, and the stories of their indifference to Portuguese interests in Asia border on the incredible. During the three years that
1619–1622 Fernão de Albuquerque was Viceroy at Goa, 1619–1622, he is said to have not received a single letter of instruction or information from the Court of Spain.[2]

Yet in this very viceroyalty a catastrophe had taken place which might have stung even Spain into a spasm of remorseful energy. Ormuz, the pearl of Portuguese Asia, fell to the English. During the century since Albuquerque captured the island in 1515, the Portuguese had dealt with it as their own, and dominated from its fortress the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Of the treaties by which they bound the princes of Ormuz I have already spoken.[3] On the death of a king of Ormuz, says a Venetian traveller, Cesare de' Federici, *circ.* 1565, 'the captain of the Portugals chooseth

[1] '2,300,000 ryals of eight' at 4*s.* 6*d.* *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 344.

[2] Macpherson, *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 34 (1812). I correct the name and dates from Da Fonseca's *Goa*, p. 91.

[3] *Ante*, pp. 145–6.

another of the blood-royal,' and 'sweareth him to be true' 'to the King of Portugal as his Lord and Governor.' Their oppressions and piracies had led the Shah of Persia to appeal for help to France in 1603, and seven years later to England. In 1618 a trade was opened between our agents at Surat and the port of Jask, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and in 1620 James I. addressed 1620
a letter to Shah Abbas with a view to obtaining a factory on shore. The Portuguese opposed our ships as usual with a greatly superior force, and in November 1620 the English gained a victory which made them a recognised power in the Persian Gulf.

The Persian Governor determined to use us against the general oppressor—the Portuguese—and in 1621 refused to allow our ships to embark 1621
their cargoes until we agreed to join with him in an attack on Ormuz. The blow was delivered early in the following year.[1] Five ships and four pinnaces of the English Company defeated the Portuguese fleet in the Persian Gulf, and in concert with a Persian land-force captured Ormuz. On April 27, 1622, the 2,500 survivors of the Portu- 1622
guese garrison were shipped off to Goa in vessels compassionately given by the English, who with difficulty protected them from the vengeance of

[1] The contemporary sources are the journal of Edward Monnox, our agent in Persia; his *History at large of the taking of Ormuz Castle*, printed by Purchas, ii. p. 1793 ff.; and his examination before a Committee of the East India Company, *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622-1624, pars. 304, 305, 639.

the natives. In spite of our efforts, the unfortunate men were stripped and maltreated by the Persians.[1] Shah Abbas rewarded the English by a settlement at Gombroon, on the mainland of Persia, and by a patent for half the customs duties, the first of those revenue grants which were to end in the transfer of great Indian provinces to British administration.[2]

Thus went down the power of Portugal in 1622 in the Persian Gulf, as it had gone down before
1612–1615 the English in 1612 and 1615 on the Indian coast. In the last years of her proud nationality, Portugal had divided her Asiatic Empire into three Governments (1571) : the coast of East Africa, India with the Persian Gulf from Cape Guardafui to Ceylon, and the Eastern Archipelago with its headquarters at Malacca. Nine years later (1580) she was forced into union with Spain, and within a generation a new power from the North had broken her chain of Asiatic possessions at the middle link. Her two other Governments on the African coast and in the Eastern Archipelago, thus thrust asunder, became
1622 an easy prey. From 1622, India and the Persian Gulf lay open to England so far as Portugal was concerned. Before Portugal could break loose from Spain and reassert her independence in 1640, her supremacy in the Asiatic seas had become a legend of the past. In 1642[3] she partially, and in 1654

[1] Low's *History of the Indian Navy*, vol. i. pp. 34–42.

[2] Macpherson, pp. 106–107.

[3] Treaty of $\frac{19}{29}$ January, 1642, between Charles I. of England and John IV. of Portugal.

she finally, accepted the situation, and agreed that the English should have the right to reside and trade in all her eastern possessions.[1]

[1] As the treaty of 1654 marks the end of the old Portuguese monopoly and formulated the new policy to England in the East, I summarise its Indian section from J. Dumont's *Corps Universel Diplomatique*, Amsterdam, 1728, vol. vi. part ii. p. 83. Treaty of peace and alliance between Oliver Cromwell and John IV., King of Portugal, made at Westminster, 10 July, 1654. 'Uti populus & Incolae Reipubl. Angliae libere possint navigare in colonias, Insulas, Regiones, Portus, Districtus, Oppida, Pagos & Emporia ad Regem Portugalliae pertinentia in India Orientali, Guinea & Insula St. Thomae, & alicubi in Oris et Litoribus, atque inibi commorari, negotiari, & commercium exercere . . . in Bonis & Mercimoniis quibuscunque.'

CHAPTER IX

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND THE DUTCH FOR THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO, 1601–1623

OUR real struggle for the Indian trade was to be with a very different rival. The decline of Spain and Portugal left the two Protestant sea-powers of the North face to face in the Asiatic seas. Holland entered on the contest in the patriotic flush of achieved independence; and with the same newly born sense of national unity which nerved Portugal for her heroic explorations two hundred years before. England had left behind her the spacious age of Elizabeth; before her stretched the crooked diplomacy and domestic disorders of a dynasty which could never become English at heart, and which had in the end to be cast forth. Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century the States-General played the leading maritime part in Europe, as the Portuguese House of Aviz had played it in the first half of the sixteenth.

The magnificent position which Holland thus won, she merited by her services to mankind. It is scarcely too much to say that the political reformation of Europe dates from the Dutch
1581 Declaration of Independence in 1581. Then for the first time was asserted and enforced the principle that governments exist for nations, not nations for governments, as no abstract dogma, but as a truth for which a whole people was willing to die.

The vigour which achieved the liberty of Holland pulsed through every vein of her internal and external life. Amsterdam, the city of refuge from Parma's havoc at Antwerp, became the European emporium of Indian commerce, richer and more powerful by far than Venice, Genoa, or Lisbon in their prime. Her manufactures were improved and her financial strength increased by the Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition; and who gave to Amsterdam alike the genius of Spinoza and the diamond-cutting industry which centres there to this day. Dutch navigators put a girdle of discovery and colonisation round the globe from New Holland, now Australia, to the New Amsterdam, now New York. Dutch agriculture, by transferring the potato and turnip from the garden to the field, created a new winter food for men and cattle.[1] This change made possible the growth of population in modern Europe, feeding threefold the inhabitants off areas which had barely supported one-third in frequent peril of famine, and contributing more than any other cause to banish leprosy from Christendom. At the same time the Dutch leapt forward to the front rank of intellectual activity. Holland became the printing house of Europe. Her thinkers were the oracles of their age, her painters have left an imperishable influence on art. Leyden was more famous for a time than Oxford or Paris, and it is still a tradition of the Scottish Bar to complete a legal education at the great Dutch University.

[1] Professor Thorold Rogers' *Holland*, p. 217 (ed. 1889).

The outburst of national energy found its chief vent on the sea. The Indian voyage of De
1595 Houtman in 1595 fired the popular enthusiasm, and while the London merchants were awaiting the changing moods of Elizabeth, or extracting subscriptions for a single expedition, no fewer than
1595-1601 fifteen fleets sailed between 1595 and 1601 from Holland to the East. This period of 'separate' Dutch voyages is so little realised by English historians, yet forms so essential a part of the Dutch precedent closely followed by the English Company, that I give their details below.[1] Of the

[1] THE FIFTEEN SEPARATE VOYAGES OF THE DUTCH TO THE INDIES, 1595-1601.

Number of Voyages	Names of Commanders	Names of the Separate Companies	Number of Vessels	Date of Departure	Date of Return
1	Houtman	Compagnie van Verre, Amsterdam	4	April 2, 1595	April 14, 1597
2	Jakob Corneliszoon van Neck	Oude Compagnie, Amsterdam	8	May 1, 1598	July 19, 1599; May 19, 1600; Sept. 1600
3	Houtman	Moucheron, Veere	2	Mar. 15, 1598	July 29, 1600
4	Gerard Leroy and Laurens Bikker	Compagnie van Middelburg	3	1598	1600
5	Jacques Mahu and Simon de Cordes	J. van der Veken & Cie, Rotterdam	5	June 27, 1598	—
6	Olivier van Noort	Rotterdam	4	July 2, 1598	Aug. 12, 1601
7	Steven van der Hagen	Oude Compagnie, Amsterdam	3	April 26, 1599	July 1601
8	Pieter Both van Amersfoort	Nieuwe Brabantsche Compagnie, Amsterdam	4	Dec. 21, 1599	1601
9	Jakob Wilkens	Oude Compagnie, Amsterdam	4	Dec. 21, 1599	1601
10	Van Neck	Oude Compagnie, Amsterdam	6	June 28, 1600	July 15, 1602, 1603, 1604
11	Guljam Seneschal	Nieuwe Brabantsche Compagnie, Amsterdam	2	June 28, 1600	1601
12	Cornelis Bastiaanszoon	Compagnie van Middelburg	4	Jan. 28, 1601	July 6, 1602
13	Jakob van Heemskerck	Vereenigde Hollandsche Compagnie, Amsterdam	8	April 23, 1601	May, 1603, 1602, 1604
14	Wolphert Harmenszoon	Vereenigde Hollandsche Compagnie, Amsterdam	5	April 23, 1601	March 1603
15	Joris Spilbergh	Moucheron, Veere	3	May 5, 1601	1604
			65		

From *Les Premiers Voyages des Néerlandais dans l'Insulinde* (1595-1602) par Prince Roland Bonaparte (Versailles, 1884).

sixty-five ships sent from Holland in the six years from April 1595 to May 1601, Amsterdam supplied by far the larger number, Zeeland with Middelburg as its centre came next, and the merchants of minor States competed with companies of their own.

The Dutch Government sagaciously foresaw 1602
the dangers to which separate expeditions might give rise in distant and hostile seas: that opposition of interests among rival groups of adventurers of the same nation, and that weakness in the face of a common enemy, to which the English system of 'separate voyages' subsequently succumbed. On March 20, 1602, as we have seen, it united the Indian Companies in the several States into one Joint Stock Association under the title of the United East India Company,[1] with an exclusive monopoly of the Indian trade for twenty-one years, dating from January 1, 1602.

The combination was compulsory, as any
company which refused to join would be *ipso facto* 1602
shut out from the Indian trade. On the other hand, the Dutch Government behaved liberally to the separate organisations, and took over their

[1] *Vereenighde Oost-Indische Compagnie* in the Charter of 1602; *Nederlandsche Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie* or *Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde O. I. Compagnie* in the title and body of the Instructions to the Gouverneur Generaal in 1632; *Generale Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde O. I. Compagnie*, in documents of 1650. Prince Roland Bonaparte gives it as 'De Algemeene Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie,' in his *Les Premiers Voyages des Néerlandais dans l'Insulinde*, p. 38 (Versailles, 1884). The initials of the Dutch Company, V.O.I.C., were from the first the exact counterpart of the U.E.I.C., adopted by the English United East India Company of the eighteenth century.

directors for life into the joint Directorate of the United Company. In this way the number of Directors of the United Company, although fixed in permanence under the Charter at sixty, was at first seventy-three.[1]

[1] The contemporary materials which I have used for the Dutch transactions in the East are (1) The MS. 'Java Book' in the India Office, being *A Statement of the States and Princes in the Eastern Seas with whom the Dutch appear at any time to have had connection, showing the nature and extent of that connection.* Compiled from the records at Batavia by a Committee appointed for that purpose during the British occupation of Java, and transmitted to the Court of Directors in 1818. Also the lately re-discovered Java Series of MSS. (2) The extracts from the Records at The Hague made by order of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, with the courteous permission of the Dutch authorities, and under the direction of Mr. F. C. Danvers, Registrar and Superintendent of Records at the India Office. I invariably quote from the authorised MS. translation of these extracts in the India Office. (3) The English Company's *Court Minutes*, *First Letter Book*, and *Letters Received from the East.* 4) Contemporary Voyages. (5) Among printed books of primary importance are *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië*, by Jhr. J. K. J. de Jonge, 11 volumes, Amsterdam, 1864–83, a monumental work from the unpublished Dutch Archives by a historian of the first class, whose death has been a loss not to Holland alone but to Europe and Asia. *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Bezittingen*, by J. J. Meinsma, one vol. Delft, 1872. *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der administrativen, rechtlichen und finanziellen Entwicklung der Niederländisch-Ostindischen Compagnie*, by G. C. Klerk de Reus, Batavia and The Hague, 1894. *Verzameling van Instructien, Ordonnancien en Reglementen voor de regering van Nederlandsch Indië, vastgesteld in de jaren* 1609, 1617, 1632, 1650, 1807, 1815, 1818, 1827, 1830, *en* 1836, *met de ontwerpen der Staats Commissie van* 1803, *en Historische Aanteekeningen*, edited by Mr. P. Mijer, one vol. Batavia, 1848. *Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel*, by Professor P. A. Tiele, continued by Professor J. E. Heeres, 's Gravenhage, 1886, in progress. *Histoire des Provinces-Unies des Païs-Bas, depuis le parfait Etablissement de cet Etat par la paix de Munster*, par M.

In a similar spirit the joint directorate was divided into six chambers, representing the six subscribing States in proportion to the amount which they severally contributed to the common capital.[1] This representative principle was carried still further in the executive Committee of Seventeen entrusted with the management of the United Company's expeditions. Sixteen of its members were taken from the six subscribing provincial centres in direct ratio to their contributions, while the seventeenth was appointed by the minor States in succession.[2] 1602

The Government had close relations with the personnel of the directorate. Reports were made to the States-General; accounts were to be sub-

Abraham de Wicquefort, Conseiller et Résident de L.A.S. les Princes de Brunswic-Lunébourg, publiée au nom de la Société d'Histoire à Utrecht par M. L. Ed. Lenting, Amsterdam, 1861. *Saken van Staet en Oorlogh*, beschreven door Jhr. L. van Aitzema, 's Graven-Hage, 1669. The Abbé Raynal's *Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Etablissemens et du Commerce dans les deux Indes*, 10 volumes, Geneva, 1782, is a good example of eighteenth-century work. But, as an authority, it must rather rank among the French abridgments mentioned *ante*, p. 239, than among the original Dutch histories. For the biographical aspects of Dutch discovery I have chiefly relied on A. J. van der Aa's monumental *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden* (21 volumes, Haarlem, 1852–78), and J. P. I. Du Bois' *Vies des Gouverneurs Généraux, avec l'Abrégé de l'Histoire des Etablissemens Hollandois aux Indes Orientales* (La Haye, 1763). But François Valentyn's *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien* (5 volumes, Dordrecht, 1724), and the *Chroniick van Hoorn* of Theodorus Velius (third ed. 4to. Hoorn, 1648), and other contemporary writers should be consulted by those who desire to realise the life-work of the Dutch navigators and founders of the power of Holland in the East.

[1] *Tabular View of the Constitution of the Dutch East India Company of* 1602, compiled from Klerk de Reus. According to

[2] See note [1] on next page.

1602 mitted to them; they supervised the Company's instructions to its servants; and they left in the hands of the Company until 1638 a sum of 25,000 florins (£2,000) due for the Charter of 1602.[2] The Council of Seventeen was, in fact, a sort of elected Board of Control, intermediate between the Dutch Company and the States-General, somewhat, although by no means exactly, like the Board of Control established nearly two centuries later between the English East India Company and Parliament.

The qualification for a director in the four leading Chambers was £500 and £250 in the two minor ones.[3] The Directors and their staff were to be

Meinsma (pp. 27, 28), the subscriptions of the six States amounted to Fl.6,475,000, making, if we add the Fl.25,000 for the charter, a round sum of Fl.6,500,000.

Names of State or Chamber [1]	Amount of Subscription [1]	Original number of Directors taken over [2]	Permanent number of Directors assigned to the Chamber [2]
	Fl.[3]		
1. Amsterdam	3,674,915	23	20
2. Zeeland	1,300,405	14	12
3. Delft	469,400	12	7
4. Rotterdam	173,000	9	7
5. Hoorn	266,868	4	7
6. Enkhuizen	540,000	11	7
Invested by the State (Klerk de Reus, p. 176)	6,424,588 25,000	—	—
Total £537,465.	6,449,588	73	60

[1] Klerk de Reus, pp. 175–6. [2] Klerk de Reus, p. 8. [3] Florins=1*s.* 8*d.*

[1] *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Bezittingen*, door J. J. Meinsma, p. 26 (Delft, 1872). [This is note [2] of p. 337.]

[2] According to Klerk de Reus, p. 176; the sum payable for the charter was Fl. 150,000 according to Meinsma, p. 27.

[3] In Amsterdam, Zeeland (in-

munerated by 1 per cent. on the cargoes. A neral reckoning was to be made every ten years, which periods shareholders might reclaim their subscriptions and withdraw.[1] The shares were ordinary ones of £250 each, and 'head-participant' shares of £500. The subscription was thrown open to the whole population of Holland. But practically the first expedition in 1602 consisted of the ships belonging to the previous separate companies, and taken over from them by the United Dutch Company. 1602

So high rose the tide of national enthusiasm that even ruined Antwerp, bleeding and mangled in the claws of Spain, found money for shares. Her clandestine subscriptions, through agents at Amsterdam and Middelburg, roused the wrath of her oppressors, and an Antwerp merchant was condemned to life-long imprisonment for this offence.[2] The great Company, with its capital of, say, £540,000, and with ample powers of conquest or attack vested in it by the State, was recognised by friend and foe as a new national force. It marks, in truth, the final development of that policy of sea-war by sea-trade with which Holland had first confronted, and was now about to beat down, Spain. 1602 1602

The States-General perfectly understood that there could be no peace between the two nations. It was not only a question of the sullen Spanish

ıding Middelburg), Delft and Rotterdam, 6,000 florins. In Hoorn and Enkhuizen, 3,000 florins.

[1] I again follow Meinsma.

[2] *Idem*, p. 27.

1602 pride, and of the long slaughter of Protestant saints and patriots in sacked towns and on bloody fields. It was also the spectral procession of those 100,000 judicial murders of peaceful men and women by fire and torture and burying alive, before the country rose in its despair,[1] that compelled every act of Holland to be an act of war against Spain. The United East India Company was the instrument by which the Dutch were to compel the oppressor first to an unwilling truce, and finally to let them go.

That magnificent achievement belongs to European history, and I here venture only to note a few of the first landmarks which it left behind in Asia. In 1602 the fleet of the Dutch Company routed the Portuguese near Bantam, and laid open for ever the road to the Moluccas or Spice Islands. From that date the ascendency of the Dutch in the Eastern seas, although subject to occasional checks, was only a question of time.

In 1603 they threatened Goa, the middle
1603 capital of the Indo-Portuguese route, and in 1606 blockaded its western terminus by carrying the
1606 war into the estuary of the Tagus itself. They shut up that river by a great expedition,[2] to which the Dutch East India Company largely contributed,
1607 and in April 1607 they totally destroyed the Spanish fleet in Gibraltar Bay. In the furthermost East, the Dutch wrenched the fairest isles of

[1] Hugo Grotius, *Annales et Historiae de Rebus Belgicis*, lib. i. p. 12 (Amsterdam, 1657).

[2] Grotius, *De Rebus Belgicis*, lib. xv. p. 480 (Ed. 1657).

the Moluccas from the Portuguese, and although 1602 to 1658
partially expelled for a time, they returned in force, gradually completed the conquest, and ousted the Portuguese trade even in Japan.

The exclusive possession of the Spice Islands became a fixed point in the Dutch policy. The instructions to their first Governor-General, Pieter Both (1609–1614), were that, 'The commerce of the Moluccas, Amboyna and Banda should belong to the Company, and that no other nation in the world should have the least part.' Throughout their long negotiations with England, they never yielded their sovereign rights in the Spice Islands.

Having thus struck at Spain at the two extremities of her Indo-Portuguese trade, Lisbon and the Moluccas, the Dutch proceeded deliberately to establish themselves at vantage-posts along the line of communication. Into the military operations of the next half-century space precludes me from entering. Five dates[1] must suffice to mark the further Dutch conquest of the Indian trade route. Having made themselves a power in Java, midway between the Malay Straits and the Moluccas, they fixed their capital at Batavia on its northern coast, in 1619. In 1641 they captured Malacca from the Portuguese, and thus turned the Straits into a Dutch water-way. From 1638 onwards they expelled the Portuguese from Ceylon, driving them from their last stronghold in 1658. They took possession of the great half-way house

[1] Each date, it should be remembered, is only the decisive one in a series of operations.

of Indo-European commerce, the Cape of Good
1652 Hope, and settled a colony there in 1652. When Portugal emerged, in 1640, from her sixty years' captivity to Spain, she found that her power in the
1641 Eastern seas had passed to the Dutch. In 1641 she surrendered for ever her exclusive claims to the spice trade by a treaty with Holland, on the basis of the Dutch retaining their conquests, and of free navigation and trade to both Powers in the Eastern seas.[1]

Holland's conquest of the Indian Archipelago was, in truth, a conquest by treaty not less than by war. Always ready to fight, she regarded fighting chiefly as an instrument of trade. Her object was not, as Portugal's had been, to take vengeance on the '*nefandissimi Machometi secta*'[2] for the loss of the Holy Places in Palestine, or to swell the pride of a Royal House by new Asiatic titles, and to bring the kingdoms of the East within the Christian fold, but by establishing a sufficient degree of sovereignty over the islands to prevent them from selling their spices to any European nation but herself. Where she found a stringent supremacy needful she established it; where a less control sufficed, she was at first willing to leave the princes and peoples very much to themselves. The whole process is laid bare in the documents copied for the English East India Company during our

[1] Clause vii. of the Dutch-Portuguese treaty of 12th June, 1641, proclaimed at Batavia in October 1642. I thank Dr. W. R. Bisschop of London and Leyden University for the text of this instrument.

[2] Bull of Nicholas V. 8th January, 1454. *Editio Taurinensis*, tom. v.

occupation of Java (1811–1818), and now preserved in the India Office.[1]

I propose, as in my sketch of the Portuguese policy in Asia, to briefly exhibit from the manuscript records the methods, rather than the military operations, by which the Dutch built up their supremacy in the Eastern Seas. So far as it is possible to generalise, the Dutch kept three points steadily in view. First, the sovereign authority of Holland must be acknowledged by the island-chiefs. This was asserted sometimes as the result of conquest, but frequently in the form of a protectorate, the native princes consenting to hold their territories as a kind of fief under the Dutch suzerainty. Second, all other European nations, and especially England, were to be excluded from the island trade; and in many cases specific engagements were entered into for war against Portugal and Spain. Third, as the Dutch tightened their grasp on the Archipelago, they adopted more drastic provisions for the maintenance of their monopoly.[2] The natives were forbidden to sail beyond certain limits from their respective coasts, under pain of piracy; they were prohibited from trading with Indian or other Asiatic ports; and they were compelled to


[1] *Statement of the States and Princes*, &c. MS. Java Book, India Office. *Vide ante*, p. 336, footnote.

[2] How all-embracing that monopoly was may be seen from the following list of articles in which the Dutch factories claimed the exclusive right to deal: Amber, bird's-nests, cassia lignum, sapanwood, cloths, camphor, benzoni, cloves, diamonds, gold, opium, pepper, mace, mother o' pearl, nutmegs, sago, slaves, tin, tortoise-shell, wax. Java Book, p. 4. India Office MSS.

root up their spice trees in islands which competed with the produce of the Dutch settlements. Stipulations were sometimes introduced to permit the introduction of the Reformed Religion.

A few examples must suffice to illustrate these general principles of policy. The arena was that great island-world, perhaps the mountain tops and plateaux of a submerged continent, which stretches from the shores of Asia to the Australian coast. An almost continuous belt of long islands (Sumatra, Java, Flores and Timor, &c.) curves south-eastwards from the Malay Peninsula to the north-west point of Australia. Within this belt, on the north, lie Borneo; Celebes to the east of Borneo; the Moluccas or Spice Islands, including Ternate and Tidore; with the valuable Nutmeg and Clove Isles, Banda, Amboyna, Pulaway, Pularoon and Rosengyn among them to the south; and finally New Guinea at the easternmost extremity. The Philippines stretch in elongated broken masses northward from the Spice Islands towards Formosa, China and Japan.

The Dutch resolved to make themselves masters both of the outer or southern belt of long islands and of the rich spice-archipelago which they girt in. A glance at the map will show that the first strategic point on the outer belt is Achin, on the north-western point of Sumatra, commanding the entrance to the narrow sea between that island and the Malay Peninsula. The King of Achin claimed a disputed supremacy
1600 over all Sumatra, and in 1600 the Dutch entered


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THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO
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For Sir William Wilson Hunter's
History of British India
1899
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COCHIN CHINA
CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MAGENDANAO
Tenasserim
Pulo Condore
Nicobar Islands
Junk Ceylon
Ligor
Patani
Queda
STRAITS OF MALACCA
Atchin
MALAY PENA
SUMATRA
Malacca
Johore
Borneo
BORNEO
MOLUCCAS
Manado
Ternate
Tidor
Passaman
Priaman
Padang
Indragiri
Indrapore
Jambi
Palembang
Banca
Billiton
Sucadana
Banjarmassan
CELEBES
Amboyna
Banda Is.
Bencoolen
Silebar
Ft York
Macassar
Bantam
Batavia (Jaccatra)
Japara
Madura
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Lumbock
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into a treaty with him for a resident factory.[1] 1600
The relations were gradually strengthened into an armed alliance against the Portuguese, whose Eastern capital, Malacca, dominated the opposite coast. When the Dutch grew strong and the Achin Raja, fearing the results of their success, began to give trouble, he found his dependent chiefdoms and islets had themselves entered into separate engagements with Holland acknowledging her sovereignty, and securing to her the privileges of exclusive trade. From the year 1688 onwards, 1688
and even before that date, the Dutch treaties with the Sumatra minor chiefs pledge them to hostility against the King of Achin.

On the opposite coast of the Malay Peninsula the Dutch took even more effective measures. The keys to the passage on the northern side were Portuguese Malacca, about two-thirds down the Straits, and the native kingdom of Johor, at their exit near the eastern point of the Malay Peninsula. In the early days of the Dutch Company Malacca, the Eastern capital of Portuguese Asia, could defy any Protestant fleet unless aided by a native land power. So in 1606 the Dutch made a compact 1606
with Johor to seize Malacca; Holland to keep the town and fortress, Johor to have the adjacent territory, and all captured property to be divided between them.[2] From this time onward the Dutch could attack Malacca with the help of the Achin fleet from Sumatra on the north-west and of

[1] Treaty of December 1600. Java Records. India Office MSS.

[2] Treaty of 17th May, 1606. Java Records. India Office MSS.

the Johor levies from the east. It was only their unstable relations with these native States that deferred the final fall of the Portuguese head
1641 quarters in the Far East to Holland in 1641. In that year the country around Malacca also abjured its allegiance to Portugal and promised fidelity to the Dutch.[1]

Of scarcely less importance than the Malacca passage between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, which thus came into Dutch keeping, were the Straits of Sunda between Sumatra and Java. This narrow opening formed an alternative entrance through the belt of long islands into the Archipelago, and the Dutch Company resolved to secure the command of it. Bantam, on the north-western point of Java, dominated its exit into the inner sea of islands. Even before the United Company's first voyage, the 'separate' Dutch commanders had made a compact with the Raja of Bantam for 'mutual honest trade,' and the subsequent treaties with Bantam fill many pages of the India Office records.[2]

1609 In 1609, by an engagement known as the 'Eternal Treaty,' the Dutch agreed to aid the Bantam Raja against foreign enemies, particularly the Spanish and Portuguese, and his State slowly passed into a dependency of Holland. The Dutch perceived, however, that the mouth of the Jacatra river, with its spacious bay, a little to the east of

[1] *Java Book*, condensed. India Office MSS.

[2] Treaties of 3rd July, 1596, down to 1782. Java Records. India Office MSS.

Bantam, afforded superior convenience for shipping. In 1612 a treaty secured free trade to the Dutch 1612 at Jacatra, and after a scuffle with the English, the Dutch destroyed the old Javanese town, rebuilt it under the name of Batavia, and made it their headquarters in the East (1619). 1619

The clearness of vision which led them to secure the two main inlets into the Archipelago (the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Sunda) also guided the Dutch to the best sites in the enclosed island world. The positions which they took up were either strong for war or rich in trade, and eventually passed into the Dutch power by conquest from the Portuguese or by treaties enforced on the native chiefs. The atrocities of Spanish-Portuguese rule made the islanders welcome the new comers, who promised to help them against the common oppressor. Almost everywhere we find a defensive alliance with the natives against the Portuguese become the basis of the Dutch power. Thus at Ternate, the chief seat of trade in the Moluccas or Spice Islands, the Sultan entered into a treaty with the Dutch Admiral in 1607 for protection against a Spanish-Portuguese 1607 armada. The right to build and to destroy forts followed. The uprooting of the clove trees which might compete with the Dutch at Amboyna came in due course; and in 1649 the Sultan appointed 1649 the Dutch Governor as his Viceroy over his chief island dependencies.[1]

[1] Treaties of June, 1607, 3rd May, 1649, &c. Java Records. India Office MSS.

One other example must suffice. Amboyna, the richest clove island of the southern Moluccas, had been visited by the Dutch 'separate' expeditions, and entered into a trade arrangement. In
1600 1600 this friendly relation was strengthened into a compact for the expulsion of the Portuguese and
1605 the erection of a Dutch castle.[1] In 1605 the chiefs acknowledged the sovereignty of Holland, in return for a guarantee of protection against Portugal and Spain. They agreed to aid the Dutch in their wars and to sell their cloves to no other nation.[2] As the Dutch drew tighter their bonds on the Moluccas, Amboyna, like its suzerain island, Ternate,
1618 grew restive. But in 1618 the Dutch finally established their supremacy at Amboyna, and secured by treaties the exclusive trade, the free exercise of the Reformed Religion, and the right to demand
1628 forced labour.[3] In 1628 they took advantage of a dispute in the family of the Ternate Raja to shake off his suzerain claims to the customs duties at Amboyna, and to declare themselves masters of the island by virtue of conquest from the Portuguese in 1605.

The harsher measures of the Dutch in the Archipelago belong, generally, to a period subsequent to 1623. It was not till a much later date that they fully developed their system of confining the islanders on pain of piracy to their own or adjacent

[1] Treaty of September 1600. India Office MSS.

[2] Treaty of 9th August, 1605 (said to have been renewed in 1609). Java Records. India Office MSS.

[3] Treaties of the 19th November, 1618, 1st July, 1620. Java Records. India Office MSS.

coasts, forbad their sending or receiving embassies to or from India and the Asiatic continent, and enforced a tribute in 'full-grown slaves.'[1] In the early years of the seventeenth century the Dutch really were what they declared themselves to be, the deliverers of the islands from Portuguese oppression. In return for their protection they demanded the exclusive trade, and such subsidiary guarantees as they deemed needful to secure it.

The growing rivalry of the English put an end to this state of comparative calm. On the one hand, the Dutch claimed the monopoly of the richest of the Spice Islands on the threefold ground of priority of occupation, services rendered to the natives against the Portuguese, and treaties which at once defined and secured their rights. On the other hand, the English asserted the still earlier arrival of Drake's ship in 1579, denied that 1579
the isolated coast castles of the Dutch amounted to effective occupation of a great archipelago, and claimed an equal right with the Dutch to make treaties with the native Powers.

The English claim founded on Drake's priority of discovery could not be pressed in serious diplomacy, as it told against our general contention that a title to territory could only be maintained on the ground of actual possession, or effective occupation. But it long served as a national rallying cry. In 1606 Sir Henry Middleton as- 1606

[1] See for example the treaties with the Island of Sumbawa, 1669, 1673, 1674-5, 1701, 1765. Java Records, p. 237. India Office MSS.

serted our right to a factory in the Moluccas, 'for that Sir Francis Drake had trade in Ternate before the name of the Hollanders was known in those parts of the world.'[1] As late as 1652 it formed a basis of a discourse, the *East India Trade first discovered by the English*, in which the author gravely relates how the Dutch 'took the advantage of the negligent and inconsiderate English' to secure the profits of Drake's discovery.[2] This popular plea, although put forward in official documents,[3] cannot be accepted by an honest historian. But it explains that sense of having been overreached which embittered English feeling to the Dutch.

The situation was in fact incompatible with peace. Yet Holland and England were in Europe, not only at peace, but the joint champions of a great religious cause. Nor could either country at once forget that but for Elizabeth's coldness to the Dutch overtures, the English Queen might have been the sovereign of the united nations. On the
1602 arrival of the English ships in the East, 1602, the commanders of the two Protestant fleets joined against the Portuguese; and, as we saw, the plunder of a Portugal ship supplied the return cargo for the first voyage of the London Company. But the Dutch quickly perceived that the English

[1] *The Last East Indian Voyage*, London 1606.

[2] *Strange News from the Indies*, by J. D. Discourse, p. 1, ff. London, 1652.

[3] Petition of the Company to the Lord High Treasurer of England, November 1611. *First Letter Book*, p. 429.

were both weak and inconvenient neighbours in the Archipelago.

Each English voyage worked with a small capital, and raised the local prices by eagerness to secure a freight. The Dutch abstained for a time from hostilities, yet strove to frighten the natives from dealing with the newcomers by representing them as buccaneers. When the island chiefs found that the English, instead of making piratical descents, came with money in their hands, and parted with it more freely than the Dutch, this device failed. The Dutch next tried bribery, and in 1603 were said to have offered 12,000 dollars to 1603
the natives of Pularoon if they would not trade with the English.[1] The death of Elizabeth in 1603, and King James's treaty with Spain and Portugal in the following year, broke the tradition of Dutch and English friendship based on the joint championship of the Protestant cause. Scruples of sentiment or of religion disappeared, and commercial rivalry became the permanent factor in the relations of England and Holland.

It is not needful to dwell on the early phases of the struggle which ensued. The English Company was the weakling child of the old age of Elizabeth and of the shifty policy of King James: the Dutch Company was the strong outgrowth of the life and death struggle of a new nation with its Spanish oppressors. The English Company began with slender resources in 1601 the system of 'separate voyages,' which the Dutch Company,

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, par. 325.

after a trial of that method on a great scale since 1595, deliberately abandoned in 1602 for the joint system of a United Company with vast capital—the joint system which the English only adopted after eleven years of painful experience in 1612, and even then in a less stable form.

Yet the English boldly stood forth to the natives not only as rivals but as opponents of the Dutch.
1605 In 1605 the King of Tidore, in the Spice Islands, appealed to King James for help against the Hollanders, on the ground that his Majesty was in friendship with Spain.[1] The King of Ternate, hard by, inquired after the health of the 'great Captain Francis Drake,' whose return 'we have daily expected,' and complained that the Dutch, having driven out the Portuguese, prevent him from granting a factory to the English.[2] The King of Bantam in Java rejoiced that 'now England and Bantam are both as one.'[3] From Achin in Sumatra,[4] commanding the western gateway of the Archipelago, to the Spice Islands in its furthest east, the Dutch found themselves encountered by a new set of competing, and sometimes hostile, compacts between the native princes and the English Company.

We even went so far as to try to provide an English wife for the King of Sumatra. That potentate having expressed a wish for such a consort, 'a gentleman of honourable parentage'

[1] *First Letter Book of the East India Company* (Birdwood and Foster, 1893), p. 67.

[2] *Idem*, p. 68.

[3] *Idem*, p. 68.

[4] *Idem*, p. 67.

proposed at a Court meeting of the Company in 1614, 'his daughter of most excellent parts for 1614
music, her needle and good discourse, as also very beautiful and personable.' The probable benefit to the Company was gravely debated, 'and the lawfulness of the enterprise proved by Scripture.' But some feared that the other wives 'may poison her if she became an extraordinary favourite.'[1] The father was willing to take the risk, but we do not hear that the lady went out. Yet the bare suggestion must have seemed alarming to the Dutch.

Nor did the English diplomacy in Europe tend to soothe the rivalry in the Asiatic seas. Holland quickly valued at its real worth the lip-friendship of King James. During the Dutch efforts for a settlement with Spain, England was detached from the Protestant cause by the bait of a Spanish marriage, and of the Netherlands as a prospective dowry of the Infanta after the death of the childless Archduke. Holland, thus deserted, saw her hoped-for peace with Spain dwindle to the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609, leaving the menace of a 1609
Spanish war on its expiry, and a resentment against England for a century to come.

The Dutch in the East took prompt measures to deal with the situation. If England proved so faint a friend in Europe, the Archipelago was to become a place of little ease for the English Company. Scarcely had the Spanish truce of 1609 given Holland a breathing-pause, than she resolved to

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, pars. 789, 812.

1609 consolidate her Asiatic settlements under a firm local control. The Council of Seventeen nominated a man of great ability to the charge of the Company's factories, and in November 1609 [1] the States-General commissioned him with extensive powers as the first Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies. Pieter Both [2] justified their confidence. He had proved his capacity as admiral of the Brabant Company's expedition in 1599-1601, and his initial duty in his new high office was to take an oath of fidelity of the Dutch servants in the East to the States-General and the United Company.

1610 He sailed as Governor-General with a fleet of eight ships in January 1610, and after months of storm arrived at Bantam in January 1611. During
1611-1614 the next four years he brought the islands within a network of treaties. He thus confirmed from Java to the Moluccas the supremacy and exclusive trade of the Dutch; procured, when expedient, the toleration of the Protestant religion; and laid the

[1] 'Instructions for Pieter Both, Governor and General, and those of the Council of India,' &c., given under the order of the Assembly of Representatives of the East India Company on the 14th November, 1609, and approved by the States-General on the 26th November, 1609. *Verzameling van Instructien, Ordonnancien en Reglementen voor de regering van Nederlandsch Indië*, from 1609 to 1636, by P. Mijer, pp. 1–22 (Batavia, 1848). It will thus be observed that the appointment of the Dutch Governor-General rested from the first on what we may call a Parliamentary basis as contrasted with the royal charters of Elizabeth and our Stuart Kings.

[2] For the life of this distinguished man see A. J. van der Aa's *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden* (21 vols., Haarlem, 1852–78); and *Vies des Gouverneurs Généraux, avec l'Abrégé de l'Histoire des Etablissemens Hollandois aux Indes Orientales*, par J. P. I. Du Bois (La Haye, 1763).

foundations of a new national Power in the Eastern Archipelago. On the expiry of his office, he sailed in January 1615 with four richly laden vessels for Europe, but perished in a hurricane off the Mauritius. The name of a mountain in that island long commemorated his loss, and appears in a journal of 1689 as 'Pierre Both.' 1615

He had found his task an easy one. The native rulers in the Archipelago, like the coast-rajas with whom the Portuguese dealt on the Malabar seaboard, were princes on a small scale. The greatest of them, like the King of Achin and the Sultan of Ternate, exercised an uncertain suzerainty over detached territories and islands, each with lesser chiefs of its own. Nor as regards the English did the first Dutch Governor-General find much difficulty. The whole number of English ships sent out up to the year 1610, inclusive, amounted to seventeen,[1] and of the seventeen vessels only a few were at any one time in Asiatic waters. The Dutch, on the other hand, had sent out sixty-five ships before the union of the separate companies in 1602, and sixty-nine vessels from 1602 to 1610.[2] The armament and fighting force of the

[1] The first six voyages (*ante*, p. 291).

[2] The contrast can best be brought out by the following figures, to be compared with the table given on p. 291. In 1602 the United Dutch Company sent out 14 ships and 1 yacht or small vessel; in 1603, 12 ships and 1 yacht; in 1605, 11 ships; in 1606, 8 ships and 1 yacht; in 1607, 10 ships and 3 yachts; in 1610, 7 ships and 1 yacht; total, 62 ships and 7 yachts. Compiled chiefly from the separate expeditions given in *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost Indië*, &c. (1595–1610) vol. iii. pp. 3–135, by Jhr. J. K. J. De Jonge (11 volumes, Amsterdam, 1864–1883).

English ships were also inferior to the Dutch. The Dutch, moreover, took a practical care for the well-being and morals of their servants unknown in the English factories. While the London Company sent out volumes of sermons and forced back
1610 the first English wife,[1] the Dutch Governor-General carried with him thirty-six goodly young women as mates to their countrymen in the East.[2] It was not till more than half a century later, that the English Company, moved by the scandal of a half-caste population, followed their example.[3]

The English factors and captains in the Archipelago were in truth outmatched at every point, and the London Company found itself compelled
1611 to seek support nearer home. In 1611 it opened negotiations at Amsterdam. A letter to the Burgomasters of that city proposed 'that as our nations have long continued in firm bonds and league of amity, so we might peaceably proceed to trade jointly together without troubling of either States.'[4] The Dutch replied in an amicable spirit, and proposed to approach the States-General on the subject. But meanwhile the London merchants realised that the struggle was a national one, not to be settled by the two Companies alone, and had

[1] Mrs. Richard Steele. *The English in Western India, being the History of the Factory at Surat of Bombay*, by the Rev. Philip Anderson, chaplain, pp. 29, 48 (ed. 1856).

[2] *Vies des Gouverneurs Généraux*, par J. P. I. Du Bois, p. 11 (La Haye, 1763).

[3] Chaplain Anderson's *The English in Western India*, based on the Surat Records, p. 215.

[4] Robert Middleton to certain Burgomasters of Amsterdam, 5th October, 1611. *First Letter Book*, p. 432.

declared to the Lord High Treasurer of England that they 'are enforced at last to break silence and complain their griefs.' [1]

The tale they told was one to which no English sovereign could turn a deaf ear. They had 'long and patiently endured sundry notorious wrongs and injurious courses at the hands of the Hollanders,' and being now reduced to extremities 'but having no means of remedy, do humbly implore your Lordship's honorable assistance and mediation to the States.' They based their claim to trade in the Archipelago on the prior discoveries of Drake, Cavendish and Lancaster; and on Drake's compact with the King of Ternate (the suzerain of the Moluccas) long before the Dutch were heard of in those seas. The argument had its inconveniences, for it would have told still more strongly in favour of the Portuguese prior rights which the English Company were about to scatter to the winds. But it sufficed to bring the question within the range of European diplomacy, and to open out new opportunities to James in his favourite rôle of the peace-making monarch.

From this period the relations of the Dutch and English Companies divide into two distinct branches: continuous negotiation in Europe, and continuous contests in the East. After preliminary action by our ambassador in Holland, the States-General, in 1613, sent Commissioners accompanied by Grotius, then Pensionary of Rotterdam and the

[1] Petition to the Earl of Salisbury, endorsed November 1611. *First Letter Book*, pp. 429–432.

foremost international jurist of the age, to treat with English Commissioners in London.[1] Much
1614 wrangling resulted in a vague agreement in 1614 that each nation should enjoy such places as it had conquered or discovered, and pay customs duties to the other at those ports, while both should join against the common enemy—Spain and Portugal.[2] The Governor of the English Company held a conference with the Dutch ambassador in London for 'a loving and friendly trade both defensive and offensive,' by the two corporations: we to throw open the Cambay coast to the Dutch, and they to admit us to the Spice Islands.[3]

The growing animosities in the East rendered this arrangement a dead-letter, and in January
1615 1615 negotiations were renewed at The Hague. Sir Henry Wotton, our ambassador in Holland, together with certain Commissioners to represent the East India Company, received a favourable audience from Barneveldt, who would gladly have seen the two Companies join 'to beat the Spaniard out of the East Indies.'[4] King James himself put pressure on the English Company to come to terms, but forbad any open breach with Spain.[5] This last condition rendered a real agreement impossible for Holland. The English Commissioners demanded free trade by the law of nations. The Dutch

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 641.

[2] *Idem*, 4th January, 1614, par. 678.

[3] *Idem*, February 1614, par. 691.

[4] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, pars. 854, 874.

[5] *Idem*, pars. 864, 893, 894, 900, 957, &c.

replied that any trade at all in the Eastern Seas could only be secured by great armaments and garrisons against Spain, and that if the English refused to share in the cost, they could not fairly claim to share in the profits.[1]

Finally Barneveldt offered three alternatives. First, for the English to retire from the trade; second, for the English to unite in a joint East India Company with the Dutch; third, for the English to maintain their position by a vigorous war.[2] He declared that the States-General regarded the East Indian trade as a cardinal point in their national policy, and that they assisted the Dutch Company with great sums to maintain it by force of arms. The English, on the other hand, thought that the Dutch capital was wasted in wars and on an army of 10,000 soldiers in the East.[3] Nothing remained but for our Commissioners to come away. The negotiations of 1615 broke down at The Hague, as those of 1613-14 had proved fruitless in London.

King James felt annoyed that he had failed in his part of royal peace-maker, and the Dutch were aware of the fact. They saw their advantage in a union which should compel the English to share in the Protestant defence of the Indies, and they had confidence in their own ability to retain the lion's share of the trade. They therefore transferred the scene of operations once more to England, and their ambassador urged as a 'groundwork' for the

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513-1616, pars. 901, 905.

[2] *Idem*, par. 957.

[3] *Idem*, pars. 957, 966.

amalgamation of the two Companies that they should jointly subscribe £1,200,000 to a common stock.[1] The English Company had by this time broken the Spanish-Portuguese power on the Indian coast, and saw their way to trade without sharing in the costly armaments and island-defences
1615 of the Dutch. In August 1615 they declared that they were content that Holland should surcease from her wars with Spain in the East, being themselves 'confident that in time they will eat the Spaniard out of that trade, only by underselling him in all parts of Christendom.'[2] So with 'good words' they thanked the Dutch ambassador, and the third series of negotiations came to an end.

Meanwhile the Hollanders were rendering our
1613 position intolerable in the Archipelago. In 1613 they forcibly prevented the people of Machian in
1614 the Moluccas from trading with us. In 1614 our agents retaliated by a treaty with the rich nutmeg-island Banda, whose inhabitants declared themselves willing to live and die with the English.[3] In 1615 the London Company encouraged its factors to break boldly into the Spice Islands and to attempt both Banda and Amboyna.[4] But the Dutch replied by the argument of 'seven tall ships' in the Archipelago, and threatened to sink any English interloper. In December 1615, at their headquarters at Bantam in Java, 'the envy

[1] *Court Book*, iii. pp. 432–435.

[2] *Court Minutes*, 18th August, 1615 [*Calendar of State Papers*, 1513–1616, par. 1014].

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1513–1616, par. 724.

[4] *Idem*, par. 972.

of the Hollanders is so great that to take out one of our eyes, they will lose both their own.'[1] In 1617 1617
came the news that the Dutch had forty or fifty English prisoners in irons at Amboyna, starving on a single cake of bread a day, so that they were reduced to skin and bone.

The personal hatred between the agents of the two Companies had now risen to fever-heat. The English despised the phlegmatic 'mechanic' ways of the Hollanders, called them 'shoemakers' and 'beer-brewers,' and flew into a passion at the mere sight of a Dutch document. In 1618 our Admiral at Batavia, Sir Thomas Dale, on receiving a communication in Flemish, 'scolded, stamped on the ground, swore, cursed,' asking 'why the letters were not in French, Spanish, Latin or any other language if we did not like to write English.'[2] The Dutch paid back abuse with scorn, pulled down the English flag, befouled it, and tore it to pieces,[3] and hit upon a device for rendering it hateful to the natives. In 1617 they 'covered all the seas from the Red Sea to the coast of China, spoiling and robbing all nations in the name and under the colour of the English.'[4] In 1618 they publicly 1618
insulted our flag by running up the French and English colours, with Prince Maurice's banner displayed above, 'triumphing in the doing thereof, because they have overcome both.'[5]

[1] *Idem*, par. 1078.

[2] MS. Dutch Records, India Office, first series, vol. iii. No. 99, p. 32.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 273 (p. 127).

[4] *Idem*, pars. 105, 106. See also par. 654. [N.B. The English version.]

[5] *Idem*, par. 421.

If we look only to their position in the East they had cause for exultation. Their second Governor-General, Gerard Reynst (1614–15), proved a worthy successor to Pieter Both. A director of the United Company at Amsterdam, Reynst was induced to accept the Governor-Generalship by liberal allowances, a gold medal with a massy chain, and the assurance of being re-appointed a
1613 director on his return. He sailed in July 1613 at the head of a large fleet, with ample powers from the Council of Seventeen ratified by the States-General, and with a commission direct from Prince Maurice. This double sanction of the States-General and of the House of Orange represented the union of the supreme civil power with the highest military authority in Holland. It gave to the Flemish Company a national basis which was absent from the charters of our Stuart kings, and which the English Company only obtained by Acts of Parliament under Dutch William, three-quarters of a century later. The tenure of office for the Dutch Governor-Generals was five years—a term afterwards adopted for our own.

1613–1615 Thus backed by the strength of his nation, Reynst detached a squadron on the voyage out to plant factories at Aden and on the Arabian coast, and became the founder of the Dutch trade in the Red Sea. But his chief aim was to shut up the nutmeg and clove islands of the archipelago against the English. With a fleet of eleven ships he chastised the Banda chiefs who had traded with us, seized on the neighbouring islands, and drove

us out of Amboyna. His career was cut short by dysentery in December 1615.[1] Laurens Reaal 1615
(1616–1618), provisionally appointed to fill his place 1616-1618
by the Council of India then assembled at Ternate, consolidated what his two predecessors had won. He strengthened the Dutch fortifications throughout the Archipelago, extended the Company's commerce, filled its exchequer, and prepared the way for the great Governor-General who succeeded him.

The English Company also armed itself for a life or death struggle. In spite of obstacles the four expeditions of its First Joint Stock (1613– 1613-1616
1616) were bringing home rich cargoes, and its shares rose to 207 per cent. in 1617. But much of its property then remained in the Indies, and, owing to losses from the Dutch, had eventually to be sold to the Second Joint Stock at a low valuation. Its accounts could not be finally wound up until 1621, and its whole profits during the eight 1621
years (1613–1621) only amounted to 87½ per cent.[2] Its permanent achievement, as we shall see, was the strengthening of our position not in the Eastern Archipelago, but on the west coast of India under the sanction of the Mughal Emperor obtained by Sir Thomas Roe. In 1616, however, its credit stood high, and the expectations from the division of its profits still higher.

[1] Du Bois, *Vies des Gouverneurs-Généraux*, p. 25, ff. (1763); Van der Aa's *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden*. Reynst, although appointed Governor-General in 1613, did not arrive till 1614.

[2] Macpherson, *History of the European Commerce with India*, p. 97 (1812).

When, therefore, on the expiry of the four years
1613-1616 of the First Joint Stock (1613–1616), the London Company resolved to open a new contribution for another four years, it was eagerly subscribed. The spirit of adventure among the English nobility and country gentry, which had found scope on the Spanish main under Elizabeth, but which the Spanish entanglements of James pent up, sought an outlet in the Second Joint Stock of the East
1617-1620 India Company. Fifteen dukes and earls, thirteen countesses and ladies of title, eighty-two knights, judges and privy councillors, headed the list of 954 subscribers.[1] The contributions amounted to £1,629,040, the largest capital that had ever been subscribed to any joint stock undertaking in the world. With this sum, to be divided into three voyages, it seemed as if the English Company might at length hold their own against Holland in the Eastern seas.[2]

They soon discovered, however, that the capture

[1] The complete list was made up as follows:

15	dukes and earls,
82	knights, including judges, privy councillors, &c.,
13	countesses and other titled ladies,
18	widows and maiden ladies,
26	clergymen and physicians,
313	merchants,
214	tradesmen,
25	merchant strangers, and
248	without any designation.
954	

[2] The capital was apportioned thus: For charges of the first voyage of 1617–18, 9 ships, £200,000; for charges of the second voyage of 1618–19, 8 ships, £200,000; for charges of the third voyage of 1619–20, 8 ships, £400,000; for cargoes for the three voyages, £298,000; for purchase of commodities in the Indies, £152,000; for purchase, repair, and up-keep of the ships, £350,000. Total, £1,600,000. Bruce quoting India Office MSS. *Annals of the Honorable East India Company*, i. pp. 193–4 (1810).

of the spice trade was not to be achieved by money alone. Both at home and in the East the English organisation was inferior to the Dutch. The original weakness in the constitution of the London Company still rendered it unfit for great or permanent efforts. The 'separate' voyages of 1601 to 1612 had indeed given place to recurring joint stocks. But the change only superseded temporary groups of adventurers for single voyages by somewhat less temporary groups of adventurers for three or four voyages. Each group, whether for a single voyage, or for three or four, knew that its existence was limited to a brief term of years. Its object was to make as much money as it could within the period allotted to it, and to spend as little as possible on fortifications which it would have to leave behind in the East and make over at a low valuation to the next group of adventurers. The Dutch East India Company felt its interests to be bound up with those of the Dutch Government, adopted the State policy, and willingly spent vast sums on troops and fortresses in the confidence that it would reap the permanent fruits of its territorial conquests. 1617-1620

The English Company, in fact, still remained a private venture; the Dutch Company knew itself to be a national enterprise. The difference received emphasis from the personal character of King James. The London Company's charter was never quite safe from Court intrigues. If royal favourites could no longer procure a license for English interlopers. His Majesty was King of Scotland as

well as of England, and the charter did not touch his northern subjects. In the crisis of its struggle with the Dutch, the London Company learned with
1617 dismay that the King had in 1617 granted a patent to Sir James Cuningham for a Scottish Company to trade to Greenland, Muscovy and the East Indies—'in as ample manner and as the Company of London do.'

The danger was grave. For the Scotch would not only prove keen rivals in trade, but their charter might be covertly utilised by English interlopers, and a Presbyterian nation was not unlikely to come to an understanding with the Calvinist and Lutheran Dutch. The movement which resulted in the Scottish Brigade in Holland had set in; and the London Company might find itself beset by a Scotch and Dutch combination in the East. We shall find that the steward of the Dutch factory at Amboyna in 1623 was an Aberdeen man. King James listened to the remonstrances
1618 of his English subjects, and in 1618 the new grant was recalled upon the London Company agreeing to compensate the Scotch patentee.[1]

The concession did not come too soon. In the autumn of the same year, 1618, the English Company found itself once more compelled to appeal for State support in what now clearly revealed itself as a struggle between the Dutch and the English nations. It presented memorials

[1] *First Letter Book*, pp. 490-491 (no date). The incident may be studied in the *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617-1621, many entries.

to the King and the Privy Council, setting forth 1618 'the manifest and insupportable wrongs and abuses done by the Hollanders unto your Majesty and your Majesty's subjects in the East Indies.' The two nutmeg-islets of Pularoon and Rosengyn, with a chief town in Lantor or Great Banda which had freely surrendered to His Majesty, had been threatened or attacked by the Hollanders, and English prisoners publicly shown in chains. 'Lo, these are the men,' said the Dutch to the islanders, 'whom ye made your Gods, in whom ye put your trust, but we have made them our slaves.' Twenty of the miserable captives were since dead of cruel usage.[1]

The Dutch had also taken two of our ships, rifled another, and put the crews in irons, declaring they had the authority of King James himself to capture any English vessel to the East of the Celebes. They refused to restore a vessel unless we gave up our claim to Pularoon, boasting 'that one Holland ship would take ten English: that they care not for our King, for Saint George was now turned child.'[2]

King James reopened negotiations in earnest (September 1618) and demanded that Dutch Com- 1618 missioners should be sent to London. A report was allowed to reach The Hague that he had ordered the seizure in England of certain Dutch East Indiamen, and in November the Dutch Commissioners were accredited—six on behalf of the Dutch East India Company, and four on behalf of

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 425. [N.B. This is English version.]

[2] *Idem*, par. 425.

1618 the States-General with the Dutch ambassador at their head.[1]

The two questions to be settled were compensation for past injuries, and a fair arrangement for the future. The Dutch Commissioners proved able diplomatists, 'very subtle and cunning'[2] as they seemed to our plain city-men. At the very first meeting they took up a firm stand against 'repara-
1619 tion of damage,' and by January 27, 1619, they were sending for men-of-war to carry them home. When Lord Digby patched up the breach, things again came to a stand in April as the Hollanders, while demanding that the English Company should share the charges of the Dutch fortresses in the East, refused to allow it any share in their control. The King himself now intervened, declaring that 'in a matter that so nearly and highly concerns the weal of both countries, His Majesty will neither spare any travail to effect it, nor be in anything more partial to either side than if they were both his own subjects.'

The King's eagerness constrained the London
1619 Company to come to terms. In July 1619 was concluded a treaty[3] which yielded the main points to the Hollanders and proved from the first unworkable by the English. The London Company obtained no compensation for past injuries, reckoned at £100,000 during a single year,[4] and no

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, E.I., 1617-1621, pars. 487, 488, 491, 492.

[2] *Idem*, par. 558.

[3] Dated 7th July, 1619; ratified by King James 16th July, 1619. Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. xvii. p. 170 ff. (ed. 1704–1735).

[4] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 431 (1618).

share in the control of the Dutch fortifications to whose cost they were to contribute. The treaty, after granting an amnesty for all excesses on either side, and providing for a mutual restitution of ships and property, declared the trade in the East to be open to both Companies. Both Companies should exert themselves to reduce the native dues and exactions, to keep down prices of Indian commodities in the East, and to maintain a high scale of prices in Europe. On the south-east Indian coast the English were to have free trade at Pulicat on paying half the expenses of the Dutch garrison. In Java the pepper trade should be equally divided. In the Moluccas and the Banda and Amboyna Archipelagoes, which included the clove and nutmeg islands, the English should have one third and the Dutch two thirds of the trade, paying for the garrisons in a corresponding ratio. Each Company was to furnish ten ships of war to be kept in the East for purposes of common defence, and not to be employed on home voyages, but only in the port-to-port trade. All forts should remain in the hands of their present possessors—which practically meant of the Dutch, as we had then so few—and certain proposed fortifications of the English were to be postponed for two or three years, until both Companies could agree upon them. 1619

The treaty was to be binding for twenty years. Its execution was to be supervised by a joint Council of Defence in the Indies, composed of four members from each Company, with an appeal in case of dispute to the States-General and the King

1619 of England. So much eventually turned on this Council of Defence clause that I give it in full.[1] Its functions were defined as the direction of the common defence by sea, the distribution of the ships of war, and the regulation of dues or imposts for maintaining the forts and garrisons. There is no mention of civil or criminal jurisdiction, nor of any system of law to be administered.

The English Company felt that the royal rôle of peacemaker had been played chiefly at their cost. They petitioned the King in particular against the articles touching the forts, 'as utterly cutting off the Company from all hope and expectation of their obtaining any parts of the forts at any time hereafter, which in the end would utterly exclude the Company from the whole trade of the Indies.'[2] Even the King's ambassador at The Hague thought the fortress clauses might have been more advan-

[1] Rymer's *Fœdera* (ed. 1704–1735) vol. xvii. pp. 172–173: 'Pour avec ordre establir & mieux administer ceste Defense, il sera erige un conseil de Defense compose de huict Personnes des premiers & principaux officiers, estans par dela; les quelles seront prises & eslues en nombre egal tant de l'une que de l'autre compagnie, & presideront par tour.

'Ce Conseil ordonnera de ce qui concernera le faict de la Defense commune par Mer, & distribuera les Navires de Guerre en telz endroits qu'il trouvera necessaire. Comme aussy il reiglera les Daces & Impositions qui seront necessaircs pour le entretennement des dits Forts & garnisons d'iceux, & sera authorise de faire rendre compte aux Recepueurs des dites Impositions . . .

'Ce Traicte sera pour le temps de vingt ans; & sy, pendant ce temps la, arrive quelques Disputes qui ne puissent estre terminees par le dit conseil en ces Quartiers la, ny par deca par les deux compagnies, le Different en sera remis au Roy de la Grande Bretagne & aus dits seigneurs Estats Generaux, qui daigneront preindre la Peine de l'accomoder au contentement des uns & des autres.'

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 683.

tageous to us,[1] while his friend Chamberlain plainly wrote to him: 'Say what they can, things are passed as the other [side] would have it.'[2] Secretary Calvert regarded the treaty as a mere suspension of the dispute, and believed a great opportunity had been lost, for the Portuguese, French and Danes were all eager for a trade alliance with us in the East. However, on July 16, 1619, King James ratified the engagement, and sweetened the pill to his subjects, by a clause promising to erect no other East India Company during the treaty term of twenty years.[3]

As a matter of fact, it but little affected events in the East. The treaty did not reach India till March 1620, when the Dutch and English generals sus- 1620
pended their hostilities, proclaimed it on every ship from the mainmast, feasted each other, and liberated all prisoners on both sides.[4] But their quarrel had got beyond control from home, and their amity ended as the smoke of their salvos cleared off. The English were trying to enforce two distinct claims which the Dutch believed to be incompatible with their position in the Eastern Archipelago: a claim to trade in the nutmeg and clove islands of the Banda and Amboyna groups, and a claim to a fortified settlement close to the Dutch headquarters in Java.

A glance at the map (p. 344) will show the

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, par. 693.

[2] *Idem*, par. 683.

[3] Rymer's *Fœdera*, vol. xvii. p. 174 (Edition 1704–1735).

[4] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 934.

1620 significance of these claims. At the eastern end of the Archipelago lie two groups, represented for our present purpose by Amboyna, a clove island, and by the Banda, literally the 'United' nutmeg isles including Lantor or Great Banda, Pularoon, Pulaway and Rosengyn.[1] Not only did these islets produce the most valuable spices, but they might be approached from the south-west. If the English could establish themselves in Amboyna, Pularoon, and Rosengyn, they would, so to speak, turn the flank of the Dutch positions commanding the Straits of Malacca and of Sunda. By keeping to the south of the line of long islands (Sumatra, Java, Flores, Timor, &c.) they could secure a direct access, not unattended indeed by nautical dangers, to the clove and nutmeg archipelago. These matters, which were hidden from King James and his councillors, were vital to the Dutch control of the spice trade. The Dutch directors in Holland understood them better; and while granting us an equal share in the cheap pepper of Java, they would only concede one third of the traffic with the clove and nutmeg islands of the further East. We were outmatched in point of knowledge as in armed force.

The Dutch rested their title to these islands on their conquest from the Portuguese and on treaties

[1] Amboyna is an islet 32 miles long with an area of about 280 square miles, to the south of the larger island of Ceram, which is itself one of the southernmost of the Moluccas or Spice Islands. The Banda group lie still further south than Amboyna, but Pularoon and Pulaway, although prominent in the struggle between the Dutch and English, are so small as not to be shown on ordinary maps. They are not mentioned even in Vivien de St. Martin's great Dictionary of Geography (Paris 1879).

with the local chiefs.[1] The English claimed that they were places of common resort for the spice trade, that in some of them they had built block-houses which the Dutch pulled down, while others, including Amboyna, Pularoon, and Rosengyn, had granted us a settlement or freely placed themselves under the protection of King James. The struggle for them, with its mutual outrages and reprisals, need not be detailed. It commenced as far back as 1608, became acute after 1616, and ended with the catastrophe of Amboyna in 1623.

While the English tried to circumvent the Dutch western positions on the Malacca and Sunda straits, and to fasten on the richest spice-isles of the easternmost archipelago, they also threatened the Dutch settlements in Java itself.
In December 1618 the English by way of reprisal 1618
captured the Dutch 'Black Lion'[2] at Bantam.
In January 1619 they beat the Dutch fleet in a 1619
'cruel bloody fight' in which 3,000 great shot were fired without lasting result, and in October the Dutch defeated our squadron off Sumatra—the last battle for the famous old 'Red Dragon.'[3] The Dutch 'Black Lion' had a less noble end—being accidentally burned while in our possession by four drunken English sailors, one of whom we hanged and the other three were flogged round the fleet.[4]

This sea-struggle around the western entrances

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 5. Dutch declarations of claim, 1617.

[2] *De Zwarte Leeuw.*

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, pars. 529, 547, 609, 755, 761, 767.

[4] *Idem*, pars. 609, 643, 671.

1619 into the Archipelago had its counterpart conflict on shore. The ships of the two Protestant nations were individually pretty well matched, the captains equally skilful, the crews equally brave, and victory sometimes fell to the one, sometimes to the other. Our cursing and stamping admiral, Sir Thomas Dale—a determined man, bred in the cruel school of the Spanish-Dutch war—had by unsparing severity wrung order out of anarchy in Virginia,
1618 and was sent with six ships to India in 1618. But the English found the land forces in Java numerically superior to their own, and directed by a man of still more masterful character, and with a genius for organisation not possessed by any other European then in the East.

Jan Pieterszoon Coen, born at Hoorn in 1587, had learned the secrets of commerce in the famous house of the Piscatori at Rome, and went first to Dutch India in 1607. By 1613 his talents raised him to the office of Director-General of Commerce and President at Bantam, with the control of all
1617 outlying agencies (*comptoirs*). In 1617 the Council of Seventeen appointed him Governor-General, with a ratification from the States-General and a commission direct from Prince Maurice of Orange—powers so ample as to afterwards warrant him in questioning orders of the Directors unless approved of by the States-General.
1618 In June 1618 he entered on his high office at Java. 'If the King of England does not make it his particular care,' a shrewd French observer reported, 'the English run the risk of having the worst in

the Indies, as being weaker than the Flemings are 1618
in that country.'[1]

Coen was to the Dutch Indies in the seventeenth century what Albuquerque had been to the Portuguese in the sixteenth, and what Dupleix became to the French in the eighteenth. He resolved to found the Dutch power on a lasting territorial basis. His clear vision of a Dutch empire in the East met with opposition from narrower minds: the antagonism which Albuquerque's policy had encountered from the honest Almeida, and which the schemes of Dupleix were to receive from a corrupt French Court. But the Dutch Company, like the English Company in after days, knew a great man when they got one; and in spite of internal differences and a temporary eclipse, Coen was supported, rewarded, and honoured. His two governor-generalships, from
1618 to 1623, and from 1627 to 1629, form the 1618–1629
seedtime of the Dutch greatness in the East.[2]

A strongly fortified capital, commanding the western entrance to the Archipelago, yet centrally situated, was necessary to his design. The Straits of Malacca were already controlled by treaties, and

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 412. *Informations out of France*, dated 15–25th August, 1618.

[2] I take the dates not of his appointments, but of his assuming office. Coen was also appointed Governor-General in 1624, but, owing to opposition, did not go out. Van der Aa's *Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden* (21 vols. Haarlem, 1852–1878) *s.v.*, and Du Bois' *Vies des Gouverneurs Généraux*, pp. 33–71, and pp. 83–98 have been followed; but they should be compared with the earlier accounts of Velius and Valentyn. A really great book might be written on Coen.

1618 circumstances led Coen to the northern exit of the Straits of Sunda as the position from which to dominate the island world. The two possible sites were Bantam and Jacatra at the north-western end of Java, where the Sunda straits debouch into the Archipelago. Bantam was nearer to the straits, Jacatra lay round the corner to the north-east, but was the stronger position. Both places were resorted to by the English and Dutch, and the two nations claimed treaty rights with the native princes at each. One of Coen's first acts as Governor-General was to obtain leave from the Jacatra chief for a fortified settlement on his river.

Presently the Jacatra and Bantam chiefs grew afraid of the rising fortress, and, although not liking the English, obtained their help to expel the Dutch. Coen had sailed to the Moluccas to avenge a native revolt and to reunite his fleet; and in
1619 January-February 1619 the Dutch at Jacatra, after a defence of their half-built walls, had to capitulate. They agreed to surrender their fortress, people, and war munitions to the English, and the money and goods of the Dutch Company to the native prince. The English were to provide a ship to convey away the Hollanders to the Indian coast of Coromandel, or whithersoever they might resolve to go, except to the Moluccas or Amboyna.[1]

[1] Treaty of 1st February, 1619. I condense chiefly from an elaborate MS. *Account of the General War the English began against us in December* 1618, *and of the beginning of the War at Jacatra; a journal following of what happened daily afterwards*, in vol. iii. 1st series, No. 99, and the rediscovered volumes of the MS. Java Records in the India Office. It is from the Dutch

The claims of Bantam caused delay, and Coen 1619
had now reunited his fleet at the Moluccas. His return to Java prevented the treaty from being carried out. In the spring of 1619 he utterly destroyed the native town of Jacatra, seized the estuary of the river together with the adjacent territory, and built on it the city and fortress from which, under the new name of Batavia, the Dutch rule the Eastern Archipelago to this day.[1]

Our admiral, brave, passionate Dale, having 1619
unwisely divided his fleet, and being stricken with fever from the swamps of the Jacatra river, sailed for India. Coen hurried on the fortifications at Batavia so as to give the complete command of the Jacatra estuary to the Dutch. He prepared to punish the Bantam prince who had joined and then quarrelled with the English during his (Coen's) absence in the Moluccas. He drew the bonds tighter on the English trade, and resolved to use our alliance with Bantam as a *casus belli* for driving us out of the Spice Islands. At this juncture, early in 1620, the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1620
July 1619 arrived at Batavia, with its amnesty for the past and promise of peace in the future.

But scarcely had the joint cheering for King James and Prince Maurice died away and the fleets been stripped of their bunting, than the treaty of 1619 was discerned to be itself a new

point of view, but I have verified it from Sainsbury's *State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621.

[1] *Idem*, also Van der Aa and Du Bois *ut supra*. The final order of the Dutch Directors for changing the name of Jacatra to Batavia bears date 4th March, 1620, but it had been locally named Batavia in 1619.

1620 source of strife. In 1618 the Dutch Directors frankly wrote to Coen that, although they were trying to come to an agreement with the London Company, yet in the meanwhile he was 'to strictly carry out our previous orders for expelling the English and all other nations from all treaty places or where we have forts.'[1] Coen had laid his plans accordingly. The Dutch Directors were, however, willing to give the treaty of 1619 a fair chance. 'It is our sincere and earnest desire,' they wrote in 1619–20, to honestly observe its terms, and they even contemplated building a fortress at the Cape of Good Hope jointly with the English. But they insisted on our executing our engagements to the utmost letter, and above all on our maintaining the full complement of war ships agreed on.[2]

The last condition was one which the English Company could not fulfil. Coen knew this and foresaw that its nonfulfilment would leave him a free hand. While therefore he made fair arrangements for the joint Council of Defence on shore, for the mutual command of the fleet, and for carrying the two national flags at the mainmast every alternate fortnight, a guarded or even hostile attitude to the English was enjoined on the outlying Dutch settlements.[3]

[1] Letter to the Governor-General, 2nd October, 1618. Dutch MS. Records in India Office, 2nd series, i. 87.

[2] Letters to the Dutch Governor-General dated 10th September, 1619, 1st May, 1620, &c. Dutch MS. Records, India Office, 2nd series, i. 105, 108, 119, &c.

[3] Letter to the Governor of the Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda from Batavia, 31st March, 1620. Instructions to vessels, 30th May, 1620. Dutch MS. Records,

The truth is the two Companies had widely different interests in the main business of defence. The Dutch truce with Spain was about to expire (1621), and Holland resolved to break the Spanish- 1621
Portuguese power in the East as a preparation for the inevitable European war. The English were by no means so anxious to attack the Spaniards, with whom they were ostensibly at peace, and whom they believed they could undersell in an open market by the fair rivalry of trade.[1] After several joint expeditions, the English failed to supply their quota of ships, but offered to pay half the naval expenses. Then they withdrew more openly, and after bitter recriminations the Dutch declared that the English 'have neither law nor justice . . . the knife of the one [alone] keeps the knife of the other in the sheath.'[2] The English replied that the Dutch used the alliance for their own ends, and that the treaty was for a fleet of defence and not for conquest. In 1623 1623
they declined to join in a third expedition against the Spanish Manillas and their ships separated from the Dutch alike in Java and the Moluccas.[3]

A second cause of quarrel arose out of the

India Office, 3rd series, i. 28, 31, 36, 37, &c. Also 1st series, vol. iv. No. 127, pp. 7, 8.

[1] *Ante*, p. 360.

[2] Letter of Jacob Dedel, 30th November, 1622. Dutch MS. Records, India Office, 1st series, vi. No. 208, p. 10. The six causes of quarrel are narrated at great length in the Dutch MSS.

[3] The Governor-General and Council at Batavia to the Directors at Amsterdam, 1st February, 1623, 1st series, vol. v. No. 186, p. 2 ff. The arguments on both sides are fully detailed in vol. vi. of the India Office, 1st series of Dutch MSS.; Governor-General's letter of 3rd January, 1624, &c.

1620-21 blockade of Bantam, which the joint Council undertook, but which the English soon declared to be a plan of conquest outside the duties of 'defence.'[1] The English only wanted an open trade at Bantam, and this the prince was willing to concede. The Dutch desired to avenge the attack of Bantam on their rising fort at Jacatra in 1618, and to ruin the trade of a rival port lying so close to their new Batavian capital. The question of the sovereign jurisdiction in the Archipelago supplied a third and more bitter subject of strife. The Dutch Directors explicitly ordered that the laws of Holland were to be observed at Batavia; that the claim given by the treaty to the English was to a share of the trade but to no share of the *dominium*; and that the treaty had not 'reduced our rights even in the smallest way in the Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda.'[2] The treaty had, in fact, omitted to provide for the question of jurisdiction. The English President himself was fined
1621 in 1621 for not obeying orders issued at Batavia in the name of the States-General, and in 1622 he was mulcted on the complaint of a native.[3]

A fourth cause of quarrel was the money contribution for fortifications under the treaty. Here again the two nations had opposed interests

[1] Dutch MS. Records, 1st series, vol. ii. No. 43, p. 2. In February 1622 the English had withdrawn from the blockade for six months 'as if that was not their business.'

[2] MS. Dutch Records in the India Office, 2nd series, vol. ii. No. 53.

[3] *Extracts from the Book of Sentences* at Jacatra and other documents. Dutch MS. Records, India Office, 1st series, vol. iv. No. 133, pp. 2, 3, and No. 147, p. 2.

in the East. It was the Flemish policy of ruining 1620–21
Spain by armed trade, as against the London Company's desire for open ports. The Dutch wanted as many fortifications as they could get at the joint expense; the English wanted few fortifications and none which they could not control. The Dutch accused the English of insufficient subsidies. The English replied that, while they found the money, the Dutch spent it, or pocketed it, as they pleased, and made no equal contribution on their part. The Dutch records themselves disclose some laxity in this respect.
In 1621 the Dutch cut down the outlay on forts, 1621
garrisons, and the Governor's table allowances, yet warned their agents that 'the English need not get the benefit of it,' but are to be charged as before.[1] Nor were the English to be allowed to 'build or make anything at their own expense, on which hereafter they can claim ownership.'[2] The English retaliated for the imposts enforced from them for fortresses in the Eastern Archipelago, by levying dues from Flemish ships near Ormuz, to the wrath of the Dutch captains.

The restitution of property clause furnished a fifth ground of wrangling, in which both sides thought themselves over-reached. The constant and bitter personal disputes between the local agents of the two Companies supplied a sixth cause, which would alone have rendered unwork-

[1] Letter from Batavia to Frederick de Houtman, Moluccas, 23rd November, 1621. Dutch MS. Records, India Office, 3rd series, i. p. 110.

[2] *Idem*, p. 125.

able the treaty of 1619. Within two years King James himself recognised that it had broken down.
1621 In March 1621 he pressed the Dutch Government to again send Commissioners, and in July he hastened its decision by threatening letters of marque.[1] The Commissioners arrived in England in November 1621, but their negotiations were spun out to January 1623—too late to avert the impending tragedy.

As Barneveldt's project for a United Dutch-English Company had been strangled by the diplomatic discord at London and The Hague, so all hope of compromise between the two nations was stifled amid the passionate disputes of their sea-captains in the East, and extinguished for ever in the torture chamber of Amboyna.

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, pars. 995, 1028, 1036, &c. I have, as a matter of international courtesy, told the story of the collapse of the treaty chiefly from the Dutch records. The English version is abundantly detailed in Sainsbury's *State Papers*, the MS. Court Books of the London Company, and its MS. correspondence with its servants in the East. The evidence agrees in essentials, and I pass over the bitter recriminations on both sides.

CHAPTER X

THE END OF THE STRUGGLE: THE TRAGEDY OF AMBOYNA, 1623

Events were now hastening to a catastrophe. The Dutch Governor-General, Coen, while resolved to make the Archipelago an island empire for Holland, was too sagacious to imperil his plans by putting his nation openly in the wrong towards a great European Power. He trusted to the treaty of 1619 to itself afford causes of quarrel, which would enable him to carry out the instructions given to the first Dutch Governor-General, 1609–1614, and steadily reiterated ever since; that 'the commerce of the Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda should belong to the Company, and that no other nation in the world should possess the least part.' But Coen's far-reaching policy was beyond the grasp of his bluff ship-captains with their flaming broadsides; or of the angry isolated Dutch agents, a thousand miles apart, with their forts and prison cells.

Coen himself believed that the treaty alone stood in the way of his triumph over the English. Our Admiral Dale, stricken with fever, and fearful lest the Bantamese might sacrifice the English to make terms with the Dutch, had shipped off our

1619 goods and factors from Bantam in the summer of 1619, sought an asylum for them on the east coast of India, and there died.[1] The English ships that remained in the Archipelago seemed destined to fall to the Dutch, who captured two of them in July 1619, and four others off Sumatra in October. Our alliance with the Prince of Bantam, to capture the Dutch half-built fort at Jacatra in the beginning of that year, furnished Coen with a cause of war against us, and placed him in the right from the point of view of European diplomacy. The arrival, early in 1620, of the treaty of July 1619 snatched the prey from between his hands. 'The English ought to be very thankful to you,' he wrote to the Dutch Directors in Holland, 'for they had worked themselves very nicely out of the Indies, and you have placed them again in the midst.'[2]

If, however, he had to obey the treaty, he could use it for his own ends. The English would have liked to resettle at Bantam, but Coen resolved not only to destroy the trade of that port but to force the English to live under his own eye at Batavia. After some negotiation the joint Council of Defence, established in Java by the treaty, agreed
1620 to blockade Bantam in 1620, and thus accomplished both his objects. For, although the English soon withdrew, they had compromised themselves with

[1] *Ante*, p. 377. I here follow chiefly the Dutch authorities.

[2] Coen to the Directors, 11th May, 1620. The treaty of 1619 seems to have reached the English in Java on the 20th January, 1620, and the Dutch on the 27th March. It is not always easy to reconcile the dates.

the Bantam prince, and the Dutch fleet was strong 1620
enough to continue the blockade without them.

In Batavia Coen made our position so miserable that in July 1620 we had to keep a ship there as a floating warehouse, 'having no place on shore.'[1] In 1621 the English almost gave up Java in despair, and part of them again sought a refuge on the Indian coast.[2] In August 1622 Thomas Brockedon, our agent at Batavia, asked leave from the Directors in London to return home, as he could 'live no longer under the insolence of the Dutch.'[3]

His situation was a mournful one. So far from restitution having been made to us under the treaty of 1619, we were compelled to supply 'incredible sums' for fortifications which the Dutch did or did not build, but which could only be a menace to ourselves. We had been dragged into a war with Bantam, from which we could derive no benefit, and which shut us out from the chief pepper mart. The civil and criminal jurisdiction was exercised by the Dutch to publicly insult us. We were placed on a level with 'the blacks,' whose bare affirmation was taken against us. We might not 'kill a wild hog or gather a cocoanut in the wood without leave.' The Dutch had flogged William Clarke,

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, par. 883. Bruce tells the story from the English Company's records, and does not trouble himself about the case for the Dutch, e.g. *Annals of the Honourable East India Company*, vol. i. pp. 230–232; and indeed throughout the whole volume.

[2] Birdwood's *Report on the Old Records of the India Office*, p. 212 (1891 reprint). Dates confused.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, 26th August, 1622, par. 140.

1620-1622 steward of the English factory, in the market-place, 'cruelly cutting his flesh, and then washed him with salt and vinegar, and laid him again in irons.' The English watch had been imprisoned for eight days and threatened with torture, to force them to make false confessions against the President of our Council.[1] What seemed to the Dutch their lawful jurisdiction, the English regarded as oppression.

For another alleged plot twelve natives had been condemned to be quartered, and the rest of the accused to perpetual slavery in chains. The torture failed to elicit anything against the English; but if it could have given the Dutch 'any advantage against us,' we should have had no mercy. 'Wherefore,' wrote in 1622 our President Fursland and Council at Batavia, 'we earnestly desire speedily to be released from this bondage.'[2] A similar attempt was made in the island of Pularoon to extort confessions against the English by cruel torments of the natives.[3] Thus was rehearsed alike in the capital of Dutch India and in the distant Nutmeg Isles, that tragedy of torture which was so soon to be enacted at Amboyna. In the still remoter seas the Hollanders, with seven ships at Japan, had, 'with sound of trumpet,' 'proclaimed there open war against the English, as their mortal enemies.'[4]

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 140, and par. 883 of vol. 1617–1621.

[2] The President and Council to the East India Company, Batavia, 6th March, 1622. *Calendar of State Papers*, 1622–1624, par. 43.

[3] *Idem*, Introd. xxv. Also par. 595, page 397, &c.

[4] *Idem*, 1617–1621, par. 819. Letter from Richard Cocks, dated Nagasaki, 10th March, 1620.

The Clove and Nutmeg Isles, including among them Amboyna, Banda, and Pularoon, lay, it will be remembered,[1] at the south-eastern end of the Spice Archipelago. The Dutch claimed the sovereignty over them, by the conquest of Amboyna from the Portuguese in 1605, and in virtue of many treaties. The English had a set of counter-claims based on the free surrender of Pularoon to us in 1616, of Lantor or Great Banda in 1620,[2] and on compacts with other chiefs. We had also an agency at Amboyna under the Dutch-English treaty of 1619. The Dutch with an overwhelming force expelled us from Lantor and Pularoon in 1621–1622. Our gallant agent, Nathaniel Courthorpe, who, in 'much want and misery,' held Pularoon from 1616 to 1620, sometimes with but thirty-eight men to resist the 'force and tyranny' of the Hollanders, had been mortally wounded in a sea-fight, and threw himself overboard rather than see his ship strike her flag.[3] 1620-1622

Herman van Speult, Governor of the neighbouring island of Amboyna, was regarded at headquarters as 'too scrupulous' in his fiscal administration.[4] In January 1623 the Governor-General Coen, when departing for Europe, enjoined strict justice, and mentioned Amboyna as a place where no English encroachments were to be allowed. 'Trust them not,' he said, 'any more than open enemies . . . not weighing too scrupulously what 1623

[1] *Ante*, pp. 344, 372.

[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 125.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1617–1621, pars. 332, 623, &c.

[4] *Idem*, vol. 1622–1624, par. 243.

1622–1623 may fall out.'[1] His farewell instructions merely reiterated the principles on which he had always insisted. 'Trust the English no more than a public enemy ought to be trusted,' he wrote two months previously to Banda, the agency nearest Amboyna.[2] This policy of suspicion, and of 'not weighing too scrupulously what may fall out,' was now to be enforced with a stupid violence which the great Governor-General might perhaps have anticipated, but which he would have been the first to condemn.

1623 By the beginning of 1623 the Dutch found themselves completely masters of the Clove and Nutmeg Archipelago. At the principal clove-island, Amboyna, they had, according to the English statement founded upon depositions on oath, a fortress garrisoned by 200 Dutch soldiers,[3] with 300 or 400 native troops, including some thirty Japanese,[4] and further protected by eight vessels in the roadstead.[5] The English numbered eighteen men, scattered between five small factories on different islands, very badly off, with a few slaves, 'just six and all boys.'[6] In their house at Amboyna only three swords, two muskets,

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 243.

[2] *Idem*, par. 193. Letter to the Governor of Banda, 18–28th December, 1622.

[3] Pamphlet i.: *A True Relation*, p. 3 (*post*, p. 393, note 2).

[4] *Idem*, p. 4.

[5] *Idem*, pp. 35, 36. Even Corthals, secretary to Van Speult, acknowledged the Dutch force to be 100 soldiers, 50 free burghers and 50 native soldiers. The Dutch also admitted they had 24 pieces of ordnance and the eight vessels. Answers of the Amboyna Judges (Dutch) in 1628. Series marked 'Java 2, Part III.' (1623–1631) India Office MSS.

[6] Pamphlet vi.: *A Reply*, p. 1[illegible] (*post*, p. 393, note 2).

and half a pound of powder were found.[1] The nearest English support was the Banda agency, at a distance across the sea, and containing but nine of their countrymen. English ships came seldom to Amboyna, and not one was then near.[2] Our President in Council at Java had in fact resolved to withdraw the petty English factories at Amboyna, and throughout the Clove and Nutmeg Archipelago. He had even arranged with the Dutch Governor-General for their transport to Batavia in Holland ships. In February 1623 orders to this effect were on their way from our President in Batavia to Amboyna.[3] 1623 February

They arrived too late. On the evening of February 10, 1623, a Japanese soldier of the Dutch garrison had some talk with the sentries about the number of the troops, and the times of changing the watch. When questioned by the Governor Van Speult next day, February 11,[4] he explained that he had merely chatted with the soldiers 'for Feb. 10

[1] Pamphlet i.: *A True Relation*, p. 35. Jan Joosten, one of the Dutch judges, says '2 muskets and 3 or 4 rapiers.' India Office MS. volume, 'Java 2, Part III.'

[2] Answers of the Dutch Judges to the Interrogatories, 1628. India Office MSS.

[3] Pamphlet iii.: *An Answer*, p. 33 (*post*, p. 393, note 2). I give the evidence from the official records at p. 398.

[4] I adopt the English dates. According to the Dutch or Gregorian calendar the dates should each be ten days later; for example, the English or Julian 11th February corresponds with the Dutch 21st February. But the Dutch give the 23rd February for the arrest of the Japanese soldier, and in other cases there is a like discrepancy. The English eye-witnesses, however, sometimes also mention the day of the week; and by working back the Julian calendar, I find that their days of the week tally with the English date of the month.

1623 his own amusement.' Indeed, the steward of the Dutch factory afterwards declared that 'it was an usual speech amongst soldiers to enquire one of another how strong the watch might be, that they might know how many hours they might stand sentinel.'[1]

Van Speult was, however, on the look-out for conspiracy, and perhaps anxious to redeem his reputation from the charge of slackness at head-quarters. In the previous summer he had written to the Governor-General Coen about the English at Amboyna: 'We hope to direct things according to your orders that our sovereignty shall not be diminished or injured in any way by their encroachments, and if we may hear of any conspiracies of theirs against the sovereignty, we shall with your sanction do justice to them, suitably, unhesitatingly, and immediately.'[2] In October 1622 Coen gave this sanction. In February 1623 the opportunity arrived. Van Speult put the Japanese soldier to the torture, and after he had 'endured pretty long,'[3] wrung from him an accu-
Feb. 11 sation against the English. His statement was signed by the unhappy man on the day of his torment, in direct contravention of the Dutch law[4] that one who had confessed under torture

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 871.

[2] Letter from Herman van Speult to Jan Pieterszoon Coen dated 15th June, 1622; and Coen's reply dated 28th October, 1622.

[3] Private letter from Van Speult to Governor-General Carpentier dated 5th June, 1623. MS. Dutch Records in the India Office, 1st series, vol. vi. No. 191.

[4] Dutch Ordinance for criminal procedure dated the 15th July, 1570.

should be re-heard to confirm it not sooner than 1623
twenty-four hours afterwards: '*ne durare adhuc tormentorum metus videatur.*'

Eight or nine other Japanese soldiers in the service of the Dutch, whose names he had mentioned, denied the plot, but were tortured[1] on that
and the following day, until a complete story of Feb. 12
treason was evolved. 'Wailing and weeping by reason of their extreme tortures with burning, they were carried by slaves to prison, for it was not possible of themselves to go on their feet.'[2]

The handful of English, ran the improbable tale, had solemnly sworn on New Year's Day to seize the fort upon the arrival of an English ship, or during the absence of the Dutch Governor, and had employed to corrupt the Japanese soldiers so unlikely an agent as a drunken barber, or barber-surgeon, Abel Price. This man already lay in the Dutch prison for threatening to set fire to a house in a frenzy of liquor. On February 15 he too was haled to the torture chamber, and made to 'confess whatever they asked him.'[3]

The English treated as ridiculous the story of eighteen men, scattered over two islands,[4] conspiring to take a fort from 200 Dutch and 300 or

[1] Jan Joosten, MS. volume, 'Java 2, Part III.,' 1628. The torture was also admitted by other of the judges before the Dutch Governor-General at Amboyna on 25th and 26th October, 1625.

[2] Statement by the steward of the Dutch factory, *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 871.

[3] Pamphlet i.: *A True Relation*, p. 5 (*post*, p. 393, note 2).

[4] At five factories on the islands of Amboyna and Ceram, viz., Amboyna, Hittou, Larica, Loho, and Cambello.

1623 400 native soldiers with eight Holland vessels in the harbour, and went about their business as usual. But Van Speult, now armed with the confession under torture of his prisoner the drunken English barber, seized our chief agent, Towerson, and the other factors at Amboyna, put them in irons, and swept in the whole English from the four outlying factories between February 15 and 23—just eighteen men all told.

Feb. 15–23

Of the extraordinary proceedings that followed we have six accounts by eye-witnesses. First, the Minutes of the Court, kept by the Greffier or secretary: minutes so irregular and incomplete as to call forth the censure of the Dutch Governor-General, and to invalidate them as a judicial record under the Dutch law. Second, the solemn dying messages of the victims written on the pages of their prayer-book or other furtive scraps of paper. Third, the statements of certain members of the Dutch Council at Amboyna who formed the Court, when called to account by the Governor-General at Batavia two and a half years later (October 1625). These admit the use of torture, passed over in silence by the Minutes, but state that it was slight. Fourth, the depositions of six Englishmen who survived, taken on oath before Sir Henry Marten, Judge of the Admiralty, in 1624. Fifth, the answers of certain of the Amboyna judges to interrogatories in 1628. Sixth, the statement of the steward of the Dutch factory, who also acted as interpreter during the trial. It was laid before Lord Dorchester and Secretary

Coke in 1629.[1] This man, George Forbis or Forbisher, a native of Aberdeen, and little likely to favour the English Company which persuaded James to cancel the charter granted to the Scotch, had long served the Dutch in the East, and was found on board a Dutch ship stayed by royal command at Portsmouth in 1627. He had continued in the Dutch service for two years after the trial. His declaration closely corresponds with the depositions of the English survivors. 1623

In my narrative I fairly consider all the foregoing materials, together with the pamphlet literature[2] which quickly sprang up. I have also checked the 'True Relation' from the depositions on oath.

[1] 13th November, 1629, *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 871.

[2] The chief contemporary pamphlets on the Amboyna tragedy are six in number, and to save space in references I cite them under the Roman numerals here prefixed to their several titles, namely:—

(i) *A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruel, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna.* This narrative was 'taken out of the depositions of six several English factors' who survived the trial, as delivered on oath before Sir Henry Marten, Judge of the Admiralty, supplemented by the testimony of Welden, the English chief agent in Banda at the time of the tragedy. The Privy Council in September 1624 gave their opinion that the relation was justified by the statements of the six witnesses. *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 620.

(ii) *A True Declaration of the Newes that came out of the East Indies, with the Pinace called the 'Hare.'* A Dutch pamphlet which appeared anonymously, and was thought by some to be the work of Boreel. The Directors of the Dutch Company denied the authorship, and, on complaint of the English ambassador, the States-General issued a proclamation declaring it to be 'a scandalous and senseless libel,' and offering a reward of 400 guilders for the discovery of either the author or the printer.

(iii) *An Answer to the Dutch Relation touching the pretended Conspiracy of the English at*

1623 That evidence consisted entirely of confessions wrung from the accused by torture. The ransacking of the English factories yielded not a single incriminating letter, or other corroborative piece of testimony.[1] The Dutch began with John Beaumont and Timothy Johnson. Beaumont, an elderly man for India and an invalid, was left with a guard in the hall, while Johnson was taken into another room. Presently Beaumont heard him 'cry out very pitifully; then be quiet for a little while, and then loud again.' Johnson long refused to confess, but after an hour he was 'brought forth wailing and lamenting, all wet and cruelly burnt in divers parts of his body.'[2]

One Englishman, Edward Collins, gave evidence according to the Dutch without torture. But the narrative founded upon the depositions of the surviving Englishmen on oath states that Collins was tied up for the torture, and the cloth put about his

Amboyna in the Indics, being a reply to No. ii. (the libellous Dutch *Declaration*) drawn up by the English Company and issued under its authority. These three pamphlets were published together by the Company in 1624 with a preface. A third reprint is dated 1632, and there were several subsequent editions.

(iv) *A Remonstrance of the Directors of the Netherlands East India Company presented to the Lords States-General .... in defence of the said Company touching the bloody Proceedings against the English Merchants executed at Amboyna.*

(v) *The Acts of the Council of Amboyna.* The official Court Record of the Trial and the confessions of the accused, as presented by the Dutch to the East India Company.

(vi) *A Reply to the Defence of the Proceedings of the Dutch against the English at Amboyna.* An answer to, and criticism of, Nos. iv. and v. These last three pamphlets were published by authority in London in 1632.

[1] Answer of Joosten, the Dutch officer who examined the papers. MS. vol. 'Java 2, Part III.'

[2] Pamphlet i.: *A True Relation*, p. 7.

throat. 'Thus prepared he prayed to be respited and he would confess all. Being let down he again vowed and protested his innocency,' but for fear of the torture asked them what he should say. This was not enough and he was tortured, but not being able to endure it long, he made a confession helped out by the Dutch prosecutor.[1] Collins himself confirmed this statement on oath and produced three witnesses who 'heard him many times roar very pitifully, being in the next room, and saw him come out, having no doublet on, his shirt all wet, his face swollen and his eyes starting out of his head.'[2] 1623

From February 15 to 23 the cruel process went on. According to the English statements, the prisoners, even while confessing under the torture, declared in the same breath that they were not speaking true. In the case of Collins, the 'fiscal' or prosecutor forced leading questions upon him, till one of the Dutch themselves exclaimed: 'Do not tell him what he should say, but let him speak for himself.' John Wetheral, having been four times tied up, they were at length obliged to read out to him the confessions of the other victims until the poor wretch merely 'answered yea to all.' He 'prayed them to tell him what he should say or to write down what they would: he would subscribe it.' John Clarke stood the ordeal so bravely that 'the tormentors reviled him saying that he was a devil . . . or a Feb. 15-23

[1] *A True Relation*, pp. 8, 9.
[2] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622-1624, par. 684. November 20, 1624.

1623 Feb. witch.' So they 'cut off his hair very short, as supposing he had some witchcraft hidden therein.'[1] They then went on with the torture—burning him with candles on the feet, hands, elbows and 'under the armpits until his inwards might evidently be seen.' The English declared that no surgeon was allowed to dress the sores 'until, his flesh being putrefied, great maggots dropt and crept from him in most loathsome and noisome manner.'[2]

According to the English accounts each confession was wrung forth by torture. The Dutch Minutes of the trial conceal the fact of torture at all, and so violate a fundamental rule of the Dutch criminal procedure. The members of the Amboyna council, who sat as judges, acknowledged on oath that twelve of the English were tortured by water and two of them also by fire, but stated that one (Beaumont) was only tortured a little on account of his age and feeble health. The judges also pled in their defence that the torture was in no case extreme, indeed of a 'civil' sort.

What it exactly amounted to we know from eye-witnesses. The accused man was hoisted up and tied spread-eagle fashion in a doorway. In the water torment 'they bound a cloth about his neck and face so close that little or no water could go by. That done they poured the water softly upon his head until the cloth was full up to the mouth and nostrils . . . till his body was swollen twice or thrice as big as before, his cheeks like

[1] Pamphlet i.: *A True Relation*, p. 11.

[2] *Idem*, p. 12.

great bladders, and his eyes staring and strutting out beyond his forehead.'[1] It was the slow agony of bursting joined to the acute but long-drawn-out agony of suffocation. In the fire torture, they held lighted candles beneath the most sensitive parts of the body: under the armpits, the palms of the hand, and the soles of the feet.[2] Emanuel Thomson, like John Clarke, it was said, had no surgeon to dress his burnt flesh, so that no one 'was able to endure the smell of his body.'

1623 Feb.

To the torture by fire and water, admitted by the Dutch, the English accounts add 'the splitting of the toes, and lancing of the breast, and putting in gunpowder, and then firing the same, whereby the body is not left entire, neither for innocency nor execution. Clarke and Thomson were both fain to be carried to their execution, though they were tortured many days before.'[3] But the Dutch admissions suffice.

Towerson, who steadily asserted his innocence, on being confronted with some who had confessed, 'charged them as they would answer it at the dreadful day of judgement, they should speak nothing but the truth.' The sufferers implored his forgiveness and declared all they had said was false. But, threatened again with torture, they reaffirmed their confessions. The spirit of the miserable little band was completely broken.

Even Van Speult felt that he might be going

[1] Pamphlet i.: *A True Relation*, p. 11.
[2] *Idem*, p. 11.
[3] Quoted *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, p. 397.

1623 Jan. too far, and for some days hesitated as to whether he should not remit the case to the Dutch Governor-General at Batavia. But the English President and Council at Batavia had, on January $\frac{10}{20}$, 1623, resolved to withdraw their oppressed factories from the Moluccas, Amboyna, and the Clove and Nutmeg Isles.[1] They had indeed thanked the Dutch President and Council for agreeing to bring them away in Flemish ships. Orders in this sense were simultaneously sent to our agents at Banda and elsewhere.[2] While the tortured men lay waiting their doom, two Holland ships arrived from Batavia, bringing the letter from the English President and Council ordering the withdrawal of our agency from Amboyna. 'Which letter was opened and read by the Dutch Governor while our people were yet in prison and not executed, and might well have secured him that there was no further danger to be feared of the English aid of shipping, whatever the English had through fear of torture confessed.'[3] The statement is confirmed by Van Speult's own admissions,[4] and it gives a darker shade to his resolve on instant judgment.

The public prosecutor was instructed to demand

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, pars. 238, 264, 595. Also *A True Relation*, p. 31, and *ante*, p. 393, footnote 2.

[2] India Office MSS., 'Java 3, Part I.'

[3] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622-1624, p. 398.

[4] Made the day after the execution 'that he had within a few days past opened a letter that came from the English President at Jacatra (Batavia) directed to Captain Towerson.' *A True Relation*, p. 31.

sentence. This, according to the Minutes, he did with irregular brevity—twenty-one lines of writing in all. According to the Dutch procedure, his requisition should have given a summary of the facts and evidence, which it did not. It should certainly have specified the separate names of the accused Englishmen, while it only contained that of Gabriel Towerson 'and his creatures and accomplices.' These were not the omissions of ignorance. The 'fiscal' who conducted the case was a lawyer,[1] and in his haste for condemnation, he set at defiance the safeguards of procedure which even the Dutch law prescribed. His demand was really the demand of Sieyes at the trial of Louis Seize—*La Mort sans phrase.* 1623 Feb.

On February 25, 1623,[2] the prisoners, with certain exceptions, were condemned to death. The English from outlying factories, who had not even been at Amboyna at the time of the alleged plot, were released; three others were allowed to draw lots for their life; and in the end the elderly Feb. 25

[1] 'Isaac de Bruyne, who has prosecuted as advocate-fiscal, calls himself a lawyer and was taken into the Company's service as such, should have shown better judgement in this affair. . . . We think the rigour of justice should have been mitigated somewhat with Dutch clemency (with consideration to a nation who is our neighbour) specially if such can be done without prejudice to the State and the dignity of justice, as we think could have been done here.' Despatch from the Dutch Governor-General and Council at Batavia to the Directors in Holland, dated 3rd January, 1624, India Office MSS. 1st series, vol. vi. No. 212.

[2] Or the 23rd February (1st ed. of *A True Relation*), for there are again discrepancies. The Dutch give the 9th March for the final pronouncement of the sentence, and state that the execution took place the same day.

1623 Feb. Beaumont and the terrified Collins were sent to give evidence at Batavia as 'men condemned and left to the mercy of the Governor-General.' Captain Towerson manfully proclaimed the iniquity of the proceedings. When ordered to indite a confession he wrote out a protestation of his innocence. The Governor gave it to the interpreter to read out in Dutch: 'which,' adds that officer, 'I could not do without shedding of tears.'[1] He had also to translate a dying declaration secretly written by Towerson in a Bible which he asked Speult to send to his friends in England—'which Bible after that time I never saw or heard mentioned.'[2]

Yet some last words reached the outer world. William Griggs wrote in his Table-book, which was secretly saved by a servant, 'We through torment were constrained to speak that which we never meant nor once imagined . . . They tortured us with that extreme torment of fire and water that flesh and blood could not endure . . . Written in the dark.'[3] Captain Towerson wrote much, but all was suppressed, except an unnoticed sentence appended to his signature to a bill of debt due from the English Company. 'Firmed by the Firm [i.e. signature] of me Gabriel Towerson now appointed to die, guiltless of anything that can be justly laid to my charge. God forgive them their guilt and receive me to His mercy. Amen.'[4]

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 871.

[2] *Idem*, pars. 554, 871.

[3] *A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruel, and Barbarous Proceedings against the English at Amboyna*, &c. Pamphlet i. p. 20. London, 1624.

[4] *Idem*, p. 20.

Samuel Colson imprisoned, with six of the others, on board the Dutch ships in the roads, wrote the following in his prayer-book and had it sewed up in a bed. 'March 5, *stilo novo*,[1] being Sunday, aboard the *Rotterdam*, lying in irons.' 'Understand that I, Samuel Colson, late factor of Hitou, was apprehended for suspicion of conspiracy; and for anything I know must die for it: wherefore having no means to make my innocence known, have writ in this book hoping some good Englishman will see it. I do here upon my salvation, as I hope by His death and passion to have redemption for my sins, that I am clear of all such conspiracy; neither do I know any Englishman guilty thereof nor any other creature in the world. As this is true, God bless me, Sam. Colson.' In another part of the book, at the beginning of the Psalms, he declared: 'As I mean and hope to have pardon for my sins, I know no more than the child unborn of this business.'[2] 1623 Feb.

On February 26 (English date) the prisoners were brought into the hall of the castle to be prepared for death. Captain Towerson was taken into the torture chamber with 'two great jars of water carried after him. What he there did or suffered is unknown to the English without, but it seemeth they made him then to underwrite his confession,'[3]—a confession of a plot so Feb. 26

[1] Corresponding to 23rd February, two days before the sentence if we take the English dates. In the first edition of the *True Relation*, *stilo novo*, in Churchill's *Collection*, *stilo veteri*.

[2] *A True Relation*, p. 22.

[3] *Idem*, p. 23.

1623 wild that, had it ever entered a man's brain, 'he should,' in the words of the English Company, 'rather have been sent to bedlam . . . than to the gallows.' [1]

Feb. 26 The condemned men still protested their innocence. 'Samuel Colson spake with a loud voice saying, According to my innocency in this treason, so Lord pardon all the rest of my sins; and if I be guilty thereof more or less, let me never be partaker of Thy heavenly joys. At which words every one of the rest cried Amen for me, Amen for me, good Lord. This done, each of them knowing whom he had accused, went one to another begging forgiveness for their false accusation,' under the torture; 'and they all freely forgave one another, for none had been so falsely accused, but he himself had accused another as falsely.' [2] Their last 'doleful night they spent in prayer, singing of psalms and comforting one another,' refusing the wine which the guards offered them, 'bidding them to drink lustick and drive away the sorrow.' [3]

Feb. 27 Next day, February 27 (English date), the ten Englishmen,[4] nine Japanese and the Portuguese

[1] Pamphlet iii.: *An Answer*, p. 18.

[2] *Idem*, pp. 24, 25.

[3] *Idem*, p. 26. The discrepancy between the Dutch and English dates almost disappears if we take it that the sentence was again read out on the 27th February (9th March) just before the prisoners were led out to execution.

[4] Captain Gabriel Towerson; Samuel Colson, factor at Hitto; Emanuel Thomson, assistant at Amboyna; Timothy Johnson, assistant at Amboyna; John Wetheral, factor at Cambello; John Clark, assistant at Hitto; William Griggs, factor at Larica; John Fardo, steward of the House; Abel Price (the drunken barber-surgeon); Robert Brown, tailor.

captain of slaves, were led out to execution 'in a long procession round the town,' through crowds of natives who had been summoned by beat of drum 'to behold this triumph over the English.' 1623 Feb. 27

It is not needful, after the fashion of that time, to accept as manifestations of divine wrath a 'great darkness' and hurricane which immediately followed, and drove two Dutch ships from their anchorage; or the pestilence said to have swept away 1,000 people.[1] The innocence of Towerson and his fellow-sufferers rests upon no such stories, whether false or true. The improbability of the enterprise, the absence of any evidence except such as was wrung forth under torments, the neglect of the safeguards imposed by the Dutch law on judicial torture, the dying declarations of the victims—suffice to convince any unbiassed mind that the ten Englishmen were unjustly done to death. This too, without insisting on the circumstance that would place Van Speult's conduct in the darkest light—his being on the outlook for conspiracies; or on the arrival of the English letter during the trial ordering the withdrawal of our agency from Amboyna; or on the existence of Dutch ships in the harbour which might even, if the shore prison were overcrowded, have carried the accused for judgment to the Dutch Governor-General at Batavia, or served for their confinement till his confirmation of the proceedings was obtained.

Van Speult took possession of our Amboyna and neighbouring factories; 'the poor remnant of the

[1] *A True Relation*, p. 30.

1623 Feb. 27 English' were removed to Batavia; and the great design for driving us out of the Clove and Nutmeg Isles was accomplished.[1]

When the news of the tragedy reached England fifteen months later—May 29, 1624—a cry of execration arose. The Company demanded justice. With English self-control it repressed irresponsible discussion by its members, and resolved, on June 16, to trust to the State 'to call for an account of the lives of the King's subjects.'[2] The Governor refrained from speech until he was assured of the facts, and it was not until July 2 that he brought the matter officially before a General Court of the Company.

1624 May

June

July

The first feeling indeed was one of incredulity at so abominable an outrage on innocent men. The King 'apprehended the fact to be so foul . . . he could not believe it,' and, when convinced, threatened to extort reparation from Holland.[3] At the Royal Council table 'sundry of the greatest shed tears.' But James had resolved to break with Spain, in wrath at the treatment of Prince Charles on his knight-errant quest at Madrid for a Spanish wife in 1623. War with Spain meant an alliance with Holland, whose twelve years' truce with Spain had also expired. Dutch envoys were,

[1] 'The nsatiable covetousness of the Hollanders,' as the English regarded it . . . 'to gain the sole trade of the Moluccas, Banda and Amboyna, which is already become the event of this bloody process.' *A True Relation*, p. 38. London, 1624.

[2] *Court Minutes* 16th June, 1624.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers* East Indies 1622–1624, pars. 463, 524.

indeed, at that moment in London negotiating a treaty of offence and defence. So the King and his Council dried their eyes, and the Dutch diplomats joyfully returned home, praising the goodwill of a monarch who had said not a word about 'the late accident at Amboyna.' Nor were courtiers wanting who blamed the Company for raising a difficulty 'when His Majesty had resolved to aid the Dutch.' 1624

Very different was the temper of the nation. On July 2, 1624, the Governor of the Company declared that assuredly 'God the Avenger of all such bloody acts will in His due time bring the truth to light'—'the unspeakable tyrannies done upon those unfortunate men, which is able to amaze the Christian world.'[1] They still hope that the King will help them; but their best comfort is that when man is at the weakest then God is strongest. On July 9 a General Court of the Company decided that unless justice were 'done on those Dutch that have in so great fury and tyranny tortured and slain the English,' the Company must wind up and 'fetch home what they have in the Indies.' A petition in this sense was voted to the King—'and according to his answer and proceeding the trade to stop or proceed.'[2] On July 11 they waited on the King in his bed-chamber with the memorial, together with 'A True Relation,' and received his promise of 'a speedy reparation

July 2

July 9

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 492, quoting the *Court Minutes*.

[2] *Idem*, pars. 496, 501.

1624 July 11 from the Dutch by the strength of his own arm, if they did it not suddenly themselves.'[1]

The cry for revenge had gathered a strength which not even James could resist. Chamberlain, the Horace Walpole of his time, wrote to the English ambassador in Holland that 'we should stay or arrest the first Indian ship that comes in our way, and hang up upon Dover cliffs' as many Dutchmen as had taken part in the outrage, 'and then dispute the matter afterwards. For there is no other course to be held with such manner of men, as neither regard law nor justice, nor any other respect of equity or humanity, but only make gain their God.'[2] The Company was believed to have collapsed. No man would pay in any money to it.[3] If the King would not help, it was wildly pro-
July 22 pounded at a General Court on July 22, to 'join with the Portugals and root the bloody Dutch out of the Indies.'[4]

The 'True Relation' presented to James on July 11 had touched the sentimental fibre in his weak nature. On July 16 he promised to make stay of Dutch vessels if satisfaction were not given, and
July 16 even offered to become himself a shareholder in the Company, and to allow its ships to sail under the Royal Standard.[5] This offer of greatness thrust upon it, the Company respectfully declined. The King meanwhile ordered his ambassador at The

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 503.

[2] *Idem*, par. 524, 24th July, 1624.

[3] *Idem*, Locke to Carleton, 24th July, 1624.

[4] *Court Minutes*, 22nd July, 1624.

[5] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 511.

Hague to demand satisfaction from the States-General before August 12, under threat of reprisals by hanging, or even 'an irreconcilable war.' [1] 1624 August

These were brave words, and if the Dutch Government had believed they would be followed by action, they might have proved decisive. For the outrage of Amboyna had come as an unpleasant surprise to the Dutch Company, and as a serious embarrassment to the Dutch Government. The Governor-General at Batavia spoke his mind as freely as he dared to Van Speult. The Company in Holland, while making the best case they could against the English claims for compensation, refrained from sending back Coen to the East, although they had reappointed him Governor-General in 1624. Members of the States-General openly expressed their disgust. The Prince of Orange wished that Van Speult with all his Council had been hanged on a gibbet before they began 'to spell this tragedy.' [2]

The States-General accordingly appointed de- 1624
puties to treat with our ambassador. But an English observer wrote that, although the King spoke valiantly, he could wish His Majesty would say less, so that he would do more. The Dutch deputies played on his irresolution, and the time allowed for redress expired. When at length, on
October 15, a royal warrant was issued for the October
seizure of Flemish ships, our ambassador at The Hague advised that this extremity should be

[1] Secretary Conway to Carleton, 19th July, 1624.

[2] Carleton to Secretary Conway, 22nd July, 1624.

1624 Oct. avoided, and the Dutch were somehow warned of the danger. In November 1624 the London Company officially informed the Lord Admiral that Nov. Holland ships were in the Straits of Dover, but they were allowed to pass unharmed.

The English Company was forced to realise that, in trusting to the royal support, it leant on a broken reed. In July it had demanded satisfaction under three heads: justice against the murderers, compensation for injuries, and absolute separation from the Dutch Company in the East. In October it despondently reduced its claims to the safe removal of the English from Batavia; the question of jurisdiction and Council of Defence; and the right to erect forts, and to be treated by the Dutch as allies and friends.[1] James would not fight, and the Dutch knew it. They were willing enough to accept the first condition, and allow the safe removal of the English from Batavia. But, while dangling before us a compromise, they would never surrender their sovereign jurisdiction in the Spice Islands or allow the English to erect fortifications. On 1625 March March 25, 1625, King James died.

By this time the facts were well known in England. A certain simplicity in Towerson's character gave additional pathos to his death. He had sailed on the Company's second voyage in 1604, and obtained his admission as a freeman *gratis* in recognition of long service. Eighteen chequered years brought him to the chief agency at

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, pars. 503 and 635.

Amboyna in 1622, with a salary of 10*l.* a month. Once indeed he had emerged for a moment. Having married the Indian widow of Captain Hawkins, he attempted for a time to make a figure not justified either by her position or his own. In 1617 Sir Thomas Roe, our ambassador to the Mughal Emperor, wrote that Towerson 'is here arrived with many servants, a trumpet and more show than I use.'[1] In 1620 we find him back in England vainly soliciting the command of a ship, and returning to the Archipelago along with other factors in 'the great cabin of the Anne.'

The contemporary records show that he had not 1622
gained caution with years. Arriving at Amboyna in May 1622, he became a close friend of the Dutch Governor Van Speult and gave him his entire confidence. In June of that year, as we saw, Van Speult was on the look out for conspiracies and asking the Dutch Governor-General at Batavia for leave to deal with them 'suitably, unhesitatingly, and immediately.'[2] In September Towerson, on the other hand, wrote to the English President at Batavia in warm terms of Van Speult's 'courtesies' and 'love.' He asks our President to send Van Speult a complimentary letter, together 'with some beer or a case of strong waters, which will be very acceptable to him.'[3]

[1] Roe to Kerridge at Surat, 18th December, 1617. India Office MS. Series, O.C. No. 578. Note to p. 33 of the *First Letter Book* by Mr. William Foster of the Record Department (I.O.), whose help I gratefully acknowledge. See also *Dict. Nat. Biog.*

[2] Van Speult to Jan Pieterzoon Coen, dated 15th June, 1622.

[3] Gabriel Towerson to the English President at Batavia,

The President and Council at Batavia saw more of the game. 'In such kind of courtesy,' they replied in December 1622, 'we know he is free enough, but in your main affairs you will find him a subtle man.' There was to be no beer or case of strong waters for Van Speult. On the contrary, 'be careful you be not circumvented in matters of importance, through his dissembling friendship.'[1] This warning they followed up next month by commanding Towerson and his subordinates to quit Amboyna. 'Prepare and make yourself ready to come away from thence with all the rest of the factors in the Dutch ship, except two you may leave there at Amboyna to keep house until our further order.'[2]

Meanwhile Towerson continued his unsuspecting course. On January 1, 1623, he gave his official dinner to the little English group at Amboyna—the regular New Year's Day party which was to serve the Dutch fiscal as a groundwork for the alleged conspiracy. How far any thoughts of seizing Amboyna were from the minds of the English may be known by the letter of our President and Council in March 1622 to the Company, desiring to retire even from Batavia; by Brockedon's petition in August 1622 for leave to return home, as he could 'live no longer under the

19th September, 1622, in the lately recovered Java MS. Series, No. 3, Part I.

[1] The President and Council at Batavia to Gabriel Towerson, 17th December, 1622, Java MS. Series, No. 3.

[2] The same to the same, 21st January, 1623, India Office MSS.

insolence of the Dutch;' and by the orders of January 1623 to Towerson and other outlying agencies to withdraw to Batavia with the English under their charge.[1] Towerson, 'a sincere honest and plain man without malice,' as one of the Amboyna free burghers and a servant of the Dutch Company described him,[2] discerned not the signs of the times, and the letter ordering him to leave Amboyna was intercepted by the Dutch Governor Van Speult. So he went to his death—'that honest good man Captain Towerson, whom I think in my conscience was so upright and honest towards all men, that he has harboured no ill will of any.'[3]

Such a character is pretty sure of sympathy from the English middle classes, always indulgent to sturdy mediocrity, especially of the jovial sort. The story of Amboyna gathered round his name, until it reached Dryden's version of a murderous plot by Van Speult against Towerson in revenge for his killing Van Speult's son in a duel.[4] In 1625 the legend was still a long way from this climax. But the last weeks of King James's life had been harassed by popular demonstrations. In February 1625, the Dutch living in London complained to the Lords of the Council that on the coming Shrove Tuesday they would be in danger from the fury of the people. Besides the pamphlets spread

[1] *Ante*, pp. 385, 386, 398.

[2] Jacob Bigwell, in the deposition before the Admiralty Judge, 1631. Java MS. Series, No. 2, Part III.

[3] Words of John Fardo. Java MS. Series, No. 2, Part III.

[4] *The Tragedy of Amboyna*, acted and printed 1673.

broadcast, a play was to be publicly acted setting forth the sufferings of the English; and a great picture had been painted, 'lively, largely, and artificially,' of their tortures and execution. The reins were falling from the old King's hands, and the Council gently admonished the Company not to exhibit this picture—at least till Shrove Tuesday be passed.[1]

1625 Next month, March 1625, Charles succeeded to the throne. The main business of our Ambassador at The Hague, Sir Dudley Carleton,[2] was to strengthen the alliance of Holland with England against Spain, and he groaned audibly over the new labours and awkward questions to which the Amboyna imbroglio gave rise. Charles, keenly resentful of his personal treatment when in quest of a wife at Madrid, was eager to send a fleet to the Spanish coast, and promised large subsidies to the Protestant league in the North. The Amboyna difficulty had to be got out of the way, and in
Sept. September 1625 Charles agreed to make no reprisals on the Dutch ships for eighteen months, and at the same time appeased the London Company by promising that if, by that time, justice were not done, he would proceed to hostilities.[3]

But before the expiry of the eighteen months
1627 Charles had quarrelled with his Parliament and found a war with France on his hands. The Dutch

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, pars. 61, 65.

[2] Afterwards Viscount Dorchester

[3] Treaty of Southampton, 7th September, 1625. *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, pars. 177, 494, &c.

were masters of the situation and they knew it. So far from their giving satisfaction for Amboyna, Coen went out as Governor-General for a second time in March 1627,[1] in spite of the protests of the English Company, who regarded his policy as the main source of their sorrows. When in April 1627, the States-General were reminded that the eighteen months had elapsed, they dexterously got the question transferred to the law courts, and offered to proceed by way of a legal prosecution against the Amboyna judges who had sentenced the English to death.[2]

Here they were on safe ground. Preliminary 1627
difficulties at once arose. The Dutch naturally insisted that the tribunal should be a Dutch one sitting in Holland. King Charles objected to his subjects being required to leave their country and prosecute before a foreign court beyond the seas. The feeling both in England and Holland was that, while the States-General would gladly have seen the matter settled, the Directors of the Dutch Company were so intermingled with the Dutch Government that no justice would be done.[3] Our protests against the re-appointment of Coen passed unheeded, and in August 1627 Carleton despaired of redress from a Government controlled by the votes of the interested parties, among whom 'one oar which holds back, stops more than ten can row forward.'[4] However, in September a tribunal of

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 417.

[2] *Idem*, pars. 430, 435.

[3] *Idem*, pars. 441, 465, 614, &c.

[4] *Idem*, par. 471.

Sept. 1627 seven Dutch judges was constituted, three from the High and four from the Provincial Council.[1]

Meanwhile Charles, with the rising tide in Parliament and in the nation against him, was anxious to keep the London Company his friends. In a moment of vigour, he stayed three Dutch ships off Cowes (September 1627) and held them fast for eleven months, although threatened with a Dutch fleet to bring them away.[2] The English Company declared that, if His Majesty let the Dutch ships go, it were better for the Company to abandon the trade.[3] But the fit of royal resolution passed, and the King, in sore straits for money, suddenly released the Dutch ships in August 1628: it was rumoured for a gratification of 30,000*l.*[4] In vain His Majesty tried to soften the blow by the unprecedented compliment of sending the Lords of the Council to a Court meeting of the Company to explain that the release was due to an 'extraordinary matter of State.'[5] The Directors of the Dutch Company gave out as far back as March 1628 that they had arranged for the release of the ships on the condition of their redeeming His Majesty's jewels.[6]

The Company now knew that, if they had little to expect from the Dutch tribunal, they had nothing to hope from the King. The Dutch also

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 484.

[2] *Idem*, pars. 494, 498, 507, 512, 528, 531, 535.

[3] *Idem*, par. 558, 12 November, 1627.

[4] *Idem*, pars. 699, 706.

[5] *Idem*, par. 684.

[6] *Idem*, par. 612.

knew it. In November 1628, His Majesty feebly suggested, in reply to the repeated demands of the Dutch for the English witnesses to go over to Holland, that the Dutch judges should come to England under a safe conduct—a proposal which merely furnished a good ground for further delay. A year later, having sunk into still deeper difficulties with the Parliament and the nation, Charles yielded to the demands of the foreigner, and sent over the witnesses.[1] But he tried to save his royal honour by explaining that he had never submitted to the jurisdiction of the Dutch judges, although he would prefer to receive reparation at their hands than by any other means. The English Ambassador must be present in the Dutch Court; the English witnesses must not be questioned on other articles than those on which they had already been examined in His Majesty's Court of Admiralty; the Dutch judges, when ready to deliver sentence, must inform the King of it, so that he might weigh and consider its import. The Dutch tribunal naturally refused to concede these points. The King had put not only himself but also the English nation in the wrong, and again the Dutch knew it. 1629

His Majesty struggled for a time in the meshes which he had woven around him. In December 1629 he insisted on reserving the final sentence either to himself or to a joint bench of English and Dutch judges, on the strength of the treaty of 1619. The Dutch quite truly rejoined that the treaty contained not a single article which implied

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, pars. 750, 874.

joint jurisdiction in criminal cases, but only in what concerned the joint defence and trade.[1] While the preliminaries were thus spun out from 1627 to
1630 1630, the six Amboyna councillors who were supposed to be on their trial figured as patriots to their nation. The English witnesses, still unheard, were sunk in debt to obtain food from day to day. They mournfully complained to the Privy Council that they have attended in Holland for twelve months, that they are now destitute and like to be cast into prison, whilst their wives and children
1631 perish miserably.[2] In March 1631, our Ambassador at The Hague reported that in the Amboyna business all is silence.[3]

It is doubtful, even if the Amboyna Council had been promptly and impartially tried, whether the London Company would have obtained substantial redress. It is certain that no Court administering the law then in force in Europe could have condemned the judges to death for the Amboyna executions. The two grounds which underlay the
1631 English contention were badly chosen. As a matter of fact, the Amboyna Council had exercised a lawful jurisdiction, and torture was not only allowed, but enjoined by the law which they were bound to administer. The Dutch Company's charter of 1602[4] empowered it to appoint public prosecutors in the name of the States-General for

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 877, and the volume for 1630–1634, par. 26.

[2] *Idem*, 1630–1634, par. 253.

[3] *Idem*, par. 149.

[4] Clause 35.

the conduct of judicial business in its fortresses beyond the Cape of Good Hope. The ordinances for the Dutch Governor-General in 1617 authorised him not only to execute all civil and criminal sentences, but also to delegate this function to the subordinate councils and proper officers of settlements at which the Governor-General and Council could not be present.[1] In 1619 instructions had been duly given to Van Speult to administer justice as Governor of Amboyna in civil and criminal cases.[2] They were further enforced by the Dutch Governor-General's express sanction to Van Speult in October 1622 to deal unhesitatingly with conspiracies.

A candid examination of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1619 shows that its jurisdiction clause referred only to questions of trade and joint defence, and left the criminal and civil jurisdiction untouched. Nor could the pronouncement of King James in 1623 seriously affect the issue, for the Dutch repudiated it as never having been accepted by (perhaps not even communicated to) their representatives.[3] The States-General consistently maintained their civil and criminal jurisdiction in their settlements throughout the Spice Archipelago. As a matter of fact, the English in the Dutch settlements had been steadily subjected to that jurisdiction, although they groaned under it, and

[1] Ordinances and Instructions for the Dutch Governor-General in Council dated 22nd August, 1617, clauses 7 and 8.

[2] Instructions of 4th April, 1619.

[3] *Calendar of State Papers, East Indies*, 1625–1629, par. 38

their very complaints to the Directors in London prove their practical submission to its most irksome forms.[1]

The general law of Europe at that time prescribed judicial torture as a proper and an almost necessary means for arriving at the truth. Dutch jurisprudence went so far as to declare that, in cases similar to that of Amboyna, a public prosecutor could only demand sentence of death on the confession of the accused. The judges therefore, after satisfying themselves by independent proof of the guilt of the accused, had to obtain his confession: without torture if possible, by torture if not. But the Dutch ordinances of 1570 provided safeguards against the abuse of this method, and insisted on *indicia sufficientia ad torturam*, or a reasonable presumption of guilt before the torture was resorted to.[2]

In England torture, although unrecognised by the common law, was employed in State trials by the Privy Council or High Commission Court in virtue of the royal prerogative. 'The rack seldom stood idle in the Tower,' writes Hallam, 'for all the latter part of Elizabeth's reign.'[3] Lord Burleigh defended its use as the accused 'was never so racked but that he was perfectly able to walk and to write;' and 'the warders whose office and act it is to handle the rack, were ever by those that attended the examinations specially charged to use

[1] *Ante*, pp. 380, 385–6.

[2] But vide *post*, p. 426, note 2.

[3] *Constitutional History of England*, by Henry Hallam, vol. i. p. 148, Ed. 1854. See Jardine's *Reading on the Use of Torture in the Criminal Law of England*, 1837, which, however, takes the extreme view of the lawfulness of torture 'as an act of prerogative.'

it in so charitable a manner as such a thing might be.'[1] 'In the highest cases of treason,' wrote Lord Bacon in 1603, 'torture is used for discovery and not for evidence.'

James I., perhaps less than any other English sovereign, had a right to complain of its use by the Dutch. As King of Scotland he had not only sanctioned torture in alleged cases of conspiracy and witchcraft, but had in 1596 authorised even a subordinate court—the Provost and Baillies of Edinburgh—to try rioters by torture. As King of England he had in 1605 racked Guy Fawkes, *per gradus ad ima*, and in 1615 the aged Puritan Peacham had been examined 'in torture, between tortures, and after torture.' In the same year O'Kennan was put to the rack in Dublin by commission of the King's deputy. In each one of his three kingdoms James had used torture, and he defended it with his 'own princely pen.'

Even such details as the Dutch complaint that John Clarke must be 'a devil' or 'a witch,' because he stubbornly refused to confess under torment, are reproduced in the English trials. On January 21, 1615, Lord Bacon condoled with His Majesty on the obstinacy of the mangled Peacham, 'whose raging devil seems to be turned into a dumb devil.' Lord Burleigh's defence of the rack on the ground that it was mercifully administered and that the

[1] Burleigh's 'Declarations of the favourable dealing of Her Majesty's Commissioners appointed for the examination of certain traitors, and of tortures unjustly reported to be done upon them for matter of religion,' 1583. Quoted by Hallam, *ut supra*, vol. i. p. 150.

sufferer was always 'able to walk and to write' afterwards, is an exact anticipation of the Amboyna judge's plea of the 'civil' character of the water-torture.

Yet if history must allow that the Dutch had jurisdiction, and that under that jurisdiction the use of torture was lawful, it must also declare that a grievous miscarriage of justice had taken place. It is admitted that the record discloses grave irregularities in procedure—irregularities so serious that if an appeal had been allowed they might have sufficed to quash the trial. How far they were due to the careless character of the record itself will ever remain undecided. There was certainly an absence of the *indicia sufficientia ad torturam*, or reasonable presumption of guilt, which would have justified torture under the Dutch law. The confession of the Japanese soldier which formed the ground of the whole proceeding was signed on the day of his torture in defiance of the Dutch ordinances of July 15, 1570, and it was attested by all the judges, although one of them (Wyncoop) was admittedly not in Amboyna on that day. The minutes make no mention of the witnesses being confronted with each other after torture, and of their reaffirming their confessions made under torture, as required by the Dutch law.

Above all, if the English statements on oath are accepted, the whole evidence from first to last was wrung forth by torture or fear of torture. If the Dutch counter-statements be preferred, the great mass of evidence was thus obtained. Of the two

witnesses not subjected to torture, according to the Dutch account, one, Edward Collins, swore that he had been tortured, and produced testimony on oath to his dismal outcries. The other, the invalid Beaumont, declared that he had only confessed after he had been tied up for torture, and that he repeated his confession at Batavia to save his own life after the death of the victims had placed them beyond reach of further harm.[1] The survivors consistently affirmed that the only evidence against them at their trial was derived from confessions under torture; confessions which, according to the English depositions on oath, were withdrawn after the torture; and which were solemnly affirmed to be false in the dying declarations of the sufferers.

It is not needful to assume that the Amboyna Council wickedly, and against their conscience, condemned the victims to death. Van Speult, as we have seen, was on the look-out for conspiracies, when he and his fellow-councillors were suddenly transferred into the judges of men who had been their keen trade-rivals and the great obstacle to the Dutch supremacy in the Archipelago. Among Eastern races the King or governor was both ruler and judge, and the early European settlements in Asia found themselves compelled to firmly unite all functions, executive and judicial, in the hands of one man or body of men. Cases inevitably occurred in which they were practically judges in their own cause; apt in moments of public danger or fear to

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, pp. 213, 305, 308, 311, &c.

bring their passions and preconceptions as governors to their seats on the bench. The Amboyna trial was such a case. It stands on the forefront of our history in the East as an example of the danger of combining the executive and the judicial authority in the same hands. That danger the English have striven to guard against by the separation of judicial and executive offices—a process commenced almost from the foundation of their territorial rule in India, yet only reaching its final stages in our own time.

But if we view with charity the cruel blunder of the Amboyna Council as a whole, it is difficult to extend to either the Governor or the prosecuting fiscal the benefit of the doubt. The fiscal, Isaac de Bruyne, appears throughout the records in a sinister light. Intent on obtaining a conviction, he constantly urged on Van Speult, and forced incriminating answers upon the witnesses till the Council itself had to interpose. His record of the trial was so irregular and incomplete as to render impossible a fair judicial review of the proceedings. On the face of the record as it stands, the accused were improperly condemned. Bruyne's conduct called forth the reprobation of his superiors at Amboyna, and in the English depositions he appears as 'the greatest adversary against the English.'[1] Whatever may have been Van Speult's own preconception as to their guilt during the first excited days of the prosecution, he can scarcely, after the seizure

[1] Java Series, No. 2, Part III., India Office MSS.; *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 871; *vide ante*, p. 399

of the English factory and the perusal of Towerson's correspondence with the English President at Batavia, have believed in the plot. But by that time he may have felt that he had gone too far to retrace his steps. Or he may have simply been one of those commonplace officials who jump to conclusions and then remain obdurate to facts. His interception of the letter from our President at Batavia ordering the withdrawal of the English from Amboyna, was only the last act in the suppression of proof of innocence.

The Dutch authorities themselves felt uneasy lest Van Speult should be examined as to his share in the business. On the expiry of his term of office at Amboyna, he had hardly returned to Batavia, when a rumour arrived of a ship in the Straits of Sunda bearing a joint commission from the King and States-General for the despatch of Van Speult to Europe. He was hastily sent off to the western coast of India, whence he proceeded with an expedition to the Red Sea, and died at Mocha, carrying his secret to the grave.[1]

Meanwhile the English, with their agents drawn in from the Spice Archipelago, and huddled together at Batavia, waited wistfully for redress from 1623
home. They waited in vain. News of the Amboyna tragedy reached Batavia on June 20, 1623.[2]

[1] Condensed from the statement of the steward of the Dutch factory at Amboyna. *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625–1629, par. 871.

[2] Java MS. Series, No. 3, Part II. p. 17, Consultations at Batavia. These MSS. were not available to Mr. Sainsbury, and they correct the date, December 1623, in his introduction to the *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies 1622–1624, p. xv.

At length, having suffered nineteen more months of insults and exactions, their ships dogged by Dutch vessels at sea and cut off from trade on shore, they resolved to quit 'this perfidious people,' and, cost what it might, to seek shelter elsewhere.[1] Some of them found refuge on the Indian coast,
1624 and in October 1624 the miserable remnant sailed to the unhealthy Lagundy islets on the south-east of Sumatra.

There, amid terrible privations yet stubbornly 'affiant of a happy plantation,' they renamed the little group Charles' Islands, and held out against fever and dysentery for eight months, dying 'like sheep infected' under the equatorial sun and rain.
1625 In May 1625 the skeleton survivors were so reduced as to implore the clemency of the Dutch, who in pity fetched them back to Batavia. The commander Verholt, be it recorded, showed them all 'care and courtesy,' although he himself and many of his crew caught the disease. Nor did Dutch compassion end with their bare deliverance. They received the rescued men with kindness and granted them a factory house at a moderate price: the Dutch Governor-General and our President, in an effusion of good feeling, exchanging chains of gold.[2]

1626 The Dutch had, in fact, accomplished the two fixed purposes of their policy—our expulsion from the Spice Archipelago and our complete subjection at their Batavian headquarters in Java. Their

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625-1629, par. 44.

[2] *Idem*, pars. 168, 255, 786, &c.

harshness had been deliberately designed to this
end, and, with the exception of Van Speult's judicial
slaughter at Amboyna, they had kept fairly with-
in their treaty rights. Their double object being
now achieved, they allowed their national good
nature free scope. But the access of cordiality
wore off, and the English soon became impatient
of the restraints which the Dutch thought them-
selves entitled to impose. In July 1627 we find 1627
our President Hawley bitterly complaining of the
treatment meted out to his countrymen.[1]

Their position was indeed an impossible one,
and the Company at home, sick of King Charles's
fair words, realised this fact. In November 1626 1626
it proposed to abolish its factory at Batavia and
to establish one under the protection of the
King of Bantam. In January 1628 these orders 1628
reached Batavia, and the English, putting the
relics of their property on board ship, sailed to
Bantam, where they were welcomed by the native
prince.[2] The sad fortunes of our Bantam factory, its
repeated reduction by the London Company to a
subordinate post, its blockades by the Dutch, and the
gradual but sure withdrawal of its trade to our settle-
ments on the Indian coast, belong to the next volume.
Its history may, however, be summed up in a single
sentence. As the executions at Amboyna proclaimed
the triumph of the Dutch in the Spice Islands, so
the fate of Bantam declared the supremacy of the
Dutch in the sea-approaches to the Far East.

[1] *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1625-1629, par. 461.

[2] *Idem*, pars. 373, 465, 573, 619.

1631 By 1631 all hope of judicial redress for the torture and execution of our countrymen at Am-
1633 boyna had flickered out. In 1633, and again in
1638 1638, Charles, urged by the despairing Company, reverted to feeble attempts at negotiation, with equal unsuccess.[1] Innocent Englishmen had been tortured and executed under the forms of a foreign law,[2] and for their slaughter redress could not be obtained either by diplomacy or by judicial proceedings. From the first, the Dutch were resolved not to yield, save to force of arms. As they had speedily discovered that James I. would not fight, so they gradually found out that Charles I. could not fight. It was not till the unhappy distractions of the second Stuart's reign came to their tragic close, and until the Dutch found that a real man again ruled

[1] Bruce's *Annals of the East India Company*, vol. i. pp. 318, 319, 323, 354, 350 (4to. 1810).

[2] An English writer, who is not a lawyer and who has spent most of his life in the practical duties of Indian administration, should speak with diffidence as to the forms of Dutch procedure in the early seventeenth century. I have, therefore, taken the precaution to consult a Dutch jurist, Dr. Bisschop, who combines accurate historical research with a judicial training. He states, and quotes Dutch legal authorities for his opinion, that in extraordinary proceedings, in which the accused were examined without witnesses being first heard, the confessions of the accused were necessary for conviction, and that torture could be legitimately resorted to in order to obtain such confessions. The Amboyna trial came practically under this category, and the evidence from first to last was obtained by torture. But the Dutch law recognised the danger of a miscarriage of justice arising out of confessions thus wrung forth, and it provided safeguards accordingly. These safeguards were explicit in form and essential to the validity of the proceedings. They were disregarded in the Amboyna trial, although the prosecuting Fiscal, in the words of the Dutch Governor-General and Council, 'calls himself a lawyer, and was taken into the Company's service as such.'

England, that they conceded to Cromwell, after war, what a little firmness might have secured at the outset to James.

At length in April 1654 the States-General agreed 'that justice be done upon those who were partakers or accomplices in the massacre of the English at Amboyna, as the Republic of England is pleased to term that fact, provided any of them be living.'[1] Cromwell brooked no delay. Within five months all claims and counter-claims arising during forty-one years had been examined. In August the general damages of 85,000*l.* were awarded to the London Company, together with 3,615*l.* to the heirs of the men done to death at Amboyna; and Pularoon was restored to English rule.[2] 1654

But this tardy justice failed to efface Amboyna from the English mind. The spectres of the tortured victims stood between the two great Protestant Powers during a century. The memory of a great wrong unredressed and of innocent blood unavenged embittered their trade rivalry, intensified each crisis of political strain, and furnished a popular cry for two wars. Dryden's 'Tragedy of Amboyna,' produced in the fiftieth year after the execution, has been not unfairly described as his one literary effort which is wholly worthless except as a curiosity. Yet it serves to show how the story deepened into a darker hue with age. 1623 to 1673; 1673

The opening dialogue between Van Speult and the Dutch Fiscal reveals their hatred to the English.

[1] Treaty of Westminster, 5th April, 1654, art. 27.

[2] Bruce's *Annals*, vol. i. pp. 489–491.

Van Speult's son, whom Towerson has rescued at sea, plots with the Fiscal against the life of his pre-
1673 server, and, after again being saved from death by Towerson, young Speult ravishes the Englishman's bride, and is killed by him in a duel. Van Speult, in revenge, invents the story of the plot. The victims are tortured on the stage; fiercely reviled by the Governor; and led off to execution. On his way to death Towerson breaks forth in a prophetic strain, foretelling the vengeance of his countrymen and the ruin and downfall of the Dutch. The characters are coarsely drawn from the 'True Relation,' the picture presented of the Dutch is grossly unfair. But it struck a chord of popular feeling, and responded to an antipathy which had hardened and set into a national tradition.

That tradition not only affected our internal and dynastic politics, but profoundly influenced the march of events in Europe. If Holland and England had been friends at heart instead of occasional allies by interest, the aggressions of Louis XIV. would have encountered a very different strength of resistance. Our Charles II. would scarcely have dared to remain the dependent of France. James II. would perhaps have shrunk from forcing a Catholic reaction on England. The memory of Amboyna wrought like a fever on the trade-rivalry of the two Protestant Sea-Powers. The friendship of France might mean Court corruption and Popery, but between England and Holland, as long as that bloody memory lived, there could be no real friendship at all. Politicians and poets

appealed to the middle-class hatred of the Dutch as against the middle-class hatred of Rome.[1] Amboyna is thus disclosed as one of the influences which lured on our Stuarts to the Revolution, and as one of the remote secret springs of the age of Louis Quatorze.

Nor had Amboyna less important consequences for the Dutch. The overthrow of the English in the Spice Archipelago and their subjection in Java, enabled the Holland Company to create a colonial system which for frank indifference to human suffering stands out in the history of European settlements across the seas. The fault was not the fault of the Dutch nation, but of the particular period when the chance of a great colonial empire came to it. The Catholic tradition of conversion by conquest, cruel as were its practices, had given place to the industrial idea of conquest for trade.

Neither Spain nor Portugal, with their record of blood in the Eastern and the Western worlds, nor England with her subsequent slave traffic, can afford to cast stones. But the comparative isolation of Holland in the East, and the absence of any strong native Power in the Archipelago like that of the Mughal dynasty in India, enabled the Dutch to work out the industrial idea of conquest to its logical results. The same isolation enabled them to perpetuate that idea, after it had been profoundly modified by a humanitarian awakening

[1] Dryden, like a docile laureate, strikes this note in the Prologue to his *Tragedy of Amboyna*, 1673:

The dotage of some Englishmen is such
To fawn on those who ruin them, the Dutch;
They shall have all; rather than make a war
With those who of the same religion are.

in Europe. It survived as a relic of a century when the Protestant nations of the Continent, wearied with religious strife, lost sight for a time of that spiritual brotherhood of man, which shot rays across the darkness of Portuguese misrule, and which had burned up afresh before the foundation of British territorial sway in India. Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the chief founder of the Dutch colonial system, became Governor-General in 1618 —the date taken by European history for the commencement of the Thirty Years' War.

Coen has left in his own words a detailed description of the fabric which he designed. The Dutch charter expired in January 1623, and on the 21st of that month the great Governor-General, as the last act of his first term of office, drew up his political testament for the benefit of his countrymen.[1] He realised that the sea-power of Holland in the Archipelago must rest on a territorial basis with a territorial revenue; the absence of which had drawn forth the Portuguese lament— 'We sit still, perishing without lands out of which to support ourselves or find shelter.'[2] Albuquerque discerned the same need a century before. But Coen deliberately worked out what Albuquerque had perceived, and, unlike Albuquerque, he was backed by a nation which loyally supported its great servants in the East.

[1] Instructions of Jan Pieterszoon Coen left with Peter de Carpentier, Governor-General, and the Council of the Indies. Dated Batavia $\frac{21}{31}$ January, 1623. *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, par. 243, pp. 97–101.

[2] Letter of Cosme Annes for the King, dated Cochin, 30th December, 1549. India Office MSS.

He cherished no illusions as to how such a territorial sea-empire was to be acquired and maintained. It was easy to bring the scattered islands under subjection. The problem was to people them with workers. The idea of settling Dutchmen and Dutchwomen in sufficient numbers, although it had its attractions for Coen as for the other colonising spirits of that age, he saw to be impracticable. He anticipated the conclusion which some of the European nations are only now reaching after long and cruel experience, that agricultural emigrants from the temperate zone perish in the tropics. The lands of the equator can only be tilled by equatorial races. The heathen whom the papal Bulls had given to the Portuguese for an inheritance, to be converted with a rod of iron or dashed to pieces like a potter's vessel, were to Coen merely a cheap labour-force. The 'in-gathering of a multitude of people from all parts to people our country withall' was his first object, and of far more consequence, he declared, than the buying of cloths and goods.

This object he proposed to accomplish by three distinct methods: the enslavement of conquered islands, the purchase of slaves from the African and Asiatic continents, and the seizure of slaves on their coasts. The first method needs but the single comment, that it went much further than the subjection of the native races enforced by the Portuguese. As regards the second, orders for the buying of slaves had been given in 1614: Coen resolved to carry them out on a large scale. 'Divers

fleets' were now to be sent to the Coromandel coast, to Madagascar, and the African seaboard, to purchase as many he and she slaves, especially young people, as could be got. This buying of slaves was to go forward before any other work, to the extent of 'many thousands, yea, to an infinite number.'

The third method, by seizure, was to be conducted by a squadron on the Chinese coast. The shore-dwellers, especially the women and children, were to be carried away for the peopling of Batavia, Amboyna, and Banda. 'Herein will be a great service done for the Company, and by this means will be found all the charge of the war.'[1] The Chinese he-slaves might be redeemed for 60 reals (£13 10*s.*) a piece. 'But by no means you must not suffer any women to return to China, or any other part out of the Company's jurisdiction, but with them to people the same.' As the Dutch supremacy firmly established itself, a fourth system of recruitment was added, by treaty provisions for a tribute in full-grown slaves.

The Dutch industrial system in the East, thus founded on the most rigorous forms of slavery, was eventually softened through successive stages of forced labour. It produced for a time enormous profits. A tropical soil was made to yield as it had never yielded before, and its fruits were monopolised by Holland. As respects European rivals, the restrictions which the Anglo-Dutch treaty still imposed on Coen, in January 1623, were removed by

[1] Abstract of Instructions: *Calendar of State Papers*, East Indies, 1622–1624, p. 100.

the tragedy of Amboyna in the next month, and by the withdrawal of the English factories from the Spice Archipelago. As regards native competition, the islanders were compelled to root up their clove and nutmeg trees, where they seemed to threaten the profits of the Dutch. The produce of the most fertile regions in the world, cultivated on the severest system of human toil, was secured to the Dutch and to the Dutch alone.

While Coen founded the colonial empire of Holland on the sure basis of the soil, he strengthened it by all the devices of a skilful administration—by a lucrative coasting trade with the African and Asiatic continents, by a great sea commerce with Europe, and by a well-planned system of tolls and local taxation. The rich island empire which he thus projected, he secured by fortresses, built and maintained by the cheap labour of prisoners and slaves. Coen stands out from among all men of European race in Asia, of his day; a statesman of the clearest vision, and an administrator of the firmest hand, half way between the Portuguese Albuquerque in the sixteenth century, and the French Dupleix, or English Warren Hastings, in the eighteenth. But he could not rise above the morals of his time, and his strong personality during a double tenure of office impressed the stamp of a cruel age on the colonial system of his country. His crime, or his misfortune, was that he stereotyped in Dutch India the disregard for human suffering which brutalised Europe during the Thirty Years' War.

Holland was the first European country to send a steady supply of really able men to the East, and she supported them by force of arms. James I. would not and Charles I. could not fight. The English East India Company was still a body of private adventurers for whose benefit Parliament felt by no means eager to go to war. In spite of the long list of lords and gentlemen who swelled the subscription book of the Company, in spite of the outburst of wrath and indignation which the news of Amboyna aroused in London; England had not yet learned to look upon her Indian trade as a national concern. Holland had: and she was willing to make sacrifices and to screen crimes, in order to maintain her position in Asia.

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